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ABSTRACT
My dissertation lays out some of the chief philosophical precursors to Jonathan

Israel’s Radical Enlightenment. It investigates the principal question of Will Durant’s The

Age of Voltaire: “How did it come about that a major part of the educated classes in Europe
and America has lost faith in the theology that for fifteen centuries gave supernatural

sanctions and supports to the precarious and uncongenial moral code upon which Western

civilization has been based?” The aim of this project is both broad and specific: the first is to
provide a general history of the philosophical precursors to the Radical Enlightenment up
until the early modern period, and the second is to highlight one of these precursors in
detail, which I do in the large Spinoza part. With the assistance of a great deal of

scholarship in philosophy of religion, history of philosophy, theological analysis, biblical
criticism, and historiography, my dissertation contends that the major philosophical

precursors against orthodox faith in revelation and for the Radical Enlightenment have

been derived primarily from several forces. I present some of the general arguments of
some of the pre-Socratics and Greek philosophers, especially Socrates and Plato,

emphasizing their rationalist and non-theological thinking. Then I point out how some of
this Greek philosophical literature led to new philosophical and theological elements in
some of the teachings of the Church Fathers, some of the medievals, and some of the

scholastics, up to the early modern period. The core of my argument, however, begins to

pick up steam at the Renaissance. With the Renaissance, the Scientific Revolution, and the

early Enlightenment New Philosophy, everything changes. Renaissance textual criticism of
vi

ancient texts leads to the beginnings of some genuine biblical criticism. The explosion of

naturalist-leaning explanations of nature via Copernicus, Galileo, Descartes and many

others in the Scientific Revolution leads many to wonder if God is needed. The rejection of

Aristotelian and Scholastic metaphysics by the New Philosophers, most notably, Descartes,
undermine what for many provided the philosophical underpinnings for the Church and

theology. And then “the most unkindest cut of all,” the revolutionary historical and textual

criticism of the Bible (by many early Enlightenment philosophers, especially Spinoza) which
utterly undermines and refutes Judaism and Christianity.

vii

PREFACE
I’m glad to be here. It has taken many years to get here. I started my studies in

philosophy at Hunter College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York in
the 1980s, but, due to countervailing circumstances, I had to leave New York and move

down to Florida. And that meant that I had to leave the Graduate Center. That hurt because
I wanted so much to have a career in philosophy and now that dream seemed to be snuffed
out. Not too long after our move down here, I was left with four small children to take care

of. By this time both my parents had died and the rest of my family and friends were in New
York.

Besides my enjoyment of and love for my children, I feared that my dreams for a

career in philosophy were over. There were moments in which I despaired of ever making

it back. Over the years, it sometimes seemed like a noose was around my neck because year
after year after year I couldn’t do what I wanted to do. I had some good jobs along the way,
but they were not what I wanted to do.

It has taken over 20 years to get here. I had to wait until my kids got on their own.

To make a long story short: Even though it has taken this long to get here, and that I won’t

have as long a career in philosophy as I had originally wished for, I’m thankful and very glad
to be here.

Since my college years I had planned to do my dissertation in epistemology. Yet in

the summer of 2008, with the professor of epistemology out of town, and wishing to earn
further credits, I asked the chair of the department, Professor Ariew, for a Directed Study
viii

course. But that would mean doing early modern philosophy with Descartes, Pascal,

Leibniz, Spinoza, and the rest – which I disliked because I had imbibed analytic philosophy’s
distaste of all philosophy that smacked of metaphysics, including from the great
philosophers of the 17th century.

At any rate, I threw myself into these studies to see what I could learn from them.

Every day I would go to the library, read all day till about 4:00 and then go to professor

Ariew’s office to discuss what I had read. He would discuss these issues with me for an

hour, an hour and a half, and sometimes two hours a day. Every day. All summer (and the

next summer and many times in between and since then)! By the end of that summer I was

so immersed in this work and so grateful that he took out so much time teaching me that I

decided to switch my dissertation topic. A student could not ask for a better professor. His

passion for his field is contagious. For me, Professor Ariew epitomizes the best in academia,
scholarship, and even humanity (though I think he would strongly disagree with this last
point).

Though the work before you might be considered too large (at least according to

some reckonings of how many pages a doctoral dissertation is supposed to be), I had hoped

to include much more in it. I am happy that I have completed the gist of this dissertation,

but I am disappointed as well, for I have done an enormous amount of study and taken an
enormous amount of notes for the purpose of writing a fuller history of the precursors to

the Radical Enlightenment. I also aspired very much to impress professor Ariew with my
knowledge of Galileo, Descartes, Pascal, Leibniz, and Spinoza.

I had hoped to include far more material in most of the chapters, especially the

chapters on the New Testament, the Renaissance, the Copernican-Galilean Revolution, the
Scientific Revolution’s drift to naturalism, the 13th century’s condemnations against

Aristotelianism, the place of Descartes, Pascal, and Leibniz as enlighteners and counterix

enlighteners, and last, but not least, a far fuller account of the Judeo-Christian repudiating

works of Spinoza (especially the Ethics and, even more, his Theological-Political Treatise). I

had even aspired to add chapters on Hobbes, Locke, and Newton! My eyes were bigger than
my stomach. As I say, I did the study for all these, and I have the notes for them, but I was
not able to put these hundreds of pages of notes in good writing order in time. Hence the
following “shorter” version of my work is the result. I will have to fill out the rest of this

history as time allows in the future.

Two last notes, which I think are needed to explain the large amount of scripture

quotes in this dissertation. The reason why I chose this subject for my dissertation was
because in my review and study of the secondary literature on the great early modern

philosophers, I noticed a glaring deficiency regarding explanations of the Church’s (the

“Counter-Enlightenment”) perspective of things. This same deficit is also apparent in the
best known historical studies on the Enlightenment. In fact, Jonathan Israel’s Radical
Enlightenment also acknowledges this deficit and calls for further work in this area.

One of the things I learned over and over again during the course of my research

was just how radically different the biblical world view is. In ontology, philosophy of mind,
epistemology, logic, philosophy of law, philosophy of government, philosophy of nature,

ethics, etc. the biblical world view is unlike anything that “unassisted” common sense or

ordinary consciousness of the world could fathom. And yet I have found some people who

disagree with my thesis that the New Testament is that radical, other-worldly, and

obscurantist. Because of this, it seemed to me then that I was forced to explain and justify
my case by making sure that I refer to many central scripture passages. Many more

scripture passages could have been referred to in order to support my claims, but I had to

settle for these so as not to turn this dissertation into a thesis on the Bible. Thus, I not only
had to do a great deal of research to make sure that I got the 17th century philosophers
x

right; I also had to do a great deal of work to make sure I got the New Testament teachings
right.

Though the title of this dissertation has to do with the “precursors to the Radical

Enlightenment,” to many, to call the Radical Enlightenment “radical” is something of a

misnomer. To their thinking, it is the theological world-view that is radical. As such, they

feel the need to stress this point because most people don’t know the degree to which
contemporary Christianity is ignorant of much of its history and the history of its

interpretation of the Bible. One is reminded of a powerful passage by the poet James

Russell Lowell on this issue: “Thoughts that great hearts once broke for, we breathe cheaply
in the common air.”
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“That which was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet possessed
has bled to death under our knives” – Friedrich Nietzsche

1

PART I

INTRODUCTION: RADICAL VERSUS RELIGIOUS ENLIGHTENMENT
"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times; it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of
foolishness; it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity; it was the season of Light, it was
the season of Darkness; it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair; we had everything before
us, we had nothing before us; we were all going directly to Heaven, we were all going the other way"
– Charles Dickens.

Introduction

To adapt Charles Dickens’ memorable opening lines from his Tale of Two Cities (which took
place in the late Enlightenment during the French Revolution) somewhat to the Radical

Enlightenment of Jonathan Israel: How did the west go from the age of faith to the age of

Enlightenment? From the devout believer’s perspective: How did Europe go from the best

of times (when much of Europe was Christian, e.g. Roman Catholic) to the worst of times

(when the Church was rent in many pieces and lost its hegemony), from the age of wisdom

(when the theologians held sway) to the age of foolishness (when deism and atheism gained

a hold)? How did western culture go from the epoch of belief to the epoch of incredulity,

from the season of Light to the season of Darkness? We had everything before us, and now
we have nothing before us. We were all going directly to Heaven, but now many are going

the other way.

How did Europe go from men whose lives were “looking forward to the city with

foundations, whose architect and builder is God” (Heb. 11:10) to men and women whose
2

lives looked only upon this world as their heavenly city (q.v. Carl Becker’s The Heavenly City

of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers)? How did we go from “The fool hath said in his

heart that there is no God” (Ps. 14:1) to the view that the God of religion represents only
“the relics of man’s ancient bondage” 1? How did we go from Jerusalem to Athens, from

Jesus to Spinoza, from the age of the miracles of the Bible to the age of the materialism of

Hobbes, and from a Christian culture to an “Enlightenment” culture? 2

In like fashion, the pages of the following study tell the tale of two cities, the City of

God and the city of man (as Augustine likened it in his The City of God). We will talk about
the two cities both from the perspectives of the City of God and the city of man, both from
the perspectives of the heavenly city of spiritual enlightenment and the earthly city of the
radical enlightenment. This is a tale of two enlightenments: the spiritual and the

unspiritual, the sheep and the goats, the good and the bad, the righteous and the wicked, of

believers and unbelievers. It is a tale and a history of the struggle between the two.

The question I wish to ask in this dissertation is similar to the question historian

Will Durant poses in the Preface to his Age of Voltaire. He asks: “How did it come about that

a major part of the educated classes in Europe and America has lost faith in the theology

that for fifteen centuries gave supernatural sanctions and supports to the precarious and
uncongenial moral code upon which Western civilization has been based?” 3 To put this

Baruch Spinoza. Theological-Political Treatise, translated by Samuel Shirley, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, 2001), 3.
2 Of course, as the Dickens’ quote wonderfully exemplifies, the historical periodization of “the Age of
Faith” and the “Enlightenment” is not so neat and tidy as the general construal of them seems to
suggest. In this study, however, we will be focusing on some clear differences in philosophy of
religion between the two periods and not their commonalities.
3 Will Durant. The Age of Voltaire: A History of Civilization in Western Europe from 1715 to 1756, with
Special Emphasis on the Conflict between Religion and Philosophy (The Story of Civilization IX (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1980), vii.
1
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more dramatically, how has it come to pass that “That which was holiest and mightiest of all
that the world has yet possessed has bled to death under our knives”? 4

The subject and plan of this dissertation
The following doctoral dissertation offers a general and selective history (or vignettes, if

you will) of the struggle between rationalism and theology from the Greeks to Leibniz, and a

more particular and thorough study of Spinoza, in relation to religion - especially against

religion. At the same time it offers partial accounts of some of the principal philosophical
precursors to the Radical Enlightenment. But to make clear what “precursors” and

“rationalism” and “theology” and “revelation” and the “Radical Enlightenment” are, we will

have to explain how we are using these terms. We will also have to discuss what the Radical
Enlightenment is primarily against (e.g. revelation [the Bible], prophecy, visions, theology,

miracles, the supernatural, animal sacrifice, faith, and so forth). This means that we will

need to juxtapose some of the work of radical and moderate rationalist enlighteners with

some of the work of orthodox and moderate religious enlighteners (or “counter-

enlighteners” depending on how you wish to interpret these terms).

My plan is to provide a sort of partial supplement to Jonathan Israel’s Radical

Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750 5, especially with respect
to explaining the “Counter-Enlightenment”, which he admits has not received much study
by Enlightenment historians. What we mean by this is that instead of merely referring to

4 Nietzsche, Friedrich, trans. Walter Kaufmann. The Gay Science (New York: Vintage Books, 1974),
181. See Appendix A for the full context of this passage.
5 Jonathan Israel. Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001).
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the “Counter-Enlightenment” or religious beliefs and theologies in general terms, we will

show the very specific roots of these beliefs and theologies from the sources, that is, from

the texts of revelation themselves. In this way, some of the central issues at stake will be

made clearer and readers will be at a better vantage point to judge what they think of this
revelation-versus-rationalism dispute.

By the “Radical Enlightenment” Israel means several things, which will be explained

in more detail below; but for now it may best be summarized as “the most dramatic step

towards secularization and rationalization in Europe’s history.” 6 Throughout this study we

will be using this term also to connote what is usually called “rationalism”, that is, a

philosophy or explanation of things that relies either completely or largely on “human

reason” and empirical or natural experience rather than on supernatural revelation and

religious experience.

But to tell this story within the scope of a doctoral dissertation, its range will have to

be delimited. This study will therefore limit itself to the following constraints: Firstly,

instead of delineating the whole story of what led to the Enlightenment (social, economic,
political, legal, technological, etc.), this study will focus on the tension between the

philosophical and the theological. Secondly, to accomplish this we can of course only cover

some of the texts in each of the periods from the Greeks to Leibniz. Thirdly, we will delimit

our scope by giving attention to aspects on this subject that have not been given much

attention to in contemporary scholarship in early modern philosophy (especially in the

English speaking world). Thus, as was said above, instead of merely referring to “CounterEnlightenment” or religious beliefs and theologies in general terms, we will point out the
specific texts from which these beliefs and theologies stem and show how they militate

against naturalistic or rationalistic thinking. Finally, the ultimate aim of this focus is to see
6

Ibid. vi.

5

how the development of this tension led to what is perhaps the most consequential aspect
of the Radical Enlightenment: the repudiation of Christianity and all traditional religion.

A summary view of the chapters and periods that will be covered in this study
According to western Enlightenment historians, the seeds of the European Enlightenment
ultimately stem from the ancient Greeks. It is with the Greeks then that this project of

tracking the precursors to the Radical Enlightenment will begin. From there we will see

how Greek philosophy is attacked by orthodox Jews based on the Jewish scriptures in the
Hellenic period, and then how it is attacked by Christians based on New Testament

revelation from the New Testament period to the Church Fathers to the medieval period.

With the Renaissance, something new under the sun occurs. Europe experiences a cultural
awakening thanks in large part to the translation of humanist, philosophic, and scientific
texts from the ancient pagan Greeks and Romans. The Renaissance seems to have

established a kind of beachhead for further developments which led to the Scientific

Revolution and the “New Philosophy.” 7

Finally, we will explore some of the key issues in the struggle between orthodox

theology and unorthodox philosophy in the writings of Galileo, Descartes, Leibniz, and

Spinoza during the early modern period. We give especial attention to Spinoza because he
more than any other philosopher of the period best represents the Radical Enlightenment.
All along the way, we will juxtapose religious enlightenment criticisms against

rationalist philosophy with the philosophical radical and moderate enlightenment

The “New Philosophy” (according to Jonathan Israel and many other historians of philosophy) may
be simply and generally characterized here as that movement in 17th century philosophy that
diverged from Platonic and Aristotelian scholastic views of the world to a more “mechanical”,
naturalistic, or materialistic way of explaining the world.

7
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criticisms – especially Spinoza’s - against the religious enlighteners. But before proceeding

to our chapter on the Greeks, we need to say a few words about the nature and meaning of

the Enlightenment and then about the nature and meaning of what Jonathan Israel calls “the
Radical Enlightenment.”

7

Chapter One
Defining the “Enlightenment”
“That which was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet possessed
has bled to death under our knives” 8

Introduction: Defining the “Enlightenment”:
The need for clarity on the use of this term
Because one cannot assume that all readers will know what the Enlightenment and the

Radical Enlightenment are, it is necessary to provide at least some explanation of both, and
of the forces opposed to them, e.g. the “Counter-Enlightenment.” After all, how can one

appreciate an account of the precursors to the Radical Enlightenment if one is not clear on

what the Radical Enlightenment itself was? In fact, most people not only do not know what
the Radical Enlightenment was, but they have never even heard of it.

It turns out that the problem of understanding the Enlightenment is more difficult

than what even many historians have recognized. In the preface of his Enlightenment

Contested, Jonathan Israel tells his readers that “there still remains great uncertainty, doubt,
and lack of clarity about what exactly the Enlightenment was.” 9 Even “in recent decades”,

Israel explains, “both the friends and foes of the Enlightenment are arguing about a

historical phenomenon which … continues to be very inadequately understood and

Spoken by Friedrich Nietzsche in the famous passage in which he announces to the world that “God
is dead.” I take it (and so do Nietzsche scholars) that this passage metaphorically encapsulates
Nietzsche’s history of precursors to the repudiation of Christianity (which, for our study, is called the
Radical Enlightenment). Friedrich Nietzsche. Translated by Walter Kaufman. The Gay Science (New
York: Vintage Books, 1974), 181, section 125. For the full context of this quote see Appendix A.
9 Jonathan Israel. Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man
1670-1752 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), v.
8
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described.” 10 One may take this as a polite way of saying that even those who think they

know what the Enlightenment is all about often do not get it quite right. As a consequence
of their assumed knowledge, many supporters and detractors of the Enlightenment often
talk at cross-purposes on this subject.

The first thing that we need to do, therefore, before giving our account of the

precursors to the Radical Enlightenment, is to try to get clearer on the meaning of the terms

“Enlightenment”, “Radical Enlightenment” and “Counter-Enlightenment.” As in many

technical terms in the study of the history of philosophy, these terms are actually quite
complicated and therefore need some space to explain them.

Defining the “Enlightenment”: first definition
What is the definition of “Enlightenment”? How should the Enlightenment be defined? The
short answer to these questions is: “It all depends on who is doing the defining.” For

anyone who has read in the literature, the “Enlightenment” has been defined or explained in
many different ways. Various historians and philosophers interpret it differently. It would
be very useful, therefore, if we could come to at least some agreed understanding of these
key terms.

Standard dictionaries typically give at least two general definitions of the term

“Enlightenment”: one of them usually having to do with an 18th century movement in

philosophy that relies on reason, and the other a religious meaning of the term that relies on
God (we will take up this definition below). In this Introduction, we will treat both

10 Ibid. See also Roger Ariew’s “Modernity” for further insights into the problems and blurring of the
lines of what are usually taken to be essential characteristics of modernity. Roger Ariew,
“Modernity,” Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, ed. R. Pasnau (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), 114-126.
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definitions along with new contributions to our understanding of the Enlightenment from
Jonathan Israel and other Enlightenment historians.

The first dictionary definition of “Enlightenment” typically goes something like this:

“Enlightenment: A philosophic movement of the 18th century marked by a rejection of

traditional, social, religious, and political ideas and an emphasis on rationalism.” 11 A couple

points need to be said about the accuracy of this definition right from the outset. First,

Jonathan Israel’s work argues for (and to my mind conclusively proves) that the

Enlightenment really began in the mid-seventeenth century and did not commence in the

18th century as so many dictionaries and histories of the Enlightenment would have it. And
second, Israel does more than change the traditional dating scheme for the Enlightenment.
In order for us to better understand this period (and of comparable enlightenment

movements in other times and places), he argues that it is necessary to distinguish between
at least two Enlightenments. This is so especially with respect to the early modern
European Enlightenment.

One should not think that there was only one Enlightenment, as Peter Gay’s 1966

classic, two-volume work on the Enlightenment claimed. Instead, Israel argues, “From the
outset [of] the late seventeenth century, there were always two enlightenments”, a

“moderate enlightenment” and a “radical enlightenment.” 12 Contrary to Gay’s ground

breaking work, Israel argues that “conceptually, there were always two – and could never
have been ‘only one Enlightenment’ – because of the basic and ubiquitous disagreement

about whether reason alone reigns supreme in human life or whether philosophy’s scope must
be limited and reason reconciled with faith and tradition.” 13 Whether “reason alone reigns

supreme in human life” is part of the position of the radical enlightenment (which Spinoza,

11 Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/enlightenment.
12 Enlightenment Contested, op. cited, 11.
13 Ibid. 10.
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for example, exemplifies); whether “philosophy’s scope must be limited and reason

reconciled with faith and tradition” is the position of the moderate enlightenment (which
Leibniz, for example, exemplifies).

This distinction between the moderate and radical enlightenment is extremely

helpful for gaining a greater insight into the dynamics of the 17th and 18th century

Enlightenment (as it is for other enlightenment movements in history, as we will see).

Without this dual Enlightenment distinction in mind, confusion about how to understand
the Enlightenment is bound to result.

Take another historian’s work on the Enlightenment besides the aforementioned

Peter Gay, for instance. For R. G. Collingwood the Enlightenment is defined as “that

endeavour, so characteristic of the early eighteenth century, to secularize every department
of human life and thought. It was a revolt not only against the power of institutional

religion but against religion as such.” 14 If this definition is sufficient, then we are left with a
serious problem. Someone knowledgeable about the Enlightenment might retort to the

characterization of the Enlightenment by Gay and Collingwood as wholly secular and antiChristian by asking:”If your characterization of the Enlightenment as wholly secular and

anti-Christian is true, than how is it that so many Christians created the Enlightenment?

How is it that many Christians campaigned for an Enlightenment in philosophy, science,

government, law, and so on? Descartes, Leibniz, Mersenne, Malebranche, Locke, Newton,
and many others were all in some shape or form, Christians, and they labored for a more
enlightened world, and one emancipated from excess superstitions and unprofitable
thinking inherited from the medieval world. How should we explain this apparent
contradiction?

14

R. G. Collingwood. The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Revised Edition, 1993), 76.
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I think that the best way to answer this question is as follows. First, only the radical

elements of the Enlightenment are patently wholly secular and anti-Christian; and second,

some of the moderate enlighteners (such as Descartes) in some respects unknowingly led to
further secular and radical

Defining the war between moderate Enlightenment, radical
Enlightenment, and the counter-enlightenment
Before discussing the second typical dictionary definition of the term “Enlightenment”, we
need to say a few more words about the Enlightenment’s dual, and indeed “triangular”,

nature because of its centrality in Israel’s account. This is important to note because, as

Israel argues, “from its first inception, the Enlightenment in the western Atlantic world was

always a mutually antagonistic duality… the ceaseless internecine strife within it – between

moderate mainstream and Radical Enlightenment – is much the most fundamental and
important thing about it.” 15 Since this is so, Israel contends that

Neither the historian nor the philosopher is likely to get very far with discussing
‘modernity’ unless he or she starts by differentiating Radical Enlightenment from
conservative – or as it is called in this study – moderate mainstream Enlightenment.
For the difference between reason alone and reason combined with faith and
tradition was a ubiquitous and absolute difference ... ‘modernity’ is the richly
nuanced brew which arose as a result of the ongoing conflict between these two
enlightenments, but also (or still more) between both these enlightenments, on the
one hand, and, on the other, the successive counter-enlightenments. 16
In essence then, the Enlightenment was a tripartite war, or what Israel calls a

“triangular battle of ideas”: “In this triangular battle of ideas what was ultimately at stake
was what kind of belief system should prevail in Europe’s politics, social order, and

institutions, as well as in high culture and, no less, in popular attitudes.” 17 Put more
Enlightenment Contested, 10.
Ibid. 11.
17 Ibid.
15
16
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succinctly, what was at stake in this triangular battle of ideas was nothing less than the fate
of God.

This war, than, was not only waged by the Counter-Enlightenment (i.e. orthodox or

traditional Christianity in government, the schools, and the pulpit) against the radical

enlightenment. The moderates also saw the radicals as a grave threat against the truth and
against a moral culture: “Frequently, the moderate mainstream were consciously, even
desperately, reacting to what was widely perceived as the massively dangerous threat

posed by radical thought.” 18 But the moderate proponents of the Enlightenment were also

battling the Counter-Enlightenment and vice versa:

Down to the 1750s the principal luminaries of the moderate Enlightenment were
uninterruptedly battling on several different fronts simultaneously. Divided among
themselves into three main separate factions contending for the middle ground,
they were at the same time engaged in fending off traditionalists on one flank and
radicals on the other. Hence it became a typical feature of intellectual conflict that
moderates endeavoured to shield themselves against conservatives by stressing,
even exaggerating, the gulf dividing them from the universally reviled and abhorred
radicals while, simultaneously, traditionalists sought a tactical advantage, in their
public discourse, by minimizing the gap separating the latter from the moderates as
much as possible. 19
Israel also makes the case several times that the Counter-Enlightenment actually

helped the Radical Enlightenment because the Counter-Enlightenment attacked the

inconsistencies and contradictions in the moderate mainstream Enlightenment:

For [the moderate mainstream Enlightenment] was always fatally hampered by its
Achilles heel, namely that all its philosophical recipes for blending theological and
traditional categories with the new critical-mathematical rationality proved flawed
in practice, not to say highly problematic and shot through with contradiction.
Cartesian dualism, Lockean empiricism, Leibnizian monads, Malebranche’s
occasionalism, Bishop Huet’s fideism, the London Boyle Lectures, Newtonian
physico-theology, Thomasian eclecticism, German and Swedish Wolffianism, all the
methodologies of compromise presented insuperable disjunctions and difficulties. 20

Radical Enlightenment, 6.
Radical Enlightenment, 12.
20 Ibid. 11.
18
19
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The radical enlighteners eschewed these dualisms and saw them as rationalizations

and cowardly adjustments. They traced their genealogy from the “Presocratics through

Epicurus, the Stoics, Strato the naturalist, and Machiavelli and then on to Spinoza, Bayle,

Fontenelle, Diderot, d’Alembert, Helvetius, d’Holbach, and Condorcet.” 21 Thus they judged
moderate enlighteners such as Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, and Newton as not going
far enough. But there was a problem: at this time the radicals could not win their case
against the moderates: “During the eighteenth century, moderate mainstream

Enlightenment with its insistence on reconciling reason and religion and support for
(modernized) monarchy, aristocracy, and ecclesiastical authority was culturally and

politically preponderant in much of the western Atlantic world.” 22 Put more succinctly: “Of

the two enlightenments, the moderate mainstream was without doubt overwhelmingly
dominant in terms of support, official approval, and prestige practically everywhere.” 23

Ibid. 38.
Enlightenment Contested 38. See also 43.
23 Ibid. 11.
21
22
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The Counter Enlightenment and its definition of “Enlightenment” 24
The Counter-Enlightenment
The moderate mainstream Enlightenment was the most powerful and popular during the
early years of the 17th century, but this would not last, for “in the end it failed, or at least

was thwarted, being unable to overcome its own internal intellectual inconsistencies and
contradictions.” (We take up the issue of its failure and the successes of the Radical

Enlightenment in the next section of this introduction, The Meaning and Triumphs of the

Radical Enlightenment). The moderate mainstream also lost ground because of “Counter-

Enlightenment attacks showing the pitfalls of mixing faith with reason, and Scripture with
philosophy.” 25 The end result of this interplay is ironic.

Rather paradoxically, then, radical thought was powerfully aided in the work of
secularizing western thought, culture, politics, and society, by its greatest enemy –
the Counter-Enlightenment, the very grouping which most denounced it … The
[Counter-Enlightenment] vigorously encouraged popular faith-based hostility to
‘philosophy’, proclaiming the power and sanctity of tradition; but by attacking
reason and extolling the simple faith of the masses, such anti-philosophie harshly
polarized matters in a way which often played straight into the hands of their
radical foes. 26

24 Israel uses the term “Counter-Enlightenment” to express “the tremendous power of the traditional
counter-offensive, a veritable ‘Counter-Enlightenment’” unleashed against the Radical and even
Moderate Enlightenment movements (Radical Enlightenment 7). But it should be pointed out here
that there are other “counter-enlightenments” very different from the orthodox, conservative, or
fundamentalist religious beliefs. Jonathan Israel’s 2010 A Revolution of the Mind: Radical
Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy mentions that there have been
“various Counter-Enlightenment movements … from the mid-seventeenth century down to the
crushing of Nazism, the supreme Counter-Enlightenment, in 1945” (xi). But there is one CounterEnlightenment that Israel particularly takes to task (in his 2006 Enlightenment Contested). This
counter-enlightenment has some diverse interpretations (such as from various Romantics or from
Isaiah Berlin), but since the 1960’s it is usually known by contemporary terms such as “postenlightenment” or “postmodernism.” Because this movement lies outside the focus of this
dissertation, we cannot discuss it in any great detail here. Having said that however, we should
admit that no contemporary analysis of the Enlightenment can be considered well-informed without
at least some knowledge of this counter-enlightenment. Because of this, we refer the reader
therefore to Appendix B at the end of this study, which gives a general account of some of the
meanings of “post-enlightenment” or “postmodernity” in relation to the Enlightenment and
modernity.
25 Ibid. 38.
26 Ibid. 38.
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The Counter-Enlightenment movement (since the inception of Christianity by Jesus

and his followers) has usually reacted hostilely against any changes or differences from the

gospel and teachings that they believe God revealed to them: “I am the way and the truth
and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me,” says Jesus (Jn. 14:6).

Christianity is extremely exclusivist. The apostle Paul made this patently clear when he laid

down the following dogma.

But even if we or an angel from heaven should preach a gospel other than the one
we preached to you, let him be eternally condemned. As we have already said, so
now I say again: If anybody is preaching to you a gospel other than what you
accepted, let him be eternally condemned! (Gal. 1:8-9).

There have always been those in the ranks of the religious who have rejected

philosophy and rationalism altogether in favor of faith, piety, and submission to God. While
the moderate or liberal strains of Christianity are committed to harmonizing revelation and
philosophy, the radicals reject revelation, and the obedient counter-enlightenment

condemn both the radicals’ rejection and the moderates’ compromises. And indeed they
must, for the scriptures, which they believe to be the very oracles of God, explicitly state

that they ought to reject all such compromises with the world and philosophy. As the New

Testament emphatically puts it:

Do not be yoked together with unbelievers. For what do righteousness and
wickedness have in common? Or what fellowship can light have with darkness?
What harmony between Christ and Belial? What does a believer have in common
with an unbeliever? What agreement is there between the temple of God and idols?
(2 Cor. 6:14-16).

This attitude is dutifully followed in the next generation of the Church Fathers, some of

whom received an excellent pagan and philosophical education. To take only one example:

In the spirit of the New Testament texts just cited above, Tertullian, proclaims:

“What likeness is there between the philosopher and the Christian, the disciple of
Greece and the disciple of heaven, the trader in reputation and the trader in
salvation, the doer in words and the worker of deeds, the builder up and destroyer
16

of things, the friend and the enemy of error, the corrupter and the restorer and
exponent of truth, its thief and its guardian?

And again:

What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the
Academy and the Church? What between heretics and Christians? … Away with all
the attempts to produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic
composition! We want no curious disputation after possessing Jesus Christ, no
inquisition after enjoying the gospel! With our faith we desire no further belief. 27
We will see this characteristic attitude throughout our study which we will take us

from the ancient Greeks to 18th century Europe. Thus, even in the midst of the 17th and 18th
century European Enlightenment, many thinking Christians came to realize that “a

philosophical accommodation of reason and faith” was futile. This pattern (in which

thinking Christians and Jews tried to reconcile biblical teachings with the new findings in
the sciences, textual criticism, and the new philosophy only to realize that this was

impossible) played out again and again in these centuries. This turn away from reason to
exclusive faith happened to all sorts of educated men throughout Europe. It happened to

the philosophically trained Albert Burgh. It happened to the great geologist Nicolas Steno.
And, of course, it happened also to many of the century’s greatest theologians.

Take Huguenot theologian Isaac Papin (1657-1709), for instance. He was originally

an “ardent champion of reason and toleration.” He “explored every path towards a
philosophical accommodation of reason and faith”, [but] in the end, after years of

peregrination …, he abandoned such research as self-defeating and hopeless, turning his
back on reason and toleration alike.” 28

Or take Bishop Pierre-Daniel Huet: “Despite having, in earlier years, been a zealous

Cartesian himself and converted others … to that philosophy”, he eventually turned away

from it and began attacking Cartesianism.
27
28

William Barclay. Educational Ideals in the Ancient Word (London: Collins, 1961), 205.
Enlightenment Contested, 39.
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The root cause of the spiritual malaise gripping France, the ‘sickness’ of the age [as]
he calls it, was, according to his diagnosis, the insidious and growing tendency to
subordinate Revelation to reason, an impulse deriving from Descartes and
culminating in ‘Benedictus Spinoza, the author of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus
… that horrible and sacrilegious book full of impiety, ignorance and madness’.
Cartesian ‘reason’, he urges, leads directly and inevitably to the triumph of Spinoza
and therefore the ruin of everything. 29
One simply cannot properly understand the Radical Enlightenment unless one also

learns what the Radical Enlightenment was fighting against and seeking to replace. Indeed,
in most respects, many of the teachings of the Radical Enlightenment have their origins in
this very reaction. Therefore, the student of the Enlightenment who does not accurately
understand Christianity will not accurately understand the Radical Enlightenment.

One last word here about the Counter-Enlightenment before delineating their

definition of “Enlightenment” and then concluding this Introduction with an account of the

Radical Enlightenment’s triumphs. From his almost exhaustive research into the history of

the Enlightenment, Jonathan Israel makes a curious claim about the Counter Enlightenment.
He says that the “Counter-Enlightenment has been little studied by historians.” 30 This is an

interesting thing to say because the various published histories of the Enlightenment have a
lot to say about the Counter-Enlightenment. How can they not say a lot about the CounterEnlightenment since the Radical Enlightenment stems from, or is a reaction against, the
Counter-Enlightenment? How is it that they can say so much about it without having
studied much about it?

Based on my research on this subject, I think I understand what Israel means here. I

think he is implying that Enlightenment historians and historians of the philosophy of this
period both focus (and therefore most study) about the new guys on the block, that is, the
moderate and radical enlighteners of the 17th century. They are not as interested in the
religious thinkers of the day. After all, aren’t the religious people saying what they’ve
29
30

Radical Enlightenment, 487.
Counter Enlightenment, 38.
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always been saying since Christianity’s beginning 1600 years ago from then? While the

hero of their studies (philosophers like Leibniz or Malebranche) do not bifurcate between

religion and philosophy to the extent of not allowing theology to enter into one’s

philosophizing, contemporary historians tend to do just this. Each of the great early

modern philosophers (Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes, Pascal, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Newton)
all knew, published, and dealt in detail with Christian theology and biblical interpretation.

While making many general pronouncements about the Counter-Enlightenment in

their works, some contemporary scholars nevertheless bypass several important details

(for example, specific details on such matters as the ultimate causes and motivations of the
Counter-Enlightenment; why they have censured and persecuted those who with different
opinions; why doubting is considered sinful; why toleration is unacceptable). It might be

that they assume that most people know the answers to these questions. Upon closer

inspection however, this is often not the case. Many people do not know why the Church

censored, persecuted, excommunicated, jailed, and even burnt to the stake its opponents.

The neglect of expounding the nature of the Radical Enlightenment’s enemy occurs,

I believe, for a number of reasons, including what the Radical Enlightenment itself has
caused (that is, its pervasive secularization of not only government and law, but of

education, as well). For now, let only a couple points suffice. (I will take this issue up in
more detail in other sections of this study.) In our 21st century world, most people are

educated in secular institutions of learning. Consequently, students are no longer publically
taught to believe or study the Bible or Church history as in the early modern period. As a

result, many Enlightenment scholars and historians of philosophy are simply not as

educated or trained in the things of Christianity as the 17th and 18th century Enlightenment
proponents and opponents were – especially regarding scripture and theology.
19

The status of the Eucharist or the Trinity is no longer a living issue for many

academics today as it most certainly was for those during much of the Enlightenment.

Contemporary scholars are understandably more interested in issues closer to their field in
contemporary philosophy, for instance. (But how can one competently judge Hobbes’s

Leviathan or Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise, which are literally filled with scriptural
and theological argumentation, unless one knows the scriptures and theology well?) I make
it a point in this dissertation to deal with this deficit by addressing the various CounterEnlightenments’ positions not only in general, wide-sweeping summations, but from

multiple, specific, and documented sources from their own scripture, church fathers, and
key theologians throughout their history up until the Radical Enlightenment.

Now that we have said something about the Counter-Enlightenment, let us see how

they define “Enlightenment.” We will find that it is upon this rock that they base their

claims. It is the foundation upon which Christianity was founded and continues.
Defining “Enlightenment”: second definition

The second dictionary definition of “Enlightenment” is very different from the first.

The second definition that dictionaries usually give to explain “Enlightenment” is one which

does not refer to philosophy or to any particular century, but rather to spiritual revelation
and transformation. This older understanding of the term is religious. The religious

meaning of enlightenment is something that the divine does in one’s soul and not something
that the devotee gains through any kind of pure or secular reasoning. As one New

Testament recipient of some of the highest levels of enlightenment put it: “I want you to

know, brothers, that the gospel I preached is not something that man made up. I did not

receive it from any man, nor was I taught it; rather I received it by revelation from Jesus
Christ” (Gal. 1:11-12).
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Religious teachers insist that this kind of enlightenment is a spiritual experience or

revelation from God. The source of these enlightenment experiences or revelations is not
derived by intellectualistic, rationalistic, curiosity-driven means. One experiences this

enlightenment. It is passively received and not actively thought up like the radical

enlightenment’s call “to use one’s own mind without another’s guidance.” This latter
individualist, rationalist call is one of the principal characteristics the German

Enlightenment philosopher Emmanuel Kant defines as essential for understanding the true

meaning of enlightenment (See his classic definition of the Enlightenment in his “An Answer
to the question ‘What is Enlightenment’”). Kant’s newer meaning of the term has to do with

thinking and philosophy, society and politics, and not with spiritual illuminative knowledge.
Long before the proponents of the secular or radical enlightenment (such as Kant)

got their hands on this term, religious men such as St. Paul were using this word not only in
a very different way, but in a totally opposite way. For St. Paul enlightenment is something

that God does in you and not something you can learn on your own: “I keep asking that the
God of our Lord Jesus Christ, the glorious Father, may give you the Spirit of wisdom and

revelation so that you may know him better. I pray also that the eyes of your heart may be
enlightened in order that you may know…” and then goes on to cite all sorts of spiritual or
theological claims (Ephesians 1:17-18). There are literally hundreds of such passages

throughout the New Testament on this doctrine of enlightenment of the spiritual kind.

Kant’s definition of the Enlightenment is not meant to be restricted to the historical

Enlightenment movement of the 17th and 18th centuries. It is meant to be an attitude, a

philosophy, and a commitment. What is this new Enlightenment? Kant summarizes the
answer to this question in the following words: “that man must use one’s own mind

without another’s guidance” and “Have the courage to use your own understanding’, is
therefore the motto of the enlightenment.”
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“Without another’s guidance”! Relying and using “your own understanding”! This is

the exact opposite of the enlightenment that the New Testament teaches. Instead of this

kind of self-reliance, the heroes of the spiritual enlightenment brag that: “we take captive

every thought to make it obedient to Christ” (2 Cor. 10:5). The only guidance that the New

Testament commands believers to submit to is to that of the Word of God, the apostles, and
the leaders of the Church.

To the devout Christian, the notion of personal independence or of having the

courage to dare think for one’s self and not in line with Christian thought is audacious – that
is, outrageous. 31 A significant example of this may be cited. In his famous letter to the

Romans, the apostle Paul explicitly denies to human beings the right to question God or to

judge according to human powers (see chapters 9 and 11 in Romans). One does not have a
right, for example, to question God’s ways even when from the human perspective it

appears to be unjust. In three whole chapters Paul lays out a case for what is known as the

sovereignty of God.

This is the doctrine that before the foundations of the earth were laid, God had

already determined the many unto eternal damnation and the few to eternal bliss. As God
says to Moses, “I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on
whom I have compassion.” Paul then asks, “What shall we say? Is God unjust?” You

probably can anticipate his response. His response to what human nature would call a

horribly abuse of arbitrary power is: “Not at all!” and then goes on to quote scripture verses
that he thinks justifies any and all of God’s actions. “Who are you, O man, to talk back to
God? ‘Shall what is formed say to him who formed it, ‘Why did you make me like this?’

31 Thousands of examples of this attitude may be documented throughout the history of Christianity,
but one will be cited here in response to the growing philosophical enlightenment in Europe. In
France, “the celebrated court preacher Father Jean-Baptiste Massillon” interpreted the growing
Enlightenment movement with its “thirst for philosophy … as a form of rebellion against religion and
the Church.” At the royal chapel at Versailles, he denounces philosophy as an arrogant bid for
personal independence” (Radical Enlightenment, 63).

22

Does not the potter have the right to make out of the same lump of clay some pottery for
noble purposes and some for common use?”

Paul goes on to suggest that God wills some to destruction “to show his wrath and

make his power known” (Rom. 9:14-22). He explicitly states that God purposely hardens

and blinds those he has previously prepared to destroy. “God gave them over to a spirit of
stupor, eyes so that they could not see and ears so that they could not hear” (Rom. 11:8).

And how does he respond to this what to all appearances looks like outrageous cruelty? He
breaks out into praise: “Oh, the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God!
How unsearchable his judgments, and his paths beyond tracing out!” (Rom. 11:33).

Paul is not going to follow Kant’s Enlightenment motto to “use one’s own mind

without another’s guidance” or “Have the courage to use your own understanding.” On the

contrary, he does the exact opposite. This is the great divide on what constitutes

enlightenment between those who believe by faith and those who will only believe what
passes muster according to human reason.

How can such a believer, who will not critique or question God in any way, do

philosophy, for the existence of God, the nature of God, the problem of evil, and the truths or
falsities of the various teachings of religions are essential issues that every philosopher

must take up. If one is denied the freedom to honestly and fully explore the premises that

one works with, one cannot do the subject sufficient justice. Kant understood this challenge
well. Of the modern European Enlightenment and its philosophical requirements, he says:

Our age is, in especial degree, the age of criticism, and to criticism everything must
submit. Religion through its sanctity, and law-giving through its majesty, may seek
to exempt themselves from it. But they then awaken just suspicion, and cannot
claim the sincere respect which reason accords only to that which has been able to
sustain the test of free and open examination. 32

Immanuel Kant. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, unabridged edition (New
York: St Martin’s Press, 1929.
32
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The further Enlightenment demand to critique even religious beliefs based on one’s

own reason here is also the opposite of what the New Testament teaches. Jesus often taught
that “If any man follow me, he must deny himself and take up his cross.” The Radical

Enlightenment from the perspective of the heroes of the New Testament (if they could have

known the radical enlighteners) is spiritual blindness and death. Christianity teaches that
one should submit one’s thinking to God. Jesus’s brother James wrote “Submit yourselves,
therefore, unto God and resist the devil” (James 4:7). One does not question, criticize, or

doubt God or Christ or the Scriptures. One does not rely on one’s self, or one’s own powers,
or one’s own mind on religious matters. Instead, one trusts in the Lord: “Lean not unto

thine own understanding, but trust in the Lord with all thine heart” (Prov. 3:5). To think for

one’s self and to seek to advance the cause of man, undirected by God, is evil hubris

according to the scriptures. It is tantamount to the sinful attitude of those who sought to
build the fabled Tower of Babel – to reach heaven on their own, that is, through secular

means (Gen. 11:1-9).

True enlightenment for the biblical believer is when one trusts God despite what one

thinks or knows or reasons! This is why the heroes of the scriptures (read Hebrews 11 for a
quintessential example) can in no way be secular rationalists, humanists, or individualists,
but men and women of faith, men and women who submit their thinking to God’s way of

thinking (“Not my will be done, but thy will be done, on earth as it is in heaven”, Mt. 6:10).

The enlightenment (of Kant and Spinoza and the radical enlightenment) then, according to
the counter-enlightenment, is self-centered (not Christ-centered). It is humanistic, not

theistic. It bases its beliefs on the principle of man. It relies on or depends on the arm of the
flesh, and not on God Spirit: “Not by flesh, nor by [human] power, but by my Spirit, saith the
Lord” (Zech. 4:6) is the oft-repeated message of biblical religion. These claims, as we will

see throughout this dissertation, are the arguments or claims of the counter-enlightenment.
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Defining the history of the “Enlightenment”

Since the difference between the two dictionary definitions of Enlightenment are so

radically different (at least with respect to the radical Enlightenment), the following

question naturally arises: “How comes it that the term ‘Enlightenment’ comes to be used in

reference to a movement and period of time in which religion or spiritual enlightenment are
questioned, doubted, and even rejected?

In an essay which seeks to determine to what extent Kant’s predecessor Gottfried

Leibniz could be considered enlightened (in the Spinozistic, Kantian, or radical sense),
Leibniz scholar Mogens Laerke gives a brief summary of the history of the term
‘Enlightenment’:

Let us first consider Kant’s position a bit more, and in particular the meaning of his
Enlightenment motto: Sapere aude! Kant also used the motto as an epitaph in the
Prolegomena. Where does this famous “motto” (Wahlspruch) come from? Contrary
to what is often presumed, Kant is not its inventor. The expression originally stems
from a letter from Horace to Lollius, where it appears in a context which has nothing
to do with the Enlightenment. However, other thinkers before Kant have taken it up
in interesting contexts. Pierre Gassendi suggested it as an intellectual motto to the
French erudite libertine Samuel La Sorbière. In 1718, the poet and arch enemy of
Alexander Pope, Ambrose Philips, also known as “Namby Pampy”, launched a Whig
journal called The Freethinker the subtitle of which was “Sapere aude.” Finally, and
much closer to Kant, “Sapere aude” was the motto of the German learned society
called the Aletophilen, i.e. the “friends of truth”, founded by Count Ernst Christoph
Manteuffel in 1736 to promote Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy. The logo and motto
of the society however was invented by someone who was not a member of the
society and certainly not a Leibnizian-Wolffian, namely the persecuted and poor
philosopher Johann Georg Wachter, best known for two books that combine
Spinozism with the branch of Jewish mysticism known as Cabbalism.
To be sure, these facts concerning the historical background of the motto
will not teach us what Kant meant by it, but they are still indicative of the heritage
he took up when adopting it. 33

Mogens Laerke. “Leibniz’s Enlightenment,” in H. Rudolph et H. Poser (eds.), Leibniz und die
Ökumene, Studia Leibnitiana Sonderheft, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, [forthcoming].
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Laerke then concludes:

So what kind of conclusion can we draw from the fact that an early modern
philosopher close to the erudite libertines, a British freethinker, and a persecuted
Spinozist introduced the ideal of ‘Daring to know’ in the Republic of Letters? What
do they have in common? It is, in my view, first of all indicative of the fact that
audacity is an ideal in important respects connected to the ‘radical enlightenment’,
to speak like Jonathan Israel. Following Israel’s description, the radical
enlightenment … actively worked on the subversion of religion .... Their common
source was Spinoza’s philosophy … mainly the splendid Tractatus theologicopoliticus. 34
The acceptance and use of the term “Enlightenment” by the intellectuals,

philosophers, and historians of the time appears to be a great piece of irony. In truth, the

use of the term ‘Enlightenment’ (in its radical, Kantian sense) seems insulting to what had
previously been considered enlightened in that it calls ‘enlightened’ all that the essence of

Christianity calls un-enlightened. To be enlightened, according to the New Testament, is to

have “the eyes of your heart enlightened in order that you may know the truth” (Eph. 1:18).

But according to the Radical Enlightenment all such explanations are considered
“enthusiastic” and therefore things that must be routed out.

And so we see that at least some understandings of the “Enlightenment” entail the

rejection (or at least the questioning or doubting of) claims to spiritual enlightenment. In

these senses then, this use of the term must be taken to be ironic or antagonistic; for what
the use of this term actually means to imply is that some people (those of the

Enlightenment) have found out that claims made by religious people about enlightenment
experiences are in reality untrue or false. And, given that they and they themselves, have

become privy to this knowledge, they see themselves, rather than the spiritually

enlightened, as the ones who are truly enlightened. As Karl Marx “stood Hegel on his head”,

so also some of the proponents of the historical Enlightenment turned the hitherto

historically sanctioned meaning of Enlightenment on its head such that they gave it the
34

Ibid. 3.

26

exact opposite meaning. So, for these proponents of the Enlightenment, the old use of the
term Enlightenment is tantamount to superstition, falsehood, error, and the like; and the
new and better meaning refers to greater insight into the truth of nature and life.

We must bear in mind, however, that my use of the phrase, ‘some proponents of the

Enlightenment’ means not all proponents of the Enlightenment thought this way. Some
proponents of the Enlightenment understood Enlightenment not as the repudiation of
revelation or Christianity (and all this entails), but rather some kind of harmonious

synthesis of both Christianity and the findings of reason, science, and biblical criticism. For
these (and they are all believers), the Enlightenment and spiritual enlightenment need not
contradict each other. In fact, to them, since God is the God of all truth (as they must say
because of their faith in scripture which says this), therefore all truth (philosophical,

scientific, moral, aesthetic, political, etc.) – if it is truth – can and must harmonize. Thus, for

these thinkers, the Enlightenment meant something very different from the Enlightenment
of the unbelievers. For the former, the Enlightenment demands some kind of new

interpretation of Christianity (and all that it entails) ranging from some moderate reforms

to the total repudiation of Christianity (this latter meaning is usually closer to the meaning
of the ‘Radical Enlightenment’).

The meaning and triumphs of the Radical Enlightenment
In the section above, we laid out the general contours of the Enlightenment (moderate and

radical) with which we have to do in this study, but we still have not clarified enough what
specifically the Radical Enlightenment was, when it started, who were its principal
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proponents, or the approximate dates for these. 35 Thankfully, to understand most of what

Israel means by the Radical Enlightenment in his monumental, 800-page book, The Radical
Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750, one need only read his
two-page Preface and his twenty-page Introduction. But the most succinct and

comprehensive definition of the Radical Enlightenment that I have been able to find in the

There’s a lot more involved in defining the Enlightenment than either my introduction does or
Israel in his Radical Enlightenment. As we cited in an earlier footnote, in order to fully assess “the
Enlightenment”, one needs to know what “post-enlightenment” thinkers have said. Israel
acknowledges this and takes up some of these issues in his next work on the Enlightenment called
Enlightenment Contested.
For a long time I wrestled with post-enlightenment interpretations of “the Enlightenment.”
There is a vast literature out there on many and various aspects of “the Enlightenment” and the
“Counter-Enlightenment.” Right off hand, one thinks of the historically and philosophically important
works of Rousseau, Haaman, Wordsworth, Schleiermacher, Emerson, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche,
Foucault, Adorno, Isaiah Berlin, Jung, Charles Taylor, and so on. These valuable and extremely
stimulating discussions involve all sorts of aspects of “the Enlightenment” – political, epistemological,
psychological, philosophy of history, philosophy of science, philosophy of language and meaning,
philosophy of economics, and much more. There’s no way that I can do justice to all this great
literature within the scope of this dissertation. Nor am I pretending to have read or comprehended it
all; but, thanks to reasoning, I think I have found a way how to find some agreement despite the many
differences and difficulties of these philosophical opinions. The aspect of the “Enlightenment”, or
better, the “Radical Enlightenment”, that this study is mostly concerned with is the status of the truth
claims of Christianity (though we also touch on Greek religion and Judaism). For instance, the
chapter on Greek rationalist philosophy concerns the status of some of the claims of the Greek “Bible”
of Hesiod and Homer regarding such things as how the gods fornicate with mortal women and war
among themselves, and the like). We can make the issues that we mean to focus on clearer, more
concrete, and more specific, still, to eliminate any confusion about what we may mean. By “the truth
claims of Christianity” let us have specifically in mind strong biblical claims such as the following:
That God commanded His people to go into the Promised Land to slay all of its inhabitants, adults and
infants; that God has predestined a minority unto eternal bliss and the many to be tormented for
ever; that only through Christ, God’s Son, is there salvation; that there is an evil, extremely powerful
angel called the devil or Satan who deceives and keeps most of the world in spiritual darkness; that
there was a “Fall” of man such that all humans inherit a “sinful” nature that puts them in need of a
propitiary blood atonement (animal sacrifice or Son of God sacrifice); that the Bible is an accurate
written record of God’s revelations to man – and many more such teachings may be listed that most
Christians down through the centuries have assented to, whether they be Roman Catholic, Eastern
Orthodox, or Protestant.
In this way then, I think that most interpreters of the Enlightenment can find some
agreement. I think that most of the great literature on the Enlightenment mentioned above can agree
on at least a couple of these central doctrines, so that whether you’re a “post-modernist” like, say
Richard Rorty, or whether you have some “counter-enlightenment” concerns, such as Isaiah Berlin, in
the end, you will agree that some or most of these revelatory claims are false.
My brief is not against Christianity or religions as a whole. Christianity and many religions
mean far more than only the holding of such theological doctrines. There are other factors, very
valuable, that are also at work. They serve all sorts of human services from love of the downtrodden
to care for the sick to the preaching against excess selfishness. These goods, and many other virtues,
need to be taken into consideration in anyone’s overall judgment of religion.
35

28

almost 1800 pages of Jonathan Israel’s Radical Enlightenment and its successor volume,

Enlightenment Contested, comes at the end of the latter work. Here professor Israel

summarizes the most important aspects of the Radical Enlightenment into eight points.

Radical Enlightenment conceived as a package of basic concepts and values may be
summarized in eight cardinal points: (1) adoption of philosophical (mathematicalhistorical) reason as the only and exclusive criterion of what is true; (2) rejection of
all supernatural agency, magic, disembodied spirits, and divine providence; (3)
equality of all mankind (racial and sexual); (4) secular ‘universalism’ in ethics
anchored in equality and chiefly stressing equity, justice, and charity; (5)
comprehensive toleration and freedom of thought based on independent critical
thinking; (6) personal liberty of lifestyle and sexual conduct between consenting
adults; safe-guarding the dignity and freedom of the unmarried and homosexuals;
(7) freedom of expression, political criticism, and the press, in the public sphere; (8)
democratic republicanism as the most legitimate form of politics. This then is the
essence of ‘philosophical modernity’ and [its] crucial core. 36
Israel treats all of these points in his works. This dissertation, however, will

concentrate mostly on the second most important aspect of the Radical Enlightenment cited
above, that is, on the “rejection of all supernatural agency, magic, disembodied spirits, and
divine providence.”

The focus of Israel’s works is Spinoza and his history of Spinozism. According to

Israel, Spinoza was the chief architect of the Radical Enlightenment because his work

argued for the rejection of revelation, miracles, prophecy, divine providence, ecclesiastical

Enlightenment Contested, 866. When one looks over this list, one can’t help wondering why is it
that those who held to these values were considered “radical” (with its pejorative connotations). The
real radicals, from this perspective, are those who don’t accept this world as it is, but instead see it
filled with demons and angels. “Therefore, be strong in the Lord and in his mighty power. Put on the
full armor of God so that you can take your stand against the devil’s schemes. For our struggle is not
against flesh and blood, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the powers of this dark
world and against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly realms” (Eph. 6:10-12). The real radicals
are those who preach “Enter the narrow gate. For wide is the gate and broad is the road that leads to
destruction, and many enter through it. But small is the gate and narrow the road that leads to life,
and only a few find it” (Mt. 7:13-14). The real radicals are those who hold to such other-worldly
views, including that the world and all its inhabitants are knowingly or unknowingly involved in a
cosmic struggle for the eternal fate of their souls. All end up either in the fires of hell for ever or in
the glories of heaven. We would do well to remember this point because throughout Jonathan Israel’s
presentation of the history of the 17th and 18th centuries, he usually uses this term “radicals” to
identify those who were arguing for the liberal, humanist values cited above.
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authority, and the beliefs in reward and punishment in an afterlife. 37 The spotlight of this

dissertation will be on some of the most prominent precursor “radical enlighteners” from
Greece up to Spinoza.

Let me now briefly explain the 8-point definition in historical and geographical

context. For Israel, “the Enlightenment marks the most dramatic step towards

secularization and rationalization in Europe’s history”, but “it does so no less in the wider

history not just of western civilization, but, arguably, the entire world. From this, it plainly
follows, it was one of the most important shifts in the history of man.” 38 In fact, for Israel,

the shift is more important than either the Renaissance or the Reformation. He thinks this
because those cultural movements

are really only adjustments, modifications to what was essentially still a
theologically conceived and ordered regional society, based on hierarchy and
ecclesiastical authority, not universality and equality.
By contrast, the [Radical] Enlightenment – European and global – not only
attacked and severed the roots of traditional European culture in the sacred, magic,
kingship, and hierarchy, secularizing all institutions and ideas, but (intellectually
and to a degree in practice) effectively demolished all legitimation of monarchy,
aristocracy, woman’s subordination to man, ecclesiastical authority, and slavery,
replacing these with the principles of universality, equality, and democracy. 39

As for part of Jonathan Israel’s argument for the dating and pervasiveness of the Radical
Enlightenment from 1650 to 1750, he says the following.

During the later Middle Ages and the early modern age down to around 1650,
western civilization was based on a largely shared core of faith, tradition, and
authority. By contrast, after 1650, everything, no matter how fundamental or
deeply rooted, was questioned in the light of philosophical reason and frequently
challenged or replaced by startlingly different concepts generated by the New
Philosophy and what may still usefully be termed the Scientific Revolution. But
throughout the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth, there was still
much, intellectually and spiritually, that the western segments of Christendom
shared. Mid-seventeenth-century Europe was still, not just predominantly but
overwhelmingly, a culture in which all debates about man, God, and the World
which penetrated into the public sphere revolved around ‘confessional’ – that is
Catholic, Lutheran, Reformed (Calvinist), or Anglican issues, and scholars fought

Rad. Enl. op. cited, 8, 11, 13.
Ibid. vi.
39 Ibid.
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above all to establish which confessional bloc possessed a monopoly of truth and a
God-given title to authority. It was a civilization in which almost no one challenged
the essentials of Christianity or the basic premises of what was taken to be a
divinely ordained system of aristocracy, monarchy, land-ownership, and
ecclesiastical authority.
By contrast, after 1650, a general process of rationalization and
secularization set in which rapidly overthrew theology’s age-old hegemony in the
world of study, slowly but surely eradicated magic and belief in the supernatural
from Europe’s intellectual culture, and led a few openly to challenge everything
inherited from the past – not just received assumptions about mankind, society,
politics, and the cosmos but also the veracity of the Bible and the Christian faith or
indeed any faith. Jeremiads were heard everywhere....
Whereas before 1650 practically everyone disputed and wrote about
confessional differences, subsequently … the main issue now was the escalating
contest between faith and incredulity. Instead of theological controversy, … “now
religion in general is the question; religion is the thing stabb’d at; the controversie
now is, whether there ought to be any form of religion on earth, or whether there be
any God in heaven.” 40

Israel contends that the Radical Enlightenment was pervasive and notoriously well-known
throughout European culture. It was not restricted to the educated classes, but also
percolated down to popular culture (to a degree far more than has been previously
known). 41

Indeed, surely no other period of European history displays such a profound and
decisive shift towards rationalization and secularization at every level as the few
decades before Voltaire. ‘The triumph of the mechanical philosophy,’ it has been
rightly asserted, ‘meant the end of the animistic conception of the universe which
had constituted the basic rationale for magical thinking.’ … Certainly the Radical
Enlightenment arose and matured in under a century, culminating in the
materialistic and atheistic books of La Mettrie and Diderot in the 1740s....
Consequently, even before Voltaire came to be widely known, in the 1740s, the real
business was over. 42

Things were very different in the generation before the Radical Enlightenment: “For

the age of confessional antagonism, broadly the period 1520-1650, had equipped Europe’s
governments, churches, courts, schools, and universities with newly devised or reinforced
mechanisms of spiritual and intellectual control which proved extremely effective in

tightening the cohesion of society and culture, and strengthening the State and ecclesiastical
Ibid. 3-5.
Ibid. 5-6.
42 Ibid. 6-7.
40
41
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authority.” 43 These confessional divisions were mostly geared to preserve their identities,
and therefore spent much of their time and labor on denominational antagonisms “to
eradicate theological dissent”, but “were soon partly, if not largely, outflanked and

neutralized by the advance of new philosophies and scientific ideas which posed a much

tougher problem for ecclesiastical authority to deal with than had religious heresy” 44, for

now “the main thrust of dissent ceased to be theological and became philosophical.” 45

To make matters worse, the church was now broken up into many pieces and so had

no unified or cohesive response to the challenge against all of Christianity itself. Should the

moderate Enlightenment be suppressed or should they suppress only the Radical

Enlightenment? Should the Church attack Neo-Cartesians and Newtonianism and Christian
Wolff , “to forge a new orthodoxy and a more cogent front against the radical wing?” 46

Israel further explains this point, reminding us that: “Historically, State and Church

had worked closely together and since the mid-sixteenth century had met the challenge of

confessionalizing the population with spectacular success. Whether Catholic, Lutheran,
Calvinist, or Anglican, the people of western and central Europe had everywhere been

grouped into cohesive doctrinal blocs formidably resistant to rival theologies.” 47 Locke was
considered dangerous, Cartesianism damaging, and Pierre Bayle pernicious, “yet all these
were innocence itself … compared with the threat to Church and society posed by the
radicals.” 48

Thus far we have shown how professor Israel has answered the what, when, where,

and some of the who of the Radical Enlightenment, but we have not yet said much about the
how of the Radical Enlightenment. This will be explicated in the course of this study, but for
Ibid. 7.
Ibid.
45 Ibid. 8.
46 Ibid. 8.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid. 9.
43
44
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the present we can cite at least three of the major causes: (1) a growing reliance on natural
reason [footnote: By “natural reason or philosophy” is understood reasoning without the

assistance of the Holy Spirit] and philosophy over revelation, (2) the use of natural reason
and philosophy in critiquing the holy scriptures, and (3) the overturning of scholasticism

(which was considered by many or most to be the best Christian philosophy to support its
theology) for a more naturalistic or mechanistic or scientific interpretation of nature.

This summary account of the Radical Enlightenment according to Jonathan Israel

should give the reader a much better appreciation of not only the momentousness of the
historical changes the Radical Enlightenment caused, but also of the philosophical and

spiritual importance this radical turn has made in the world. Now we can proceed to the
seedbed, to the foundations, to one of the most significant spiritual progenitors of the
European Radical Enlightenment – the Greeks.
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PART II

PRECURSORS TO THE RADICAL ENLIGHTNEMENT: THE GREEKS

Chapter Two
The Greeks as Precursors

Introduction: Subject and Plan of Chapter
As mentioned in the introduction to this study, the question I explore in this dissertation is

similar to the question historian Will Durant poses in the Preface to his The Age of Voltaire:
A History of Civilization in Western Europe from 1715 to 1756, With Special Emphasis on the

Conflict Between Religion and Philosophy. He asks: “How did it come about that a major part
of the educated classes in Europe and America has lost faith in the theology that for fifteen
centuries gave supernatural sanctions and supports to the precarious and uncongenial
moral code upon which Western civilization has been based?” 49

One can ask this same question with respect to the history of the ancient Greeks.

How did it come about that a culture which believed in all sorts of the most mind-boggling

myths came to produce philosophers who denied the literal truth of such claims? How did
49 Durant’s question can be translated into our question: “How did the European Radical
Enlightenment come about?” Durant wrote this in 1965. Curiously, 42 years later Charles Taylor
writes the same thing in the opening of his book A Secular Age: “One way to put the question that I
want to answer here is this: why was it virtually impossible not to believe in God in, say, 1500 in our
Western society, while in 2000 many of us find this not only easy, but even inescapable.” Charles
Taylor. A Secular Age (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), 25.
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the Greeks get from Hesiod to Xenophanes, from mythological accounts of things to a more

rationalistic and naturalistic account of things? 50 And how did these radical thinkers come

to be precursors to the 17 century Radical Enlightenment?

The purpose of this chapter is not to present an exhaustive account of the history of

the ancient Greek moderate and radical Enlightenments; nor of all the dynamics between
their philosophies and their myths; nor with any of the social, political, economic, or

military causes for their growing reliance on natural reason at the expense of revelation,

inspiration, prophecy, visions, trances, dreams, ecstatic states, daemonic leading, talismans,
theurgy, oracles, omens, mediums, sorcerers, magicians, taboos, rites, rituals, and so on.

Our aim is less ambitious. We wish only to show some representative examples of

that evolving struggle between Greek theology and Greek rationalism, and that only as told
by a few scholars. 51 As we do so, we will also come to recognize them as precursors to

Europe’s Radical Enlightenment which occurred not only before the Christian era, but also
provided the philosophical groundwork for what would become models both for later
moderate enlightenment Christian thinkers (to justify their treatment of Christian

revelation) and also for radical anti-Christian writers (to use against the Christian world
view).

I first present some of Jonathan Israel’s history of the Greeks as precursors to the

Radical Enlightenment, especially relating to their influence on scholarship. We then go on

to fill out Israel’s account by adding some of the major enlighteners in the history of ancient

Greece. Because of their central importance in early (and later) Christian thought I focus on
The radical transformation from Hesiod and Homer to Plato and the Sophists is like that from Jesus
and St. Paul to Descartes and Spinoza.

50

I say “and that as only told by a few scholars” because there are some scholars who offer a richer
context and more philosophically sophisticated (and more skeptical) appraisal of some of these
claims.
51
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the status of Plato and Socrates as enlighteners in relation to the Greek and Christian

religious view of things. (Not much will be said here about Aristotle because his major

philosophical influence in European culture comes much later on in the latter Middle Ages
up to the early modern period.) After this we note the decline of Greek Enlightenment
thought to Hellenism and religious enlightenment thinking.

Jonathan Israel’s account of the Greeks as precursors to the Radical Enlightenment
via Renaissance humanist scholarship to Enlightenment new scholarship
What Kant said in 1784 was as true for the high Enlightenment in Europe as it has been of
Enlightenment movements in other times and places:

Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is
the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another. This
immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of
resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of
enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! [Dare to know] ‘Have courage to use your
own understanding!’ – that is the motto of Enlightenment.” 52
Long before the European Radical Enlightenment that Jonathan Israel plots from

1650 to 1750, there were other radical enlightenments. Take the “radical enlightenment”
which occurred among the ancient Greeks, for instance. Echoing the words of a preacher

writing in 1712, Israel compares the shaking of the foundations of early modern European
religion and civilization

to the ancient Athens of the warring Hellenistic philosophy schools, a land racked by
intellectual controversy where rival schools of thought battled ceaselessly … and
even the common people were proving susceptible to new ideas, … the helpless prey

52 Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’", my emphasis. We ought to
point out here that Kant’s definition of human enlightenment is not without its critics. There is a rich
and extremely important discussion of weaknesses and problems with the Enlightenment’s concept
of the self and many other philosophical issues made by postmodernists. We refer the reader to
Appendix B on postmodernism for this discussion. For the purposes of this dissertation, however,
this discussion lies outside the purview of our thesis.
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of philosophical seducers and, through new ideas, becoming entrapped in the
‘Devil’s snares’. 53

Greek influence in the shaking of the foundations of early Enlightenment Europe

takes on life in the Renaissance. We cannot give a complete account of the Renaissance’s

role as precursor to the Radical Enlightenment here. We will instead focus on the role that
Renaissance humanist scholarship of the Greeks played in its development.

The Greeks as precursors to the Radical Enlightenment via Renaissance humanist
scholarship. 54
Though Israel does not go into exhaustive detail about the influence of the Greeks as

precursors of the 17th and 18th century Radical Enlightenment, in several places he does
acknowledge that they exerted considerable force. He plots their sway through the

libertinisme erudite, for instance. He shows how these Renaissance writers veiled or
masked their ideas which were

opposed to prevailing theological and metaphysical orthodoxies by
presenting opinions and quotations culled mostly from classical authors in
innovative and seditious ways, paying particular attention to skeptical,
irreverent, and atheistic sources such as Lucian, Epicurus, and Sextus
Empiricus, and historians of philosophy such as Diogenes Laertius. This was
a potent intellectual undercurrent, especially in France and Italy, and one
which played a notable role in preparing the ground for the rise of the
Radical Enlightenment…. The liberins erudits … were essentially precursors of
the Radical Enlightenment operating behind a dense layer of camouflage. 55

But, as Israel shows in his chapter on “The Overthrow of Humanist Criticism” in his

Enlightenment Contested, humanist scholars failed in many ways to do justice to Greek

Radical Enlightenment, op. cited, 3.
A note perhaps is in order here regarding the meaning of “humanist” in this context. While
“humanist” has come to mean many things, including what today is meant by “secular humanism”,
Israel’s use of the term with regard to Renaissance scholarship is meant in a less radical sense. Thus,
there are also “Christian humanists” such as Erasmus. For a brief, but excellent summary of the
Renaissance meaning of “humanist”, see for instance James Handkins essay “Humanism,
scholasticism, and Renaissance philosophy” in The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy,
p. 30-32.
55 Israel has in mind writers such as Bodin, Bruno, Vanini and even Machiavelli and Pomponazzie
(Radical Enlightenment 14-15. )
53
54
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literature. For all their erudition, the humanists’ “prime concern was still mainly to exhort
pious submission and emulation, not explore meanings.” 56 Both moderate and radical

enlighteners agreed that the Renaissance humanist approach needed drastic changes. The
new interpreters charged the humanists with two basic failures in their scholarship: one,

that of accurate translations, and two, that of explaining the texts in their historical milieu. 57

Thus the humanists “had utterly failed to introduce and expound ancient literature to
educated lay society.” Instead of doing the work of competent exposition, the older
scholarship mostly cultivated eloquence, rhetorical skill, and moral qualities.

The Renaissance humanist studies seemed to be “constantly skirting around the

fundamental questions” of the meaning and truth of the central works of the Greeks because
of the pervasive hold that Christianity had on their minds: “Inability to free themselves from
basically theological, traditional, and magical views of the world had left them imprisoned
within … a hopelessly disfigured and superficial perspective not just on antiquity but

likewise philosophy, morality, ecclesiastical history, and history of thought and culture

generally.” 58 They were too bound to “the presumption of an ultimate harmonious union of

theology and philosophy.” 59

While Israel concedes that “One newly rediscovered strand of Greek thought which

the humanists did investigate with more resolve was ancient skepticism, especially
Pyrrhonism,” he goes on to say: “However, skepticism … was made much of by the

humanists precisely because it appeared useful as a device for defending theology’s

hegemony against the encroachments of less welcome strands of ancient thought …

Enlightenment Contested, op. cited, 416.
Ibid. 414-415.
58 Ibid. 416.
59 Ibid. 417.
56
57
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Primarily as a way of discrediting the ancient philosophy schools and neutralizing their
naturalistic and ‘atheistic’ views.” 60

Renaissance humanist treatment of Greek thought failed in other ways, as well.

Take their reading of Graeco-Roman Stoicism for example. The Renaissance humanists

tended to ignore all that which might create tension with Christian thinking, “screening out
everything contradicting Christian theology.” They tended to view Stoicism then “as

essentially a preparation and paving the way for Christianity.” 61 By following this “method”,

they inevitably missed a great deal of truth in their subject. Israel calls this textual

approach “humanism’s anachronistic Christianization of pre-Christian thought.” 62 Thus

they viewed Stoicism like they viewed Platonism, as “profoundly akin to, and essentially a
preparation for, the thought-world of the early Church Fathers.” 63

Israel further criticizes Renaissance scholarship in that: “humanist scholarship had

proven remarkably slow to challenge and supplant all manner of fanciful suppositions,

fabrications, and received traditions passed down through texts, including notions which, to
the Early Enlightenment mind, were full of gullibility, uncritical acceptance of authority, and
not infrequently sheer fantasy … there being a prevailing unwillingness rigorously to follow
up such doubts.” 64

A large part of the reason for the humanists’ shortcomings had to do with the fear of

persecution. They were not “so much blind to the deeper intellectual challenges inherent in
a close study of classical texts as compelled by the practical impossibility of compromising
or questioning the fundamental beliefs of their age … in this way avoiding risk of scandal,
outrage, controversy, and a brutal clash of values.” Even some boldness evinced by some
Ibid. 420.
Ibid. 417.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid. 418.
60
61
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authors such as Erasmus tended to be watered down; as Israel puts it: “cohabitation

designed to paper over major theological and philosophical problems, not systematic
investigation and exploration of ideas, remained the predominant strategy.” 65

The Greeks as precursors to the Radical Enlightenment via Early Enlightenment scholarship
A more exact and fuller interpretation of the Greeks had to wait until early

Enlightenment scholars took up the challenge. Israel argues that the Early Enlightenment’s
“ars critica”, the new text criticism, or “new scholarship” overthrew Renaissance humanist

criticism. This new text criticism, according to Israel, became one of the three major factors
that led to the struggle for the fate of God in the modern world. These three forces, as was
mentioned in the chapter defining the Enlightenment, were the New Philosophy, the
Scientific Revolution, and, last but by no means least, the new scholarship. 66

Israel is right to argue that the new scholarship of the Early Enlightenment period

“has generally received the least emphasis from later historians.” By contrast to the

revolutions caused by the New Philosophy (such as Cartesianism) and the Scientific
Revolution (of Copernicus, Galileo, Gilbert, Harvey, Newton, etc.), the revolution in

scholarship “has received much less recognition despite being integrally linked to both the
other revolutions.” Yet it is “arguably, of comparable importance.” 67 Despite this fact,

“there continues to be an insufficient awareness among historians of the late seventeenth
century’s claims to a scholarly breakthrough, repudiation of humanism, and disclosing of

the limitations, both real and imputed, of all earlier hermeneutics and text scholarship.” 68
Ibid. 420.
Ibid. 409.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid. 410.
65
66
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The new great critical scholars of this period were Simon, Vico, Bentley and Le Clerc.

They all had many criticisms of their earlier humanist predecessors. Of this new

scholarship, Israel says:

The new perspectives and approaches … radically transformed whole fields of
knowledge, including such vital areas as Bible hermeneutics, comparative history of
religions, history of philosophy, study of the Church Fathers, ancient Greece and
Rome, Jewish history, Islam, and Chinese civilization. But this was by no means all;
for, as we shall see, the revolution in text criticism and erudition had a major impact
also on the practice of philosophy itself and on the developing struggle between the
two enlightenments. 69
Think, for instance, of how some of the major philosophers of early modernity did

philosophy. They did philosophy not by separating philosophy from theology or the Bible,

but by taking on theology and the Bible as they philosophized. One thinks right off hand of
Hobbes and Spinoza, for example. Hobbes’s Leviathan appears to be the work of a

theologian or Bible commentator. It is shot through and through with references to the
Bible to make his case for a radically different theology and philosophy; and he does so
following a very different methodological perspective compared with the less daring
humanist interpreters.

Spinoza’s audaciousness goes even further. Israel mentions that “Spinoza’s

Tractatus theologico-politicus has, not without reason, been called ‘the most important

seventeenth-century work to advance the study of the Bible and religion generally’… which

‘disarmed the religious interpreters who would enforce conformity’.” 70 As we will see later,
this work was to become one of the principal engines that brought an end to the preEnlightenment religious hegemony over biblical scholarship.

The early Enlightenment revolution in text criticism (especially of the Greek classics

and biblical studies), insisted “on the need for scholars to approach the subject wholly

independently, free of all prejudgments about its meaning and significance, acknowledging
69
70

410.
Ibid. 410.
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allegiance to no chain of tradition and authority whether Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, or
Muslim.” They also insisted on honoring the distinction between truths of meaning in

interpreting sacred texts in comparison or in contrast to truths of fact . 71 For instance,

Spinoza argued that all of the biblical text needs to be put in context, the context of history.

But “Placing all writings in ‘historical’ context effectively meant … systematically excluding

every miraculous, magical, revealed factor, explanation, and criterion.” 72 For Spinoza, then,
history should be seen “as an exclusively natural process devoid of magical action, spirits,

supernatural agency, or miracles.” 73 Spinoza sought to apply the same scientific principles

in his study of scripture as he did toward nature. Following this philosophy toward even
sacred texts, “for the first time, made hermeneutics a fundamental aspect of philosophy

itself.” 74

While rejecting Spinoza’s metaphysical presuppositions, moderate enlighteners

nevertheless recognized the value of some of his ground-breaking scholarly methods in

approaching texts and were thus led to reject some of the older, traditional conventions of
humanist scholarship. The moderate enlighteners wished to secure a rational basis for
learning the truth of scripture. According to their thinking, the orthodox (Catholic,

Lutheran, or Calvinist) also need not be afraid, for is not God the God of all truth? Still, they
argued that more was needed to combat the radicals then the approach of the Counter-

Enlightenment: “For personal conviction that Scripture is divine revelation, or taking it for

granted that everyone accepts Christianity is true, and the Pentateuch the authentic Word of
God, no longer suffices either adequately to explain Scripture’s meaning or to defend what,
for most men, were still undoubted verities against libertines, Spinozists, Deists, and

Ibid.
Ibid. 411.
73 Ibid. 412.
74 Ibid. 413. For a fuller exposition of Spinoza place in the history of textual interpretation, see J.
Samuel Preus’s Spinoza and the Irrelevance of Biblical Authority, especially the opening chapter,
“Spinoza versus the interpreters.”
71
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skeptics.” 75 Ironically, it was the interaction between the moderates and radicals over text
interpretation that actually advanced the new scholarship; and this then led to further
arguments against the veracity of Greek and Christian sacred texts.

Enlightenment thinkers see rationalist Greek philosophy as a source for human
enlightenment
Israel argues and documents that the new scholars recognized greater importance

in Greek philosophy than did the humanists. Thinkers such as Pierre Bayle recognized a
Greek “’revolution’ perceived by some as being Man’s first great ‘enlightenment’ – the

Presocratics’ discovery of philosophical argument and criticism.” 76 Man’s “first

enlightenment” from pagan philosophers and not from Moses or the Hebrew prophets?

According to [Bayle], humanity’s first great philosophical revolution served to bring
civilization to utter ‘sauvages’, which is what in his eyes, like Fontenelle’s, the
archaic Greeks were prior to the rise of philosophy. Philosophy, he believed, taught
them above all the vital difference between religion and morality, and how to tailor
institutions, laws, and politics to the needs of men. Here was a revolution crucial
intellectually, morally, religiously, and politically. 77
Israel argues that one of the most influential Greek philosophers for many

Enlightenment thinkers was the Presocratic philosopher Xenophanes of Colophon (BCE
560-470): “the Enlightenment turned [Xenophanes] into one of the most important

precursors of the esprit philosophique of the eighteenth century … From both the moderate
and radical perspectives, Xenophanes became a key exemplum.” 78

As opposed to most Christian Medieval and Renaissance scholars and philosophers,

Xenophanes dared to know more. He bravely critiqued the ideas of the masses and Homer
Ibid. 413-414.
Ibid. 436, my emphasis.
77 Ibid. 437.
78 Ibid. 436.
75
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and Hesiod about the gods, divination, omens, and the like. He is thought to have been the
first to affirm a strong this-worldly view of things: “for all things are from the earth and to

the earth all things end.” 79 He is also thought to have been “the first to employ doubt as an

instrument of philosophy” (which becomes enormously important in the history of modern
philosophy). 80 Timon of Phlius, “the official founder of skepticism as a philosophical school
… stressed Xenophanes’ alleged invention of skepticism as a philosophical technique, as

well as his notoriety as a critic of Homer’s treatment of the gods.” 81

Many in the Enlightenment saw “Spinozism” in Xenophanes: “With his new

skeptical reasoning about the divine, Xenophanes inferred from the fact that different

peoples conceive the gods differently – and after their own likeness – that they imagine (if
not fashion) their gods after their own image, unthinkingly imputing anthropomorphic

qualities to them.” 82 Needless to say, this is radical talk. His philosophy turns religion on its

head. Instead of man being made in the image and likeness of God, for Xenophanes, the
gods are made in the image and likeness of man! As Jonathan Israel puts it:

Xenophanes is in fact the very first thinker known to have argued that because men
conceive the gods in their own likeness they also credit them with their own desires
and aspirations and, consequently, their own limitations and failings … For men to
think of the gods in their own likeness, he held … is neither logical nor fitting. He
censures Homer’s gods on moral grounds in particular … As Sextus Empiricus
reports Xenophanes’ words: ‘Homer and Hesiod ascribe all the things to the gods

Ibid. 437. It might be that Israel’s take on Xenophanes implies that he was a systematic thinker.
However, as Jonathan Barnes mentions in his Early Greek Philosophy, “Many modern scholars have
doubted whether he was a systematic thinker, and some have denied that he ever wrote a properly
philosophical poem.” Nevertheless, Barnes still thinks that “there are enough surviving fragments to
warrant our calling him a philosopher.” Early Greek Philosophy, translated and edited with
Introduction by Jonathan Barnes (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 14. Xenophanes’ “radical
enlightenment” status might also need to made more modest because, according to Hippolytus, “He
also says that god is eternal and unique and homogenous in every way and limited and spherical and
capable of perception in all his parts” (Ibid. 99).
80 See Richard H. Popkin’s influential study The History of Scepticism: from Erasmus to Spinoza for the
role that doubt and skepticism played in the development of modernity. We will take up this subject
in some detail in later sections of this dissertation, especially on Descartes.
81 Ibid. 437.
82 Ibid. 440.
79
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which are considered disreputable among men: stealing, fornicating and cheating
others’. 83

One can tell from such audacious arguments that Xenophanes may be thought of as a

Greek radical enlightener and a precursor to the European Radical Enlightenment. How

could he not be deemed a radical enlightener, especially of his time, since he “overthrew the
gods of mythology and, much as he demythologized divine power, sought to demythologize
natural phenomena”? Israel mentions that even the “Clouds he explains as vapour lifted

from the sea by the sun.” 84 Beyond this, the surviving fragments of his work seem to show
that he also naturalized rainbows. Israel states that “If rain, the movements of clouds, and
rainbows are purely natural phenomena, mechanically caused, there is neither reason nor

requirement to attribute such occurrences to supernatural interference or action.” Not only

did Xenophanes rule out the gods involvement in nature, he even “more or less ruled out the
secret communication of gods with men.” 85 This additional radical claim in effect denies to

human beings any personal comfort from the divine from prayer or worship.

Xenophanes was not the only Greek precursor to the Radical Enlightenment or to

Spinoza. The Greek Enlightenment produced many others. Strato of Lampsacus, though not
well known today, also had a powerful impact on Spinoza and other thinkers during the

Enlightenment. Israel’s research shows that: “Still more often tied to Spinoza during the
Early Enlightenment than Xenophanes was the third-century BC philosopher Strato of

Lampsacus … [He] played a not inconsiderable role in the evolution of eighteenth-century

materialism… contemporaries were greatly struck by the affinities between his supposed
system and that of Spinoza.” 86 And again: “No other classical writer was cited as often or

insistently as Strato in the role of chief ancient precursor of Spinoza, though all sorts of
Ibid. 440-441.
Enlightenment Contested, 442.
85 Ibid. 443.
86 Ibid. 445.
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other ancient writers besides Xenophanes, Strato, and Epicurus were adduced in this

capacity.” 87 Israel supports this claim by citing some great 17th century thinkers who

believed there was such a relation. Bayle, for instance, “held that Strato was a direct
precursor of Spinoza and the principal Greek exponent of the idea that a blind and
unintelligent nature created and creates everything in the universe, animate and

inanimate.” 88 But while Strato appears to have been a precursor to Spinoza in the sense of
having held some radical ideas as Spinoza, so far as I have been able to discover from the
works of Spinoza scholars, I have not found any evidence to claim that Spinoza himself

acknowledged Strato as an influence over his thinking.

Israel cites one further major school of Greek thought that needs to be mentioned.

The Stoics were also hugely influential in the European Enlightenment; so much so that

Spinoza was charged “with subversively reintroducing Stoic teaching without declaring his

sources or real purpose.” 89 Israel remarks that Enlightenment scholarship was not alone in
this historical judgment: “In modern times, the case for regarding Spinoza as a ‘new Stoic’

has been reiterated by Dilthey” and others. 90 Yet, as always, there were also some thinkers

of the Counter-Enlightenment who sought to counteract Stoic and Spinozist influence by
teaching that both were refuted long ago: “For by labeling Spinoza a ‘Stoic’, Early

87
88

Ibid. 457.
Ibid. 456.

Though Israel agrees that in some striking cases Stoicism and Spinoza seem agreed, he makes it a
point to show major ways in which the two are very different. While “In Stoicism, there cannot be
disembodied spirits or supernatural forces any more than in Spinoza and “Both philosophies scorn
‘superstition’ and credulity”, “the Stoics defined ‘superstition’ differently from Spinoza.” For
instance, “They did not reject divination or astrology or even the ancient oracles” (Enl. Cont. 461).
More, “even prayer, as well as the cult practices accompanying these, are appropriate in a way
inconceivable to the Radical Enlightenment” (Enl. Cont. 465). “Spinoza, on the other hand, as
Nietzsche was later delighted to discover, spurns all teleology, Stoic, Aristotelian, or any other in
depicting nature” (Enl. Cont. 466). Israel cites many other divergences between the two which
conclusively demonstrate the fallaciousness of conflating the two (Enl. Cont. 457-470).
90 Ibid. 459.
89
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Enlightenment critics questioned both his originality and integrity, reminding readers that

Christianity had long since disposed of the arguments of the Stoics, back in late antiquity.” 91
The foregoing account briefly summarizes Jonathan Israel’s study of the Greeks as

precursors to the Radical Enlightenment. We need now to give further context to the

history of the Greek Enlightenment (and what it was reacting against) and its influence on
the European Enlightenment.

The Greek Enlightenment in further context: from mythology to rationalism 92.
As we mentioned earlier, Israel does not give an exhaustive or comprehensive account of

the influence of the Greeks on the European Enlightenment. This is because his focus was to
give an account of the Radical Enlightenment from 1650 to 1750. But since the purpose of

this dissertation is to give a general account of the precursors to the Radical Enlightenment,

and since the enlightened Greeks are the foundation and inspiration for a great deal of future
radical thinking, we need to add to Israel’s account of the Greeks. In order to accomplish

this, we should also some description of the background or context of these precursors. 93 In
Ibid. 460.
Just as the term “Enlightenment” is fraught with many deep and profound philosophical
interpretations, so also with the terms “mythology” and “rationalism.” Some of these issues are
addressed in the appendix on postmodernism, but a great deal more than can be done in this study
has been proffered by other disciplines besides philosophy. Cultural Anthropology, History of
Religion, Comparative Religion, and even some works in Psychology of Religion have made insightful
and important contributions on this subject.
93 In his short, but excellent introductory summary of Greek philosophy in his Early Greek Philosophy,
Jonathan Barnes (following conventional dating schemes) divides the history of Greek philosophy
into three periods. The first period from 585 to 400 BC is traditionally known as the “Presocratic”
period (though this term is not exactly accurate because much of Socrates’ (470-399 BC) career was
during this period and because some of the “Presocratics” were contemporaries of Socrates). This
period “established the scope and determined the problems of philosophy” (9). The second period is
usually known as the period of the Schools (of Plato and Aristotle, and of the Epicureans, Stoics, and
Sceptics) and typically dates from 400 to 100 BC. The third period from 100 BC to 539 AD “was
marked in the main by scholarship and syncretism: the later thinkers studied their predecessors’
91
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a word, we have to give added explanation of the religion of their culture, that is, their

Counter-Enlightenment. Let us then retrace our steps for a moment; only this time by
supplementing Israel’s account of the Greeks.

When most people think of ancient Greek philosophy, they think of philosophers

such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. 94 These moderate enlightenment philosophers were

great because instead of just believing everything they were taught at home, in the Temple,
and by tradition, they did what the eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosopher Kant

urged all adults to do: and that was to have the audacity to use and rely on their own

understanding and reason even, at times, in variance with their culture’s most precious and

important beliefs. 95 But, as we have seen from Israel’s account, Socrates and Plato were not
the only self-reliant, courageous thinkers in the history of Greek rationalism. In fact, as we
shall show in the last sections of this chapter, Socrates and Plato are problematic with

respect to the radical enlightenment both in Greece and Europe’s Radical Enlightenment.

Because of this, some scholars attribute the true sources of the radical enlightenment to the
Presocratics and other radical thinkers after Socrates and Plato.

Xenophanes, Strato, the Stoics and other revolutionary thinkers led to what can be

called the Greek Radical Enlightenment. They came before (and after) Socrates, Plato, and
Aristotle, and should be understood as purer forerunners of the European Radical

Enlightenment to come. About the ancient Greek Enlightenment, E. R. Dodds states:

writings with assiduity; …” (9). In only 20 pages of his Introduction, Barnes is able to present the gist
of the history of Greek philosophy within its political and religious context.
94 The reason why the west has been mostly familiar with Plato and Aristotle and not the other great
Greek philosophers, scholars say, is because Christianity (which became the religion of the west)
adopted their philosophies as opposed to the others. And they did so because their writings seemed
to be more in accord with Christian thought. After the Renaissance however, more and more
thinkers started embracing other Greek thinkers, including ones that were verboten to the Church.

95 In practice, however, “moderate enlightenment” philosophers such as Socrates appeared to be
more conservative – at least in the sense of keeping up with some of the ritual practices of his culture.
But even here, I suspect that if we were to talk to Socrates-Plato about this, Socrates would (or had)
subject these practices to his keen analytic mind. We know, for instance, that even on his death, he
subjected the belief in the immortality of the soul to a searching and skeptical discussion.
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The [ancient Greek] Enlightenment [has] … its roots are in sixth-century Ionia; it is
at work in Hecataeus, Xenophanes, and Heraclitus, and in a later generation is
carried further by speculative scientists like Anaxagoras and Deomocritus.
Hecataeus is the first Greek who admitted that he found Greek mythology ‘funny,’
and set to work to make it less funny by inventing rationalist explanations, while his
contemporary Xenophanes attacked the Homeric and Hesiodic myths from a moral
angle. 96
Dodds goes on to describe Xenophanes as one who even “denied the validity of

divination.” If this is true, it would mean “that, almost alone among Greek thinkers, he
swept aside not only the pseudo-science of reading omens but the whole deep-seated

complex of ideas about inspiration.” 97 Not to be outdone, Heraclitus “made fun of ritual

catharsis, comparing those who purge blood with blood to a man who should try to wash off

dirt by bathing in mud”! 98 To an Athenian, these charges were not only radical; they were

also blasphemous. 99 Such thinkers were the precursors of their radical enlightenment.

They were, if you will, the Hobbes’s and Spinoza’s of their day. We begin to see them more
and more as exemplars, influences, helps, or precursors that influenced future generations
of “enlighteners” or “rationalists” up unto the European Radical Enlightenment. 100

Dodds refers to others besides Xenophanes and Heraclitus as precursors to the

Greek philosophical Enlightenment such that “By Euripides’ day [480-406 BCE] the

Enlightenment had been carried much further.” 101 Euripides had the audacity to rely on his
own common sense reason to such a degree that he was able to overcome the pressure to
conform to the religious sirens of his culture. He actually called the sun, which was

E. R. Dodds. The Greeks and the Irrational (California: University of California Press, 1951), 180.
Ibid. 181.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid. 182.
100 Indeed, much of Dodd’s account of the Greek moderate and radical enlightenments in his Greeks
and the Irrational read just like Jonathan Israel’s Radical Enlightenment in that he lists the major
figures in the history of Greek culture who questioned, doubted, and denied the reigning popular
religious beliefs (of inspiration, the validity of dreams from the gods, of ritual catharsis,
shamanism,etc.
101 Dodds, op. cited, 181.
96
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traditionally considered a chief god for the Greeks, “a golden clod.” 102 Anyone with only the

slimmest of education about the religion of the Greeks should know with what religious awe
the sun was viewed in the ancient world.

In his The Sacred and Profane, historian of religion Mircea Eliade documents that

even as late as the Roman Macrobius (395-423AD) it was understood that the ancients saw
“in the sun all the gods of the Graeco-oriental world, from Apollo and Jupiter to Osiris,

Horus, and Adonis.” 103 For modern readers, it has to be understood that, “For religious man,
nature is never only ‘natural’; it is always fraught with religious value. This is easy to

understand, for the cosmos is a divine creation; coming from the hands of the gods, the
world is impregnated with sacredness.” 104

There is no way readers can appreciate the revolutionary paradigm shift of this

advancement in human knowledge unless one has taken the time and trouble to enter their
literature and mind-set to appreciate just how “enchanted” and god-filled their world was.

In the same way that contemporary readers are precluded from fully understanding and
appreciating early Enlightenment philosophers such as Descartes or Leibniz without

knowing the scholastics, so also readers of the ancient Greeks are precluded from fully

understanding and appreciating the philosophy of the Greek rationalists without really
learning the counter-enlightenment religion of their day.

In order to do accurate history then, one has to do the requisite labor to get a

glimpse (as best we can) of world-views radically different from our own. And the ancient

Greek religious world-view of, say Hesiod and Homer, is even more radically different than

the scholastic world-view. It gets more and more challenging the further we go back in time
Ibid. 182.
103 Mircea Eliade. The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion (New York: Harcourt, Brace &
World, 1959), 158. See also, for example, Mircea Eliade’s Patterns in Comparative Religion (New
York: Sheed & Ward, Inc., 1958) especially chapter two on “The Sky and Sky Gods” and chapter three
on “The Sun and Sun-Worship.”
104 Eliade, Sacred and Profane, 116.
102
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such that historians of religion tell us that even the theology of Hesiod and Homer show

signs of “desacralization.” On “the hastening of the process of rationalization”, Eliade notes
that this can be seen very early on, even in their religious thought:

In the Graeco-Roman world the sun, having become the ‘fire of intelligence’, ended
by becoming a ‘cosmic principle’; from a hierophany [manifestation of the god] it
turned into an idea by a process similar to that undergone by various of the sky gods
(Iho, Braham, etc.). Even Heraclitus says that “the sun is new each day’. To Plato it
was the image of the good as expressed in visible things; to the Orphics it was the
intellect of the world. Rationalization and syncretism advanced together…. These
last honours paid to the sun in the twilight of antiquity are not entirely devoid of
significance; they are like palimpsests in which traces of the old writing can still be
seen under the new – they still reveal traces of the true, primitive hierophanies: the
dependence of the sun on God which recalls the very early myth of the solarized
demiurge, its connections with fecundity and plant life and so on. But generally
speaking, we find there only the palest shadow of what the sun hierophanies once
meant, and constant rationalization makes it paler still. The philosophers … thus at
last completed the secularization of what was one of the mightiest of all the cosmic
hierophanies. 105
We have now given some of the religious background of some of the Greek

rationalist thinkers and can better see the radical differences between its theological

explanations compared to the more Greek “Enlightenment” naturalistic explanations. It is

primarily with respect to this difference that the historians we have referred to have cited

the Presocratics as precursors to the Greek “radical Enlightenment.” Of course, there were

other powerful influences besides the Presocratic philosophers, as well, such as the

playwrights Euripides and Aristophanes, the historians Herodotus and Thucydides, and of
Sophists such as Protagoras, Gorgias, and Hippias. “Nonetheless, as Aristotle saw, the

Presocratics are the most important and influential representatives of the early period: it
was they who began philosophy, they who prepared the way for Plato and for the great

105 Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, op. cited, 151. And again: “This desacralization of solar
hierophanies is only one among many similar processes through whose operation the entire cosmos
is finally emptied of its religious content” (Eliade, Sacred and Profane, 158. Like Eliade, Israel, Dodds,
Havelock, and Barnes also argue that the “desacralization” or secularizing or demythologizing of
these radical Greek philosophers secularized a great deal of the Greek mythological tradition. Max
Weber coined the famous phrase “the disenchantment of the world” mostly in reference to the
sciences and the 17th century, but it has application to the secularization process initiated by the
Greek Enlightenment.
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philosophical schools of the following generations.” 106 Let us then to Plato and his teacher,
the great Socrates

The Greek Enlightenment of Socrates and Plato in comparison to orthodox Greek religious
dogma (and with some comparisons to the Bible, as well)
Greek religious orthodoxy and Socrates’-Plato’s philosophical enlightenment
For the purposes of this dissertation, at this point, I wish to focus on Socrates and Plato and

their famous rejection of some of their culture’s depiction of the gods as an example of what
happens (even if only to a moderate degree) when a person has the courage to use his own
understanding to test, by reason, even the most precious and the most important

theological and philosophical claims of one’s culture – beliefs that are foundational for faith,

morals, law, and government. I focus primarily on Plato here because of the centrality of his
influence on that which is to come in the Hellenistic period, the New Testament, and the

Church Fathers – and, indeed, even up to the Renaissance and the early modern period in
several places.

I make it a point to compare Plato’s writings with the New Testament for two

reasons: in order to make dramatically clear the differences between the two, and to use
this section as a bridge to lead us from Greek philosophy to Christianity. Plato is only a

“moderate enlightener”, but his work is still a far cry from the religion of Hesiod, Homer,

and the counter-enlightenment orthodoxy which executed Socrates for “impiety.” As we
mentioned earlier, not much will be said here about Aristotle because his major

Early Greek Philosophy, translated and edited with Introduction by Jonathan Barnes (New York:
Penguin Books,1987), 14.
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philosophical influence in European culture comes much later on in the latter Middle Ages
to the Enlightenment.

A good way for the reader to better appreciate and feel the far-reaching difference

between the orthodox theological teachings of ancient Greek religion with the more

rational, secular, or enlightened views of even moderate enlightenment philosophers such
as Plato is by personally acquainting oneself with both by studious reading. It would be

useful at this point for readers to refresh their memory of Greek mythology by perusing

some of Hesiod’s Theogony and Homer’s Odyssey or Illiad. I this way they will grasp in more

vivid detail just how very different mythological thinking is from the growing nonmythological thinking of the Greek enlightenment philosophers.

Read Hesiod’s creation account and his explanations on how all things have become

as they are. Read about the war in Olympus, of Zeus and of his father, of Promethius, and of

the ways of the gods with humankind. And then read Homer and note how visions, dreams,
oracles, voices, impulses, and experiences from the gods fill his world. Note how events are
explained. Note to what degree the whole world is filled with the glories and horrors of
their gods. And then realize that these stories were not meant to be “literature” for the
ancient Greeks (as they are for us). They were sung from generation to generation as
revelations from the gods about the ultimate causes behind the world.

Now then, imagine if you will that you are an ancient Greek and that your whole

education has been restricted to learning, memorizing, and singing only Hesiod and Homer.
Imagine, moreover, that your whole culture teaches that Hesiod and Homer are inspired by
the very gods, and that these songs are in reality the truth. Your whole being is filled with

this sacred history and explanation of things. You reach adulthood and then, one fine day,

you happen to come upon a few people in a shady grove in animated discussion. You learn
that one of them is said to be the famous philosopher of Athens called Socrates and the
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other principal talker, a bright young man named Theatetus.

As you listen to this dialogue your mental world is slowly but gradually brought into

contact with a very different mind-set. Instead of referring to the oracles of Hesiod and

Homer at every turn as you are accustomed to hearing the priests explain such things, you
note that this philosopher is struggling to understand the truth about things in a different

way. He doesn’t continually advert to poets, priests, or prophets for his explanations or for

confirmation or justification of his explanations. 107 Instead, he tries to understand things
using what he calls reason and philosophy. The longer you listen to his arguments, the

more you realize that this philosopher is not at all like the priests and prophets of your fair

city. You feel frightened by this new way of talking and investigating things; but at the same

time you feel exhilarated, as if this something new under the sun that you are learning is
fraught with great power and possibility.

Some of what he says contradicts your knowledge of the nature of the gods and

therefore seems wickedly heretical; yet you can’t help but to listen further and to think

more about what is being said to get a better judgment on this new teaching. You become
completely taken up with it. You’re astounded by Socrates’ way of explaining things

rationally, and by how his arguments expand your mind, and by how admirably human and
this-worldly his philosophical passions and illustrations usually are. You want to become a

disciple of this philosophy and to submit your beliefs and judgments to reason, as well. But,
even as you decide to make these internal changes, you feel that the old way, the way of the
gods of the poets, priests, and prophets now somehow seem foolish and even immoral, and
you sense that there hath been a glory that hath departed. You feel a sense of alienation

Actually, this is not entirely true. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle often did refer to poets and
prophets. But what is different in their treatment of them is that they used the opinions of the poets
and prophets of their culture for further analysis, testing, and thought. They did not refer to them in
the usual orthodox fashion of “God said it; I believe it; that settles it.”
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from the culture at large and from family and friends. Sometimes you feel nostalgia for the
old way. You have been enlightened and the old enchanted world has died.

In part this is what Socrates’ and Plato’s love of reason and philosophy

accomplished. Now you know what it might have been like for Theatetus and other young
men who listened and learned from Socrates. They were part of something new in the

world, a philosophical movement that not only loved and pursued wisdom and knowledge,
but did so primarily or largely based on their own human rational resources. 108

Plato versus some of the Greek religious world view

Hesiod: “Hail, daughters of Zeus! … Tell how the gods and earth arose at first/And rivers and the
boundless swollen sea/And shining stars, and the broad heaven above … 109

Hesiod: Great Heaven [Ouranos] came, and with him brought the night./Longing for love, he lay around
Earth,/ Spreading out fully. But the hidden boy [Cronos)/ Stretched forth his left hand; in his right he
took/The great long jagged sickle; eagerly/He harvested his father’s genitals/And threw them off
behind” 110

I am reminded of an insightful passage in Josef Pieper’s Scholasticism: Personalities and Problems
of Medieval Philosophy. Pieper describes the life-changing impact that the newly translated corpus of
Aristotle’s works had on many 13th century minds such as Siger of Brabant. Imagine if you will, that
you are a 13th century theologian and that your education stemmed mostly from the Bible, the
Church Fathers, and from Platonic and Augustinian sources. After nearly a thousand years of
Platonistic-Augustinian interior rationality, Aristotle seemed to have rent the curtain that prevented
this type of mind-set from beholding the world. Pieper describes Siger of Brabant (whom he takes to
be a sincere believer) as “a man so enthusiastically dedicated to the process of thinking – with the
truly amazing potentialities of human reason to acquire knowledge and insight.” But, for the 13th
century, these truly amazing potentialities of human reason to acquire knowledge and insight were
infinitely supplemented by something new under the European sun: the world. “Those potentialities
had suddenly been revealed to Siger and his contemporaries by Aristotle, and seemed in the first
rush of enthusiasm utterly without limit. Aristotle had newly brought within the range of their vision
the wealth of the natural world, the infinite possibilities of exploring it. ‘Even more than reason, it
seems to have been nature that Aristotle opened up to these minds’; ‘there came to light a real world,
a knowable world.’” Pieper goes on: “And what of theology? Of course it was not expressly denied;
such denial was simply beyond the bounds of possibility for the thought of that age. But in the face of
this new plethora of knowledge about the natural world, theology simply became uninteresting.”
And that, says Pieper “was something new, something ‘un-medieval’” (Josef Pieper. Scholasticism:
Personalities and Problems of Medieval Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964),
123-124.
109 Odyssey. Trans. Richmond Lattimore. The Odyssey of Homer, p. 27 or lines 1 and 9-10.
110 Hesiod. Trans. Dorothea Wender. Hesiod: Theology, Works and Days. New York: Penguin Books,
1973. First quote page 26, second quote 28-9.
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Homer: “Tell me, Muse …. From some point goddess, daughter of Zeus, speak, and begin our story” .

Plato: “First, I said, the greatest lie about the most important matters was that of the man who told bad
fiction when he said that Ouranos did what Hesiod tells us he did, and how Cronos punished him for it…
Nor indeed, said I, any tales of gods warring and plotting and fighting each other - these things are not
true… We must not admit into our city stories about Hera being chained by her son, or of Hephaestus
being hurled from heaven by his father when he intended to help his mother who was being beaten, nor
the battle of the gods in Homer, whether these stories are told allegorically or without allegory” –
Plato’s Republic 111

The first two passages above come from Hesiod’s Theogony. Note Hesiod’s epistemological

stance: He is relying on the gods (and not empirical experience or hypothesis testing or

reason) to reveal to him the answer to such natural philosophical questions as how the

shining stars, broad heavens, and swollen sea came to be. We see this same stance in the
passage from Homer’s Odyssey (“Tell me, Muse …. From some point goddess, daughter of

Zeus, speak, and begin our story”) because from this point onwards the goddess is presumed

to inspire the poet with insights into the councils of the gods, the degree of the gods’

involvement in the affairs of mortals, of what is right and wrong, the story of god-like

Odysseus, and many other culture-informing teachings. Hesiod and Homer was the Bible of
the Greeks.

Notice how the passage from Plato directly contradicts the teachings of Hesiod

about the gods Ouranos and Cronos. This is a very serious thing to do (even though, it is

true, Plato’s criticism comes centuries after Hesiod and the climate is more liberal thanks to
the Presocratics (and other historical and cultural factors). But despite this liberal

development, we need to remember that Socrates was tried and executed by the state for
impiety against the gods of Athens).

Plato. Trans. G.M.A. Grube. Plato’s Republic. New York: Hackett Publishing Company, 1974, pp.
47-9. Plato is referring here to the story of the castration of Ouranos told by Hesiod in the Theogony,
154-210. We will see in succeeding chapters of this study how thinkers who relied more on reason
than on faith leveled similar criticisms of their religion. We’ll see this from those influenced by Greek
philosophy (such as in Athens (Acts 17) when they rejected belief in the resurrection of the body and
from some in the Church at Corinth (1 Cor. 1-4), and then, later, in the Renaissance, (1582) from Noel
Journet, and then, of course, from Spinoza and others.
111
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Socrates calls the reigning Greek theology “the greatest lie” and “bad fiction.” And

he declares this “whether these stories are told allegorically or without allegory.” 112 He

firmly announces that Cronos did not do to Ouranos what has been told for generations that
he did do. And he is adamant that such stories not be publically taught, especially to the

Greek youth. Like Solomon, Plato knew very well the truth of the proverb: “Train up a child
in the way he should go, and he shall not depart from it” (Prov. 22:6). He states this clearly

in the Republic (#378e): “The young cannot distinguish what is allegorical from what is not,

and the beliefs they acquire at that age are hard to expunge and usually remain unchanged.
That may be the reason why it is most important that the first stories they hear should be
well told.”

To get a better feel for the magnitude of Socrates’ and Plato’s stance against Hesiod,

imagine someone in the Jewish and Christian tradition who publically sought not only to

persuade people not to believe various teachings from the Bible, but also sought to

persuade people that God was immoral! If you have read only Deuteronomy 28:15-68 you

would know how serious this is. Imagine someone in Jewish and Christian history teaching
against even morally worrisome portions of scripture. Envision someone who teaches in

public that God did not tell Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac, or that the covenant with God
and His people was not confirmed by genital circumcision, or that God’s marching orders

for the Israelites to take the Promised Land by slaying every man, woman, child and infant

in it was a great lie or bad fiction. (In fact, of course, there were some men and women who
112 There is a great deal of extremely interesting and important literature on the question of Plato
and allegory and myth versus truth or science. For instance, in his Plato the Myth Maker, Luc Brisson
attributes to Plato the distinction between myth and reason. He says: “Until Plato the vocabulary
(muthos/logos) hardly distinguishes between a ‘true’ account and a ‘legendary’ account” (vii). And
again: “There is thus little evidence, if any, evidence prior to Plato which could lead one to conclude
that there was a clear opposition between muthos and logos” (ix). Brisson’s final conclusion on this
matter then is this: “In the final analysis, however, the famous muthos/logos dichotomy is not clearly
attested prior to Plato, although the germs may be discerned in some authors” (x).
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did oppose various biblical teachings and they paid for it by being stoned to death in biblical
times or having their tongues torn out of their mouths and burned at the stake even up to

the Early Enlightenment. Descartes’ contemporary and philosopher Marin Mersenne still
felt it was justified that Noel Fournet had his tongue gouged out and then body burnt to a
stake for arguing that the God of the Bible who predetermined the masses to an eternal
torment was more immoral than the gods of the Greeks and Romans. 113)

Plato utterly and systematically dismisses any and all accounts of the gods when they

plot, fight with each other, or behave as humans. But because this is part and parcel of the
inspired narratives of Hesiod and Homer, Plato’s philosophical pronouncement against

these is tantamount to a total rejection of orthodox or traditional Greek religion. 114 Such a
An anecdote reported by Mersenne: “saying [of a certain Noel, executed at Metz] that he would
rather have preferred to adore a Saturn who eats his children, an adulterous Jupiter, a drunkard
Bacchus, a deceiving Mercury, or believe that there is no God at all, than to believe Him to be the
author of the ruin of humankind, and of the perdition of reprobates, who surmount the number of the
elect by so very much” (Jean-Luc Marion. On the Ego and on God: Further Cartesian Questions. Trans.
Christina M. Gschwandtner (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 110 and endnote #31 on p.
231.
114 In the history of the reception of Greek works such as Hesiod’s and Homer’s, most commentators
in the Christian west up unto the Enlightenment regarded all such heathen accounts as “myths”, the
Christian term for pagan cosmological narratives. From the Christian’s perspective the account of the
gods in these stories appeared as clear evidence that they were not only obviously morally inferior to
the Hebrew-Christian religious tradition, but also obviously foolish and fictional. The first important
lesson I learned in my first major in the History of Religion from the chair of the religion department
was the recurrent phenomenon that everyone brought up in a certain religious tradition thinks that
all other religious traditions are not only strange and foreign, but also foolish and obviously false.
The bias of one’s upbringing is the scholar of religion’s greatest challenge. A more neutral or fairer or
scholarly comparison between Greek religion and the Christian religion would be to point out the
strong similarities between the two traditions. We can’t take the space to adequately demonstrate
this here, but maybe a couple comparisons will serve as an exemplar of so many other
commonalities. One might for instance point out accounts similar to Hesiod’s and Homer’s in the
Bible. See how similar Hesiod’s account that the “earth arose at first… And shining stars, and the
broad heaven above” with the Genesis account of “In the beginning God created the heavens and the
earth….” Or if Hesiod’s claim of “Hephaestus being hurled from heaven” seems out of a comic book,
then read passages such as the Book of Revelation’s: “And there was war in heaven. Michael and his
angels fought against the dragon, and the dragon and his angels fought back. But he was not strong
enough, and they lost their place in heaven. The great dragon was hurled down – that ancient
serpent called the devil or Satan, who leads the whole world astray. He was hurled down to the
earth, and his angels with him” (Rev. 12:7-9). Many other similarities or correspondences might be
cited as well. One further note here: Right after Socrates wisely excoriates Hesiod and Homer for
their brutish views about the gods and their morality (e.g. immorality), he then goes on to say that he
won’t allow such beliefs to be uttered in his city. The practice of censorship is, of course, what the
Church did through most of its history as well. This was part of the reason why Nietzsche’s
113
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sweeping indictment by a philosopher sounds like the principal protagonist of the European
Radical Enlightenment Baruch Spinoza.

How Enlightened were Socrates and Plato?
But how “enlightened” was Plato? How radical was he? In what sense should we affirm or
deny him as a precursor to the Radical Enlightenment? Remember (according to Jonathan
Israel’s definition that we’re using), the Radical Enlightenment is the “rejection of all

supernatural agency, magic, disembodied spirits, and divine providence.” Though Plato’s

rationalist bent was clearly radically different from the credulous believers in the old time

Greek religion, a careful and closer look at Plato’s writings reveal that he was not very

radical with respect to Israel’s definition of radical. The question as to his philosophical

influence on succeeding generations in the Christian western world will be taken up briefly
in the next and last section of this chapter.

Now it is clear that though Socrates believed in “following the argument wherever it

led”, he also took dreams and oracles very seriously. In fact, he even ‘heard voices’. He

called this his ‘daemon’. Dodds states that “If we can believe Xenophon, [Socrates] called it,
quite simply, ‘the voice of God’.” 115 So, despite his pioneering rationalism, we mustn’t leap

to the unwarranted conclusion that he was as radical as a Spinoza, or Hobbes, or modern

day atheists such as Bertrand Russell, Sidney Hook, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and

so on. With Plato, however, things might have been different; for “it is not always so easy to

complained so violently about Plato, and accused him of being a “Christian” (See his Twilight of the
gods for this).
115 Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, op. cited, 185.
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decide where Plato is expressing a personal faith and where he is merely using a traditional

language.” 116

What about the metaphysical-theological Platonism of Plato? True, his philosophy-

theology seems to have developed primarily via rationalistic means; but, still, one can argue

that it wasn’t derived only from rationalistic means. This is where Dodds argues that due to
“events which might well induce any rationalist to reconsider his faith” and the influence of
the Pythagoreans’ new transcendental psychology, “Plato in effect cross-fertilized the

tradition of Greek rationalism with magico-religious ideas whose remoter origins belong to
the northern shamanistic culture.” 117 Dodds goes on to explain that Plato was also

influenced around this time by philosophers who “took over the old mythical fancies about
the fate of the soul and read into them new allegorical meanings … Such men prepared the
way for Plato.” 118 Nevertheless, an important difference in this transference must be

pointed out, for Plato “transposed these ideas definitively from the plane of revelation to the
plane of rational argument.” 119

Dodds discusses the theory that Plato’s religiousness dates only or mostly towards

the end of his life. Dodds then asks a question about Plato’s later growing theological bent

(which many today are asking about the well-known English philosopher Antony Flew’s

conversion from atheism to deism). Dodds asks, “Ought we to discount all this [Plato’s later
‘Platonic’ views] as a senile aberration, the sour pessimism of a tired and irritable old

man?”, for it seems to contrast with his earlier views. 120 Dodds answers, in essence, that
though it was more pronounced later in his life (and with it many heinous teachings

[primarily authoritarian] which Karl Popper highlights in his The Open Society and its
Ibid. 207-208.
Ibid. 209.
118 Ibid. 209.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid. 215.
116
117
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Enemies (vol. 1, especially chapters 3 and 10)), it was nevertheless alive and well even in his
best days as a philosopher.

As we will find at the end of our study of Descartes as a precursor to the Radical

Enlightenment, so we find here: there are two forces at work, the one a reliance and love of
human reason, and the other a continued and at least partial acceptance of some of the

culture’s theological views. 121 So, just as Descartes argued that his writings were better

able to stave off Radical Enlightenment ideas (e.g. to confute the atheists and infidels) than

any other philosophical systems, so also did some works of Plato, such as his Laws, argue for
measures just as heinous as that committed against Socrates.

We can end this section on Plato by noting that despite Plato’s more virulent anti-

enlightenment edicts, according to Dodds, he remained faithful all his life to Socratic
rationalism.

Knowledge, as distinct from true opinion, remained for him the affair of the intellect,
which can justify its beliefs by rational argument. To the intuitions both of the seer
and of the poet he consistently refused the title of knowledge, not because he
thought them necessarily groundless, but because their grounds could not be
produced… [and] the products of poetic intuition must be subject to the rational and
moral censorship of the trained legislator. 122

Even Karl Popper (whose analysis of Plato and Platonism is harsh in the extreme)

admits that even though there is much that is repulsively authoritarian in Plato’s

philosophy, he nevertheless “pays tribute, by his manner of writing, to our inter-personal

theory or reason; for most of his earlier dialogues describe arguments conducted in a very

reasonable spirit.” 123 Popper distinguishes between true rationalism and pseudorationalism.

What I call the ‘true rationalism’ is the rationalism of Socrates. It is the awareness of
one’s limitations, the intellectual modesty of those who know how often they err,

Ibid. 215-216.
Ibid. 217.
123 Karl Popper. The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1966), 227. See Popper’s definition of “rational.”
121
122
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and how much they depend on others even for this knowledge. It is the realization
that we must not expect too much from reason; that argument rarely settles a
question, although it is the only means for learning – not to see clearly, but to see
more clearly than before. 124
The very fact that many of Plato’s dialogues do not end with either The Answer or

any claimed certain answers is powerful testimony to Socrates’ and Plato’s commitment to
reason and truth.

Transition to Hellenism and the regression of Greek thought

We have briefly gone over various scholars’ accounts, such as E. R. Dodds’, of the Greek

moderate and radical enlightenments of the ancient Greeks. But he is careful to also point

out that the story of Greek civilization doesn’t end with the Greek Enlightenment. On the
contrary. There was a regression. He does not take this cultural regression as a reaction

against the Enlightenment, in the sense that some historians view the Romantic period in

European history, for example. Instead, he sees it as a “failure of nerve.” In his influential

essay, “The New Failure of Nerve” Sidney Hook says the following about the period from the
Greeks to the Christians:

In the famous third chapter of his Four Stages of Greek Religion Gilbert Murray
characterizes the period from 300 B.C. through the first century of the Christian era
as marked by ‘a failure of nerve.’ This failure of nerve exhibited itself in ‘a rise in
asceticism, of mysticism, in a sense, of pessimism; a loss of self-confidence, of hope
in this life and of faith in normal human efforts; a despair of patient inquiry, a cry for
infallible revelation; an indifference to the welfare of the state, a conversion of the
soul to God. 125

As a result of this Greek cultural regression, Dodds tells us, there were several

Ibid.
Evolution and Religion: The Conflict Between Science and Theology in Modern America, edited by
Gail Kennedy. Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1957, p. 97.
124
125
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successful prosecutions of intellectuals on religious grounds [which] took place at
Athens … disbelief in the supernatural and the teaching of astronomy were made
indictable offences … a series of heresy trials … The victims included most of the
leaders of progressive thought at Athens – Anaxagoras 126, Diagoras, Socrates, almost
certainly Protagoras also, and possibly Euripides… All these were famous people.
How many obscurer persons may have suffered for their opinions we do not know.
But the evidence we have is more than enough to prove that the Great Age of Greek
Enlightenment was also, like our own time [1951 of McCarthyism and Russian and
Chinese totalitarian communism] , during an Age of Persecution – banishment of
scholars, blinkering of thought, and even … burning of books. 127
Some have sought to explain the ancient Greek prosecutions as motivated primarily

by political and not religious reasons. Dodds argues against this view except in so far as the

political persecution was driven by the “religious bigotry” among the masses which

politicians used for their own purposes. 128 Nilsson argues that persecution against the
rationalist philosophers “was whipped up by the professional diviners, who saw in the
advance of rationalism a threat to their prestige, and even to their livelihood.” 129

There is one further argument that Dodds makes that I think is un-fathomed and

therefore under-appreciated by many contemporary thinkers. He reminds us that in

antiquity, “To offend the gods by doubting their existence, or by calling the sun a stone …

was practically treason – it amounted to helping the enemy. For religion was a collective

responsibility. The gods were not content to strike down the individual offender: did not
Hesiod say that whole cities often suffered for one bad man?” 130

Israel and Dodds do not say much about Anaxagoras beyond listing him as a revolutionary thinker
who was persecuted by religious authorities. In his Early Greek Philosophy, Jonathan Barnes goes
into greater detail about Anaxagoras than Israel or Dodds by first citing serious problems in how to
accurately interpret the truth about Anaxagoras (26-31), and then by citing some of his less than
radical enlightenment views regarding Mind. Some believe that “he held that the original
cosmogonical force was mind” (45). Still, if what we are told from some ancients is true, he “appears
to have offered a complete account of the natural world on the old Milesian model” (226).
127 Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, op. cited, 189.
128 Ibid. 190.
129 Ibid. 190. One can see this same religious bigotry plus economic fear at work against St. Paul. See
for instance, Acts 19:23-40 for an excellent of example of this.
130 Ibid. 191. This notion was by no means restricted to the ancient Greeks. They were even more so
notoriously practiced among the ancient Israelites. As we will see in my section on The
Condemnatations of Cartesians from the Church’s perspective, Christianity practiced these same
divinely ordained edicts throughout much of its history. What many fail to appreciate, however, is
126
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Dodds mentions that within a generation or two of the high Greek Enlightenment,

especially perhaps owing to the effects of the Great Plague of 430, even while Plato was

writing his great works, there was an increasing acceptance and embrace of magical and

miraculous healings, pilgrimages to temples (as in Lourdes in our generation), foreign cults
(“mostly of a highly emotional, ‘orgiastic’ kind”), the worship of the Phrygian ‘Mountain

Mother,’ Bendis, Cybele, Asiatic ‘dying gods” Attis and Adonis, black magic, and many more

irrational beliefs and behaviors that Dodds cites. 131 “All the symptoms I have mentioned …

can be viewed as regressive; they were in a sense a return to the past. But they were also, in
another aspect, portents of things to come.” 132

The decline of Greek Enlightenment thought after Aristotle
Introduction
Earlier, I noted historian Will Durant’s question asking how the European Enlightenment

came about and then asked this of the Greek Enlightenment. In this final section I want to

turn this question upside down: How did the Greeks go from the radical enlightenment of
Presocratics such as Xenophanes, to the moderate enlightenment of Socrates and Plato, to
the almost purely practical or ethical philosophies of Epicureanism and Stoicism, to the

“failure of nerve” in the growing acceptance of Hellenistic and eastern mystery religions? 133
the fact that these condemnations, persecutions, censorship, and executions were biblical! Too many
commentators, who are not natives of Judaism, Christianity or Islam, simply do not know the depth of
devotion, love, and obedience to the scriptures these religions of the book have.
131 Ibid. 194.
132 Ibid. 195.
133 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (Eleventh Edition) defines “Hellenistic” as: a person living
in Hellenistic times who was Greek in language, outlook, and way of life but was not Greek in
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As we mentioned in the preceding section, some Greek scholars have advanced the

theory that after the period of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, an “Age of Anxiety” or “Failure
of Nerve” set in. Because of its importance as a historical thesis, it bears repeating: this

decline of enlightenment philosophy “characterizes the period from 300 BC through the

first century of the Christian era as marked by ‘a failure of nerve’. This failure of nerve

exhibited itself in ‘a rise of asceticism, of mysticism, in a sense, of pessimism; a loss of self-

confidence, of hope in this life and of faith in normal human efforts; a despair of patient
inquiry, a cry for infallible revelation; an indifference to the welfare of the state, a
conversion of the soul to God.’” 134

W. W. Tarn’s Hellenistic Civilization (especially the last chapter on philosophy and

religion) lays out many historical, social, political, philosophical and religious developments
from the Hellenistic (approx. 300 to 30 BCE) to the Christian era (pp. 325-360) that seem to

support Murray’s and Dodds’ interpretation. For Tarn, the Hellenistic period is “not one

phase of civilization, but two: the earlier phase creative in science, philosophy, literature
political state-forms, and much else, with an independent Graeco-Macedonian world

extending its civilization to Asia; the later phase distinguished by the exhaustion of the
creative impulse and the reaction, both spiritual and material, of the East against the
West.” 135

The following account of the Hellenistic period into the Christian era is selective and

brief. I first focus on the two new schools of philosophy after Plato and Aristotle, that of

ancestry; esp: a Hellenized Jew. Hellenism is a body of humanistic and classical ideals associated
with ancient Greece and including reason, the pursuit of knowledge and the arts, moderation, civic
responsibility, and bodily development. W.W.Tarn follows convention for this period and dates it
“from the death of Alexander in 323 to the establishment of the Roman empire by Augustus in 30 B.
C” (Tarn 1).
134 From Sidney Hook’s “The New Failure of Nerve” in Evolution and Religion: The Conflict Between
Science and Religion in Modern America (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1957), 97.
135 W. W. Tarn. Hellenistic Civilization, 3rd edition (New York: A Meridian Book, 1975), 129. It should
be noted here, however, that Tarn has some reservations about the view that the Hellenistic period is
one of decline or decay).
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Epicurus and Zeno. And then go on to say a few words about the developing incursions of
religious ideas which will segue into the next chapter on the warfare of religious

“enlightenment” or counter-enlightenment beliefs versus Greek Enlightenment philosophy.

In keeping with the focus of this study, I say virtually nothing about the equally-important

political, military, economic, and social processes that contributed to the philosophy of
“Hellenism” and “the failure of nerve” in this period.

The two new schools of philosophy
Epicureanism

The four great schools in the history of Greek philosophy were Plato’s Academy, Aristotle’s

school (the Peripatetics), Epicurus in his garden, and Zeno in the Painted Porch or Stoa. The
Cynics had no established school, in keeping with their profession of poverty. Their appeal

was primarily to the poor and downtrodden, though Zeno’s teacher was a Cynic (Crates, the
‘physician of souls’). 136

The two new philosophies of the Hellenistic period were that of Epicurus and Zeno.

Tarn states that “The two philosophies both aimed not at the discovery of truth, but at the

satisfaction of practical needs… The aim of philosophy was the happiness of the individual;
what mattered was conduct… neither cared for science of learning.” 137 But beyond these

points of agreement, Epicurus and Zeno reacted to the new world which Alexander the
Great had made in two very different ways.

Epicurus taught an ethics or philosophy that he thought could relieve the feelings of

religious oppression and anxiety that many felt at the time. “The world they dreaded,
136
137
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[according to Epicurus], was only a machine. No gods, good or evil, affected it; it was not

made or guided by design; it came into being through certain mechanical principle.” 138 As

Tarn explains, by “constructing a world on scientific principles”, Epicurus sought to “free
men from fear of the gods and the evils of superstition.” After all, man need not fear the

afterlife because “man’s soul at death dissolved again into the atoms which made it.” 139 I

assume that Tarn is using the term “scientific” here in a loose sense).

All this sounds very much like radical enlightenment philosophy. It is, for one thing,

a revival of Democritus’s atomic theory. 140 Yet Tarn is not so willing to treat Epicurean

thought in this way for a few reasons. For one thing, as we have already mentioned, his

philosophy did not aim to increase theoretic knowledge of the world, but, instead to find

individual happiness. For the Epicureans, in order to attain happiness one needed to avoid
passions and emotions. And, if one is to avoid passions and emotions, one should not get
too involved in the real world. According to Tarn, “This constituted a doctrine of

renunciation.” And because of this position, “They never influenced the great world”; they

had no wish to.” 141 Tarn criticizes Epicureanism further saying, “The real reproach against
his philosophy was that it taught men to shirk living; it was a running away.” 142 As we will
see, Epicurean influence extends into the New Testament world and past the second
century A.D.

Despite these arguments, I think we can see Epicurus and his followers as “radical”

enlighteners, at least in some regards. Their anti-demonic, anti-god, materialist-like,

mechanistic-like, atomistic-like teachings were certainly radical in the context of the times.
Though they conceded that gods existed, they taught that they did not do anything. They

Ibid.
Ibid. 329.
140 Ibid. 328.
141 Ibid. 329.
142 Ibid. 330.
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refused to get involved with divination and astrology, and adopted a form of naturalism to

explain the world. And they loved the life of the mind. Still, Tarn is right in that though they
may have loved thought and talking, they had no active involvement in the world. The

picture that Tarn draws of the Epicureans here reminds me of what the author of the book
of Acts said when St. Paul arrived in Athens and talked and preached to Athenians and to

Epicureans and Stoic philosophers: “All the Athenians and the foreigners who lived there
spent their time doing nothing but talking and listening to the latest ideas” (Acts 17:21).

This may be so, but they can nevertheless be considered radical enlighteners in that they

thought Paul a “babbler” and “When they heard about the resurrection of the dead, some of
them sneered” (Acts 17:18,32).
Stoicism
As we mentioned above, the teachings of Epicurus and Zeno had several things in common,

but they also had big differences. For one thing, Epicurean philosophy only won a minority,
and it was somewhat limited to Athens. 143 Zeno, however, did not have a center or formal
school to teach from. He “talked to those who came in a public colonnade, the Painted
Porch, a forecast of the fact that the Stoic teachers were never to be tied to a centre at

Athens, but were to spread throughout the world.” 144 By far, the greater school between

Epicureans and Stoicism was the latter. Tarn emphatically declares that “The philosophy of
the Hellenistic world was the Stoa.” 145 So much so, that it greatly influenced even

Christianity. 146

Zeno responded to the new world of Hellenism by providing a philosophy that

claimed could guide the world and make it happier without escaping it completely and
Ibid. 328.
Ibid. 330.
145 Ibid. 325.
146 Ibid. 335.
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without rejecting the gods’ active role in the world. Unfortunately, there are no surviving

writings of Zeno or his immediate successors, and no complete Stoic writings until Seneca,
Marcus Aurelius, and Epictetus. 147 But scholars consider the writings of these latter Stoics

as probably a fairly accurate picture of the teachings of Zeno and his first followers. For the
purposes of this thesis, there is no need to tell the history and teachings of Stoicism. My
purpose at this juncture is to show how they helped set the stage for the religious
“enlightenment” or counter-enlightenment to come.

Zeno’s successor was Cleanthes of Assos. Tarn claims that he is the “author of the

greatest religious hymn in Greek” and that he “brought out the religious side of [Zeno’s]

doctrine.” 148 Thus the universe was considered to be “ruled by one Supreme Power whom

the Stoics envisaged under may aspects and names – Destiny, Zeus, Providence, the

Universal Law, Nature.” 149 From this Power came everything, including man’s soul. This

soul was thought to be “akin to the divine.” 150 Stoics also had an eschatology, as well. They
believed, for instance, that the universe cyclically ended in the divine Fire and then started
again exactly as it had been. This is because the whole universe is controlled by Destiny.
Their Destiny, however, differed from the grim Babylonian notion of Fate in that the

universe was a product of His design and that “His design was all-wise and all-good.” 151 In

fact, He is even a merciful God. Other foreshadowing’s of Christianity could be cited.

The Stoics believed in a World State and that because all men are citizens of this one

State or City, all “ought to be equal.” Stoics believed that “everything was determined”, and,
as a consequence of this, thought “that all that had to do with the body – strength and

weakness, sickness and health, wealth and poverty – was a matter of indifference.” The

Ibid. 330-331.
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149 Ibid. 331.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid. 331.
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Wise Man should neglect these things in favor of the things of the soul and thus desire only
that “which God or Destiny in its wisdom had ordained for him.” Thus, “The ideal man,

when he came, would say ‘Thy will be done’.” 152 Submitting one’s self to God’s will was the

way to happiness (and escape from suffering). Moral virtue was supreme. “On this Zeno
was uncompromising; the intention to do evil, he said, was equivalent to doing it.” 153

Moreover, the Supreme Power gave man a conscience to follow, so that “the true Stoic,
whatever else he was, was captain of his soul.” 154
A new religious “enlightenment” arises
Stoic philosophy had other deeply ingrained religious notions, for Stoicism also took up

astrology. Tarn calls this another sign of “its detachment from the scientific spirit.” 155 In
fact, by the second century “science was beginning to fail.” And because of this decline it
lost out to astrology. “Astronomy might have killed it; instead, by the end of the second
century, it had killed astronomy, and thenceforth it had a free field till Copernicus.” 156

Notice from just this one example how important Greek enlightenment ideas are in

comparison with religious counter-enlightenment ideas for the development of natural
philosophy.

Since the Stoics embraced astrology they were confronted with the problem of how

to escape the Fate of the stars. Tarn answers how they were able to do this: “there were
three main lines on which man sought to escape from his stars, all depending on a belief

Ibid. 332-333.
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that some god was really more powerful than that Fate which ruled the gods… These three
lines were Gnosis, magic, and the eastern mystery-religions.” 157

Gnosticism is the belief that one can gain a special kind of knowledge,

but not the knowledge of the philosopher; some god had once directly revealed the
secret key of the universe to some chosen soul, and could a man find that
knowledge, hidden from other men, he was immune from Fate; he had shortcircuited the stars. They might torment his body, but his soul was beyond their
reach. 158

This kind of “enlightenment” knowledge, as we have discussed earlier, was also
foundational to that movement that would soon enter the world – Christianity.

Magic also filled the world once again and influenced many realms of practical life.

(We see this in the New Testament in many ways, especially in the belief they had in the
name of Jesus.) But more influential than magic, was the new religions bursting on the

scene: “But far more important than magic were the Hellenistic mystery-religions.” 159 As

Tarn puts it: “Magic might alter your fate, but initiation lifted you above the sphere of Fate

altogether… your soul, even in this life, was beyond [the reach of the stars], and after death
would rise above their spheres to the sphere of the divine and dwell with the gods; you
were in fact ‘saved’.” 160

Along with the growth of Stoicism came a skepticism and decline of the traditional

Greek gods and an increase in foreign religious ideas. A growing lack of living faith in the
old Greek gods continued. “Many things conspired to decide the fate of the Olympians,”

Tarn argues. “They belonged to, and fell with, the city state; philosophy killed them for the
educated, individualism for the common man; he was no longer part of the city… But
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perhaps what settled the matter was the conquest of Asia and Egypt.” 161 By the “conquest

of Asia and Egypt”, Tarn means their religious ideas and practices.

For the educated, the place of religion was being taken by philosophy and science.
But these hardly affected the common man; he must worship something, and, as the
Olympians faded, a more real religious feeling began to develop, and the appeal of
the intimate and confident oriental worships became irresistible. In this sphere the
East led its conqueror captive; and thought the movement did not perhaps
culminate till after the Christian era, it was adding strength all through the
Hellenistic period. 162
Tarn plots this decline. “Twilight was indeed falling on the Olympians, in spite of

[some] external show” of loyalty. 163 Dionysus now became the most important Greek god

outside Greece. 164 There was also a pervasive syncretistic movement which blended gods

and sacred accounts. 165 And new or more experiential forms of religious teaching sprouted:
“A dominant factor of the time was the striving after one god.” 166

Tarn explains that the basis of the mystery-religions striving after one god was also

to seek soteria or salvation. And the way to do this was “by personal union with a savior

god who had himself died and risen again.” 167 More than that, one sought to be one with the
god himself. As one can no doubt tell from these short descriptions of the changes in

philosophical and religious thinking, some of the foundations of Christianity were being
laid.

These religions brought to the aspirant a new sense of sin, a new conception of
holiness; and the rite of initiation, culminating in the knowledge that you were
saved, was undoubtedly an intense emotional experience. From the second century
onwards [this] religious sense deepened. 168
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Many other streams added to the torrent of Greek counter-enlightenment religious beliefs.
Orphic ideas, for instance, became very popular because of “its religious ecstasy and its

ideas of purity and the antagonism of flesh and spirit.” 169 All these new ideas eventually led

to a new religion which would very quickly dominate the whole western world. “The

interest in the Hellenistic religions is that they depict the world in which Christianity arose.
That world provided more than the medium of the common civilization in which
Christianity was to spread; it to some extent paved the way.” 170

169
170
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PART III

THE RELIGIOUS ENLIGHTENMENT VERSUS THE GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT:
IN JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY FROM THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD TO SCHOLASTICISM

Chapter Three
The Religious “Enlightenment” versus the Greek Enlightenment in Judaism and Christianity
from Hellenism to 1st century Christianity

Introduction

In our last chapter, we briefly cited some of the changes that occurred in the Mediterranean
world since the death of Aristotle. We saw that philosophy’s focus (generally speaking)

changed from the Presocratics’ primary interest in theoretical knowledge of nature to ethics
with Socrates and Plato. The movement away from empirical scientific thinking continues

in the new philosophies (Epicureanism and Stoicism) and then in the new mystery religions
of the Hellenistic period (300 to 30 BC) into the Christian era. We also briefly mentioned

how some of these new movements and ideas would culminate in Christianity. In this

chapter we do three things. First, we add one further major component to this culmination

in Christianity, and that is the Religious “Enlightenment” versus the Greek Enlightenment in
Judaism (from Hellenism to 1st century Christianity); second, we tell the story of the

Christian “Enlightenment” against Judaism in the New Testament; and finally we will relate
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more of the story of Christian enlightenment” versus the Greek enlightenment, as this is

portrayed in the New Testament.

The Religious “Enlightenment” versus the Greek Enlightenment in Judaism from the
Hellenistic period to 1st century Christianity
Just as the purpose of W. W. Tarn’s Hellenistic Civilization was “an attempt to get a general
picture of the civilization of the Hellenistic period”, so this section is an attempt to get a

general and brief picture of how the Greek “radical” and “moderate” enlightenments were

precursors to Jewish radical, moderate, and counter-enlightenments in the Hellenistic

period (300-30 BC) to the 1st century Christian era. Though it may be true that “Few Greeks
in the Hellenistic period ever managed to learn very much about the Jews” and that “no Jew
made his history available to Greeks before Josephus, late in the first century A.D”, the Jews
not only knew the writings of the Greeks Enlightenment; many of them were even
converted to it. 171

During this period the Jews both in the Diaspora and in Judea were growing accustomed

to the Greek language and to many other aspects of Greek culture. Tarn argues that not only
were the Jews in the Diaspora adopting the language and some cultural aspects of the

Greeks, but they were even adopting some aspects of the Greek Enlightenment and Stoic

notions such that they even “had some sympathy with the religions of those around them
and a tendency to universalism.” 172 This tendency is pronounced in some places such as
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Alexandria where there was a huge population of Jews. Tarn says that even as early as the

third century “the Hebrew Scriptures were useless to many Alexandrian Jews.” 173

Around the time in which Ptolemy I acquired Judaea in 301 BCE, Tarn tells us that

“Ezra had originated modern Judaism.” 174 Yet, despite the liberties that Ezra took with

respect to Jewish tradition and scripture, he is, compared to the more Hellenized Jews of the
time, very orthodox. For anyone who knows Judaism and its sacred traditions, it is easy to
discern that all was not well in the house of the Lord when, despite Ezra’s conservative

influence, “elements of the governing class” and even “the High Priest, were favourable to
Hellenism.” 175 Indeed, during this time we see something similar to the tripartite war of

enlightenment ideologies we referred to in chapter one: we see an orthodox (or counter-

Greek Enlightenment) party of pious Jews; a more liberal or Hellenistic or

accommodationist or “moderate enlightenment” party; and we see out and out Hellenist
radical Jews who totally repudiated Judaism and its purported revelations from God.

The orthodox or traditional attitude toward what wisdom and understanding is has

been the same since the book of Deuteronomy:

See, I have taught you decrees and laws as the Lord my God commanded me, so that
you may follow the in the land you are entering to take possession of it. Observe
them carefully, for this will show your wisdom and understanding to the nations, who
will hear about all these decrees and say, ‘Surely this great nation is a wise and
understanding people’ (Deut. 4:5-6, my emphasis).

We see this same attitude later in the Psalms: “Blessed is the man … whose delight is

in the law of the Lord, and on his law he meditates day and night” (Ps. 1:1-3). And even
more in the longest Psalm and chapter in the Bible, Psalm 119. Anyone who reads this
Psalm and then thinks of the Hellenist Jew who is attracted to Greek learning will

understand why it is that the orthodox party felt that God’s people should be focused only
Ibid. 224.
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on God’s word. And, as for more profound or philosophical things, the greatest king of

Israel was a model of the orthodox attitude: “Such knowledge is too wonderful for me, too
lofty for me to attain” (Ps. 139:3), and again:

Lord, my heart is not haughty, nor my eyes lofty. Neither do I concern myself with
great matters, nor with things too profound for me. Surely I have calmed and quieted
my soul. Like a weaned child with his mother; like a weaned child is my soul within
me. O Israel, hope in the Lord from this time forth and forever (Ps. 131, my
emphasis).
Those Jews who were being transformed by Greek philosophy and culture were

causing extreme anger and bitterness among the orthodox (traditionalists or

conservatives). This Greek and Hellenistic influence actually explains Jewish animosity

against unorthodox Jews in books of the Bible such as Ecclesiastes, Proverbs, and Daniel.

These Hellenising Jews provoked bitter enmity among the pious; they are ‘the
ungodly’ so often referred in subsequent Jewish writings, and Jewish Hellenism may
be the ‘strange woman’ of Proverbs, ‘which flattereth with her lips’, but whose
‘house inclineth unto death’. They were accused of neglecting circumcision and of
exhibiting all the moral shortcomings commonly attributed in the Old Testament to
backsliders… [by] 169 two definite charges made against them were that they
favoured Greek exercises (which involved nudity) and wore Greek hats. 176
And so we see that even before the start of the Christian era, the warfare between

Greek wisdom versus biblical wisdom had begun. It might be that the passage just quoted

above may not be fully appreciated by those not versed in the Torah, so it needs to be made
clear that these charges are anathema to Judaism. Ever since Moses laid down the laws
about circumcision and against mixing with the heathen, he made it clear that dreaded

curses of the Lord would be unleashed against any and all backsliders “who do not carefully
follow all his commands and decrees” (Deut. 28:15 ff). The fact that those converted to

Greek wisdom, “the ungodly”, are given a place and ferociously denounced even in sacred

scripture makes it patently clear that Jewish wisdom and Greek wisdom cannot be married
or yoked or harmonize or fellowship or be friends or agree or concur or walk together
176

Ibid. 213, my emphasis.

77

(these are the kinds of expressions the Jewish and Christian scriptures and their orthodox
followers use).

Tarn is right to say that, “Both praised Wisdom; but, to the Greek, wisdom was a

thing which grew with the toil of many brains, while to the Jew it was the fear of the Lord,
unchangeable for ever.” He no doubt had the following famous maxim from the book of

Proverbs in mind: “The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge, but fools despise

wisdom and discipline” (Prov. 1:7). “Wisdom” for the Jew is through and through moral and
not theoretical. A comparison of the book of Proverbs, for instance, with even a moderate

enlightener like Plato on the subject of wisdom will easily disabuse anyone who might think
that the use of the word is synonymous in both cultures. For the Jews, wisdom calls for

obedience to Yahweh’s moral commands. Even the Greek-influenced book of Ecclesiastes

(probably later edited by orthodox believers) emphatically speaks to this question and
categorically states:

Of making many books there is no end, and much study wearies the body.
Now all has been heard;
here is the conclusion of the matter:
Fear God and keep his commandments,
for this is the whole duty of man (Eccl. 12:12-13).

The wisdom that God commands His people to get comes not from depending on

one’s human intellectual abilities, but rather on Yahweh: “Trust in the Lord with all your

heart and lean not on your own understanding” (Proverbs 3:5). Even the following Greeksounding passage has in mind only Jewish morality and fear of God: “Get wisdom, get

understanding … Wisdom is supreme; therefore get wisdom” (Prov. 4:5, 7); for “The fear of
the Lord is the beginning of knowledge.”

Plato would have had a serious problem with Jewish thinking about wisdom had he

known of it. He would have judged it to be too limited and narrow minded:

The lover of wisdom, we shall say, has a passion for wisdom, nor for this kind of
wisdom and not that, but for every kind of wisdom? – True.
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As for one who is choosy about what he learns … we shall not call him a lover of
learning or a philosopher, just as we shall not say that a man who is difficult about
his food is hungry or has an appetite for food. We shall not call him a lover of food
but a bad feeder. – And we should be right.
But we shall rightly call a philosopher the man who is easily willing to learn every
kind of knowledge, gladly turns to learning things, and is insatiable in this respect
(Grube translation of Republic, #475 b to c). 177
While the Jew will preach “Taste and see that the Lord is good; blessed is the man

who takes refuge in him” (Ps. 34:8), the Greek lover (Plato) of wisdom talks about “the

pleasure to be gained from the contemplation of reality cannot be tasted by anyone except

the philosopher” (Republic 582 c). Similarly (to anticipate our next section), Christians will

say things like:

It is impossible for those who have once been enlightened, who have tasted the
heavenly gift, who have shared in the Holy Spirit, who have tasted the goodness of
the word of God and powers of the coming age, if they fall away, to be brought back
to repentance, because to their loss they are crucifying the Son of God all over again
and subjecting him to public disgrace (Hebrews 6:4-6, my emphasis: note the key
term “enlightenment” in this important passage).

But lovers of Greek wisdom say such things as, the man who “never has a taste of any

learning or any investigation; he has no share in any reasoned discussion or any other form
of culture” (Republic # 411 d).

Tarns’ interpretation of the “strange woman” of Proverbs may be right. It may refer

both to an adulterous woman and to an “adulteress” Jew, that is, a Hellenized or

“backsliding” Jew. The Hebrew for the King James English translation of “strange woman”
here connotes meanings such as “foreign”, “non-relative”, “adulterous”, “different”, and
curiously, “wonderful.” 178

While the Christian writer of the Acts of the Apostles criticizes Athenian philosophers for doing
“nothing but talking about and listening to the latest ideas” (Acts 17:21), Socrates and Plato say
things like: “discussion is very much the philosopher’s tool” (Grube, Republic, #582 d).
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If this is correct, then one thing is patently clear from all the many passages in

Proverbs that refers to this woman, and that is that she was attracting Jewish youth “with

her words; Which forsaketh the guide of her youth, and forgetteth the covenant of her God”
(Prov. 2:16-17). But even if this is not a valid exegesis, we know that Greek Enlightenment

wisdom attracted and seduced many Jews (and then later, Christians in the New Testament,
and then some Church Fathers, some medieval philosophers, some scholastics, some

Renaissance humanists and, finally, some of the religion-destroying philosophers of the

Radical Enlightenment). Thus, by the end of the Hellenistic period and into the beginning of
the Christian era, we continue to see the affect that the sirens of the Greek Enlightenment
had over Judaism. One last example of this will suffice before we turn to the Christian
“enlightened” stance toward Judaism.

Let us take Philo of Alexandria, for our example. Philo (20-50 A.D.) was a Jew and a

philosopher. That’s all that one needs to know to conclude that “righteous” ones (like Ezra)
have lost and “the ungodly” have won out. Philo’s philosophy demonstrates how much of
the Hellenistic spirit he imbibed because he labored to harmonize Judaism with Greek
philosophy, the very thing that orthodoxy have always warred against.

Before we end our discussion on Jewish wisdom, let us prepare the way for the new

Lord and His attitude toward even orthodox Jewish wisdom.

Christian spiritual enlightenment wisdom versus Judaism
As opposed to places in the Diaspora such as in Alexandria, things were different in Judea,
and especially in Jerusalem. Here Greek philosophy and the Hellenistic spirit are not very
prominent. The Jews in Judea after all are maintaining the Temple worship, rituals, and
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synagogue teaching of Torah throughout the land. Yet, according to the new Christian

spiritual enlightenment movement of the time, they were missing out on the light. The “true
light … was in the world, and though the world was made through him, the world did not

recognize him. He came to that which was his own [the Jews], but his own did not receive
him” (Jn. 1:5-11).

Jesus treated the Pharisees (which were the strictest and most orthodox believers of

Judaism of the time) as un-enlightened. He sees them as learned, but superficial; wise, but

only in an intellectual-scholarly sense and not in the true sense of wisdom to him. The

Pharisees and scribes are not only literate (as opposed to the majority of the population)

but also the scholars and “wise” or most “enlightened” in their society. Yet the gospels and

the New Testament judge them to be spiritually blind. Jesus’ “enlightenment” is of a wholly
different order: “I praise you Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because you have hidden

these things from the wise and the learned and revealed them to little children” (Lk. 10:21,
my emphases). And this is where things get even more “mysterious”; for the New

Testament also teaches that God Himself actually makes it impossible for many, including
the Jews, to believe, even if they witnessed the most astounding miracles!
He has blinded their eyes
and deadened their hearts,
so they can neither see with their eyes,
nor understand with their hearts,
nor turn – and I would heal them (Jn. 12:40).

St. Paul puts it in this way:

God gave them a spirit of stupor,
eyes so that they could not see
and ears to that they could not hear,
to this very day (Rom. 11:8).

And again:

Jews demand miraculous signs and Greeks look for wisdom, but we preach Christ
crucified: a stumbling block to the Jews and foolishness to Gentiles, but to those
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whom God has called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the
wisdom of God. For the foolishness of God is wiser than man’s wisdom (1 Cor. 1:2123).
According to the New Testament, even the most devout and zealous Jews are

unenlightened and therefore will not be saved from damnation. St. Paul, for instance, states:
“Brothers, my heart’s desire and prayer to God for the Israelites is that they may be saved.
For I can testify about them that they are zealous to God, but their zeal is not based on

knowledge” (Rom. 10:1-2). 179 Paul is talking about a new kind of “knowledge.” This new

kind of knowledge is in keeping with the new kind of Jew that he says is the only true Jew.
Though he acknowledges that the Jews “have been entrusted with the very words of God”

and that there is some advantage in being a Jew and in circumcision, he nevertheless says:
A man is not a Jew if he is only one outwardly, nor is circumcision merely outward
and physical. No, a man is a Jew if he is one inwardly; and circumcision is
circumcision of the heart, by the Spirit, not by the written code (Rom. 2:28-3:2).

For Jesus and Christianity, true enlightenment is not a matter of “worldly” learning

or wisdom, but of spiritual learning and wisdom. And this wisdom and learning can only be
received by child-like faith and love, and not by any sort of scholarly or scientific learning.

In fact, Jesus was also speaking quite literally and not just metaphorically about the wisdom

of children: “But Jesus called the children to him and said, ‘Let the little children come to me,
Paul knew a thing or two about zeal for Judaism: “For you have heard of my previous way of life
in Judaism … I was advancing in Judaism beyond many Jews of my own age and was extremely
zealous for the traditions of my ancestors. But when God, who set me apart from birth and called me
by his grace, was pleased to reveal his Son in me” (Gal. 1:13-16). Of some Judaeizers who were
preaching that it was necessary to be circumcised, he says: “Watch out for those dogs, those
mutilators of the flesh. For it is we who are the circumcision, we who worship by the Spirit of God,
who glory in Christ Jesus, and who put no confidence in the flesh – though I myself have reasons for
such confidence.
If anyone things he has reasons to put confidence in the flesh, I have more: circumcised on the
eighth day, of the people of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew of Hebrews; in regard to the
law, a Pharisee, as for zeal, persecuting the church; as for legalistic righteousness, faultless.
But whatever was to my profit I now consider loss for the sake of Christ. What is more, I
consider everything a loss compared to the surpassing greatness of knowing Christ Jesus my Lord,
for whose sake I have lost all things. I consider them rubbish, that I may gain Christ …” (Phil. 3:2-11).
In the first passage, note how he came to learn about the Son. In the last passage, note his attitude
toward knowledge.
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and do not hinder them, for the kingdom of God belongs to these. I tell you the truth,

anyone who will not receive the kingdom of God like a little child will never enter it” (Lk.

18:16-17). This is exactly what the Pharisees and certainly the Greeks would definitely not

do. Indeed, to those influenced by Greek wisdom, such claims as Jesus’ seem the opposite of
the truth. They are indeed the very things that the rationalist Enlighteners from the Greeks
to the European Enlightenment of Spinoza and Kant fought against. As we cited in the first
chapter, according to Kant, “Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed

immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s understanding without the guidance
from another.” But this is exactly the method and state that children are in! For Spinoza

and Kant, one needs not only to think for oneself, but one needs to test every claim to truth.
This also is the very opposite of the kind of Enlightenment that Jesus and Christianity
teaches. Their kind of enlightenment forbids testing.

The Christian “Enlightenment” versus the Greek Enlightenment according to the New
Testament
Now that we have made some inroads about how the Christian “Enlightenment” judges even
its parent, Judaism (or at least some forms of it in 1st century Judea), let us look a little

further into the New Testament view of Greek Enlightenment thought. We have already

made a start on this subject in Chapter One, Section 4, and we’ve also touched on it here and
there in the last chapter, and of course in the section preceding this one. But let us look

more closely now at the attitude of the New Testament toward reason and philosophy to fill
out some things that have not been explained yet. We stress this analysis because of its
importance to arguments that will be made in later chapters.
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From the very beginnings of Christianity, in certain times and places, there was

tension and conflict. Not all early Christians were happy with the way their church was

developing. In Judea and in the more Jewish sections of the Roman world, the tension and
conflict was over to what degree beliefs and practices of Judaism should be considered

mandatory for the Christian. But in other parts of the world in which the Greek spirit was
dominant (throughout Greece, parts of Asia Minor, and part of Italy, including Rome), we

see a tension and conflict between what we might call the Christian “Enlightenment” (that

is, of those who tend to think that the believer should look for knowledge and life primarily

from God’s Holy Spirit) and the “moderate Enlightenment” of Christians who wished also to
include Greek Enlightenment or rationalist thinking.

There were Christians in the primitive churches that were enamored not only with

their newly found religion, but also with philosophy. Most of these believers were

influenced by the Greek spirit in the culture around them and not formally educated. (In

fact, Paul indicates that most of the early believers were not educated. See 1 Corinthians

1:26-29). The Greek influence was such a prevalent problem that the apostle Paul had to

repeatedly warn and chasten believers who were attracted to philosophy. Over and over
again, he says things such as: “See to it that no one takes you captive through hollow and

deceptive philosophy, which depends on human tradition and the basic principles of this
world rather than on Christ” (Colossians 2:8).

From the perspective of the apostles like Paul, the problem with philosophy is that,

at bottom, it depends on human, all-too-human sources and authority, and, as such must be

“hollow and deceptive.” Since man is sinful, and since even his very mind is corrupt, he is in
no position to really know the truth about God’s world and spiritual things. The only way
one can know such truth is from God Himself. One therefore must not depend on “human

tradition and the basic principles of the world”, but, instead, “on Christ.”
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How does one know what the past was like? How can one find out where the

universe came from? How does one learn what is right and wrong? All the apostles knew

the answers to these questions. The devout believer finds the truth on all such matters not

from disinterested research into the history of various peoples; nor from intellectual

curiosity to observe nature carefully in order to know it better; nor from independent

critical reasoning on various literature on the subject to test and learn from it. All the

apostles knew the answers to these questions. One finds the truth on all such matters from
the Holy Scriptures, from the “Word of God”, from revelation, and from spiritual

illumination. The apostle Peter says, “His divine power has given us everything we need for
life and godliness through our knowledge of him who called us by his own glory and

goodness” (2 Pet. 1:3). In 2 Timothy, Paul says that “the holy Scriptures … are able to make

you wise” and that “All Scripture is God-breathed and is useful for teaching, rebuking,
correcting and training in righteousness, so that the man of God may be thoroughly
equipped for every good work” (2 Tim. 3:15-16).

Those Christians who had been influenced by philosophy and Greek learning

naturally could not help admiring the intellectual achievements and eloquence of non-

believers in the culture at large. These believers (and even many scribes and Pharisees)
could not help thinking that Jesus and his disciples should also have more such formal

education, common sense, and scholarly knowledge and wisdom. But both disappointed.
Jesus praised God for hiding truth from the learned and the wise (Luke 10:21), and Paul
explicitly goes out of his way not to rely on such wisdom. Paul primarily believes in

spiritual wisdom, which he calls a “secret wisdom”, and a wisdom only for “the mature, but
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not the wisdom of this age or of the rulers of this age” (1 Cor. 2:6-7). 180 Paul makes it crystal

clear that he will not play the pagan, Greek rationalist philosophy game:

When I came to you brothers, I did not come with eloquence or superior wisdom as I
proclaimed to you the testimony of God ... For my message and my preaching were
not with wise and persuasive words, but with a demonstration of the Spirit’s power,
so that your faith might not rest on men’s wisdom, but on God’s power.... this is what
we speak, not in words taught us by human wisdom but in words taught by the Spirit,
expressing spiritual truths in spiritual words. The man without the Spirit does not
accept the things that come from the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him,
and he cannot understand them, because they are spiritually discerned. The
spiritual man make judgments about all things, but he himself is not subject to any
man’s judgment: ‘For who has known the mind of the Lord that he may instruct
him?’ But we have the mind of Christ (1 Cor. 2, my emphases).

This passage in a nutshell says it all. Here the Christian “Enlightenment” position is

clearly laid out. Here the spiritual bifurcation of the human race and who knows what and

who can know truth is made abundantly clear. Paul purposely eschews “superior wisdom”,
philosophy, logic, or “wise and persuasive words.” There’s no natural theology going on

here; nor any kind of rationalist, evidentialist philosophy of religion. He makes it clear that
for his preaching and for his life, he depends on only one thing: Christ. Beyond this kind of
knowledge, generally speaking, he thinks all else is but dung or rubbish (Phil. 3:8). For,

ultimately, all such “knowledge puffeth up”; for “the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life” (2

Cor. 3:6). If St. Paul is to be proud, if he would boast, it will only be, he says, about “visions
and revelations from the Lord” (2 Cor. 12:1) and not on the traditions of men or hollow or
deceptive human wisdom.

Christians are exhorted to have faith. Unbelief and doubting are often severely

rebuked. They are not taught to rely on reason. They are not taught to critique all claims

and beliefs and presuppositions. There are no major didactic teachings that explicitly praise
reliance on reason in the Torah or in the New Testament, as there are in the works of the
great Greek philosophers; for believers are taught to “pray without ceasing” (1

For more on this from contemporary scholarship, see, for instance, Elaine Pagels’s The Gnostic
Paul: Gnostic Exegesis of the Pauline Letters.
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Thessalonians 5:17), to fast, to worship, to love, hope, and to be filled with faith. Over and
over again, throughout the whole New Testament, there are stories and teachings that
rationalism and doubting are foolish and sinful, and that only childlike (and literally

children’s) faith is what is praised and rewarded. For example, Jesus does not praise the

knowledge of the scholars and sages of the Pharisees of Sadducees. 181 Instead he says things

like: “I praise you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because you have hidden these things

from the wise and learned, and revealed them to little children” (Luke 10:21). God hides the

spiritual things from the scholarly, but will only reveal them to child-like faith.

In John, we are told that the greatest scholar of the time could make neither head

nor tail out of what Jesus was teaching. Jesus tells him,

I tell you the truth, unless a man is born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God”,
but Nicodemus doesn’t have a clue as to what is meant: “How can a man be born
when he is old?” Nicodemus asked. “Surely he cannot enter a second time into his
mother’s womb to be born!” Jesus answered, “I tell you the truth, unless a man is
born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God. Flesh gives birth
to flesh, but the Spirit gives birth to spirit”... “How can this be?” Nicodemus asked.
“You are Israel’s teacher,” said Jesus, “and do you not understand these things?
(John 3:3-11).
The original church saw themselves as “strangers and pilgrims” in the world, and

that “the time is short” and that “the fashion of the world is passing away”; they are thus

exhorted to look only to the “city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God”

(Hebrews 11:9-10, 1 Peter 1:1; 2:11; 1 Corinthians 7:29-32). In fact, some churches, such as
the church in Thessalonica, were so filled with faith in the teachings from Jesus and the

As the context of the next New Testament passage shows, Jesus railed against the scholarship of
the Pharisees since through it they rejected him. From the Enlightenment’s point of view, of course,
scholarship is, on the whole, a good thing. But, as Nietzsche points out, the primitive church
condemned the wisdom of the world: [you need to introduce and explain the following:] “Whomever
a ‘first Christian’ attacks is not besmirched by it. ... Conversely: it is an honour to have ‘first Christians’
against one. It is impossible to read the New Testament without feeling a partiality for that which is
ill-treated in it – to say nothing of the ‘wisdom of the world’ which an impudent humbug tried in vain
to confound.... But even the Scribes and Pharisees gain advantage from having such an opponent:
they must have been worth something to be hated in such an indecent fashion” (The Anti-Christ, 161162).
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apostles of the Lord’s soon return, that many of them even left their jobs! The apostle Paul
actually had to tell them to keep working -”until the Lord returns.”

The first Christians were exhorted to “Therefore come out from them and be

separate” (2 Corinthians 6:17), for “Your citizenship is in heaven” (Philippians 3:20). This is
also why they are told to “not conform any longer to the pattern of this world, but to be

transformed by the renewing of your mind” and to “not love the world or anything in the
world” (Romans 12:2; 1 John 1:15). Indeed, Jesus’ brother, James, rebukes the early

believers in the harshest of terms for being cozy with “the world”: “You adulterous people,

don’t you know that friendship with the world is hatred toward God? Anyone who chooses

to be a friend of the world becomes an enemy of God” (James 4:4). In all these passages, and
so many more, there is not a hint of teaching or encouragement to philosophize or to
reason. And yet later Christian philosophers would do just this.

Let me refer to a couple more texts before showing how this same problem cropped

up in the generation of the Church Fathers. To the church in the Greek city of Corinth, Paul

the apostle explains that “the message of the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing,
but to us who are being saved it is the power of God” (1 Cor. 1:18). To “prove” his point (in

the Christian “Enlightenment” way), he quotes from the Word of God (a passage from Isaiah
29:14) and then expounds what it means. “For it is written:
’I will destroy the wisdom of the wise;
the intelligence of the intelligent I will frustrate.’

Where is the wise man? Where is the scholar? Where is the philosopher of this age?
Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? 182 For since in the wisdom of
Nietzsche: “A religion like Christianity, which is at no point in contact with actuality, which
crumbles away as soon as actuality comes into its own at any point whatever, must naturally be a
mortal enemy of the ‘wisdom of the world’, that is to say of science – it will approve of all expedients
by which disciplining of the intellect, clarity and severity in matters of intellectual conscience, noble
coolness and freedom of intellect, can be poisoned and calumniated and brought into ill repute.
‘Faith’ as an imperative is a veto against science ... Paul understood the need for the lie, for ‘faith’; the
Church subsequently understood Paul.” Nietzsche goes on to assert his theory that Paul invented this
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God the world through its wisdom did not know Him, God was pleased through the
foolishness of what was preached to save those who believe. Jews demand
miraculous signs and Greeks look for wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified: a
stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles, but to those whom God has
called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power and wisdom of God. For the
foolishness of God is wiser than man’s wisdom.... God chose the foolish things of the
world to shame the wise.... so that your faith might not rest on men’s wisdom, but on
God’s power.... This is what we speak, not in words taught us by human wisdom but
in words taught by the Spirit, expressing spiritual truths in spiritual words. The
man without the Spirit does not accept the things that come from the Spirit of God,
for they are foolishness to him, and he cannot understand them, because they are
spiritually discerned.... Do not be deceive yourselves. If any one of you thinks he is
wise by the standards of this age, he should become a ‘fool’ so that he may become
wise. For the wisdom of the world is foolishness in God’s sight. As it is written: ‘He
catches the wise in their craftiness’; and again, ‘The Lord knows that the thoughts of
the wise are futile’ (1 Corinthians, chapters 1-3, my emphasis). 183
You can’t get any clearer than this. If this doesn’t express the Christian

Enlightenment’s view of worldly knowledge, of God’s attitude toward the wise man and

scholar and the philosopher of this age, I don’t know what can. The Greek Enlightenment is
“foolishness to God.” Greek philosophical reasoning cannot come to know God, nor the
things of God. It cannot bring salvation, spiritual wisdom, or true enlightenment from

communing with the true God through Christ His Son. It cannot then find out what this

world is all about. It cannot then learn the truth about the creation of the world in seven
days, or about our first parents, Adam and Eve, or of the Garden of evil and the fact that
there is a devil who tries to lead men’s minds away from the truth. How can the

philosopher of this age find out from hollow and deceptive philosophy which depends

human tradition about the all-important all of man and the curse on nature? How can they
know why women suffer in child birth or why the earth yields thistles? How can their

God who ‘confounds the wisdom of the world’ because he thought that by this route he could defeat
his intellectual enemies (The Anti-Christ, trans. Hollingdale, 163).
183 There has been a great deal of writing on the anti-philosophy passages of Scripture throughout
the history of Christian theology and apologetics. There have also been some differences of opinion
on how far to take these passages’ rejection of philosophy. All interpreters however agree that the
New Testament’s distinction between philosophy and theology is, at the least, a rejection of any
philosophizing or reasoning that would reject or make obstacles to the Christian message. Thus,
even if the New Testament’s position is not a wholesale rejection of philosophy as such, it does
appear to be of any and all philosophies of religion that reject the gospel.
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reasoning teach them who God has peculiarly selected as His people and who He has
appointed to rule the earth?

How can they understand where plagues or famines or wars or blights or blindness

or disease comes from? How can they know about the meaning of death and what, if

anything, happens after death? How can they know that “the earth is established; it cannot
be moved”? How can they know what is right and wrong? No, the wise men, the scholars,

the philosophers of this world are “always learning but never able to acknowledge truth” (2
Tim. 3:7).

All their reasoning won’t teach them about the angels, about the laws of God, about

the sign of the rainbow as God covenant that he will never destroy mankind again by water.
By reasoning they cannot find out what God is like, what the end of the world will be like,

how they should live. As a matter of fact, Paul states that most of the early church was not
wise when they were converted – “not many of you were wise by human standards” (1

Corinthians 1:26). Yet, despite such clear passages (and there are many many more)

against intellectualism and rationalism and philosophy throughout the Torah, Prophets, and
New Testament, some Christians to come, who were brought up in pagan learning and

philosophy, would nevertheless rely on (to varying degrees) and practice philosophy on

their religion. Being educated and trained in Greek thought, they couldn’t help but to

analyze, critique, wonder, and philosophize about life, the world, the scriptures, and their

faith. But, again, David and the great heroes of the faith did not. Instead, they responded in
exactly the opposite way. As we’ve quoted above:

Lord, my heart is not haughty, nor my eyes lofty. Neither do I concern myself with
great matters, nor with things too profound for me. Surely I have calmed and
quieted my soul. Like a weaned child with his mother; like a weaned child is my soul
within me. O Israel, hope in the Lord from this time forth and forever (Psalm 131)!

Despite all these proof texts exhorting believers to attend focus on spiritual wisdom,

some early Christians (and then, throughout the history of Christian philosophy - which was
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most of western philosophy up until the Radical Enlightenment!- could not resist intellectual
temptation. They found it too hard not to “concern themselves with great matters.” They
could not “wean themselves like a child.” We see this pattern of intellectualism versus
spiritualism played out not only in what is called the “primitive” church (meaning the

churches and Christians as we know them from the New Testament), but also in the very
next generation after the Apostolic Fathers – in the generation of the Church Fathers.
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Chapter Four
The Apostolic Fathers and the Church Fathers on the Tension between Theology and
Philosophy

The Apostolic Fathers versus Greek or worldly wisdom
Contrary to popular opinion, the first generation after the apostles was not that of the

Church Fathers such as Tertullian or St. Augustine. It was that of the Apostolic Fathers such
as Clement of Rome, Ignatius, Polycarp, Diognetus, and Barnabas. In the Introduction to his
translation of Early Christian Writings, Maxwell Staniforth makes clear that the Apostolic

Fathers continued the anti-philosophy, anti-Greek-Enlightenment, keep-your-eyes-on-theheavenly-prize mentality of the apostles. I take this to be a very important and largely

ignored fact.

In the eyes of the primitive Church the writings of these men were virtually on the
same level as Holy Scripture; in fact, if things had been only just a very little
different, some of them would actually have been Holy Scripture – and today, instead
of being unknown names, as they are to nine out of ten, they would have been
familiar to every Bible reader in the world. 184

Staniforth goes on to provide a working definition for the Apostolic Fathers: “So if

you want a definition of the Apostolic Fathers, all we can say is that they are certain writers
who faithfully preserved the apostolic teaching and tradition between the time of the

Early Christian Writings, translated by Maxwell Staniforth (New York: Penguin, 1968), 9. See also
J. B. Lightfoot’s The Apostolic Fathers (Michigan: Baker Book House, 1980).
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Apostles themselves and the latter years of the second century.” 185 And what does it mean

that they “faithfully preserved the apostolic teaching and tradition between the time of the
Apostles and themselves”? Staniforth gives us the answer: In “Nearly all their writings …
[they] write in a manner very like that of St. Paul.” 186 This is an accurate assessment.

One fact that is unmistakable in the writings of the Apostolic Fathers and that is that

all their writings ape the writings of the New Testament almost exactly in style, words,
advice, teachings, et cetera. There’s absolutely no free thinking or original thinking or

thinking outside the box in their writings. There is no inkling of the Greek philosophical

spirit in these writings whatsoever. We also find the same complete reliance on Scripture

and Scripture alone. No other writings are referred to. No other reasoning is presented.

Only reasoning stemming directly and constantly from scripture. They say only what the

apostles said. How different this is compared with the writings of later Church Fathers such

as St. Augustine whose City of God gives a history of the city of man, of pagan philosophy,

and of a million other things under the sun. What happened to this complete dependence
on scripture alone?

We also find the same un-Enlightened view of authority for one’s beliefs and

obedience. The Apostolic Fathers, like the New Testament apostles, demanded faith and
obedience to scripture and to the Bishops and deacons of the church. Take Ignatius

Theophorus, Bishop of Antioch, the capital of Syria (which was one of the world’s three

great cities only surpassed by Rome and Alexandria). He is said to have been a disciple of
the Apostles. 187 In his epistle to the Ephesians, he demands that the church unite “in a

common act of submission and acknowledging the authority of your bishop and clergy.”

Later, he says, “as [Jesus Christ] represents the mind of the Father, so our bishops …
Ibid. 10.
Ibid. 10.
187 Ibid. 63.
185
186
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represent the mind of Jesus Christ” and again, “we must regard a bishop as the Lord

Himself.” 188 This is not Kantian-Spinoza Enlightenment talk or even Socrates-Plato

Enlightenment talk. This is “Don’t think or believe on your own” talk. Think and believe

only in obedience to “your Bishop and clergy,” not “Dare to know! Have the courage to use
your own understanding” “without guidance from another.”

The earliest surviving Christian writings, outside of the New Testament, come from

Clement, Bishop of Rome at about 96 AD. In his Epistle to “the colony of the Church of God

at Corinth”, he praises them for “deferring with correctness to those who were set over you”
and for their “Humility, too, and a complete absence of self-assertion.” 189 For people are

“made better” by “self-effacement and humble submissiveness” (33). Clement might have

been a Greek or Roman by birth, but he makes no mention of any Greek or Roman

literature; only “the Bible.” He reminds them of their “heavenly citizenship” 190; “Let us fix

our thoughts on the Blood of Christ”; 191 “Let us bow, then, to that sovereign and glorious

will.” 192

There were some in the church at Corinth who disagreed with the Bishop of their

church. Clement tells them to “make your submission to the clergy. Bend the knees of your
hearts and accept correction, so that it may bring you to a better frame of mind. Learn to

subordinate yourselves.” 193 The only study he calls his church to do is “careful study on the
maxims of the divine Teaching”; for “it is a moral duty for us to bow the head and take our

seat on the stool of submission.” 194

Ibid. 76-77.
Ibid. 23.
190 Ibid. 24.
191 Idid. 26.
192 Ibid. 27.
193 Ibid. 53.
194 Ibid. 56.
188
189
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There’s nothing in these earliest Christian writings which bespeak any radical or

Greek enlightenment values. There isn’t the slightest hint of naturalism or rationalism. All
is based on the Word of God and obedience to their leaders.

Reading the earliest of Christian writings is really quite revealing. For instance, one

finds an eschatology of the kind that one hears in American Evangelical and Fundamentalist
churches today. They believed that the Lord’s coming was at hand. The scriptures that

teach this are too many to cite here, but some must be quoted in order to help readers to

know the mind-set of the New Testament and the New Testament Church. These will also

help readers to gain a richer understanding of Christian hostility to worldly pursuits such as
philosophy, for it the world is indeed ending and the Lord is indeed coming “with

judgment”, then one would indeed be a fool to ignore these things to pursue philosophy.

Jesus: “I tell you the truth, this generation will certainly not pass away until all these
things have happened” (Lk. 21:32).
Paul: “What I mean, brothers, is that the time is short. From now on those who have
wives should live as if they had none; those who mourn, as if they did not; those who
are happy, as if they were not; those who buy something, as if it were not theirs to
keep; those who use the things of the world, as if not engrossed in them. For this
world in its present form is passing away” (1 Cor. 7: 29).
“The Lord is near” (Phil. 4:5).
1 Jn. 2:18: “Dear children, this is the last hour; and as you have heard that the
antichrist is coming, even now many antichrists have come. This is how we know it
is the last hour.”
“The revelation of Jesus Christ, which God gave him to show his servants what must
soon take place … because the time is near … Look, he is coming with the clouds, and
every eye will see him, even those who pierced him, and all the peoples of the earth
will mourn because of him” (Rev. 1:1-3).
Jesus: “Behold, I am coming soon! … Yes, I am coming soon” (Rev. 22: 7, 20).
The early church and Apostolic Fathers also believed strongly and says a lot about

the devil or the “Dark Lord.” They believed that the devil’s man (the anti-Christ and the

Beast) would soon deceive the world, and much else of end-times talk. They fully believed
St. Paul’s teaching that Satan personally and actively deceives the minds of unbelievers so

that they believe lies instead of “the truth” (that is, their myth) because “they refused to love
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the truth and so be saved.” In fact, because of unbelievers refusal “to love the truth” (how

different from the love of truth that even Plato counseled!) God punishes all such so that

they will believe in lies and delusions such as the claims of Greek wisdom. “For this reason
God sends them a powerful delusion so that they will believe the lie so that all will be

condemned who have not believed the truth but have delighted in wickedness” (2 Thess.
2:11-12).

For the early Christians such as St. Paul, the philosophers do not know God. And, if

they don’t know God (that is, the Christian God), then they’re in a heap of trouble, for “God’s

judgment is right … God is just … This will happen when the Lord Jesus is revealed from

heaven in blazing fire with his powerful angels. He will punish those who do not know God
and do not obey the gospel of our Lord Jesus. They will be punished with everlasting
destruction” (2 Thess. 1:8).

It is therefore “logical” that the primitive church preached against the pursuit of

worldly wisdom, for they fully believed that the end of the world and the return of the Lord of

Lords was at hand! In fact, some churches, such as those in Thessalonica actually were
quitting their jobs and neglecting even practical affairs for survival! 195

One more observation that I think worth pointing out from my study of the

Apostolic Fathers: the Epistle of Barnabus and the Didache talk about the Two Ways. They

thus continue the New Testament teachings of a bifurcated universe of the enlightened and
saved from the unenlightened and unsaved - and this long before Augustine’s theology and

history of the Two Cities memorialized in his The City of God. In other words, this “twoways” business is very Christian and very orthodox.

This New Testament teaching, by the way, has been followed throughout the history of
Christianity, and not only in that of the New Testament or the Apostolic Fathers. See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Coming_of_Christ, for a list of some of the many believers who
believed and acted on this biblical belief.
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Staniforth tells us that these writings from this period are considered “the purest

times of Christianity next to the Apostles.” 196 A reading of their writings reveals a very

different mentality compared to the later generations of Church Fathers, who are skilled

(with ambivalent love) in Greek philosophical wisdom. Compared to the Church Fathers,

“The Apostolic Fathers were not all intellectual giants, they were men of a simple and rather
endearing piety, who were devoted heart and soul to a living Saviour and quite untroubled
by the theological conundrums that were so soon to perplex their successors.” 197

The Church Fathers up to Augustine and their struggle between philosophy and the
scriptures
The Church Fathers (along with the Apostolic Fathers) continued the other-worldly

tradition of Jesus and the apostles. Clement addressed his letters (as Peter and Paul often
did) with expressions such as, to the “Church of God which sojourns at Rome”; Polycarp

does the same; Justin writes: “Depart ye, depart ye, depart ye, go ye out from thence and
touch no unclean thing”; Cyprian says, “We have renounced the world when we were

baptised”; Pontius understands that as a Christian, “he is a stranger even in his own state”;
Tertullian asks why some Christians seem to want the age to be prolonged when they

should be longing for its consummation and the Kingdom to come; Augustine also knows

196
197

Ibid. 12.
Ibid. 11.
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this spirit: “We are sojourners, unable to live happily exiled from our fatherland. We seek a
way to help us to end our sorrows and to return to our native country.” 198

Of course, these passages should not be taken out of context. Thought they yearn to

leave the body to be with the Lord, they also still have to live in the world until the Lord
returns. Thus there are many passages that urge believers to love their fellow man, to

preach the gospel, and to do good. Nevertheless, “there was a strong feeling that Christians

should not take part in public life, and accept public office ... and such an attitude was bound
to react on his view of the education that the world had to offer.” 199 This is proved by the
fact that the early Church was proud of and deliberately stressed that they were

unschooled. Indeed, all of their models (the heroes of the faith) were either unschooled or
renounced such worldly schooling. 200 Many not only knew but also gloried in the lives of
Peter and John, who, when the learned priests and Sadducees summoned them, “saw the

courage of Peter and John and realized that they were unschooled, ordinary men” (Acts 4:13).
From all this one should not be surprised upon hearing that the pagans thought the

Christians were a pack of buffoons. Celsus criticizes the Christians because they never

provided reasons or arguments for their beliefs in Christ, but instead demanded only blind
faith. The Christian slogans were “Do not examine, but believe!” “Your faith will save you!”
and “Do not investigate.” Celsus then concludes that the Christians “repel every wise man

William Barclay. Educational Ideals in the Ancient World (Mich: Baker Book, 1959), 193-195.
Most of my quotes come from his chapter entitled “The Christian Attitude to Pagan Culture.”
199 Ibid. 197.
200 Some commentators aver that believers like Daniel and Solomon prove the lie to this rule. Their
argument however does not take context into consideration. For instance, we are told by most
orthodox commentators on “Solomon’s” book of Ecclesiastics that he wrote it during the time of his
backsliding and idolatry. The book then, according to their point of view, is a lesson of what happens
to the soul in a backslidden condition. Indeed, the issue of the canonicity of Ecclesiastes was only
accepted because of the (later inserted) orthodox passages that repudiate the “backslidden” thinking
of the book (See Spinoza’s TTP wonderful insights on this; see also Warren Montag’s excellent and
detailed “Lucretius Hebraizant: Spinoza’s Reading of Ecclesiastes” in an upcoming issue in the
European Journal of Philosophy). The case with Daniel is also dispatched when we merely consider
the context of his learning, for he was forced to learn while in captivity. The kinds of learning that he
imbibed and cultivated then were not of the kind that he would have pursued if not forced into it
(that is, so long as he remained devout).
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from the doctrine of their faith, and invite only the ignorant and the vulgar.” Origin accepts
this charge “and turns it to the glory of God.” 201 Barclay cites numerous examples like this.
But what of the minority of Christians who had been schooled before they became

Christians, and some of whom were philosophers? How did they regard philosophy and

Greek wisdom? Tertullian says that one of the joys that Christians will have in heaven is
seeing the philosophers burning in Hell:

How vast the spectacle that day, how wide! What sight shall wake my wonder, what
my laughter, my joy, my exultation? as I see ... those sages the philosophers blushing
before their disciples whom they taught that God was concerned with nothing, that
men have no souls at all, or that what souls they have shall never return to their
former bodies!202
Tatian’s invective is worse. 203 Hippolytus rails against their “artificial sophisms of

error”; Lactantius and Justin Martyr also join in on the condemnations. There’s not space

enough in this section to include the many passages from their books in which they not only
repudiate the wisdom of the world and of philosophy, but in which they also sternly warn
and charge believers to stay away from all such literature so as not to be sucked into its

charms and thus lose one’s salvation. 204 This spirit is well-captured in passages such as the

following:

What likeness is there between the philosopher and the Christian, the disciple of
Greece and the disciple of heaven, the trader in reputation and the trader in
salvation, the doer of words and the worker of deeds, the builder up and the
destroyer of things, the friend and the enemy of error, the corrupter and the
restorer and the exponent of truth, its thief and its guardian?

And again, the famous lines:

What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? 205 What concord is there between
the Academy and the Church? What between heretics and Christians? ... Away with

Ibid. 198-199.
Ibid. 202-203.
203 Ibid. 203-204.
204 Ibid. 204-209.
205 Lest the reader think that Tertullian was hyperbolic or extreme in his interpretation of the
scriptures, hear St. Paul’s stronger views, from which Tertullian no doubt received the guidance for
his statements: St. Paul tells the Christians in Corinth the plain, brutal theological fact that all
201
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all the attempts to produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic
composition! We want no curious disputation after possessing Jesus Christ, no
inquisition after enjoying the gospel! With our faith we desire no further belief. 206
Why did even those who were brought up and trained in philosophy, upon

becoming Christians, take this attitude? Answer: Because this is the consistent teaching of
the New Testament. It was not easy for many such learned Christians to take this stance.
Barclay tells stories of how such brilliant men as Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Jerome, and

Clement struggled to keep the intellect in its rightful, spiritual place. Jerome’s is a colorful
one. He wrote an account of this painful struggle in his own personal life. He tells us that

when he became a Christian, he had no problem with cutting himself off his love of dainty

food, and even from his home, parents, relations. But he found that he could not forego his
books.

And so, miserable man that I was, I would fast only that I might afterwards read
Cicero. After many nights spent in vigil, after floods of tears called from my inmost
heart, after the recollection of my past sins, I would once more take up Plautus. And
when at times I returned to my right mind and began to read the prophets, their
style seemed rude and repellent.

unbelievers are wicked and members of the kingdom of Satan. Because of this fundamentally
ontological (in a spiritual sense) and epistemological difference between believers and unbelievers,
the apostle demands a spiritual-cultural separation (except with respect to seeking to convert them
and livelihood). He wants them to “purify” themselves from “everything that contaminates body and
spirit” that stem from the children of darkness. He commands the Corinthian churches that were
mixing their lives with unbelievers, the following information about these Greeks: “Do not be yoked
together with unbelievers. For what do righteousness [believers] and wickedness [unbelievers] have
in common? For what fellowship can light [believers] have with darkness [unbelievers]? What
harmony is there between Christ and Belial [a demon or Satan]? What does a believer have in
common with an unbeliever? What agreement is there between the Temple of God and idols” (2 Cor.
6:14-16). This passage is not a piece of literary rhetoric; it is a piece of staunch orthodox theology.
And it is in agreement with the apostle’s soteriology and eschatology in all his writings. Passages
such as these will be watered down and sanitized over and over again in the history of Christianity by
worldly Christians and Christians in the throes of love with unbelievers’ books. A careful, thorough,
and unflinchingly honest interpretation of such New Testament passages however, do not harmonize
with these later revisionist and presentist textual interpretations.
206 Both passages come from Tertullian (Barclay, op. cited, 205). The quote above is precisely the
same criticism leveled against moderate enlightenment Christians who, in their love of worldly
learning, relied on the rationalism of the Greek philosophers as they did on theology and “Christian”
philosophy. This same orthodox charge is made over and over again throughout the history of
Christian theology and philosophy – in the Church Fathers, against some in the medieval period, and
more certainly against the Scholastics. One can find these charges in the Paris Condemnation of
1277; but they’re made by Bonaventure, Erasmus, Scotus, Luther, Calvin, Pascal, and even, of all
people, Hobbes.
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This went on for some time until he has a dream in which he is caught up to the

Judgment seat of God and asked who he was. He replied, “I am a Christian.” “But he who

presided said: ‘You lie; you are a Ciceronian and not a Christian.’” Jerome awoke from this

dream begging God for mercy : “He was told that he would be tortured till he agreed not to

read the works of the Gentiles.” Jerome replied that “if ever again I possess worldly books,

or if ever again I read such I have denied Thee.” Barclay goes on to tell us that Jerome didn’t
keep his word. 207

But other Christian intellectuals took a different interpretation on the philosophers.

Clement, for instance, practices a kind of revisionist or allegorical history. He says that as

the law was given to the Hebrews to lead them to God, so also philosophy was given to the
Greeks to lead them to the true God. “Philosophy was a schoolmaster to lead the Hellenic
mind to Christ ... The way of truth is one, but it is like a river into which there flow many

streams and many tributaries.” 208 Here we see a picture of things to come in the history of
Christian theology. In later centuries, Dante, Aquinas, Descartes, and Leibniz would all
somehow legitimate and harmonize worldly and divine learning for the glory of God.
Origen succeeded Clement at the school at Alexandria. He even praised the

philosophers and persuaded Gregory to study the philosophy of the Greeks. 209 Here indeed
was a new thing under the Christian sun, and one which would have momentous influence
for what was to follow in the history of Christian thinking.

Before we get to Augustine, three other great Christian leaders should be

mentioned: Basil, Gregory of Nazianzen, and Gregory of Nyssa. Gregory of Nazianzen writes

Ibid. 212-13.
Ibid. 215-216.
209 Ibid. 216-219.
207
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in praise of “even that pagan culture which many Christians spit upon, as treacherous and
dangerous, and keeping us afar from God.” 210

How do we account for this radical change in attitude toward Greek philosophy and

wisdom? This was not a mystery to many of their Christian contemporaries, though. They
interpreted this change to a liberal shift, to worldliness, and lack of devotion to Christ and

spiritual things. As such, they condemned their philosophical compatriots. (This pattern is
played out over and over again in the history of philosophy: of Bonaventure against

Aquinas, Luther against Erasmus, Leibniz against Descartes, and of Burgh against Spinoza.)
Some demanded Christians to “Avoid all books of the heathen.” 211 However, this

time the move to the intellect was not squashed out. Hence philosophers and lovers of

pagan learning such as Augustine arose, which praised Greek wisdom. Augustine writes

that Christians should not shrink from heathen learning, and they should learn all they can
about it, especially of that which agrees with Christian doctrine. Like Clement and Origin

before him, Augustine found all sorts of wonderful truths in pagan literature, especially in
Plato and the Platonists. He tried to legitimize and sanction this practice by calling it

“spoiling the Egyptians”: “As the Jews spoiled the Egyptian when they went forth from

Egypt so the Christian spoils the pagan writers when he goes out from paganism.” 212 For

others, though, this analogy between the ancient Hebrews taking physical possessions from
their captives, the Egyptians, with Christians taking worldly wisdom from the world is in
many respects dis-analogous and therefore arguably hermeneutically illegitimate. It is
certain that this is not a proof text that can be rightfully used to argue that God wishes
Christians to study worldly wisdom and knowledge from unregenerate unbelievers.

Ibid. 221.
Ibid. 230.
212 Ibid. 230-232.
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We get an even deeper analysis of how Christians dealt with Greek learning and

philosophy from Christopher Stead’s Philosophy in Christian Antiquity. Strangely, Stead does
not tell us much about the New Testament and the primitive church’s attitude toward

reason and philosophy. His analysis takes up where Barclay leaves off. He begins with the
Church Fathers, but is also constrained by a stricter notion of philosophy than Barclay.

Stead makes it clear that “Philosophy was invented and given to the world by the

Greeks” and that the term should not be used loosely to also include theology. Stead is
anxious to define philosophy as distinct from religion or theology. In his history of

philosophy, he begins with thinkers from Miletus: “A philosophy recognizably distinct from

mythology began when the sages of Miletus in Asia Minor, attempted to explain things in

terms of inanimate things which could be expected to behave in a regular way in accordance
with a few simple laws ... instead of attributing them to the caprice of the all-too-human

gods.” 213

It is true, though, that Thales, who has been “traditionally regarded as the founder of

Greek philosophy”, declared that “all things are full of gods.” 214 Yes, says Stead, “But their

main significance as philosophers lies in their attempt to account for all natural phenomena
in terms of a few simple substances of principles.” 215 Thus he is doubtful that Christian

thought in the early centuries can be labeled as philosophy. It was sometimes called “the

barbarian philosophy”, but Stead says that “It is a nice question whether we should call it a
philosophy today.” 216 This is because, according to Stead, early Christianity (2nd to 4th

centuries) “kept a sharply defined identity; its commitment to the Bible as a sacred book
was far more uncompromising than the philosophers’ respect for Plato; and it valued
communal experience and tradition in a way which offended students accustomed to

Christopher Stead’s Philosophy in Christian Antiquity, 3.
Ibid. 4.
215 Ibid. 4.
216 Ibid. 79.
213
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accepting the guidance of expert scholars.” 217 As a result, Stead does not agree with other

scholars in their acceptance of a Christian philosophy in this period. He says that a more
accurate definition of philosophy can be understood “in the sense accepted today”:

The proper question is whether the use of which Christian teachers made of
philosophical doctrines and methods, in the sense accepted today, entitles them to
be called philosophers. I myself would prefer to reserve the term for those who
treat such doctrines and methods as an autonomous discipline to which they are
committed. In this sense, only a few of the early Christian Fathers can properly
claim to rank as philosophers; for the majority, the commitment to philosophical
method was too uncertain and their achievement, as philosophers, too slight. 218

While Barclay could countenance Gregory of Nyssa (for example) as a philosopher,

Stead says: “To Gregory, the Bible and Christian tradition were the source of all truth; he

would have considered it frivolous to give comparable attention to Platonic scholarship or

Aristotelian logic.” 219 Justin may be considered a philosopher, but he was so insignificant in

philosophy that his importance is only as a Christian teacher. Thus: “Our point is rather that
their allegiance to biblical and Church tradition left too little room, in most cases, for the
dispassionate critical study that philosophy requires.” 220 For Stead then, “Christian

philosophy” is really Christian theology.

Claiming that most of the Church Fathers were not philosophers, however, does not

deny the fact that they were influenced by philosophy. He gives many examples of this fact;
we can only mention a few here. He shows how a philosophical ‘syncretistic’ movement of
the 1st century came to influence Christian thought. We know also that Stoic ethics even

“influenced the New Testament writers.” 221 Philo of Alexandria had a powerful influence on
many Christian theologians and monasticism. 222 Platonism also had an immense affect on
Ibid.
Ibid. 80.
219 Ibid. 81.
220 Ibid. 80.
221 Ibid. 52.
222 Ibid. 56-57.
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the imagination and thinking of the early Church 223 (as in how the body and human

sexuality should be treated). 224 The Middle Platonists influenced Church Fathers such as

Justin, Clement, Origin and Eusebius. 225 And both Plato and Plotinus were part and parcel of
Augustine’s education and Christianity. 226

Augustine and philosophy
Augustine, however, is somewhat of a different case. Stead argues that though Augustine

confesses that “I had to leave the philosophers for love of thee” (Confessions 3.6.10), Stead

persuasively demonstrates that that he really didn’t. Contrary to the impression Augustine
gives of abandoning “worldly ambitions and a commitment to the spiritual life ... a different
impression is conveyed ... [which] show him discussing problems in Platonic philosophy.
Some scholars have suggested, accordingly, that it was to philosophy that he was really

converted.” 227 In view of the fact that most of his writings are shot through and through
with scriptural references and professed devotion to God, plus his constant refrain that

God’s Word is far greater and therefore far more reliable than man’s (including all

philosophers) word, I find this claim difficult to countenance. But perhaps by “philosophy”
these scholars mean “philosophy-mixed-with-biblical-theology.” However this may be,
“Aristotle’s influence on Western thought can hardly be exaggerated; but he was not a major
influence on Christianity during its first four centuries” (31).
224 Ibid. 62.
225 Idid. 66.
226 Ibid. 64.
227 Ibid. 222.
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while acknowledging Augustine as “by far the ablest philosopher of late antiquity”, Stead
still singles out “the basic assumptions of his metaphysics.” 228

In my opinion, there’s no way around it: Augustine is one of the supreme intellects

in the history of theology and philosophy. Our brief and tidy Enlightenment-versus-

Counter-Enlightenment treatment of him cannot do him justice. On the contrary, this

focused treatment in some respects is irritatingly too reductive, too simplistic, and too

misleading (especially for those who don’t know Augustine well). We therefore

acknowledge to readers that this treatment is inadequate if one wants to also know the

greatness of Augustine. To this we refer our readers to Augustine’s writings themselves.
With this very important caveat said, what can we say about Augustine in short compass

that may speak to the Enlightenment versus Counter-Enlightenment theme of this study except that Augustine, despite all his vast learning, eloquence, and humanity, is one of

history’s greatest promoters of the City of God, and therefore, from the perspective of the
17th century Radical Enlightenment, is one of the world’s greatest arch counter-

enlighteners. 229

Ibid. 219.
There are many other things that can be said to support this view, of course: his rampant
superstitiousness, his credulity about all sorts of stories (q.v. his belief in the composition of the
Septuagint), his views on heresy (and the infamous “compel them to come in”), his views on human
depravity and sexuality, his views on demonology, miracles, prophecy, omens, dreams, hearing
voices, and so much more. He may have used something of a neo-Platonic hermeneutic on the first
chapter of Genesis in something of a rationalist manner; but this rationalism certainly did not extend
very far. So, though he had some great, insightful ideas on the first two chapters of Genesis, he shows
the usual orthodox adherence of most of the rest of the book. All these positions show him to be far
from the great “radical enlightenment” pre-Socratics, or even, in my opinion, of the “moderate
enlightenment” Socrates or Plato. Socrates had his daemon and heard his voices, but he subjected
just about everything to the most honest and courageous searching criticism in his search for truth.
He even treated the gods and his own daemon with an ever-open, watchful, and critical mind. Plato
moreover had the courage to condemn the outrageous immoralities of the gods of his culture;
Augustine could not. Augustine was too devout, too obedient, too fundamentalist, too enthusiastic,
too needy, too subservient, too self-sacrificing, even to the point of sacrificing human judgment for
“God’s.” Some might feel that my judgment is too harsh and a-historical, but I don’t think it is. He had
the books and the time and the life to search out the truth of Lucretius, of Epicurus, of Democritus,
Herodotus, Thucydides, and so on; and to compare them with the claims, the arguments, and the
histories of the religious. Many another man judged better, even if without the genius he had.
228
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Stead is not the only scholar with this view on the Church Fathers, Augustine, and

their legacy on the history of Western-Christian theology and philosophy. David Knowles’
classic Evolution of Medieval Thought delineates a similar history. Outside the Bible, for

Knowles, Augustine “has had greater influence upon the history of dogma” than any other
thinker. 230 Therefore some things should be pointed out about Augustine as philosopher
and theologian.

For one thing, the divisions between nature, rational wisdom, supernatural wisdom,

reason, Christian revelation and philosophy and theology “have no place in Augustine.” 231

Knowles argues that “Augustine has at no time any interest in analyzing or describing either
the universe or the microcosm of man in [purely] philosophical terms.” 232 Because of

Augustine’s little training in philosophy, Knowles sees him more as a theologian than a

philosopher. 233 And indeed most of his works reflect this judgment. Let us take his great

City of God for our model of Augustine’s theology-philosophy. The City of God is Augustine’s
history of the world: As he puts it:

I must deal with the course of the history of the two cities [the City of God and the
city of man] from the time when children were born to the first couple until the day
when men shall beget no more. By the course of their history, as distinguished from
their original cause and final consummation, I mean the whole time of world history
in which men are born and take the place of those who die and depart. 234

David Knowles. Evolution of Medieval Thought (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), 32.
Ibid. 34. See rest of 34 as well.
232 Ibid. 33.
233 Ibid. 37-39. For a fascinating example of how Augustine privileges revelation over philosophic
thought, see his discussion in Chapter 9, Book XVI, on the antipodes. Here he shows first his
knowledge of at least some of the “scientific” literature available to him. He offers some rational
reasons why he argues against this view, but, in the final analysis, the test of truth is, as always, the
scriptures: “First of all, our Scriptures never deceive us, since we can test the truth of what they have
told us by the fulfillment of predictions” (that is, since the prophecies of Scripture has been proven
true, we can and therefore should rely on Scripture to tell us the truth on all sorts of its other claims,
367).
234 St. Augustine. The City of God (New York: Image Books, 1958), 323-324.
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Of these two cities, Etienne Gilson’s Forward to Augustine’s City of God says: “Both

cities are in fact immortal” – only one city is the city of the Devil and ends up spending
eternity in torment with the devil, and the other spends eternity in Bliss with God. 235

Early examples of Augustine’s history include the usual literal understanding of

Scripture: “Now, the first man born of the two parents of the human race was Cain. He

belonged to the city of man. The next born was Abel, and he was of the City of God … Now, it
is recorded of Cain that he built a city [Gen. 4:17], while Abel, as though he were merely a
pilgrim on earth, built none.” 236

The picture rendered here is not one like that of the Stoics. “Contrary to the Stoics,

however, St. Augustine did not conceive of the universe as a city. Never did he speak of the

cosmos as the City of God in the same sense as a Stoic could speak of it as the City of Zeus.” 237

In Augustine’s tale of two cities, both cities are contained in one universe - one whose end is

hell, and the other whose end is heaven. Augustine’s history then gives the same theological
Ibid. 29.
Ibid. 324-325. Since thinkers first began to critique the scriptures (and the history it offers) with
an independent mind (ex. Spinoza), we have continually learned that the history of the two cities as
portrayed by the Bible and Augustine (et. al.) has been false. The Bible provides a clear history from
the creation of the universe, to Adam and Eve, to the world-wide Noahic Flood, to all the
chronologies, to Jesus, to the Apocalypse, the end of the world, and the new heaven and the new
earth. What is at issue here is nothing less than the question of truth of the Bible’s and Christians’
claims for the past millennia. Just as the stories and histories of Achilles, Dionysus, Hinduism, etc. are
understood to be false, so also are the writings of the Bible and Christians on their origins,
development, and history. There are hundreds of millions of people today who don’t know that Ezra,
St. Paul, Augustine, Boethius, Aquinas, Pascal, Leibniz, Descartes, George Fox, Thomas a Kempis,
Martin Luther, John Calvin, John Wesley, Pat Robertson, Pope John Paul, and so on – all work with a
false history – all got it wrong just as the ancient Greek myths got their history wrong. See Popper’s
The Open Society and Its Enemies on oracular history for a superb philosophical treatment of the
epistemology of historiography. The question of historical truth or that of getting one’s claims about
what did and did not happen in times past is not merely an academic ivory tower interest. It is of
vital importance in all sorts of domains. We’re told by the best biblical scholars and Jewish and
Christian historians in the finest schools in the world today (in Cambridge, Oxford, Harvard,
Princeton, etc.) that the true history of the biblical writings and the accepted teachings and traditions
handed down from these are all largely false. For thousands of years, Jews, Muslims, and Christians
(the people of the Book) have been taught a false history. It has taken this many centuries for enough
freedom, wealth, sciences, and scholarship to combine to finally bring to light these findings.
Meanwhile, most of the earth’s inhabitants are still bamboozled by what Spinoza called “the relics of
man’s ancient bondage” (Spinoza, TTP, trans. Shirley, 3)
237 Ibid. 30.
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and eschatological history that the scriptures claim. And indeed, how could he offer a
different schema as a Christian? So, despite all of Augustine’s genius and vast pagan

learning, he still nevertheless constrains much of his thinking and beliefs to the scriptures,
with which, to him, are the veritable oracles of God. As a result, we get the same white or

black, sheep or goat, wheat or tares, good or evil, saint or sinner, found or lost, damned or

saved, Christ or Satan bifurcation and absolute dualism of all things – just as the scriptures
teach. And this dualistic, cosmic either-or is not directed only against the pagans, but also

against the Jews of the “Old Testament” who reject the good news of the “New Testament.”

The Jews who reject the “New Testament” are called “vessels of wrath”, while Christians are

called “vessels of mercy.” 238 From this admittedly under-described handling of the

Augustine corpus, it should still be plain that Augustine is no radical enlightener. Not by a
long stretch.

Summing up the Greek influence on the Church
With the exception of Augustine then, Stead sums up his view that “There is no doubt about

the contribution which philosophy made to early Christian thought ... But we cannot speak

with the same assurance about the contribution which Christian writers made to
philosophy.” 239

Ibid. 326. To the Radical Enlightenment mind, reading The City of God is based on principles
which are radically unenlightened, un-humanistic, un-rational, un-empirical, and morally outrageous.
In the course of his history, he takes up the question how Christian virgins could have been raped in
Rome by the invading hordes, Augustine’s only answer is that they must not have been purely
devoted to their true husband Christ like they should have been.
239 Ibid. 80.
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The caption on the front page of Christopher Stead’s book aptly states what

happened to Christianity from its contacts and interactions with Greek thought:

In the ancient world ‘philosophy’ included all branches of higher learning except
mathematics and medicine. It was the keystone of a university education; and it
helped to change the Christian Church from an obscure Jewish sect into a worldwide
civilizing force. This book gives a brief, lucid and systematic account of its origin
among the Greeks and its transforming influence on Christian thought. 240

Stead says that

In this process Christians often learnt from their pagan critics … And this dialogue
has left its mark on the classical structure of Christian theology, which passed from
Augustine to the Schoolmen, and so to Luther and Calvin, to Schleiermacher and to
Karl Barth, and is the common inheritance of Orthodox, Roman Catholic and
Anglican churchmen.” 241

This completes our brief and selective summary of the Church Fathers and Augustine.

Imagine the following: Imagine that a very different world-view and “philosophy” impacted the
early Church Fathers instead of the Greco-Roman philosophy. Imagine that Justin Martyr, Origin, and
Augustine were born and raised in as Confuctionists or Theravadan Buddhists or Zen Buddhists.
What would Christian theology turned into then? What then would have become of discussions
about the Trinity, the Eucharist, the role of the Church in the world, persecution, censorship, the
church councils, hermeneutics and biblical interpretation, notions of God, the supernatural, nature,
expiation for sins, life after death, judgment day, sanctification, and the Fall? We can only imagine.
241 Stead, op. cited, 9-10.
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Chapter Five
Outline of the Church Fathers to Scholasticism

During the period of the Church Fathers and Augustine, the decline and fall of the Roman

Empire was taking place. This of course had huge implications for European culture. From
this cultural transformation, the Church went from Church persecuted to Church

persecutor. The period of time extending from the beginnings of Christian apologetics after
the Apostolic Fathers to the time of St. Augustine is known as the Patristic era in theology

and philosophy. Most of these Christian theologians and philosophers primarily relied on
Platonic or neo-Platonic (especially Plotinus) thought (and not in the thought of “radical

enlightenment” pre-Socratics or “moderate enlightenment” of Socrates and Plato) and often

held more to mystical intuition over rational or dialectical proof. In one paragraph,

Knowles encapsulates the influence of the Greek mind over the Christian mind for over a
millennium:

Christianity, in its origins and pre-history, had little kinship with Greece, but what
we call Christendom, for more than a thousand years from the conversion of the
emperor Constantine, was almost exclusively a society of people deriving their
intellectual discipline and the habits of reasoning directly or indirectly from the
Greco-Roman culture of the ancient world. It would be scarcely an exaggeration to
say that the philosophy in those centuries is so deeply impregnated with the
methodological ideas of Greek thought, and with the doctrines of non-Christian and
more particularly of pre-Christian philosophers, as to be in a very real sense a direct
extension or prolongation of ancient philosophy … Indeed, if we have in mind only
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, it is possible to say that almost all the leading
ideas of medieval philosophy, with the partial exception of that branch of it later
known as natural theology, were identical with, or were directly derived from, ideas
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put into currency at Athens between 450 and 300 B.C. by a handful of Greek
thinkers, among whom two, Plato and Aristotle, stand supreme. 242
One can understand many of the changes in the Christian theological and

philosophical ethos simply because of the new status Christians had in the world. Thanks to

Constantine (and other forces) in placing Christians in places of power throughout the

Empire, Christians were now confronted with entirely different challenges. They were now
faced with worldly challenges – political, economic, social, legal, and military. Law,

technology, government, money, war, survival, medicine, and so on were needed if one is to

govern in the real world. And the Bible didn’t seem to meet all these needs. So it was

natural to look for help and knowledge elsewhere – even if, at bottom, it was from the
benighted heathen.

From early on in the Church Fathers and in the first medievals, Plato and other

pagan writers were refurbished. Though the Jews of the dispersion and the early Christians

had “an aversion from philosophy … When Christian theologians and apologists made use of
philosophy, it was to Plato and to later Platonists that they turned to find … the lofty
idealism and other worldliness that seemed a divinely ordained preparation for the
gospel.” 243 In truth, though, these apologists esteemed Plato as the “greatest” of

philosophers only because his writings were considered most in accord with the Bible.

Plato and the later Platonists are seen as being proto-Christians. God must have given them
a glimpse of the Truth, for Plato is so Christian

with his moral earnestness and lofty idealism with his unshakeable faith in the
beautiful and the good, with his vision of the godlike soul and its immortal destiny,
with his soaring flight from what is temporal and visible to what is unseen and
eternal … Plato … the source and exemplar for all those who would find ultimate
reality … Plato is the idealist moulding this life and its institutions, upon the model
of a city not made with hands ‘yonder in the heavens’, to another life… a mystical
approach to the problem of knowledge and action. 244

Knowles, op. cited, 3-4.
Knowles 19.
244 Ibid. 4-5.
242
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After all, Plato was convinced of design, a transcendent God, and even the soul’s

immortality: “he approaches at times very nearly to the outlook on life and on human

destiny and endeavor of the Hebrew psalmist and the Christian ascetic.” Plato’s arguments
for the soul’s immortality became classics for Christian apologists. He was considered
“avant le not.” 245

The all-powerful influence of Plato and Plotinus, however, would not last.

Scholasticism was being born. We can only give the barest mention of its development over
many centuries here. In essence, I will brutally summarize Knowles’ account of the middle
ages to tell this story.

Knowles tells us that “Scholasticism” is often used to refer to the period from the

end of the Patristics to the mid-fifteenth century and beyond to the eighteenth century.

Somewhere early in the sixth century, the head of Christian schools of the time was called
“scholasticus.” European schools were evolving and progressing. “Scholastic” theology

developed into a method and a system. It eventually became clearly distinguished from

Patristic theology and “philosophy.” The curriculum of these schools taught dialectic among
the seven liberal arts – which, at that time, was the only branch of philosophy studied in a
systemic way. The head of the school usually taught dialectic. From his teaching of
dialectic, the way philosophy was done and the extent of what philosophy covered

continued throughout the Middle Ages. The term “scholasticism” came to be used to refer to
the methodology and system that developed from the school curricula of the schools.

Knowles dates the beginning of the Scholastic era in the 9th century. From the 5th to

the 9th centuries, theologians and thinkers such as Claudinus, Mamertus, Boethius,

Cassiodoros, the Venerable Bede, St. Isidore of Seville, and others passed down the tradition

of the Patristics with its Platonism. 9th century theologians Alcuin, Rabonus, and John
245

Knowles, op. cited, 11.
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Scotus commenced the scholastic movement. They knew very little of Aristotle, and that

which they did know, was mostly only some of his logic. Still, a rationalism and a dialectic
was growing, and this growth led them further away from Patristic philosophy.

As usual, to many of the devout, this new education did not seem to reflect true New

Testament Christianity, especially in its spirituality. This new scholastic way was thought to
be worldly, Greek-like, or pagan-like, for it all depended not on the Holy Spirit, but to a

degree never before seen in Christian thinkers, was overwhelmingly philosophical. By

Roscelin in the 11th century, the spirit of rationalism was definitely in the air. Christian

mystics raised the first warnings against this development. The advocates of reason (such

as Roscelin, Abelard, Peter Lombard) were at odds in important respects with those more
akin to the spiritual or the mystical (such as St. Anselm, St. Damien, and St. Bernard).

Gradually, the Christian rationalists brought their thinking more in line with orthodox

thinking and the mysteries of the faith. Still, the struggle continued. Knowles’ history tells
us that rationalism (that is, a “Christian” rationalism) won out in the schools.

Scholasticism philosophized about the use of reason in relation to natural and

spiritual truth. They began to think and learn about new things and from new places and

people– even from the Christ-killing Jews and infidel Arabs! 246 New translations of Aristotle
were making themselves known throughout Europe. This caused a restructuring in

Christian theology and philosophy. With the continued rise of better and better universities
thanks to increased economic expansion (and many other factors), by the 13th century an

enormous boost in intellectual activity occurred. This was especially so at the University of
Paris.

I use these harsh expressions because this was the language of Christians of the time – and for
most of the history of Christendom in the west.
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The rationalism of the Scholastics, of course, did not reject the claims of revelation.

But now they applied the full resources of the rational and logical reasoning they learned
from Aristotle to comprehend revelation and spiritual truth in an intellectually superior

way than the post-1st century Church has ever understood it. As opposed to the mystics and

the more spiritually devout practitioners of the faith (which distrusted reason and placed
emphasis on intuition and contemplation), the Scholastics gave themselves up to reason,
which they identified as “the candle of the Lord” (we see some of this difference, for
instance, between Aquinas and Bonaventure).

The Scholastics did not give themselves up to reason totally, of course. As we said,

they did not question the claims of revelation. On the whole, they accepted the premises of

revelation without question as truth from God that they can trust and build on. They did
not therefore sincerely question these premises, which were part and parcel of the

foundations of their systems. I’m reminded of a passage in a wonderful essay by Ralph

Waldo Emerson entitled “Self-Reliance” (which in some important respects is like an

Enlightenment manifesto). One of the principal criticisms he levels against un-enlightened
thinking is its lack of courage, honesty, and independence of thought - not thinking for

oneself but instead conforming one’s beliefs and thinking to the crowd, to tradition, and to
the powers that be.

I hear a preacher announce for his text and topic [to take only one example] the
expediency of one of the institutions of his church. Do I not know beforehand that
not possibly can he say a new and spontaneous word? Do I not know that with all
this ostentation of examining the grounds of the institution he will do no such thing?
Do I not know that he is pledged to himself not to look but at one side, the permitted
side, not as a man, but as parish minister? He is a retained attorney, and these airs
of the bench are the emptiest affectation. 247
Do we not know even before we read the works of many of the Scholastics what

positions they’re going to take on all sorts of issues, including key philosophical ones if they
247

Ralph Waldo Emerson. The Portable Emerson (New York: Penguin Books, 1981), 144.
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have anything to do with any biblical and Christian teachings? 248 Do we not know

beforehand that no matter how many philosophers they may quote, no matter how much

display of apparently neutral philosophizing, and no matter how much acute analysis and
detail they go into, that, in the end, they will “argue” for only Christian outcomes? Their

thinking on the existence and nature of God, angels, the creation, the world, man, the mind,

Jesus, the incarnation, other religions, sexuality, and so on all come to the same conclusions

– Christian conclusions. And, when we study their analysis on any premises that impinge on
Christian theology, the feeling we get is that they are not seriously or honestly or fully
examining these premises with the ultimate aim of genuinely testing them. 249

This summation can be applied to much of the work of Scholasticism (though by no

means all!). And indeed, as we will see, this reliance on theology when doing philosophy is

one of the major criticisms radical enlighteners will level against medieval , scholastic, and

some early modern methodology, philosophy, and science. The dependence on revelation
and the Church Fathers in their philosophizing is one of the characteristic traits of
Scholasticism that modern philosophy and science has moved away from.

This distinction between Scholasticism and Modern philosophy is by no means

trivial. There’s no getting over the great importance of examining and testing all the

premises in one’s argument if one is genuinely concerned to come to a true conclusion.
I’m generalizing, of course. In fact, a closer examination of some of the scholastics reveals that
“Scholasticism” is by no means a monolithic system in which there are no serious differences in
doctrine – especially on philosophical issues that don’t threaten theological orthodoxy. On the
contrary! Aquinas, Scotus, and Occam are by no means mindless conformists. There are great
differences among them. Still, the claim that we can pretty much predict what positions most of the
scholastics will take holds regarding many central and orthodox teachings of the Bible and the
Church (that the God of Israel created the world; that He created Adam and Eve; saved Noah, made a
covenant with Abraham and his progeny, gave Moses the Law, sent his Son to save the world, the
immortality of the soul, the resurrection from the dead, the coming end of the world, etc. – all these,
by the way, create a great deal of limitations and constraints on what one can freely do philosophy
on).
249 Of course we can feel this way –in hindsight. But, and I want to underscore this, it’s not only us
who judge their work in this way. As we will show, many of their own contemporaries did! I trust
that this fact takes much of the sting away from the charge of presentism.
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Responding to a letter from Foucher, the early modern philosopher and genius, Gottfried
Leibniz, sounding like Descartes, writes:

I agree with you that it is important once and for all to examine all of our
assumptions in order to establish something solid. For I hold that it is only when we
can prove everything that we understand perfectly the thing under consideration. I
know that such studies are not popular with the common people, but I also know
that the common people do not take the trouble to understand things at their
deepest level. 250
Unfortunately, Leibniz himself did not practice what he preached. Even though

Leibniz says that all assumptions have to be proved, with respect to Christianity and

theology Leibniz was more like the Scholastics than he was like radical enlighteners such as

Hobbes and Spinoza. Though Leibniz did not rely on or refer to the scriptures and the

Church Fathers nearly as much as many of the Scholastics did, his writings on many key

Christian concerns show no such true analysis of assumptions. 251 On the other hand, in my
opinion, Hobbes and Spinoza really did examine and follow the thread of their meditations
on the questions of Christian theological premises.

We will see this same challenge in our next chapter on St. Thomas Aquinas. I take it

that Gilson is exactly right when he says the following:

There is an ethical problem at the root of our philosophical difficulties; for men are
most anxious to find truth, but very reluctant to accept it [when it conflicts with
what we want]. We do not like to be cornered by rational evidence, and even when
truth is there, in its impersonal and commanding objectivity, our greatest difficulty
still remains; it is for me to bow to it … The greatest among philosophers are those
who do not flinch in the presence of truth, but welcome it with the simple words:
yes, Amen. 252

Gottfried Leibniz. G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, edited and translated by Roger Ariew and
Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 1.
251 Not all Leibniz scholars would agree with my opinion here. Some would argue that Leibniz did
really examine even Christian premises, and that after years of such analyses (even though during
one period he almost converted to Spinozism), he came up with metaphysical proofs that seemed to
him to defend theism and Christianity. And it was upon these proofs that Leibniz based his faith.
Much more, of course, could be said on the subject of Leibniz and his philosophy of religion, not to
mention extenuating contextual circumstances such as the nature of his job and his obligations
thereof.
252 Etienne Gilson. The Unity of Philosophical Experience: A Survey Showing the Unity of Medieval,
Cartesian & Modern Philosophy (County Dublin, Ireland: Four Courts Press, 1892), 61.
250

117

But I take it that Gilson is exactly wrong on this point of theological premises when he goes

on to say that “St. Thomas Aquinas was one of the latter, clear-sighted enough to know truth
when he saw it, humble enough to bow to it in its presence.” 253

It does not matter how much a genius one is, or how much one has read, if one’s

premises are fallacious, one’s conclusions usually will be fallacious as well. Of course, no

one can completely get rid of all presuppositions and prejudices. No philosophy is

completely examined and without questionable assumptions. Still, as a philosophical ideal,
it should at least be seriously and genuinely attempted. In my opinion, we do not usually
find this in medieval and scholastic philosophy on points related to essential Christian
theology.

But perhaps we should not only speak in general terms here. Perhaps, before

ending this section on medieval and scholastic theology and philosophy (which comprises
many centuries!), we should pick at least one example of one Scholastic on at least one

subject that might be used to exemplify Scholasticism. And this is in keeping with the plan
of our study. 254 Let us then chose the “Prince of the Scholastics”, the great St. Thomas

Aquinas (1225-1274). And let us pick an example that is not wholly a Christian subject

Ibid. 61-62. This to me does not give due honor and credit to those philosophers who did actually
question and overturn false theological premises.
254 “But to tell this story within the scope of a doctoral dissertation, its range will have to be
delimited. This study will therefore limit itself to the following constraints: Firstly, instead of
delineating the whole story of what led to the Enlightenment (social, economic, political, legal,
technological, etc.), this study will focus on the tension between the philosophical and the theological.
Secondly, to accomplish this we can of course only cover some of the texts in the period from the
Greeks to Leibniz. Thirdly, we will delimit our scope by giving attention to aspects on this subject
that have not been given much attention to in contemporary scholarship in early modern philosophy
(especially in the English speaking world). Thus, as was said above, instead of merely referring to
“Counter-Enlightenment” or religious beliefs and theologies in general terms, we will point out the
specific texts from which these beliefs and theologies stem and show how they militate against
naturalistic or rationalistic thinking. Finally, the ultimate aim of this focus is to see how the
development of this tension led to what is perhaps the most consequential aspect of the Radical
Enlightenment: the repudiation of Christianity and all traditional religion.”
253
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(such as on angels 255 or the incarnation). Let us pick an example that most philosophers,

both religious and non-religious, know to be of great importance to human beings. We will
therefore pick the problem of human happiness and see how Aquinas does his philosophy

on this subject. This will take some analysis, but, in the end, I hope the reader will gain from
this example a better idea on how scholastics such as St. Thomas deal with the philosophy-

theology dynamic.

I am reminded of an almost humorous passage in Descartes’ Conversation with Burnam (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1976) in which it is thought that Descartes said: “Thus St. Thomas wanted every
angel to be of a different kind from every other, and he described each in as much detail as if he had
been right in their midst, which is how he got the honorific title of the ‘Angelic Doctor’. Yet although
he spent more time on this question than on almost anything else, nowhere were his labors more
pointless” (19). Even if this is not an accurate telling of what Descartes really said, it nevertheless is
correct in spirit, for Descartes would not “waste” his time on such scholastic-theological issues. We
can see in this difference between the two great philosophers also a difference between “modern” or
philosophy and scholastic philosophy.
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Chapter Six
A Scholastic Example: St. Thomas on Happiness
“Man’s happiness is twofold … One is perfect or complete, the other imperfect. By perfect happiness we
understand that which attains the true nature of happiness; imperfect happiness we understand that
which does not attain this but participates in some partial likeness of happiness.” 256

Introduction
In this chapter we wish to provide one example of how some scholastics treated the

relations between philosophy and theology. The scholastics not only did philosophy, but

they also did theology at the same time. In a word, scholastics such as St. Thomas mix

philosophy (especially Aristotle) with Christian revelation. But while they may mix their

philosophy with theology, they make it clear that philosophy must always be subordinate to
revelation when the two in any way conflict. While most believers from orthodox Jews to

New Testament Christians and the Apostolic Fathers kept philosophy almost completely out

This quote is taken from Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, Response to Question III, Article Six. It is
also found in John A. Oesterle. St. Thomas Aquinas: Treatise on Happiness (Indiana: University of
Notre Dame Press), 36. It should be pointed out at the outset that this notion of the twofold
happiness is not unique to Aquinas or to Christian theology. Aquinas mentions the twofold
happiness in philosophers such as Aristotle. Aquinas scholar Denis Bradley points this out: “As is
evident in Book X of the [Nicomachean] Ethics, philosophers posit a twofold happiness: one is
contemplative, the other active. According to this, they distinguish two parts of philosophy, calling
moral philosophy practical and natural, and rational philosophy theoretical.” Denis Bradley. Aquinas
on the Twofold Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas’s Moral Science (Washington, D.C.: The
Catholic University of American Press), 45. On the other hand, the theological ramifications of this
notion of twofold happiness are not in Aristotle and are unique to Christianity (and religions like it).
See next footnote.
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of their thinking and lives, the Church Fathers, but then far more, the scholastics, purposely
and systematically used philosophy (Aristotle) in their philosophy-theologizing.

This is certainly the case in St. Thomas. As we will see, he not only mixes philosophy

with theology, he even distinguishes or separates the two in a way that treats philosophy

with dignity – with far more dignity than had hitherto been accorded to it by orthodox

Judaism and Christianity, including some of the Church Fathers who had been reared in

pagan philosophy. Because of this notable change and because of the importance of

scholasticism in the early modern period, we devote a whole chapter to it. We hope to make
clear how different scholasticism is from what went before it and what will come after it.

By the early modern period, this movement (to distinguish or separate philosophy

from theology and to treat it as an autonomous subject worthy of its own honor), would

intensify in Descartes and then reach its radical apex in Spinoza. Let us see more closely

then how St. Thomas, as an example of scholasticism, did his work on the problem of human
happiness.

What is Aquinas’s view on human happiness and unhappiness? How does he do

philosophy on this subject? What method does he use to get at the truth of the question of
how man can be happy? A description and critique of some of his arguments for these are
what this chapter will investigate.

In sum, as we will see, Aquinas holds to a twofold view of human happiness. 257 He

holds that humans can experience a genuine earthly, natural or worldly kind of happiness
which he calls imperfect, and he holds that humans can also enjoy what he calls a “true”
happiness, that is, a perfect or ultimate happiness. He makes this distinction based on

257 This black-and-white “twofold” business stems from the Christian “twofold” worldview which
divides all things up into a dualism of soul and body, God and the creation, sheep and goats, Christ
and Satan, the spiritual and the carnal, etc. We saw this Christian twofold system earlier in St. Paul
and then later in Augustine’s City of God.
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Christian theology. Aquinas puts it this way: “Happiness is of two kinds; an imperfect one
which is had in this life, and a perfect one which consists in the vision of God.” 258

The following is a closer look at his arguments for these followed by some

concluding remarks.

Aquinas’s view of imperfect happiness: its negative and positive aspects

“Aristotle is speaking in the Ethics of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this
life.” 259

The quote above indicates that Aquinas’s thinking about the subject of happiness was
largely influenced by Aristotle’s Ethics. Aquinas no doubt used Aristotle’s Ethics as a

sounding board to develop his own distinctively Christian view. Aquinas’ scholar Denis
Bradley says that Aquinas then transforms Aristotle’s teaching about happiness “by

introducing the theological distinction between ‘imperfect’ and ‘perfect’ happiness.” 260

Not only does Aquinas hold a twofold view of human happiness, in general (that is,
between imperfect and perfect happiness), but he also holds a twofold view on
imperfect happiness. In some passages, his view of imperfect happiness is negative and
critical; in others, it is positive and affirmative.

Op. cited, Oesterle 46.
Oesterle, 37.
260 Op. cited, Bradley 12. Where Aquinas agrees with Aristotle and where he adds to and diverges
from Aristotle is an interesting subject. There is an extensive literature on this. Denis Bradley, for
instance, says that “Aquinas is certainly not repeating what Aristotle said about happiness” in all
points. As opposed to Aristotelian man, “Thomistic man is more mysterious: he is created by an
utterly transcendent God who plants in human nature an innate orientation to Himself” (459).
Bradley also offers helpful insight on the differences between Aristotle and Aquinas’s views on
contemplation. Aquinas distinguishes his concept of the vision of the divine essence from Aristotle’s
contemplation of the gods. Aristotle’s philosophical contemplations is “beatitudo imperfecta”, which
is only an “analogue” for true happiness or the beatific vision of God in Aquinas. This latter concept,
says Bradley quoting Aquinas, “falls entirely outside of the ken of Aristotle’s philosophy” (398).
258
259
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Imperfect happiness: its negative aspects
From the very start of the Treatise on Happiness, Aquinas makes his position clear

about what type of human happiness he thinks is most important and what type of
happiness he is critical of. In question one, article five, he states,

The ultimate end [of man], then, must so entirely satisfy man’s desire that there is
nothing left for him to desire. It cannot be his ultimate end if something additional
is required for his fulfillment. Hence it is not possible for desire to tend to two
things as though each were its perfect good.” 261

In biblical terms this is tantamount to saying, “You cannot serve two masters.” For

Aquinas, those who do not follow their ultimate end then, fall short of their potential. In

article seven of question one, he says, “Those who sin turn away from that in which the
ultimate end is truly found, but they still intend an ultimate end, which they mistakenly seek
in other things.” 262

In order to determine if true happiness might consist in other elements besides God,

Aquinas asks the following eight questions: Does man’s happiness consist in wealth? Does
man’s happiness consist in honors? Does man’s happiness consist in fame or glory? Does

man’s happiness consist in power? Does man’s happiness consist in some good of the body?
Oesterle 11.
Oesterle 13. Aquinas also makes it clear in some passages that not all people are aware of their
ultimate end. It is unconscious to them, as Freud would put it, or simply “unrecognized”, as Aquinas
scholar Eleonore Stump explains. Eleonore Stump. Aquinas (New York: Routledge), 24. Stump
points out that in Aquinas’s commentary on the book of Job, offers another argument that humans
cannot enjoy perfect happiness in this world. And this argument has to do with the problem of evil.
For Aquinas, says Stump, the inherent sinful character of human beings is the greatest obstacle to
contemplation of God. It is like a cancer in our soul. The only way to be cured of this cancer is
through the divine medicine of pain and suffering. Hear Aquinas: “If all the pain a human being
suffers is from God then he ought to bear it patiently, both because it is from God and because it is
ordered toward good; for pains purge sins, bring evil doers to humility, and stimulate good people to
love of God.” Stump 466.
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Does man’s happiness consist in pleasure? Does man’s happiness consist in some good of
the soul? And, does man’s happiness consist in any created good? He answers all of them

in the negative, opting instead for “true” or perfect happiness, which can only be ultimately
satisfied in God.

Imperfect happiness: its positive aspects
However, despite these negative references regarding the insufficiency of natural

happiness and its goods, Aquinas is not totally dismissive. On the contrary, Aquinas

acknowledges “a twofold ultimate perfection … The first is one which it can attain by its

own natural power, and this is in a measure called beatitude or happiness.” 263 And again,
“Happiness is of two kinds; an imperfect one which is had in this life, and a perfect one

which consists in the vision of God.” 264 Of the former kind of happiness, a case can be made

in defense of the natural goods cited above in the eight questions Aquinas asks. Here

Aquinas says that, “in imperfect happiness we need an accumulation of goods sufficient for

the most perfect operation of this life.” 265 Goods such as these may be called “a participated

good and hence a partial good.” 266 In another place he says, “External goods are required
for the imperfect happiness which can be had in this life … serving instrumentally for
happiness….” 267

Thus Aquinas recognizes that there is more to human happiness than contemplation

of God. Whilst on earth, a man has other needs, as well. For instance, the human body and

intellect are needed: “the body is necessary for happiness in this life” and “the happiness of
Oesterle 11.
Ibid. 46.
265 Ibid. 31.
266 Ibid. 25.
267 Ibid. 51.
263
264
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this life consists in activity of the intellect, whether speculative or practical.” 268 Aquinas

rejects the view that the soul can’t be happy unless it is rid of the body. For him, “it is

natural to the soul to be united to the body, the perfection of the soul cannot exclude the
natural perfection of the body.” 269 Moreover, “a corporeal good can add a certain

embellishment or perfection to happiness.” 270 And again, Aquinas makes it clear in such
passages that happiness is not only a religious or spiritual function, but also a kind of

happiness that “can be acquired by his natural powers.” 271 All of this is in keeping with

Aquinas’s general principle that “grace does not destroy nature, but brings it to
fulfillment.” 272

Beyond the goods of the body and intellect, Aquinas also accepts other needed

goods for natural happiness: “as the Philosopher says, the happy man needs friends … For in

order to do well, whether in the works of the active life or in the activity of the
contemplative life, man needs the help of friends.” 273

Before ending this section, it should be noted that some scholars find logical

problems with Aquinas’s account of happiness. For example, though John Oesterle

acknowledges that Aquinas’s account of natural happiness “remains a realizable end in its

own order” and that it can be had in this life, he nevertheless complains that Aquinas’s view
on imperfect happiness is “difficult and varying.” 274 The conclusion of this chapter will

point out both some deficient and positive aspects of Aquinas’s views on imperfect and
perfect happiness.

Ibid. 46.
Ibid. 49.
270 Ibid. 50.
271 Ibid. 60.
272 E. M. Atkins and Williams, Thomas. Aquinas: Disputed Questions on the Virtues (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), xxx.
273 Oesterle 52.
274 Ibid. 31.
268
269
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Aquinas on perfect happiness
As has been shown above, Aquinas discusses not only the positive aspects of natural or
imperfect happiness, but also some of the negative or insufficient aspects of natural or

imperfect happiness. Some of these were listed. But there’s more. In the final analysis, no

matter how much natural happiness a human may enjoy in this life, it will never be enough;

for this sort of happiness can never be perfect. We can get clearer on Aquinas’s thoughts on
this subject by comparing his view of imperfect happiness to his view of perfect happiness.
What is perfect happiness and how does Aquinas connect his view of imperfect

happiness with his view of perfect happiness? Denis Bradley states that,

For Aquinas, the desire to attain perfect happiness is a natural desire, even though
perfect happiness cannot be naturally attained either in this life or in the life to
come. Perfect happiness results from seeing God. The desire to see God is natural
not in the sense that all men explicitly know that God is their final end, but natural in
the sense that knowing God is the only way to satisfy the necessary desire for
happiness. 275
This means that, “The desire to see God, then, is implicit in the desire for perfect

beatitude.” 276 If this is the case, then so long as man is in the world, he cannot enjoy perfect

happiness. Hence, perfect or true happiness cannot be found in this world.
Perfect happiness cannot be found in this world.

Many Christians believe that part of Christian salvation, redemption, and

sanctification is complete joy or happiness. They take such scriptures as Jesus’ “I am come
275
276

Bradley 424.
Ibid.
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that they may have life, and have it abundantly” to mean that Christians can be perfectly
happy in God in this life. But Aquinas takes a different view of this matter. “In probing

Aristotle’s characterization of happiness,” Bradley states, “Aquinas reached a remarkable

and, to some of his contemporaries in the Faculty of Arts at Paris, a disturbing philosophical
conclusion: since perfect human happiness must be uninterrupted and unchanging, it
cannot be found in this world.” 277 Aquinas says that the only way humans can be

completely happy is if their minds could by “united to God in one, continual, everlasting

activity.” 278 And this, according to Aquinas, is not fully possible even for the great saints and

mystics. This is because “The activity of the senses cannot pertain to happiness essentially,
for man’s happiness consists essentially in his being united with the uncreated good.” And
“man cannot be united to the uncreated good by his senses.” 279

The same, of course, applies to non-believers. In their natural state, they are

ignorant of the final causes and purposes of the universe and of their own selves. As long as

they are ignorant of these causes and purposes, so long as they don’t know what’s going on,

so long as they don’t know where they have come from and where they are going, so long as
they don’t know their maker, and so long as they are not found in Him, they cannot be fully
happy.

As believers or non-believers, no matter how much theoretical knowledge we may

attain, no matter how much of The Philosopher we have studied, our desires will not

ultimately be fulfilled or brought to rest. Our hearts can only rest in God. 280 We can achieve
an imperfect happiness, Aquinas argues, agreeing with Aristotle’s Ethics, but this is still an

Bradley 424.
Oesterle 30.
279 Ibid. 31.
280 Op. cited, Atkins and Williams: “This is clear from the fact that the natural longing of a human
being cannot rest in anything else except in God alone. For human beings have an innate longing that
moves them from the things that have been brought into being to seeking their cause. Therefore this
longing will not rest until it reaches the first cause, which is God” (65).
277
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imperfect happiness because it is engrossed in created things rather than in the Creator. 281

According to Aquinas, even if a person knows that God is the creator of all things, he will
still be unhappy because if the human intellect

knows no more about God than that He exists, the perfection of that intellect has not
reached the point of knowing the first cause absolutely, and there still remains in it a
natural desire to seek out the cause. Hence it is not yet completely happy.
Consequently, for perfect happiness, the intellect must reach the very essence of the
first cause. Thus its perfection will be had by its union with God as an object, and
only in this does man’s happiness consist, as has been pointed out.” 282
One of the primary reasons why personages such as Solomon, Buddha, and Faust

were unhappy was because they knew that by their own powers they could never “know
what is going on under the sun.” As Aquinas points out, “comprehension is required for
happiness.” 283

Aquinas quotes the authority of Job to support his argument that man cannot be

perfectly happy in this life. He says,

some participation in happiness can be had in this life, but true and perfect
happiness cannot be had in this life. This can be shown in two ways. The first way is
taken from the common notion of happiness, for happiness, since it is ‘the complete
and sufficient good,’ excludes all evil and fulfills all desire. Now in this life all evil
cannot be excluded. The present life is subject to many evils which cannot be
avoided: the evil of ignorance on the part of the intellect, the evil of inordinate
affection on the part of desire, and the evil of much suffering on the part of the body,
as Augustine carefully sets forth. Likewise, the desire for good cannot be fully
satisfied in this life, for man naturally desires the good he has to be permanent. Now
what is good in the present life is transitory; for life itself, which we naturally desire,
passes away, and we would like to hold on to it for ever, since man naturally shrinks
from death. Hence it is impossible for true happiness to be had in this life. 284

Bradley states that, “Aquinas fastens on Aristotle’s admission that the mundane happiness of the
good man can never completely escape fortune’s whims: to be truly blessed a happy man must be
both virtuous and lucky enough to have a modest measure of external and bodily goods. Aristotle
acknowledges that life, too often, brings changes for the worse. For that reason, Aquinas
unhesitatingly attributes to Aristotle the recognition that this-worldly happiness is imperfect or
merely human” (Bradley 401).
282 Oesterle 39.
283 Ibid. 43.
284 Oesterle 57. Eleonore Stump makes a similar point in discussing Aquinas’s commentary on the
book of Job. She quotes Aquinas from this book: “If in this life people are rewarded by God for good
deeds and punished for bad, as Eliphaz was trying to establish, it apparently follows that the ultimate
goal for human beings is in this life. But Job means to rebut this opinion, and he wants to show that
281
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Note the thoroughness of his list of arguments why complete happiness is not

possible. Note also that this long list of reasons is based on naturalistic or empirical sources
and not Biblical or theological authority. This passage is a splendid example of Aquinas as

philosopher par excellence. Aquinas is not just a Christian. He is not just a theologian. He is
not just an Aristotelian. He is also a philosopher and a man.

The second way in which Aquinas argues that perfect happiness is not possible in

this life is theological: true happiness can only be had in the vision of the divine essence.
And this no man can attain in this life. 285

True happiness can only be enjoyed in God
And so, we are brought back to where Aquinas started. Sounding like the Buddha,

Solomon, and Faust, Aquinas declares: “The ultimate end, then, must so entirely satisfy

man’s desire that there is nothing left for him to desire. It cannot be his ultimate end if
something additional is required for his fulfillment.” 286 Aquinas repeats this refrain in
varying ways through the Treatise and elsewhere. He holds this view not only on

psychological or spiritual grounds, but also on ontological or theological grounds. He

believes that, “It is impossible for man’s happiness to consist in a created good.” 287 It must

be in the Creator or the uncreated Good. To sum up then, for Aquinas perfect happiness can
only be enjoyed from God, “because full enjoyment is derived from Him alone.” 288

the present life of human beings does not contain the ultimate goal, but is related to it as motion is
related to rest, and a road to its destination” (6, Stump).
285 Oesterle 57.
286 Oesterle 11.
287 Oesterle 27.
288 Oesterle 14.
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Concluding remarks: Some critical and affirmative remarks on Aquinas’s treatment of
happiness 289
“give honor to that which honor is due” (Rom. 12).

Deficiencies in Aquinas’s treatment of natural happiness
It can be argued that Aquinas’s account of happiness does not give due honor to

what can be said about natural or imperfect happiness. In several passages he does give

some honor to these natural blessings; yet in far more passages he depreciates them. True,
he is comparing natural happiness with supernatural happiness, yet, it can still be argued

that he could have done a better job in honoring and praising the usual list of ingredients for
human happiness (pleasure, wealth, honors, fame, glory, the body, the intellect). Instead,

his account of natural happiness too often seems more like a grudging concession. And his
treatment of it is often too negative. This claim may more easily be made out from

Aquinas’s treatment of happiness in the Summa Contra Gentiles. There the sections marked
out make his attitude even clearer than in the Summa Theologiae.

In the Summa Contra Gentiles the sections are marked out along with their negative

conclusions: “That Human Felicity Does Not Consist in Pleasures of the Flesh,” “That Felicity
Does Not Consist in Honors,” “That Man’s Felicity Does Not Consist in Glory,” “That Man’s
Felicity Does Not Consist in Riches,” “That Felicity Does Not Consist in Worldly Power,”

“That Felicity Does Not Consist in Good of the Body,” “That Human Felicity Does Not Lie in
the Senses,” “That Man’s Ultimate Felicity Does Not Lie in Acts of the Moral Virtues,” “That

Ultimate Felicity Does Not Lie in the Act of Prudence,” and “That Felicity Does Not Consist in
These critical and affirmative remarks, of course, are from an unbeliever’s or the radical
enlightener’s point of view.

289

130

the Operation of Art.” He ends this part of his treatment on happiness with the section,
“That the Ultimate Felicity of Man Consists in the Contemplation of God.”

As one can tell from only this cursory look at the section headings, Aquinas often

(but not always) gives short shrift to the natural things that can contribute to natural

happiness. In this sense, his account of human happiness is lacking. He also talks of the
necessity of friends, but in the texts we have studied, says nothing about the value of

romantic, erotic, or marital love 290 between human beings – despite Eleonore Stump’s

rationalization that, “Among the many chapters in Summa contra gentiles saying what

happiness does consist in, there is no chapter saying that happiness does not consist in
loving relations with other persons.” 291

Beyond this complaint about his treatment of romantic love, a further complaint can

be leveled. His account of human instincts is too often cast in theologically negative terms.

Much of his treatment of our instincts is categorized as only as of the “flesh,” as “carnal sin,”
“lust,” and the like. Today, the Roman Catholic and protestant churches preach a fuller
account of human love and human instincts.

It must not be thought that by “love” here only the sexual or erotic is meant. No, much more than
that is meant. Take for instance Bertrand Russell’s paean to his wife:
Through the long years
I sought peace.
I found ecstasy, I found anguish,
I found loneliness.
I found the solitary pain
That gnaws the heart,
But peace I did not find.

290

Now, old and near my end,
I have known you,
And, knowing you,
I have found both ecstasy & peace
I know rest.
After so many lonely years,
I know what life & love may be.
Now, if I sleep,
I shall sleep fulfilled.
Bertrand Russell. The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell: 1872-1914 (New York: Bantom Books,
1967), dedication page.
291 Stump 465.
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Further deficiencies in Aquinas’s account of human happiness
In many respects Aquinas treatment of human happiness is sensitive and humane.

But in others, some argue that they are insensitive and inhumane. While Aquinas did not

trivialize human pain and suffering, at times he may have glossed over them. Certainly he

did from non-believing perspectives. Though Aquinas did not usually treat human suffering
in a dismissive fashion, as many religious believers have done, 292 nevertheless there are key

aspects in his theology that all is not well with respect to his attitude toward human

happiness. Though Alexander Pope uttered the following words, one can find the same
argument in Aquinas’ corpus.

All nature is but art unknown to thee:
All chance, direction which thou canst not see;
All discord, harmony not understood;
All partial evil, universal good;
And, spite of pride, in erring reason’s spite,
One truth is clear, Whatever is, is right. 293

It is true that Aquinas did not countenance mystical views such as Heraclitus’ that

pronounce that “Good and ill are one,” and “To God all things are fair and good and right, but
men hold some things wrong and some right.” 294 For Aquinas, evil was not just a mere
appearance.

And though he may have agreed with Leibniz, that “this is the best of all possible

worlds,” Aquinas did not usually put a Candide-like 295 face on his accounts of evil. Aquinas
Eleanore Stump argues that Aquinas not only did not gloss over suffering, but to some degree he
even embraced it. He interpreted a lot of it as due to the correcting, sanctifying purpose of God: “we
attain to that happiness [e.g. true or perfect happiness] only through suffering.” Op. cited, Stump,
469.
293 Alexander Pope. Essay on Man and Other Poems (New York, Dover Publication, 1994), 52-3.
294 Betrand Russell. Mysticism and Logic (New York, Pelican Books), 11.
295 The expression “Candide-like” is of course taken from Voltaire’s classic argument against the
Pope-Leibniz attitude toward evil in Voltaire’s Candide.
292
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made it clear that, “The present life is subject to many evils which cannot be avoided: the
evil of ignorance on the part of the intellect, the evil of inordinate affection on the part of

desire, and the evil of much suffering on the part of the body…the desire for good cannot be

fully satisfied in this life…. Hence it is impossible for true happiness to be had in this life.” 296
It is also true that Aquinas rejected the view that evil is only “an illusion produced

by the divisions and oppositions of the analytic intellect.” 297 On the contrary, he argued that
the truths that the analytic intellect discovered in the universe were evidence for the reality
of evil and a true cause of human unhappiness. Aquinas, like Aristotle, attributed high
honor and pride of place to human reason, both in its practical and theoretical
employments.

Yet, as was said above, all is not well with Aquinas’s account of happiness in other

respects. For one thing, his treatment of the lives of our non-human neighbors on this
planet is less then honorable. For Aquinas, God made the animal kingdoms to be

subordinated to our interests and power. Their suffering is not thought about, and no

provision is made for their good. In this respect, according to contemporary animal rights’
ethics, Aquinas’s attitude and narrow view of happiness for only humans 298 is considered

inhumane.

For Aquinas, suffering and evil are ultimately justified because they are sent from

God - even if “God permits only those evils he can turn into goods.” 299 This is even the case

when God “connives” (Stump’s word) against Job. 300 For if we would be ultimately happy,
then we need to be purified. Only the pure shall see God. Therefore suffering and evil are
needed and sent by God for our good to excise the cancer of impurities out of us.
Oesterle 57.
Op. cited, Russell, 17.
298 Stump 462.
299 Ibid.
300 Ibid. 463.
296
297
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Tribulations are sent to “extinguish the force of concupiscent desires …[for] “Pain and

suffering of all sorts are God’s medicine.” 301 “Suffering is the chemotherapy for spiritual
cancer,” Stump says. 302

This doctrine is so true and important to Aquinas that he supports St. Paul’s counsel

that we are to glory in our sufferings. 303 Job’s friends erroneously thought that happiness
and unhappiness were functions of God’s justice. They didn’t know, says Stump, that God
actually causes more suffering on his saints! Job suffered more because he was a better
person. 304

Needless to say, these views are considered heartless to many. On at least the

surface of things, this attitude appears to be “a disgusting willingness to accept evil.” 305 In

the history of religion, this attitude has more than once led to a relaxing of efforts to

alleviate suffering and evil in the personal, social, political and economic domains. 306

Stump argues, however, that Aquinas’s account is not indifferent to suffering and

evil; it only see them as part of God’s plan to makes us, in the end, happier. 307 None of this
justifies injustice or cruelty or lack of care. Evil and suffering are not considered good in
themselves, but only as a means. 308

Stump makes two very interesting remarks with which we will end this section of

the chapter. She says, “If [Aquinas] is right, everything we typically think about what counts
as evil in the world is the exact opposite of what we ought to think.” 309 And: “if we do not
share the worldview that holds that there is an afterlife, that true happiness consists in

Stump 466.
Ibid. 469.
303 Ibid. 468.
304 Ibid. 469.
305 Ibid. 470.
306 For more on this, see: Francis J. De La Vega. Social Progress and Happiness in the Philosophy of St.
Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary American Sociology (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 1949).
307 Ibid. 473.
308 Ibid. 470.
309 Ibid. 468.
301
302
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union with God in the afterlife, and that suffering helps us attain that happiness, we will

naturally find Aquinas’s valuing suffering even as a conditional good appalling or crazy.” 310
Aquinas’s account of imperfect happiness shows depth
Despite these deficiencies in Aquinas’s account of human happiness and

unhappiness, his view is still, in some important respects, correct even from a secular or
rationalist point of view. The following statement on the ultimate status of natural

happiness is correct: “The definition which some give of happiness – Happy is he who has

all he wills,’ or ‘whose every wish is fulfilled’ – is a good and sufficient definition….” 311

One may find agreement in this formulation from many of the greatest thinkers in

human history. We mentioned Solomon, Buddha, and Faust earlier. But we could add to
this list many of our near-contemporaries, who have come centuries after Aquinas –

geniuses such as Schopenhauer, Camus, Russell, and Freud for instance. All these thinkers
added light on the problem of happiness – and unhappiness – in humankind. And yet, we
find that Aquinas cited most of these arguments long ago.

Aquinas was right to distinguish between perfect and imperfect happiness.

Philosophizing based on this distinction, for Aquinas, may have been analogous to what

Daniel Dennett called an “intuition pump.” Applying this intuition pump to the subject of
human happiness opened up for Aquinas many aspects of natural happiness that on the

surface seems all well and fine, but, only after deeper study, proves that all is not well and
fine.

310
311

Stump 473.
Oersterle 66.
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No matter how many goods one may have, no matter how good one’s employment

may be, no matter how wonderful one’s wife, family, honor, fame, money, and the love of
many may be, human nature always wants more. As Aquinas knew from his study of the

book of Ecclesiastes: “The eye never has enough of seeing, or the ear its fill of hearing.” 312
Aquinas’s Treatise on Happiness lays out the many reasons why human beings

cannot enjoy complete satisfaction. He shows how that no matter what the conditions of

one’s life, at bottom, all mortals sense that they are undone, unsettled, insecure, and afraid.
No matter how good one may have it, one cannot avoid dying, sickness, worry, anxiety, the

death of one’s loved ones, fear, and so on: “to desire happiness is simply to desire that one’s
will be wholly satisfied, and this everyone desires.” 313 But “[nature] does not give him a
principle whereby he can attain happiness.” 314

While radical enlighteners reject Aquinas’s scholastic theology and Christian faith,

elements in Thomas’s philosophy such as his psychological and philosophical insights into
what is called “the human condition” should be honored. Aquinas keenly understood the

problems and sufferings of life. And he recognized the limits and weaknesses of philosophy.
He understood as a philosopher and as a man what all human beings ultimately don’t want
and what we ultimately do want: we don’t want to get sick; we don’t want to die; we don’t
want our loved ones to die; we want to live forever; we want to be safe; we want to be
secure; in a word, we want to be Happy.

Ecclesiastes 1:8.
Oesterle 65.
314 Ibid. 61.
312
313
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Scholastic St. Thomas and radical enlightenment
As the foregoing example of scholasticism in Aquinas shows, he is extremely thorough. He

breaks down arguments into their component parts and parses the major concepts offering

fine distinctions that clarify and deepen our knowledge of the subject. He shows what in

Aristotle’s ethics he agrees with and what he believes needs the addition of Christian grace.

All in all, it is a splendid piece of scholastic philosophic work. And yet, as we can now also

tell from focusing on its Christian elements, this philosophical account is saturated with the
deliverances and myths of Christian special revelation. Though he tips his hat to Aristotle
and to nature, ultimately, Aquinas’ philosophy of happiness is a thoroughly Christian one.
Notwithstanding this fact, his account also shows how much natural reason and

philosophy can contribute to the subject. Yet, if we want to get a clear - and albeit

somewhat simplified - picture of Aquinas’s final, positive and theological view on the

subject, we can bracket out all the natural-philosophical discussions on it. In this sense, and

this sense only, we have to remember that no matter how much philosophical depth

Aquinas goes into this subject, no matter how many philosophical arguments he considers,
and no matter how much his words “grace does not destroy nature, but brings it to

fulfillment” may placate us, in the final analysis, he holds a theological position. And this

means that all the attendant doctrines that go along with happiness in contemplation of God
in heaven are part and parcel of the deal. Hence, walking on water, raisings from the dead,

demons being cast out, predestination, original sin, the Fall, the need for salvation, holy

water, prayer to the saints, the pope as vicar of Christ, the Mass, transubstantiation, the

power of Satan over the weather, witches, and a place called hell for the damned - all are

theologically entailed in Thomas’s account of happiness. And this is not a happy outcome.
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Now that we have delineated Aquinas’s scholastic Christian view on happiness, we

will be in a much better position to appreciate how radically different Spinoza’s account will
be when we reach that penultimate chapter. The foregoing thoughts on Aquinas’s

treatment regarding the subject of happiness, I hope, presents a fair statement of how he
approached issues (particularly, of course, of issues that have some relation to Christian

theology). As one can see, the conclusions of his arguments, though utilizing Aristotelian

philosophy, all align themselves with Christian theology. Any perusal of Thomas’ writings
on happiness clearly reveals what constitutes the supreme authority for him. He does not
only refer to Aristotle, but, over and over again he refers to the authority of Scripture and
the Church Fathers. Far from being a precursor to the Radical Enlightenment in this

respect, one historian sums up Thomas’ legacy (with reference especially to philosophy and
science) in this way:

But the theological spirit of the thirteenth century gained its greatest victory in the
work of St. Thomas Aquinas. In him was the theological spirit of his age incarnate.
Although he yielded somewhat at one period to love of natural science, it was he
who finally made that great treaty or compromise which for ages subjected science
entirely to theology. He it was who reared the most enduring barrier against those
who in that age and in succeeding ages labored to open for science the path by its
own methods toward its own ends … he [made a truce] which was to give theology
permanent supremacy over science. 315

Some scholars might object to such a characterization complaining that it is unfairly

unhistorical or presentist. 316 I think there is some truth to this charge. Still, it is not as

though Aquinas did not have access to books or to people who showed a more enlightened

(according to Enlightenment lights) philosophy. In fact, he was on the front lines of most of
the cutting edge intellectual ideas of his time, including dealing with heretical and

“atheistical” works (such as by some Avveroists) that criticized revelation.

Andrew White, A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom, op. cited, 379.
See for instance Ralph McInery’s criticism of Bertrand Russell’s and Will Durant’s take on Aquinas
in the Introduction to Thomas Aquinas: Selected Writings (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), xiii-xv.

315
316

138

In his Introduction to Aquinas: Disputed Questions on the Virtues, Thomas Williams

tells us that around 1260 (14 years before Aquinas would die), the faculty of arts at the

University of Paris began to clamor for greater independence in philosophy from theology
and the theology faculty. They viewed philosophy as a critical discipline deserving of its
own dignity and independence. Strongly influenced by Aristotle’s philosophy, they

recognized in it “a comprehensive view of the world that did not rely on any purported
revelation. Some of the arts masters therefore made very strong claims about the

preeminence of philosophy.” So much so that, according to Williams, “some of the

propositions [were] later condemned by the Bishop of Paris in 1277 [such as]: That there is
no more excellent way of life than the philosophical way. That the highest good of which

the human being is capable consists in the intellectual virtues. That the philosophers alone
are the wise men of this world.” 317 This sounds just like Spinoza!

The arts masters’ call for independence from theology and autonomy for philosophy

(“and indeed the whole natural order, which philosophy purports to explain”) has come to

be called “integral Aristotelianism.” We can also translate this as meaning to a large degree
a “Radical Enlightenment” with respect to theology. Needless to say, the theologians were

none too happy with this development and therefore opposed it. Their sentiment was well
expressed by St. Bonaventure. Williams summarizes their opposition to the integral

Aristotelians in the following words: “In short, those who do not rigorously subordinate

Aristotelian philosophy to scriptural theology are deserters from Christ’s army, reversers of

his miracles, and indeed closet idolaters.” 318

We see then, that Aquinas is privy to a lot of “Radical Enlightenment” thought. Some

of this thought is not only radical in terms of philosophy, but even, in some respects, in

Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas: Disputed Question on the Virtues, Edited by E. M. Atkins and Thomas
Williams, translated by E.M. Atkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), xxii.
318 Ibid. xxiii.
317
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biblical criticism. Yet, Aquinas would have none of that. Even though he avoided the
orthodoxy of his fellow theologians, or, as Williams puts it, “what we might call the

‘rejectionism’ of the conservative theologians”, he nevertheless rejected “the extreme
naturalism of the integral Aristotelians.” Even though Aquinas was “thoroughly

Aristotelian”, he “did not agree with the integral Aristotelians that philosophy by itself
offers a comprehensive, autonomous account of everything there is.” 319

From the orthodox or “rejectionists’” point of view, Aquinas was probably seen as a

“lukewarm” or “worldly” Christian. Even though he was not in the camp of the integral

Aristotelians, he may nevertheless have been interpreted as being immoderately wedded to
Aristotle and philosophy. Many future conservative or orthodox theologians certainly

thought so. Still, despite having feet in both worlds in some respects, when all is said and
done, Thomas firmly aligned himself with orthodoxy and Christ. Thus, once again, even

though he had access to various “Radical Enlightenment” literature if you will, he rejected it.
Aquinas was a rejectionist of Radical Enlightenment thought. Thomas was even privy to

some early scientific experimental work. Andrew White gives us further intellectual context
in Aquinas’s life regarding science or the experimental method:

The experimental method had already been practically initiated: Albert of Bollstadt
and Roger Bacon had begun their work in accordance with its methods; but St.
Thomas gave all his thought to bringing science again under the sway of theological
methods and ecclesiastical control. In his commentary on Aristotle’s treatise upon
Heaven and Earth he gave to the world a striking example of what his method could
produce, illustrating all the evils which arise in combining theological reasoning and
literal interpretation of Scripture with scientific facts; and this work remains to this
day a monument to scientific genius perverted by theology. 320

Still, Aquinas did make some moves to distinguish philosophy from theology. And

he praised reason to high heaven. Literally. So much so, in fact, that some during his time
Ibid. xxiii-xxiv.
White, op. cited, 380. White deals with Roman Catholic historians of science (such as Rohrbacher
and Pouchet) who argue that Aquinas made “an alliance between religious and scientific thought, and
laying the foundation of a ‘sanctified science’; but the unprejudiced historian can not indulge in this
enthusiastic view; the results both for the Church and for science have been most unfortunate.”
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and afterwards, charged that his work was too pagan, too worldly, too philosophical, and

too Aristotelian. Even his great Franciscan colleague St. Bonaventure was critical in some
respects. In later centuries, Luther lambasted him and much of his work as “Aristotelian”

and not Christian. Nevertheless, regarding philosophical matters on which no overriding

Christian theological teaching was at issue, Thomas’s thinking exhibited some brilliant

original philosophical work along with some of the most acute intellectual output the world
has known.
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PART IV

PRECURSORS TO THE RADICAL ENLIGHTENMENT: RENAISSANCE TO ENLIGHTENMENT

Chapter Seven
The Renaissance and the Scientific Revolution as Precursors to the Radical Enlightenment

Renaissance humanism as precursor
We have already treated the important contribution that Renaissance textual

criticism played in the development of biblical criticism, but we have not said much more
about the Renaissance as a precursor to secular or Radical Enlightenment thought. We

should do so now. As in the plan of our previous chapters, the purpose of this chapter on

the Renaissance and the Scientific Revolution is to provide a general picture of some of the

changes these two movements caused which ultimately led to the Radical Enlightenment. 321
Broad selective histories, like large panoramic pictures are just as helpful and just as legitimate as
microscopically focused treatments. As a result of this plan then, no attempt will be made to provide
a comprehensive study of all the many complex, interweaving, confusing, controversial issues
involved in the historiography of the Renaissance or the Scientific Revolution. The usual endless
controversies over defining, dating, types of humanism (Christian and pagan), different types of
humanist movements in different countries, and so on will not be our concern in this section.
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To begin our selective macroscopic study then, many historians argue that the

Renaissance (e.g. the rebirth of classical philosophy, science, literature and art) was that
pivotal movement in European history that set the ball in motion that helped usher in

secular and anti-ecclesiastical Radical Enlightenment movements. They argue that without
the Renaissance there could not have been a Scientific Revolution or Enlightenment.

According to this view, the middle ages are seen as primarily a long period of time in which
European civilization was feeble and scrawny with respect to economics, education,

philosophy, and science. However, with the rise of a commercial class and of wealth, along
with the infusion of translations from the classical world (thanks to the Crusades, Arabs,
and Irish) Europe was inundated with a world of new ideas. 322

One of the chief characteristics of the Renaissance, say historians, is the turn away

from a theo-centric to a humanistic attitude. This humanism is usually understood to have

started as

a system of education and mode of inquiry that developed in northern Italy during
the 14th century and later spread through Europe and England … this program was
so broadly and profoundly influential that it is one of the chief reasons why the
Renaissance is viewed as a distinct historical period. 323

This humanistic program sought to develop human virtue. No longer was the whole

concentration on Christian ethics or the supernaturally infused virtues. Now one could

seek honor even for oneself. Jesus’s ethic of “He who would be first, shall be last; and he

who would be last shall be first” is no longer as deep or as prevalent in Renaissance Europe.

“In short,” says the author of “Humanism” in the Encyclopedia Britannica, Renaissance

humanism called for the comprehensive reform of culture, the transformation of
what humanists termed the passive and ignorant society of the ‘dark’ ages into a
new order that would reflect and encourage the grandest human potentialities. 324

Of course, this does not tell the whole story. As in most major historical periods multiple and
various forces are at work.
323 “Humanism”, Encyclopedia Britannica Vol. 6, 15th edition 1986 (Indiana: University of Chicago,
1986), 723.
324 Ibid.
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Note that it was the Renaissance humanists themselves (and not only later pro-

Enlightenment historians) that judged the medieval past as “the dark ages.” This movement
then possesses all the marks of a cultural revolution. And, because this revolution is critical
and somewhat dismissive of its Judeo-Christian heritage, and because of its this-worldly,

human-centered interests and labors, it is not hard to identify this movement as a

foreshadowing of greater Christianity-challenging things to come. Renaissance Europeans
fell in love with everything about the classical world: its literature, its art, its genius, its

creativity, its poetry, its science, its mythologies, and many of its philosophies.

Compared with the typical productions of medieval Christianity, these pagan works
had a fresh, radical, almost avant-garde tonality. Indeed, recovering the classics was
to [Renaissance] humanism tantamount to recovering reality. Classical philosophy,
rhetoric, and history were seen as models of proper method - efforts to come to
terms, systematically and without preconceptions of any kind, with perceived
experience. 325
Renaissance humanists focused on earthly activities and even the pursuit of fame

and wealth and encouraged more independent thinking in philosophy and science. This

greater “Critical scrutiny and concern with detail … of perceived phenomena, that took hold
across the arts and the literary and historical disciplines … would have profound effects on
the rise of modern science.” And not only of physical sciences, but the social sciences as
well: “To humanism is owed the rise of modern social science.” 326

The dignity of man is trumpeted from many quarters. Unabashed male nudity is

glorified in some of the greatest outpourings of artistic genius the world has ever known.

Michelangelo’s “Last Judgment” depicts the saints of old in the nude. Not only in the nude,
but with Gentile and not Hebrew features, including uncircumcised genitals! Unheard of!

All in all, “The religious themes that dominated Renaissance art (partly because of generous
church patronage) were frequently developed into images of such human richness that …
325
326

Ibid.
Ibid. 724.
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the Christian message was submerged. The human-centeredness of Renaissance art,

moreover, was not just a generalized endorsement of earthly experience”, but it “stressed
the autonomy and dignity of the individual.” 327

One can tell from what has been said just how important, once again, the Greeks

and classical culture have been to European civilization and to our attempts to explain the
history of the precursors to Radical Enlightenment ideals. One outspoken historian,

Friedrich Nietzsche, argued that the world had all it needed for a Radical Enlightenment (or,

in Nietzsche’s language, to kill God) as early as the classical ancient world. But, as he makes
clear, medieval “Christianity robbed European civilization of the harvest of the culture of
the ancient world.” 328 He elaborates on this (with some hyperbole) in a very significant

passage in his history of philosophy:

The whole labour of the ancient world in vain … Every prerequisite for an erudite
culture, all the scientific methods were already there … the prerequisite for a
cultural tradition, for a uniform science; natural science, in concert with
mathematics and mechanics, was on the best possible road – the sense for facts, the
last-developed and most valuable of all the senses, had its schools and its tradition
already centuries old! Is this understood? Everything essential for setting to work
had been devised – methods, one must repeat ten times, are the essential, as well as
being the most difficult, as well as being that which has habit and laziness against it
the longest. What we have won back for ourselves today with an unspeakable
amount of self-constraint – for we all still have bad instincts, the Christian instincts,
somewhere within us – the free view of reality, the cautious hand, patience and
seriousness in the smallest things, the whole integrity of knowledge – was already
there! Already more than two millennia ago! … All in vain! Overnight merely a
memory! - Greeks! Romans! … ruined by cunning, secret, invisible, anaemic
vampires! Not conquered – only sucked dry! 329
But then, after many hundreds of years, a spectacular rebirth of Greek and Roman

culture blossomed in Europe. The Renaissance of the genius of the classical world brought
some of the best of ancient learning back to life again. This turn to the pagan Greeks and

Ibid. 732.
Friedrich Nietzsche. Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale (New
York: Penguin Classics, 1968), 182-3.
329 Ibid. Note how many times he refers to “science.” And note how affirmatively he speaks of science
here and of its facts, its method, and of the whole integrity of its knowledge. It is upon facts such at
these that Nietzsche implicitly and explicitly argues that “God is dead.”
327
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Romans set the stage for much to come. As Nietzsche understood, without the Greeks, the

Renaissance may not have occurred, and without the Renaissance, the Age of Reason or the

Enlightenment may never have arisen. For Nietzsche the “Radical Enlightenment” 330, if you

will, first appears in the Renaissance. In his Anti-Christ, Nietzsche says that the Renaissance

was antichristian at its core. It was, in essence, a great attack against Christianity and its
values.

Is it at last understood, is there a desire to understand, what the Renaissance was?
The Revaluation of Christian values, the attempt, undertaken with every expedient,
with every instinct, with genius of every kind, to bring about the victory of the
opposing values, the noble values ... Up till now this has been the only great war,
there has been no more decisive interrogation than that conducted by the
Renaissance – the question it asks is the question I ask - neither has there been a
form of attack more fundamental, more direct, and more strenuously delivered on
the entire front and at the enemy’s centre! To attack at the decisive point, in the
very seat of Christianity. 331
He goes on to say that had this attack against Christianity succeeded at that time,

“Christianity would thereby have been abolished!” 332 God, or at least the Christian God,

would have died long ago. But Martin Luther and other religious revivalists kept God

Once again, just in case the reader may have forgotten, the phrase “Radical Enlightenment” is the
technical term historian of philosophy Jonathan Israel uses in his landmark study Radical
Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity: 1650-1750. By “radical enlightenment”
Israel mostly has in mind all that western civilization came up with that led to disbelief in the Bible
and Judeao-Christianity. Israel argues that the Radical Enlightenment comes to fruition with Spinoza.
As the quote from above shows, Nietzsche thought that the Enlightenment really commenced in the
early Renaissance.
331 Friedrich Nietzsche. Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ, translated by R. J. Hollingdale (New
York, Penguin Books, 1968, 184, section 61. Nietzsche is referring to the fact that some of the most
radical productions of the Renaissance humanists and libertines were done in the very heart of the
Vatican – such as Michelangelo’s pagan treatment of the “Last Judgment” in the Sistine chapel.
332 Ibid., 185. But of course Nietzsche understood that it would take more than the challenges of
Copernicus and Galileo to bring down the Church, or to “kill God.” Speaking about his own day,
Nietzsche says, “We see the religious community of Christianity shaken to its lowest foundations; the
faith in God has collapsed; the faith in the Christian ascetic ideal is still fighting its final battle. An
edifice like Christianity … naturally could not be destroyed all at once. All kinds of earthquakes had
to shake it, all kinds of spirits that bore, dig, gnaw, and moisten have had to help” (Gay Science, 310,
section 358).
330
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alive 333, though now many new questions and doubts were in the air. Something new was

under the sun.

Distilling hundreds of Nietzsche’s aphorisms on this subject, one can summarize his

overall argument as follows: the Renaissance at bottom was a reaction against over a

thousand years of narrow-minded devotion to scripture and heavenly things. Because of

this burden, a reaction set in which ushered in a humanistic revolution. Man now looked to
himself, and not only to God. He began to read other books, and not just God’s book. A love
for learning began to inspire him. He became fascinated with this world. He began to ask

questions - even forbidden questions (this last step of courage is what Nietzsche believes is
one of the most important aspects of modernity). Further, Renaissance man looked to

mathematics and reason and his own experience to understand the world better. The fight
against the old time religion had begun (even though at the time most people were not

aware of it).

The Copernican and Scientific Revolutions as precursors
One of the first and most serious rounds in this struggle was brought to a head by a grave

challenge to the Holy Scriptures by Copernicus and Galileo, which “unchained this earth

And yet, as Nietzsche argues in several places, Luther and the German reformation “who exerted
themselves the most to preserve and conserve Christianity have become precisely its most efficient
destroyers” (Gay Science section 358), for statements by Luther and his theological colleagues
ridiculing Copernicus in the name of the “higher” and “more certain” truth of “the word of God”
forced many to choose and then side with science over God. This section, by the way, is also
important because it is one of the only passages in which Nietzsche gives Luther and the Reformation
some credit for the progress of science and conscience with respect to truth.
333
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from its sun.” 334 It is not absolutely certain that Nietzsche had the Copernican Revolution

in mind when he wrote “What did we do when we unchained this earth?” 335 It would seem
so however because it used to be believed that the sun revolved around the earth. The

earth, as the Center of the universe and the apple of God’s eye, was as it were, chained. “The
earth is established; it cannot be moved” (Psalm 104:5). All things were in their rightful

place in the Great Chain of Being. But then the Greco-Christian 336 will to truth unchained
If I might be forgiven an aside here, it must be noted that Nietzsche’s pronouncements about
science were not always laudatory. On the contrary: since his Birth of Tragedy, there is a consistent
thread of anti-science statements made. Despite this fact however, many of Nietzsche’s arguments
against religion and Christianity have been based not just on psychological etiologies, but upon the
findings of science as well. How to harmonize the two is a question that I’m still working on. So,
along with Nietzsche’s praise of science and the scientific method, there are nevertheless also many
cautions, criticisms, and even out-and-out denunciations. “No! Don’t come to me with science when I
ask for the natural antagonist of the ascetic ideal …” (Genealogy of Morals, section 25). And though he
acknowledges that later science (evolutionary theory) has shown that man is “an animal, literally and
without reservation or qualification, he who was, according to his old faith, almost God (‘child of
God,’ ‘God-man’)”, he is critical of what he takes to be its excess belittlement of man. It’s one thing to
be disabused of doctrines of the connection of man to God that the old faith taught, but it’s not good
to interpret the findings of science to disabuse man from his dignity and self-respect. In this sense (if
I read him right here), Nietzsche seems to criticize the effects of the Copernican revolution: “Has the
self-belittlement of man, his will to self-belittlement, not progressed irresistibly since Copernicus?
Alas, the faith in the dignity and uniqueness of man … is a thing of the past” (Ibid.). In this sense,
science makes man into a nothing just as Christianity did. And this Nietzsche combats. On this
interpretation then, it’s not only the loss of God and religious faith that the madman is bemoaning; he
is also bemoaning the lostness that science seems to have conferred on man and the challenge of
nihilism that this brings with it: “Since Copernicus, man…is slipping faster and faster away from the
center into – what? Into nothingness?” (Ibid.) Daniel Conway accepts this interpretation, too. And he
quotes an apt Nietzsche text for support: “All science … has at present the object of dissuading man
from his former respect for himself, as if this had been nothing but a piece of bizarre conceit.” Daniel
W. Conway’s “The Slave Revolt in Epistemology” from Feminist Interpretations of Friedrich Nietzsche.
Edited by Kelly Oliver and Marilyn Pearsall (Penn: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 253.
The quote is from Nietzsche’s Genealogy, III, 25.
335 I checked other English translations of this passage and the German on this passage: “Was thaten
wir, als wir diese Erde von ihrer Sonne Loskettetten?” Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche Werke:
Kritische Gesamtaugsgabe. Die frohliche Wissenschaft. Herausgegeben von Giorgio und Mazzino
Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1973), 159. They all closely agree. There were no variants in
meaning to shed any further light on this question.
336 In Nietzsche’s extraordinarily deep analysis of Christianity, he argued that though Christianity is
obscurantist to its very heart, yet, at the same time, underneath all its slimy mendacity, there is also
some genuine moral impulse. Its resolve to be honest and to not commit the sin of lying has caused
many a thinking Christian to seek for God’s truth in nature (natural theology). After all, Copernicus
and Galileo and scores of other great early modern scientists were Christians. On the other hand, the
“Christian will to truth” has also caused a great deal of anguish when the Christian has to confront
truths which contradict their commitment of faith. Often this has resulted in a “moderate
Enlightenment” or synthesis of religion and science. Often it has also caused believers to chose or to
334
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this earth from its sun, so that the earth was shown to be no longer fixed, no longer stable,
no longer secure, no longer the Center of the Universe, but instead is in rapid, vertiginous

motion (“E pur si muove” - “And yet it moves” - is what some say Galileo muttered under his

breath after recanting his defense of the Copernican heliocentric theory before the Church).
The earth is now “unchained.” It moves. It is now shown to be a great sphere that

rotates in (almost) circular motion at a mind-boggling velocity while, at the same time, it

also revolves about the sun at equally mind-boggling speeds. Nietzsche asks, like many in

the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, What did we do when we unchained this earth? Is
there any up or down now? Who are we? Where are we going? If God is in question, then

how do we now answer these questions? Such was the spiritual vertigo many experienced
during this period.

It might be that the “earth” as Nietzsche uses it here represents both the physical

earth itself and we humans who have learned that God is dead and therefore should no

longer be chained to this sun (God) as the center of our lives about which we revolve. The
heliocentric theory of Copernicus and Galileo taught that the earth moves around the sun,
and not the other way around. This astronomical explanation directly contradicts God’s

claim (that is, the Bible’s claim) that, “The earth is established; it cannot be moved” (Psalm
104:5). Alluding to this watershed event in the history of secularism (and ones to follow

such as the theory of evolution), Nietzsche states: “Man has been reared by his errors: first
he never saw himself other than imperfectly, second he attributed to himself imaginary

qualities, third he felt himself in a false order of rank with the animal and nature, forth he

reject one of them. The modern history of Christianity shows a mix of responses to these
confrontations.
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continually invented new tables of values and for a time took each of them to eternal and
unconditional” 337

An immense ruckus ensued that challenged the thinking of all scientists,

philosophers, and theologians of the time. The “noise of the gravediggers who were burying
God” was beginning to be heard throughout the whole educated world. According to this
rendering of the Copernican Revolution, thinkers everywhere began to question the

accuracy and truthfulness of Scripture. But this was only the beginning. It also set in

motion the questioning of all sorts of things that previously man did not have the courage to
inquire into. And it did more than that, for Copernicus and Galileo seemed to prove that the
universe could be understood rationally through mathematics and experimental science.
Thus the stage was set so that man could learn about the truth of the universe

outside the confines of the church, the Bible, and even God. According to many in the 16th
and 17th centuries, and according to many historians since (especially Enlightenment

historians), the most fatal attacks in this regard came from the sciences because the

sciences seemed to demonstrate that the universe and all its manifestations could be

explained and predicted by means of human reason and empirical-experimentalism and not

by means of purported supernatural revelation or prophecy. It also powerfully encouraged
the scientific method to be utilized in all sorts of subjects as far as possible – even on

subjects such as the historicity of the biblical accounts (e.g. biblical criticism was born). 338
Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann. The Gay Science, 174, section 115. How can
Nietzsche affirm this, unless he is affirming the truth of science over that of Christianity? His theory
of truth is not completely perspectivist (that is, in a completely relativistic sense) here. He not only
seems to favor the apparently scientific explanations of the earth and man’s place in the cosmos
alluded to here; it appears from the way he expresses himself that he believes this explanation to be
true. Now, grant it, he may not be holding a theological view of truth here, but still, it seems to be a
belief in the truth of the claim nevertheless.
338 Several audacious works in this period cropped up which questioned orthodox and traditional
interpretations of the Bible - Hobbes’ Leviathan and Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus being
two of the most well-known of such works. In the opinion of Israel, Nadler, and other early modern
scholars, the most powerful work of the early modern period to exemplify this destructive biblical
criticism stems from Spinoza and his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Most of what Nietzsche says
337
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Subsequently, many came to realize that the Bible was no longer needed to understand

nature. And if the Bible is not needed, then maybe God is not needed. 339 Maybe God is –

“dead.” 340

Of course, not all historians agree with this version of history. They will point out,

for instance, that many or most of the sciences were fostered and promoted by Christians.

They will also point out that the development of natural theology also greatly contributed to
the progress in the sciences. We can tell from this difference of opinion among the experts
that more parsing is needed to be done.

There were many other important scientific discoveries besides Galileo’s that

showed the natural (e.g. not supernatural) functioning of the world (which, therefore put

Holy Writ in question) such as the anatomy of the human body and the discovery of the

circulation of the blood. 341 These discoveries led to revolutionary ideas that maybe human
beings themselves (formerly understood to be “made in the image and likeness of God”)

should also be considered as a natural mechanism or machine like the animal. 342 Perhaps
about Spinoza is derogatory, but it is important for Nietzsche scholars to remember that Nietzsche
also found in Spinoza a precursor! “I am utterly amazed, utterly enchanted! I have a precursor, and
what a precursor! I hardly knew Spinoza: that I should have turned to him just now, was inspired by
my ‘instinct’. Not only is his over-all tendency like mine – namely to make knowledge the most
powerful affect – but in five main points of doctrine I recognize myself; this most unusual and
loneliest thinker is closest to me precisely in these matters: he denies the freedom of the will,
teleology, the moral world order, the unegoistic, and evil. Even though the divergences are
admittedly tremendous, they are due more to the difference in time, culture, and science” (Walter
Kaufmann. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 140. See also pages 246-7).
339 Nietzsche was well-versed in biblical criticism as his Beyond Good and Evil and Anti-Christ amply
demonstrate. He ridiculed orthodox theological defenses of scripture, but he was very critical also of
liberal biblical scholarship. To him, they still did not go far enough – they were not brave enough or
honest enough - in their critiques. Still, he was quite aware of the Christianity-weakening effect that
all this criticism was having on the church, particularly in Germany.
340 Nietzsche clarifies what he meant by “God is dead” in the Gay Science aphorism 343: ”The greatest
recent event – that ‘God is dead,’ that the belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable’ – is
already beginning to cast its first shadows over Europe” (my emphasis).
341 Nietzsche was aware of these discoveries and their impact in the history of western secularism.
He even made a point of counteracting “the soul superstition” by often calling his psychology a
“physiology.”
342 Nietzsche makes mention of or alludes to the evolutionary-naturalistic view that man is an animal
and not a child of God created in the image and likeness of God several times in several of his books.
Man “has become an animal, literally and without reservation or qualification” (Genealogy, section
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man is not special, or higher, or above nature, as scripture claims. Perhaps, again, the Bible
is – false.

If you’ll excuse the following audacious metaphorical language in the spirit of

Nietzsche, criminology teaches that stabbing murders are usually the result of multiple knife

thrusts. It is the same with the death of God. The Renaissance and Age of Reason started

the fight and wounded God with vicious knife thrusts delivered by Copernicus, Galileo, and

many others. But other attackers were in the wings. The Enlightenment is about to mount
the stage. 343 It would take more than one stabbing to bring God Almighty down. Assassins
like Halley, Hooke, Guericke, Burnet, Huygens, Boyle, Leeuwenhoek, and then the great

Newton rose up and played their part in that most fateful of all assassinations – deicide! 344

“Long live physics!” says Nietzsche. 345

It is with Newton that the gospel of science makes its deepest inroads into

Christendom’s consciousness, and Nietzsche understood this. In his essay “Truth and the

Primacy of Life” in A Companion to Nietzsche, Keith Ansell-Pearson states that “According to
25). I take this to mean that he believed the theory of evolution’s evidence that human beings have
not only evolved from animals, but also are animals. This is not just a perspective, but a truth.
343 Roy Porter, The Enlightenment, 65. Porter states that the Enlightenment’s “true radicalism lies in
making a break with the Biblical, other-worldly framework for understanding man, society and
nature, as revealed in the Scriptures, endorsed by the churches, rationalized in theology, and
preached from the pulpit….The Enlightenment thus decisively launched the secularization of
European thought” (65-6). Lest the reader only think of Nietzsche only as a child of the
Enlightenment, he should think again. For there is also much in Nietzsche’s writings that are antiEnlightenment or anti-modernist; the most radical departure from modernity (in my view) are his
many aphorisms against science, reason, and truth. In this sense, Nietzsche is a postmodernist.
Stanley Rosen’s The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche’s Zarathustra (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995) affirms that Nietzsche was “the first and best postmodernist”, but he also
argues that Nietzsche’s criticisms of the Enlightenment serve to purify the imperfections of
modernity and thus mitigates “The risk that modernity will be rejected tout court”(21, 7). This paper
however cannot also take up this subject, but instead will stay focused on what Nietzsche may have
meant in the madman passage about the death of God.
344 Nietzsche pays Newton one of the highest of compliments that Nietzsche ever gives. Not only
does he credit Newton with being a philosopher, but, more than that, he calls him one of “those few
who … alone deserve to be called ‘thinkers’” (Gay Science 344 n, section 381n).
345 Gay Science 263, 266, section 335. Nietzsche implicitly praises the power of observation that
physicists evince. Kaufmann offers some commentary on this passage because it’s not definite what
Nietzsche had in mind. Kaufmann thinks that he is probably juxtaposing “physics” with metaphysics.
Thus “God is dead”, but “Long live physics!”
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Nietzsche, the characteristic methodological paradigm of modern science was only fully
attained, not in Galileo or Descartes, but in Newton.” 346

Nietzsche fully appreciated the central place that the scientific method had over

“superstitions” such as “the God hypothesis” (Nietzsche’s language) and therefore

encouraged every thinking person to learn at least one science to attain the scientific spirit:
“for the scientific spirit is based on the insight into methods, and were the methods to be
lost, all the results of science could not prevent a renewed triumph of superstition and

nonsense. Clever people may learn the results of science as much as they like, one still sees
from their conversation … that they lack the scientific spirit …. Therefore everyone should

have come to know at least one science in its essentials; then he knows what method is.” 347
In fact, Nietzsche wished education to force the learning of science. Decrying the

religious mindlessness of the middle ages and of Asia, Nietzsche asserts modern European
superiority because of its science. He agreed with Goethe’s Mephistopheles who said,

“Reason and science, the supreme strength in man.” 348 And again: “The decline of the faith
in the Christian god” was due to “the triumph of scientific atheism.” 349

Keith Ansell-Pearson. A Companion to Nietzsche (New York: Blackwell, 2007), 305. This is not the
place to explicate Nietzsche’s profound epistemological doctrines on truth, perspectivism and his
philosophy of science. Suffice it to say here that Nietzsche’s attitude toward science and to all truth
was not what it was for most enlightenment philosophers. He did not accept the correspondence
theory of truth – and this includes scientific truth. He calls scientists like Newton “great” (Gay
Science, section 37), but he nevertheless knows that in too many respects science has set itself up to
be the metaphysical substitute for the truths of religion. And this Nietzsche rejects. Still, he often
refers to and alludes to scientific discoveries and to the scientific method in laudatory terms,
especially when he is bashing Christianity, religion, the gods, and supernaturalistic metaphysical
systems.
347 Friedrich Nietzsche. Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits. Translated by Marion Faber
with Stephen Lehmann, (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 264-5, section 635. But of
course this opinion says nothing about the fact that great thinkers and scientists such as Newton
nevertheless maintained a strong faith in God.
348 Ibid. 162, section 265. In this book and most of his books, the names of or allusions to various
scientists and scientific discoveries are referred to by Nietzsche usually in terms of praise.
349 Gay Science, 306, section 357.
346
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Problematic issues in the historiography of the Scientific Revolution
In what respects was the Scientific Revolution a precursor to the Radical Enlightenment?

Like all important historical and philosophical questions, this query is in reality a very Big

question. To fully answer it (if that were possible), we’d have to tell a lot of stories – of

Aristotle, of medieval science, of Copernicus, of the Copernican Revolution, of Galileo’s Two
Systems of the World, of Harvey, Gilbert, and many other movers and shakers in the

scientific and philosophical world from the 13th to the 17th centuries. And not only the

movers and shakers in the scientific and philosophical worlds. Much more is needed to give
a full and true account. The “true account” means that all the relevant social, economic,
technological, political, etc. contextual details be delineated. As Roger Ariew states in a

book review critiquing Stephen Gaukroger’s The Emergence of a Scientific Culture: Science
and the Shaping of Modernity 1210-1685, Gaukroger’s history of science is valuable,

but without the social dimensions, some important elements appear to be lacking in
the analysis. Is it likely that an adequate description of the Scientific Revolution can
be constructed without needing to mention the radical changes in social and
political structures from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries; without
repeated references to the Reformation and the threat it posed to the hegemony of
the Catholic Church; without investigating considerable shifts in universities,
curricula, and the establishment of numerous colleges by new teaching orders such
as the Jesuits; without referring to novel institutions … to the rise of intellectual and
scientific societies and learned journals; without needing to say much about
scientific patronage or the growing size and cost of the sciences, of instruments and
of experiments? Gaukroger’s story … is primarily one about the intellectual
relations holding among natural philosophy, theology and metaphysics; it concerns
also mathematics, mechanics and astronomy. 350

This is correct. There’s no getting around this fact. And yet, Gaukroger’s account, as

in the accounts of many other historians of science, simply leaves much of the relevant
social context out. Indeed, Jonathan Israel’s Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the

Making of Modernity 1650-1750 was criticized from many quarters also on this perceived

Roger Ariew. Essay Review: “The Emergence of a Scientific Culture”, from the British Journal for
the History of Philosophy 17 (2) 2009: 387-388.
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deficit. Thus Israel makes it a point to take up these charges in his next tome on the

Enlightenment, Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of

Man 1670-1752. In the early chapters of this work he defends his focus on philosophy and

science in his history. And, indeed, he offers several plausible arguments for his case. While
not denying the place of the fuller social, contextualist story, Israel nevertheless argues that

the philosophical-scientific story is the more significant. It should be said that Israel’s books
on the Enlightenment do in fact deal with or mention several social, political, economic, etc.
forces that helped lead to the Radical Enlightenment. His argument, however, is that the
most important factors were ideological.

Be that as it may, I only bring up some of these issues to show that there are a great

number of very important (and interesting) matters involved in offering a “true account” of

this historical period, and that it will thus be impossible to enumerate all of these in this
study. But before offering my generalized account of the Scientific Revolution as a

precursor to the Radical Enlightenment, I think it worthwhile to at least alert the reader to a
few other significant differences of opinion on several key issues in the story of the

Scientific Revolution. For instance, how much of a revolution was the Scientific Revolution?
Many historians (especially Enlightenment and 19th century historians) have given a

simplified, black and white, good guys-versus-bad guys, enlighteners-versus-Christianity
account of the Scientific Revolution. They argue that the sciences in the Scientific

Revolution were not only more plenteous and extensive, but also were completely new

under the sun (that is, through the use of the “new” “scientific method”), and that, to all

extents, there was no “real” or “true” science in “the dark ages” of the medieval centuries.

Their account is that there was a radical break, a significant discontinuity between medieval
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and “modern” science. But many other historians of science and philosophy, such as Pierre

Duhem and Thomas Kuhn, strongly dissent from this view. 351

There are also great differences of opinion over the place that Christian theology

played and over how much it was really “overturned” by, for example, the Copernican-

Galilean account. For instance, to take only one example of the many disagreements on this
subject, take Ariew’s view that “I do not think it is best to think of the dispute as a broadly
theological one, as [Gaukroger] does, as opposed to a local dispute based on a specific

interpretation of the Scriptures by some Churchmen at a particular time and place.” Indeed,
“The Church’s interpretations of Scriptures were thus understood by some of the relevant
actors to be contingent matters that could, at times, be reversed … after all, one is dealing
with a social practice that varies over time and place and is often applicable only to
restricted domains.” 352
351Jonathan

Israel says some very important things in his Enlightenment Contested about the:

recent trend among historians of science to question whether there was a ‘Scientific
Revolution’ of discoveries, new procedures, and instruments which fundamentally changed
the substance of scientific debate in the seventeenth century … it is precisely in the
‘displacement of the conceptual network through which scientists view the world’ by an
essentially new paradigm, a change in categories and ideas, a philosophical transformation
in other words, that one find the really significant difference between what is pre-modern
and what is ‘modern’. The more historians of science stress the persistence of older
methods, approaches, and categories in the era between Copernicus and Newton, detracting
from a ‘Scientific Revolution’ of procedure and fact, the more it emerges that what actually
occurred during the Early Enlightenment was a ‘revolution’ in ideas and interpretative
framework.

Not only that, but :

Before 1750, then, Cartesians, Hobbists, Spinozists, Leibnizians, and after them the
philosophes, did not doubt that there had been a ‘Scientific Revolution’ and that this
revolution was conceptual or philosophical rather than ‘scientific’ in the twentieth-century
sense. In fact they did not know or use the words ‘science’ or ‘scientific’ in our sense but
spoke rather of a ‘revolution’ in ‘natural philosophy. After the Cartesian and ‘scientific’
revolutions, moreover, nothing could have been more natural than that Europeans and
Americans should quickly familiarize themselves with the reality and challenging
implications of conceptual ‘revolution’ in general, and begin to extend this idea to politics
(Enlightenment Contested 6).
352 Ariew, op. cited, 392-394. According to Professor Ariew, Galileo’s Two Chief World Systems –
Ptolemaic & Copernican was condemned more because he deceived priests into getting the

156

Compare this view with Draper’s History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science,

or, even more, with Andrew White’s The Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom!
While 17th century historians such as Ariew assesses all the hoopla over the Copernican-

Galilean controversy with respect to Scripture as accidental or incidental and only (or

primarily) an issue due to various socially dependent issues; historians such as Draper and

White judge all of the hoopla over the Copernican-Galilean controversy as primarily due to

its rejection of the Word of God’s teaching (as traditionally interpreted), and therefore not

only treated the problem as a socially contingent matter, but more so as a critical challenge
facing the universal Church.

Each historian treats his history differently because each has a different focus (or

overriding concern) that they want to bring out. Since this is the case, it is inevitable that

other areas won’t be included. Research in the literature among the different contestants on

the historiography of the science-religion debate can be disheartening. Each side tends to

overdo their criticism of the other side. Thus, for example, in contemporary sciencehistoriography, White’s Warfare is almost always referred to as a benighted account

because of its apparently extreme black-and-white, good-guys-versus-bad-guys account.

Yet, though this is true, and though his rendering in parts lacks enough scholarship and
historical sophistication, still, much of his documented work provides an incomparable
service to some of the key issues on the subject - such as, laying out hundreds of cases

conclusively demonstrating contradictions between scripture and what the new sciences

were saying. He also presents a huge amount of documentary proof of specific and concrete
attacks against many of the sciences and philosophies throughout the history of the west

from theologians, philosophers, and believers from every walk of life. No matter what
imprimatur of the Church for his book than because of any theological outrage over the work
conflicting with sacred scripture.
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general position a historian wishes to take on some of the differences of opinion among
historians, these primary documents at least support much of White’s contention.

The new historians of science who wax proud of their historical-philosophical

sophistication too often make their valuable points at the expense of missing or neglecting

the legitimacy of many of the invaluable arguments made by their “older” passé colleagues.

It’s as if the most powerful motivation for the new historians of science is to blur the lines of
all past important historical treatments. The unfortunate result of this almost cottage

industry of historical blurring and relativizing is often confusion and skepticism. One ends
up utterly in the dark as to whether there is any justification whatsoever in such standard
historical terms as “modernity”, “Enlightenment”, “Christianity”, “science”, and so on.

Instead of just talking in vague terms on this subject, I should cite some specific

books and essays exemplifying this sort of new historiography. Take Kenneth Howell’s God’s

Two Books: Copernican Cosmology and Biblical Interpretation in Early Modern Science or
some of the essays in God and Nature: Historical Essays on the Encounter between

Christianity and Science (ed. by David Lindberg and Ronald Numbers) - or, perhaps more

importantly than these, take Richard Popkin (because in many respects he spearheaded and

modeled a lot of the new historiography in early modern philosophy and science)and his
1968 essay “Scepticism, Theology and the Scientific Revolution in the Seventeenth

Century.” 353 Portions of each of these works make a lot of hay on some of the weaknesses

of their opponents’ history of the science-religion conflict, but they seem absolutely

oblivious to the accurate and important contributions that their opponents have made. In
some cases, the differences of opinion are not correctly understood. They are talking at

Kenneth J. Howell. God’s Two Books: Copernican Cosmology and Biblical Interpretation in Early
Modern Science (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002); God and Nature: Historical Essays on
the Encounter between Christianity and Science (California: University of California Press, 1986); and
Richard Popkin. “Scepticism, Theology, and the Scientific Revolution in the Seventeenth Century” in
Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, Vol. 49, (North Holland Publishing Co., 1968), 139.

353
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cross-purposes from one another. What Popkin has in mind by “Christianity”, for instance,
is different from what White usually has in mind. The way I read the two on this issue is

that Popkin’s overall presentation of “Christianity” has to do largely with what all kinds of
Christians have done (ex. Some of them have been great scientists); the “Christianity” that

White attacks is primarily orthodox Christians (Catholic and Protestant) who follow the
tradition of orthodox interpretations of the “Word of God.” We see a kind of fallacy of

equivocation at work here between these two renditions. One concentrates on one aspect

of Christianity (and proves his point thereby), and the other focuses on what most concerns
him (and proves his point thereby). One calls Venus “the evening star”, the other “the
morning star.” Yet both are referring to Venus. Both are right – and wrong.

A general summary of the Scientific Revolution as precursor to the Radical Enlightenment
“And new philosophy calls all in doubt,
The element of fire is quite put out,
The sun is lost, and th’earth, and no man’s wit
Can well direct him where to look for it.
And freely men confess that this world’s spent,
When in the planets and the firmament
They seek so many new; they see that this
Is crumbled out again to his atomies.
‘Tis all in pieces, all coherence gone” – John Donne 354

From John Donne’s An Anatomy of the World (1611). Professor Ariew and Alan Gabbey comments
that “John Donne’s famous lines beginning ‘And new philosophy calls all in doubt’ do not allude to the
latest innovation in logic, metaphysics, or epistemology, but to the Copernican upheavals in
astronomy and cosmology and to the Renaissance revivals of ancient atomism.” Roger Ariew and
Allan Gabbey, “The Scholastic Background,” The Cambridge Companion to Seventeenth-Century
Philosophy, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 429.

354
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The Scientific Revolution versus Aristotle and Scholasticism
Having stated some of the problems in the historiography of the Scientific Revolution for the
readers’ critical awareness, let us now offer our generalized account of the Scientific
Revolution as a precursor to the Radical Enlightenment.

First of all, we should note what much of the “Scientific Revolution” was about. The

Scientific Revolution was not only a “revolution” in the sense that it was something new in

history. It was also a revolution in that it no longer relied on the past way of doing “science”
or natural philosophy, that is, it no longer followed the explanatory conceptual scheme of

occult or scholastic natural philosophy. In this sense then, the “Scientific Revolution” was
also a revolt against the old way of doing natural philosophy which referred to “prime

matter,” “substantial forms”, and multiple Aristotelian causes such as final causes with its

built-in teleology and anthropomorphism of nature.

The new scientists on the block (prime examples: Galileo and Descartes) would have

no truck with the old explanations of nature (“the rock falls because it seeks the center of
the earth”). To them, such explanations were not explanations at all. They were pseudo-

explanations. They only appeared to be explaining things, but, in actuality, they were

begging the question all along. To explain that objects such as rocks fall to the ground
because they “want” or “seek” something is to posit illegitimate mental predicates to

inanimate (non-mental) objects. Why not pare this down? Why not simply and solely deal
with what we have more evidence to know? Why not not posit entities beyond what is
necessary?

More, the new scientists on the block found that their new way of explaining natural

phenomena free from the added ontological furniture of Aristotelianism and other ancient

excecrences were leading to new and powerful breakthroughs. The Patristic, Medieval,

Scholastic, and Renaissance advertence to all things past, to the Golden Age, to Adam, to
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Moses, to Plato, to Aristotle, or to the Church Fathers was giving way to a brave new world.
Just like Columbus and Magellan, we too can discover new worlds, thought the new

philosophers. The “New Philosophy” attitude was different: Since the ancients were

ignorant of so many things, and since we’re seeing more and more that they got so many
things wrong, we need to found the sciences on new and better foundations. Instead of
relying on their books to tell us about nature, let us look and see nature for ourselves
without all their over-cumbersome superfluous additions.

As far back as Parmenides’ famous “What is is and what is not is not”, the way of

explaining nature (generally speaking) has either been by way of Democritus and Epicurus
(atomism) or by way of Aristotle (and the Scholastics) with its qualities, forms, souls, final

causes, and so on. 355 Because of the onslaught of attacks against the Roman Catholic Church

by all sorts of Protestants in the 16th and 17th centuries, the Church was up in arms to

counter this ideological war against its very existence. The center piece of this war was in
many respects over the theology and philosophy of the Mass. The Mass is what most

distinguished the Catholic Church from the churches of the Reformation. The centerpiece of

the Mass was the Eucharist. Catholic thinking on this subject may be paraphrased as

follows: “If you come up with a theology and philosophy that does not support

transubstantiation, then you have come up with a false, dangerous, and heretical

philosophy. Hence all forms of materialism or atomism are rejected. Thus, if you explain
the world (which God made) by adverting only to material forces, then you are giving an
unspiritual, unbiblical, untraditional, un-Christian view of the world. Therefore it is
atheistical and must be rooted out.”

This characterization is of course a simplification. There were other powerful explanatory
schemes that influenced the course of western philosophy besides atomism and Aristotelianism – for
example, Stoicism and Platonism. Stoicism was more of an ethics than an ontology, but it still
possessed a metaphysics and a philosophy of nature that was influential. Plato and his offshoots
Platonism, neo-Platonism, and then Augustinianism were also of course other indisputable major
influences on future philosophers’ and theologians’ way of explaining nature.

355
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To take only one historical example of this stance, take the condemnation of the

Sorbonne in 1624 against certain anti-Aristotelian theses put forward by the student Jean

Bitault. The Sorbonne condemned the student’s atomist thesis that primary matter is

fictitious because “prime matter” was considered essential to explaining and justifying the
Catholic dogma of transubstantiation. 356

The worry and condemnation of Bitault’s anti-Aristotelianism and materialistic

atomism was also partly what motivated many against Galileo, and then later, Descartes –
e.g. because the views of Galileo and Descartes’ seemed to support the evil dreaded

materialist atomism. Descartes’ 1632 Le Monde explains the phenomena of nature without
referring to or alluding to Aristotelian or Scholastic forms, prime matter, final causes

(though later in the work God is referred to as creator and occurent with nature), or

qualities: “all the forms of all inanimate bodies can be explained without needing to assume

anything in their matter other than the motion, size, shape, and arrangement of its parts.” 357
All that is needed to explain the processes of the universe reduce to these three. To the

religious establishment of Scholasticism this seemed like the disenchantment of the world “there hath been a glory that hath departed from the world.” And not only the

356 See Ariew’s Descartes and the Last Scholastics on this (p. 87) and Garber’s 1988 “Descartes, the
Aristotelians and the Revolution That Did Not Happen in 1637” in Monist 71: 471-86. White’s take on
this condemnation focuses on its unscriptural component: “the theological faculty of Paris protested
against the scientific doctrine [of Bitaud] as unscriptural” (White’s A History of the Warfare of Science
with Theology in Christendom, Vol. I, p. 214. Ariew’s account refers also to Mersenne’s support of the
Sorbonne’s condemnation because of its defense of Aristotle (Ariew, op. cited, 87). Yet, Mersenne’s
reasoning (as briefly summarized on p. 88) boils down not only to a defense of the Aristotelian
explanation of things but, at bottom, is a defense of the biblical view of man and the universe.
Aristotle’s philosophy is not defended and praised in and of itself outside of Christian theological
considerations. Rather, it is considered as extremely important because it is considered the best
philosophy to defend Christian orthodox theological teachings. It’s not only Aristotelianism or
scholasticism that is against the teaching that “man is of the same species as stones, plants, and
animals.” Once again, one should not think of scholasticism as only informed or motivated by
Aristotelianism. The Sorbonne’s condemnations of Bitaud’s theses were not only because they were
anti-Aristotelian, but also because of its atomist-materialist principles (Bitaud’s XIV Thesis states
“that everything is composed of atoms or indivisibles). As a result of both, they are considered – as
the Sorbonne wrote - “erroneous in faith.”
357 Descartes. Rene Descartes: Philosophical Essays and Correspondence (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc., 2000), 34).
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disenchantment of the world, but also the repudiation of the central Roman Catholic

doctrine of the Eucharist (via transubstantiation) and, ultimately, the philosophical backdoor way of kicking God out of the world, too. The Roman Church could not countenance
any such anti-Scholastic view of the world, especially since the Council of Trent, because

these views seemed to undermine the Catholic dogma of the Eucharist which the reformers
and Protestants were clamoring against. Thus, any philosophical teaching that seemed to
support the enemy was then treated as an enemy.

The Scientific Revolution (ex. Copernican-Galilean heliocentric view) versus Scripture
In this section, we will look more closely at a couple of the claims we made above. Some

repetition will therefore be unavoidable.

Another major respect in which the Scientific Revolution (especially the Copernican-

Galilean Revolution) should be seen as a precursor to the Radical Enlightenment was in the
assault the Copernican theory had against the truth of Holy Scriptures that clearly asserts

that the earth is stationary and that the sun moves. (Of course, the ancient Hebrew authors
of the Scriptures were not the only people to think this. This is, after all the common sense
view. So, it is of course no wonder that we would find the common sense view of such
things intermixed in the inspired literature of pre-modern-astronomy cultures.)

In the last few decades there have been many works that have shown a far more

contextualist view of the Copernican-Galileo condemnations. Some of these have watered
down the widely accepted view that the key element of the Church’s (both Catholic and

Protestant) attacks against Copernicus and Galileo were not thought of as in contradiction
to scripture. Some also argue that in point of scientific fact, there are ways of looking at
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how to define “motion” and “stationary” in such a way to take the sting out of the so-called

contradiction against scripture. In the 17th century, Leibniz, for one, offered such a view. 358
Furthermore, some, such as Professor Ariew, have arguments that question the view that

the Copernican-Galilean theories definitively refute the geocentric view. However these

arguments may pan out, there is no denying that many have judged the Copernican view of
the earth’s motion and the sun’s centrality to be contradictory to Scripture, and therefore,

another reason to question and to doubt the “Word of God.”

Galileo himself knew that it seemed to contradict Scripture. He knew it so well that

he counseled theologians to interpret the relevant passages in a new way, that is, in

accordance with the truths that science uncovers. His argument ran as follows: Since the

Holy Scriptures is true, it cannot utter a falsehood; and since science tells us that the earth
does move and that the sun is basically stationary, and since truth cannot contradict truth,
therefore, the theologians simply need to re-interpret the scriptural passages that seem to
say differently. Galileo:

To me, the surest and swiftest way to prove that the position of Copernicus is not
contrary to Scripture would be to give a host of proofs that it is true and that the
contrary cannot be maintained at all; thus, since no two truths can contradict one
another, this and the Bible must be perfectly harmonious. 359
Galileo goes on to offer his theological hypothesis on why God would inspire the

authors of Scripture to write things about the motion of the sun and the centrality and
immobility of the earth:

Since it is very obvious that it was necessary to attribute motion to the sun and rest
to the earth, in order not to confound the shallow understanding of the common
people and make them obstinate and perverse about believing the principle articles
of faith, it is no wonder that this was wisely done in the divine Scriptures.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Philosophical Essays, translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 91-94.
359 Galileo. Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, translated with Introduction and Notes by Stillman
Drake (New York: Anchor Books, 1957), 166.
358
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But many or most of the theologians would have none of this. They rejected

Galileo’s accommodationist hermeneutic as not only unbiblical but dishonoring to God, as

well: God tells the truth; he doesn’t lead men to believe in falsehoods “to accommodate” our

ignorance. 360 Cardinal Bellarmine, for instance, wrote that if people assert that the new

astronomical view is really true (as opposed to only hypothetically true as Copernicus was
believed to have written), then

this is a very dangerous thing, not only by irritating all the theologians and
scholastic philosophers, but also by injuring our holy faith and making the sacred
Scripture false … Second. I say that, as you know, the Council [of Trent] would
prohibit expounding the Bible contrary to the common agreement of the holy
Fathers. And if your Reverence would read not only all their works but the
commentaries of modern writers on Genesis, Psalms, Ecclesiastes, and Joshua, you
would find that all agree in expounding literally that the sun is in the heavens and
travels swiftly around the earth, while the earth is far from the heavens and remains
motionless in the center of the world. Now consider whether, in all prudence, the
Church could support the giving to Scripture of a sense contrary to the holy Fathers
and all the Greek and Latin expositors. Nor may it be replied that this is not a matter
of faith, since if it is not so with regard to the subject matter, it is with regard to
those who have spoken. Thus that man would be just as much a heretic who denied
that Abraham had two sons and Jacob twelve, as one who denied the virgin birth of
Christ, for both are declared by the Holy Ghost through the mouths of the prophets
and apostles. 361
Cardinal Bellarmine makes three very important arguments here. First, he argues

that the interpretations of the scriptures regarding the earth and the sun from the Holy

Fathers until the 16th century have been expounded “literally.” It is extremely important to

point this out because there is a pervasive misunderstanding about Roman Catholic

hermeneutics. It is repeated over and over again that Roman Catholic hermeneutics used an

allegorical method toward Scripture which the Reformers didn’t. As a result, the attack
against the alleged veracity of Scripture referring to the motion of the sun and the

In his works, Israel cites many cases of all sorts of theologians, philosophers, etc. who attacked
this accommodationist view: “This, protested orthodox Calvinists, was tantamount to claiming ‘God
says things to us He knows are not true, in other words lies to us; since, in the story of Joshua and
elsewhere [Ecclesiastes 1:4-7; Psalms 19:5-7], Holy Scripture plainly affirms the sun circles the earth,
this must be so’” (Rad. Enl. 27).
361 Galileo. Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, translated with Introduction and Notes by Stillman
Drake (New York: Anchor Books, 1957), 163.
360
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immobility of the earth were supposedly much less threatening. This is simply false when it
comes to the Church’s traditional interpretation of the passages on the sun and earth.

Bellarmine was not only a Cardinal; he was also a Doctor of the Church. He knew what he
was talking about.

The second very important argument in this passage is that Bellarmine argues that

interpretations of the scriptures regarding the earth and the sun from the Holy Fathers until
the 16th century have received the same interpretation. Theologians and Bible

commentators have been in one accord for all of the Church’s history. The fact that all of

God’s holy people have always interpreted God’s Word in the same way on this subject is,

for Bellarmine, a proof that this is the way that these scriptures should be interpreted and

not in the new, cowardly, unbelieving way of Galileo and others who capitulate the integrity
of holy writ at the drop of a hat. As a result of this hasty capitulation, they radically restrict

the extent and authority of truth in the Holy Scriptures to only essential matters of faith and
practice.

Last but not least, Bellarmine’s final point quoted in this passage is also

tremendously significant. It has been overlooked and ignored for centuries. Ballarmine’s

quote here demonstrates the theological illegitimacy and the logical impossibility of such a
hermeneutical stratagem as Galileo’s. The real issue, Bellarmine argues, is whether the
inspired scriptures is true on every assertion of fact, including seemingly unessential

matters of faith and practice: “Thus that man would be just as much a heretic who denied

that Abraham had two sons and Jacob twelve, as one who denied the virgin birth of Christ,
for both have been declared by the Holy Ghost through the mouths of the prophets and
apostles.”

Galileo was acutely aware of the challenge that this either-or dilemma confronted

Christendom with. We said above that Bellarmine’s argument puts the lie to many of the in166

hindsight-apologetic interpretations of the scriptures. But on the switch side, to not take

the liberal interpretation that Galileo advised is then to put the lie to all the scriptures and

to the very faith itself. Galileo well-understood this quandary and he warned the

theologians about it:

Take note, theologians, that in your desire to make matters of faith out of
propositions relating to the fixity of sun and earth you run the risk of eventually
having to condemn as heretics those who would declare the earth to stand still and
the sun to change position – eventually, I say, at such a time as it might be physically
or logically proved that the earth moves and the sun stands still. 362
In other words (the last part of this passage seems to imply), Galileo may be

understood as saying, “If you reject this full-proof-success-system interpretation 363 of these

passages and then it comes out that it is proved! that the earth really does move and the sun
really does stand still, then great harm will come to the Church and the Faith.

It was not only Catholic theologians such as Cardinal Bellarmine who condemned

the new view of the earth and sun; the Reformers Martin Luther and John Calvin did as well.

Luther, who hated Aristotle and Scholasticism, is believed to have said the following:

People give ear to an upstart astrologer who strove to show that the earth revolves,
not the heaven or the firmament, the sun and the moon. Whoever wishes to appear
clever must devise some new system, which of all systems is of course the very best.
This fool wishes to reverse the entire science of astronomy; but sacred Scripture
tells us that Joshua commanded the sun to stand still, and not the earth. 364

Drake uses this quote from Galileo in the frontispiece of the book or as the epigraph of the book.
Of the quote, Drake states: “Note added by Galileo in the preliminary leaves of his own copy of the
Dialogue.” See Galileo Galilei. Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems – Ptolemaic &
Copernican, translated by Stillman Drake, 2nd ed. (California: University of California Press, 1967),
frontispiece.
363 The expression “full-proof-success-system interpretation” derives from Mortimer Adler’s and Karl
Popper’s criticisms of ideologies such as that of Freudianism, Marxism - and for Popper, but not
Adler - and faith claims made from orthodox or fundamentalist religious faiths. The reasoning here
goes as follows: No matter what can be said against P, something in the ideology can always respond
to explain or justify P within said ideology. So, if it is argued that P in psychoanalytic theory is wrong,
the faith adherent to psychoanalytic theory can always respond by saying that the arguer thinks this
because he represses x or y or other like pseudo refutations. The point of this criticism against such
ideologies was to show that insofar as they cannot be tested, refuted or falsified, they are to that
extent “metaphysical” and therefore beyond the ken of science or rationality.
364 Bertrand Russell. Religion and Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935), 23.
362
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After quoting from the Scripture “The world is established, that it cannot be moved” (Ps.

Xciii, I), Calvin “triumphantly concluded: ‘Who will venture to place the authority of
Copernicus above that of the Holy Spirit?’” 365

Jonathan Israel‘s Radical Enlightenment argues that though the ‘Crisis of the

European Mind’ commenced in the middle of the seventeenth century especially “with the
rise of Cartesianism and the subsequent spread of ‘mechanical philosophy’ or the
‘mechanistic world-view’ … Yet

it was unquestionably the rise of powerful new philosophic systems, rooted in the
scientific advances of the early seventeenth century and especially the mechanistic
views of Galileo, which chiefly generated that vast Kulturekampf [culture war]
between traditional, theologically sanctioned ideas about Man, God, and the
universe and secular, mechanistic conceptions which stood independently of any
theological sanction. 366

As we have argued above, Descartes and Cartesianism was one of the most powerful

philosophical expositors and proponents in the world of this “New Philosophy.” And to
Descartes and Cartesianism we now go.

Ibid. This passage and the passage above have been quoted in scores of books. It should be said
here, however, that Owen Gingerich argues that these passages purportedly from Luther and Calvin
are a myth. See The Book Nobody Read: Chasing the Revolutions of Nicolaus Copernicus (New York:
Penguin Books, 2004), 136- 138. Gingrich assured me through personal communication that since
the publication of his book, no one to his knowledge has written anything that refutes his view. I
have some doubts about Gingrich’s argument against these specific passages; but even if he’s right
about these specific passages, it is highly unlikely that that Luther and Calvin didn’t hold these views.
366 Radical Enlightenment, op. cited, 14, my emphases. I don’t think that Israel’s Radical
Enlightenment gives due credit to Scientific Revolution (and the Renaissance). He addresses some of
this deficit in his next volume, but still not enough in my estimation.
365
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Chapter Eight
The Question of Descartes as Precursor to the Radical Enlightenment

Introduction
Before we commence with our reflections on the question of Descartes as precursor to the
Radical Enlightenment, it might be a good idea to remind ourselves of our purpose. As we

stated in the Introduction to this dissertation, our intention is to offer a selective history of

vignettes on the struggle between rationalism and theology. But instead of citing the usual

over-generalized narration of the Counter-Enlightenment or orthodox religious viewpoint,

we will show the very specific sources of their beliefs and theologies (that is, from the texts

of revelation or the Bible) and show how these militate against naturalistic and rationalistic
thinking (and vice versa).

In this chapter, we will look more closely at a few of the things that show Descartes

as a major precursor to the Radical Enlightenment, but also those respects in which he was
still a “medieval” or “counter-enlightener” or enemy of the Radical Enlightenment. By the

use of such terms as “Radical Enlightenment” and “medieval” here, we continue to single out
particularly the question of the truth-status of revelation, faith, miracles, prophecy, and

theology. The “Radical Enlightenment” is the term being used to represent disbelief in and

rejection of these claims; and “medieval” is meant to represent having faith in, and support

of, these claims.
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Where are we? In part one of our study, we laid out many of the principal

characteristics of the Enlightenment, particularly with respect to the struggles among
radical, moderate, and counter-enlighteners. We delineated the meaning of the

Enlightenment along with how it should be distinguished from that which came before it,
the ”pre-Enlightenment”, if you will. We paid particular attention to the heart of the

warfare between these camps, e.g. the problem of interpreting and incorporating biblical

revelation and church doctrine with reason, philosophy, rationalism, and science. How to

understand and follow the “Word of God” when so many reasons, arguments, and scientific

discoveries seem to contradict it? What we have to do with in this period of the 17th century

and Descartes is nothing less than “the fate of God in the modern world” 367 - not an
insignificant problem, to say the least.

The question of Descartes as a major precursor to the Radical Enlightenment
The question of Descartes as precursor to the Radical Enlightenment: in historical context
Here’s one way Jonathan Israel characterizes the place of Descartes and

Cartesianism in the 17th century:

The first example of the onset of a principled, general discarding of authority
and traditional premises, in Europe, was the advent of the mechanistic worldview asserted by Cartesianism which triumphed widely in the later seventeenth
century. This great shift in basic concepts, like the slightly later notion of a
‘Scientific Revolution’ occurring between Galileo and Newton, changed western
civilization profoundly and, among innumerable other changes, transformed the
meaning of ‘revolution’ itself ... Descartes embarked on a general … ‘revolution’
… of knowledge … for, in Descartes, ‘revolution’ means not just linear,
fundamental, and irreversible change, and not just auto-emancipation from the
intellectual and cultural shackles of the past, but … something that changes

This expression is used often in many works on the period – for instance, Matthew Stewart’s The
Courtier and the Heretic: Leibniz, Spinoza, and the Fate of God in the Modern World.
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everything … Scorning all existing categories and premises, and all traditional
learning, Descartes and Cartesianism transformed men’s way of viewing the
world … and for this reason were regarded as a true founding ‘revolution’. 368

This is correct. But we have to take Descartes’ and the Cartesians’ role in this

revolution with respect to the Radical Enlightenment in historical context, for Descartes

was not the only force who wrought the vast changes of the Enlightenment. The Protestant
Revolution, the Thirty Years War, the Scientific Revolution (especially, at first, Copernicus
and Galileo) are other forces that must be underscored. Not only that, but none of these,
including Descartes, meant to weaken or destroy Christianity’s survival in Europe.

Admittedly, new philosophical and scientific ideas such as Cartesianism cannot
claim all the credit for engineering the resulting revolutionary transformation in
European culture. New kinds of theological controversy often contributed to
weakening the internal cohesion of the main confessional blocs … Yet it was
unquestionably the rise of powerful new philosophical mechanistic views of Galileo,
which chiefly generated the vast Kulturkampf between traditional, theologically
sanctioned ideas about Man, God, and the universe and secular, mechanistic
conceptions which stood independently of any theological sanction. What came to
be called the ‘New Philosophy’, which in most cases meant Cartesianism, diverged
fundamentally from the essentially magical, Aristotelian, ‘pre-scientific’ view of the
world which had everywhere prevailed hitherto … albeit most ‘Cartesians’ of the
1650s and 1660s never intended to undermine theology’s hegemony or weaken the
sway of the churches. 369
And there were other forces at work for a more Enlightened Europe, as well. One

simply cannot ignore the powerful influence that the libertinisme erudit (16th and early 17th

century humanist libertines) had in this period. Israel states that

This form of intellectual dissent, termed libertinisme erudit, still an appreciable force
in the late seventeenth century … sought to mask, but simultaneously to
disseminate, views opposed to prevailing theological and metaphysical orthodoxies
by presenting opinions and quotations culled mostly from classical authors in
innovative and seditious ways, paying particular attention to skeptical, irreverent,
and atheistical sources such as Lucian, Epicurus, and Sextus Empiricus, and
historians of philosophy such as Diogenes Laertius. 370

Enlightenment Contested, 5. I take Israel’s use of the word “everything” and “all” in the last three
lines of this quote as hyperbolic and not literal.
369 Radical Enlightenment 14.
370 Ibid. 14-15.
368
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This form of stealthy writing influenced many of the intelligentsia of the time to

question several of the religious beliefs and traditions inserted into European culture since
the takeover of Christianity. Israel continues his history of this movement explaining that

“various manifestations of clandestine atheistic and deistic traditions reaching back via such
authors as Bodin, Bruno, and … Vanini … and then through earlier Italian thinkers, notably
Machiavelli and Pomponazzi … albeit in the veiled, camouflaged manner of the sixteenthcentury libertines.” 371 There’s no getting around this fact then: “This was a potent

intellectual undercurrent … and one which played a notable role in preparing the ground for
the rise of the Radical Enlightenment.” 372

Much more can be said about the powerful influence that this humanist-libertine

movement had in Europe, but this will suffice to give us a feel for some of the other

movements going on around the same time as the Cartesian revolution. Still, we must

remember that despite these movements and the New Philosophy of Descartes and his
colleagues, none of these were explicitly Radical Enlightenment stuff. Despite these

revolutions taking place, much of Christianity’s power in Europe was still preserved.
From the 1650s … the opportunity to forge an explicit and systematic philosophical
radicalism existed. Nevertheless, all new streams of thought which gained any
broad support in Europe between 1650 and 1750, such as the philosophies of
Descartes, Malebranche, Le Clerc, Locke, Newton, Thomasius, Leibniz, and Wolff,
sought to substantiate and defend the truth of revealed religion and the principle of
a divinely created and ordered universe. If the great thinkers of the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth century uniformly reviled bigotry and
‘superstition’ and discarded, if not expressly rejected, belief in magic, divination,
alchemy, and demonology, all except Spinoza and Bayle sought to accommodate the
new advances in science and mathematics to Christian belief (if not always to that of
one or other Church) and the authority of Scripture. They asserted as fundamental
features of our cosmos the ceaseless working of divine Providence, the authenticity
of Biblical prophecy, the reality of miracles, immortality of the soul, reward and

371
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Rad. Enl. 14.
Ibid. 15.
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punishment in the hereafter, and in one way or another … Christ’s mission as the
Redeemer of Man. 373

Despite the Protestant Revolution, the Thirty Years War, the 16th and 17th century

Scientific Revolution, the humanist-libertine movement, and despite Descartes, the
hegemony of theology in Europe continued. Though Europe was now divided and

splintered into different confessional camps, biblical revelation was still considered
indispensable.

By 1648 Europe’s rulers had been engulfed for over a century in inter-confessional
conflict … Yet everywhere organized Churches of one theological complexion or
other were deemed indispensable pillars of the social order, arbiters of belief,
morality, education, and censorship, and the ultimate guardians of authority, by
elites and populace alike. So great indeed was the cultural ascendancy of the
dominant or State Churches in their respective zones of hegemony that confessional
theology long remained the principal and overriding criterion in assessing all
intellectual debates and innovation. 374
Though Christianity still held sway over Europe despite the early revolutions in

science and philosophy, the New Philosophy was beginning to percolate throughout the
consciousness and unconsciousness of the European mind. People were beginning to

question their church, their faith, and the “Word of God.” It would only be a matter of time

that these explosions of new ideas would have their radical effects in every significant area
of culture, including government.

Trust in and acceptance of social hierarchy [the great chain of being] and kings,
bishops, and aristocracy was bound to erode and be at risk once revolutionary
philosophical, scientific, and political thought systems began to invade the general
consciousness, questioning the ascendancy of established authority and tradition,
and eroding deference for supposed ancient constitutions and law codes as well as
the ancient consensus that all legal and institutional legitimacy derives from
precedent, religious sanction, and traditional notions about the true character of the
community. From this followed directly the advent of republican and democratic

Radical Enlightenment, 15. Francis Bacon must be added to Israel’s lists both as being a powerful
Enlightenment force and, at the same time, as being a moderate enlightener in so far as he continued
to support the church triumphant and the revelational claims which undergird it). I should say too
that Israel’s mention of Bayle in the same line with Spinoza, as if Bayle too was an out-and-out radical
enlightener, is open to question.
374 Ibid. 23.
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political ideologies expressly rejecting the principles on which political, socialhierarchical, and ecclesiastical legitimacy had previously rested. 375

Many in the 17th century (and afterwards) recognized and blamed Descartes for

being one of the major forces that destroyed the sacred age-old world-view. We learn from

Descartes’ contemporaries not only that Descartes’ philosophy was new and different, but
also how it was to a large degree a precursor to the Radical Enlightenment. We will note

only a smattering of samples of these in our next section to make this point, and then show

it further in the subsequent section on the condemnations of Cartesianism from the Church.
Finally, I take up this issue of the condemnations and criticisms of Descartes and

Cartesianism again in our ensuing chapter on Leibniz. We will see that even geniuses and
moderate enlightenment voices had fierce words against Cartesianism because of its
deleterious influence against Christianity.

Descartes as Enlightenment revolutionary supported by the testimonies of his
contemporaries up to the high Enlightenment
The above passages from Jonathan Israel help put Cartesianism with respect to the Radical
Enlightenment in its proper historical context. Yet, though all these things are true,

Descartes’ accomplishments and role as a precursor to the Enlightenment and indeed to the

Radical Enlightenment (though unmeant by him) is assured. After noting the pivotal role

that Descartes played with respect to the revolution in philosophy, science, and in man’s
world view (in our first quote above in section II), Israel goes on to show Descartes’

influence throughout Europe – in its universities and in various preachers, philosophers,

and theologians (contemporary to Descartes and in the next century). All of these confirm
the assessment of Descartes’ revolutionary effect on Europe and the claim “that modern
375
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thought begins with Descartes.” As was mentioned above, we will only briefly note some of
these here.

1640s.

Israel notes the effect of Cartesianism in the Netherlands starting as early as the late

By the late 1640s his influence in the Dutch universities, and Dutch scholarship,
medicine, and science, at a time when it was still unnoticed in his native land, was
already far-reaching … all the Dutch universities … lapsed into a philosophical
struggle unprecedented in European history since ancient times for acrimony,
duration, and divisiveness. The result was a deep and abiding split between
philosophical conservatives, broadly scholastic Aristotelians … and innovators,
primarily Cartesians, intent on revolutionizing not just philosophy but also physics,
astronomy, medicine, and in some respects Bible criticism and theology, along the
lines of Descartes’ mechanistic world-view. 376
Descartes’ influence was felt not only in the universities and in the upper echelons

of government, but “also began to be debated in taverns, passenger barges, and popular

pamphlets in the vernacular.” 377 Preachers throughout Europe accused Cartesianism of

being the root cause of the growing unbelief and impiety. At the end of the seventeenth-

century, many blamed Cartesianism for the ‘crisis of conscience’. They “tended to attribute

the whole of what they saw as a social catastrophe to Cartesianism itself.” To take only one
concrete example of such claims: “It was due to Descartes, as the Reformed preacher

Jacobus Koelman expressed it in 1692, that Holland was now rife with a ‘dreadful mass’ of
‘atheists, libertines, New Sadducees, Hobbists, mockers and the like’; for all of them were
intellectually nurtured on Cartesianism, including the Cartesian Spinoza.” 378

But, of course, preachers were not the only ones who recognized the revolutionary

changes that Descartes unleashed. Israel gives copious examples of philosophers and

philosophes who confirmed the view of Descartes’ role in the modern world. “Bayle and
most of the philosophes of the eighteenth century, for all their criticism, continued to
Rad. Enl. 24-25.
Ibid. 25.
378 Enl. Cont. 31.
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venerate [Descartes’ works] as marking the true beginning of ‘modernity’ and

‘enlightenment’ in men’s ideas.” 379 The philosophes were aware “that Descartes was the first

to ‘change the general way of thinking, starting an intellectual revolution which culminated
in the mid eighteenth-century Enlightenment.” 380

Julien Offray de La Mettrie, French physician and philosopher, was another

prominent philosophe whose writings make it clear just how influential Descartes’ works

were. La Mettrie was brought up as a Jansenist, but he turned away from this movement in
his teens and then took up the study of medicine for his doctor’s degree. In his Man a

Machine published anonymously in 1748, he argues that humans, and not only animals, are

- machines! To say that man is a machine is to imply that he is not a special creation by God,
that is, that he is not created in the image and likeness of God, that he does not have an

immortal soul, that there is no immortality and therefore no eternal judgment. All that is

operates by mechanical principles. La Mettrie credits Descartes’ writings as the stimulus
which led to materialism.

Justin Leiber’s introduction to La Mettrie’s book confirms La Mettrie’s claim that he

derived his materialist or mechanistic belief from Descartes. Leiber shows us how

(according to La Mattrie) Descartes “realized that advances in anatomy, biology, and

neurophysiology might well be thought to have begun to form a firm scientific basis for

materialism.” 381 From Descartes’ influence, Leiber says that La Mettrie “has been variously

credited as the first truly modern materialist, the first modern defender of animal rights, the
first modern sexologist and criminologist.” 382

Rad. Enl. 24.
Ibid. 25.
381 La Mettrie. Man a Machine and Man a Plant, translated by Richard A. Watson and Maya Rybalka
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), 1.
382 Ibid. 3.
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Several other scholars have also attributed La Mettrie’s materialist inspiration to

Descartes. Many think that Man a Machine “is the decisive culmination of Descartes’s beast

machine-work” and also that the materialism of the philosophes “derives from Descartes’s

mechanistic views and his rejection of final causes.” 383 Descartes is considered “as the

originator of the machine-model to the study of human anatomy, and thus as the father of

scientific naturalism.” 384 Indeed, La Mettrie thought that Descartes’ dualism was merely a

put-up job to keep him from being persecuted. 385 He did not think Descartes believed in the

soul.

La Mettrie acknowledges that Descartes made many mistakes, but he argues that

because Descartes “was the first to demonstrate fully that animals are pure machines …

only a churl would not forgive him his errors!” For La Mettrie, this move to see animals as

machines ineluctably leads serious thinkers to infer that man, too, is only a machine - “To be

a machine, to feel, think, know good from evil like blue from yellow.” 386 From mechanical
explanations of animals, to the similarities of them with man, and then to the next

courageous leap that La Mettrie took from this, we go from man in the image and likeness of
God to the image of man just like the animals, in one generation! This was Descartes’ great
stimulus. Thus La Mettrie offers us some conclusive evidence of seeing Descartes as a
precursor to the Radical Enlightenment.

As is Israel’s custom, he diagnoses the literature in the major European countries

like a doctor in order to get the heartbeat of how each country felt. We’ve cited an example
from the Netherlands and from France, but he cites multiple cases from countries

throughout Europe. Israel, of course, is not the only historian or scholar who argues the

case for Descartes’ world-changing influence. Every historian and scholar of Descartes and
Ibid. 14.
Ibid.
385 Ibid. 71.
386 Ibid.
383
384
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the Enlightenment does. Before ending this section, let us cite one further example of the
influence of Descartes; this time from England. Let us take Leibniz’s famous nemesis,
“Newton’s mouthpiece”, Samuel Clarke, as our example.
One scholar puts it this way:

Samuel Clarke (1675–1729) was the most important British philosopher in the
generation between Locke and Berkeley, at least in terms of influence on his
contemporaries, and was a leading figure in Newton's circle. His philosophical
interests were mostly in metaphysics, theology, and ethics; epistemology seems to
have held little attraction for him. Although his philosophical vocabulary and some
of his metaphysical ideas were influenced by Descartes, Clarke's overall judgment of
Descartes was quite critical. He shared the view expressed by More, Pascal, Bayle,
and Leibniz that Descartes' system could be, and had been, used to further irreligion
and had naturally developed into Spinozism. 387

From these examples above we are given a summary glimpse into the mind of

Europe, which with almost one accord, charges Descartes with being one of the leading

forces which led to the Radical Enlightenment movement of irreligion, materialism, and the
gravest of all perceived evils – Spinozism.

Descartes as Enlightenment revolutionary who destroyed occultist and scholastic thinking
There is another very important argument for the revolutionary significance of

Cartesianism that we have not yet said anything about, and that is the role that Descartes
played in being one of the chief knights (along with Galileo and Hobbes) who slew the

dragon of the philosophy of the occult. In his wonderful essay, “The occultist tradition and
its critics” in The Cambridge History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy, Brian Copenhaver

pulls back the veil on the seventeenth century and shows the background and influence that
Vailati, Ezio and Yenter, Timothy, "Samuel Clarke", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/clarke/>.
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the occult had in Europe from the Renaissance to the seventeenth century up to Leibniz and
Newton.

While Descartes was not a Radical Enlightener with respect to Christianity (at least

according to many Descartes’ scholars who believe that Descartes’ expressions of faith were
sincere and not due to fear), he was with respect to scholastic forms, magic, alchemy,

astrology, and much else. He expelled magic from philosophy. He rejected the Renaissance
humanists’ restoration of the occult that the Renaissance revival of Greek and Roman

culture (with its revival of pagan ideas, occultism, substantial forms, Neoplatonic beliefs,

and magic) conjured back up in Europe. After all, what lay underneath Plato’s astronomy?

What underpinned Pythagoras’s astronomy - and even Copernicus’s and Kepler’s? How did
they think of the sun and of light? All these natural philosophers thought in un-(or non)
naturalistic terms to complete their explanations of natural phenomena. 388

Conspicuous among the ruins restored by the humanists were ancient signposts to
the truth and significance of magic, astrology, divination, and demonology. In the
Renaissance landscape of antiquity, Hermes, Plato, Pliny, and Plotinus were seen
telling the tales that Naude doubted. The old sages haunted history’s terrain, but
Descartes averted his eyes. 389
In his younger years, Descartes had indeed shown interest in the occult and its

cousins. He looked into Rosicrucianism. He took dreams as messages from God seriously.

He even at one time wrote things that sound as if he were one of them: “The active force in

things is one: love, charity, harmony” and “every corporeal form acts through harmony.” 390

But Descartes gradually turned from these. In his Discourse, he records how he dealt with
“superstition and falsehood, in order to know their true value and guard against being

deceived by them.” He wouldn’t go the way of Marlowe’s Faustus. He would not trust in
388 Yet it is also true that Descartes, at least in his metaphysical passages, also adverts to un-(or non)
natural forces to complete his explanations of natural phenomena. Despite this fact, however, the
influence of his naturalistic explanations took hold and grew.
389 The Cambridge History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy, op. cited, 475.
390 Ibid, 476.
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“the false sciences [knowing] their worth well enough not … to be deceived by the promises
of an alchemist … the predictions of an astrologer [or] the tricks of a magician.” Descartes
called alchemical work “illusions [that] aren’t worth a moment’s thought from a decent
person.” 391

Copenhaver says that Descartes extricated himself from this old thinking very early

on in his career.

From the time he composed his posthumously published Regulae ad directionem
ingennii (1620-8?), Descartes saw the occult sciences as arsenals of bad method …
The eighth rule calls it ‘foolish … to argue about the secrets [arcane] of nature, the
influence of the heavens on these lower regions, the prediction of future events …
without ever inquiring whether human reason is adequate for discovering matters
such as these ... Whatever he found esoteric, obscure, or vacuous, Descartes wished
to eliminate from his philosophy, whose clear and distinct ideas were to end the
reign of the occult. 392

I suspect that most people who read Descartes today haven’t a clue as to this context

and to just how enchanted a place the world was still thought to be by many in the 17th

century. 393 The more that we learn about this context, the more we feel admiration for

Descartes’ contributions to the Enlightenment.

The world that Descartes lived in was a messier place and a nursery of wonderment,
as he learned in the feud with Gijsbertus Voetius [a prominent Dutch Calvinist
theologian and rector of the University of Utrecht] that began in 1639. Magic, occult
qualities, and substantial forms were some of the many threads in the fabric of this
tedious dispute. Voetius linked Cartesianism with atomism and skepticism,
denounced it as incompatible with scripture, and condemned it for rejecting the
Christian doctrine of the soul, the incarnation, demonic possession and miracles. 394

According to this definition then, Newton would not be deemed a decent person, for he spent
much of his career on such illusions.
392 Ibid. 477.
393 See also Richard Popkin’s “The Third Force in 17th Century Philosophy: Scepticism, Science and
Biblical Prophecy” in Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres, 1983, 35-63. See also his “The religious
background of the seventeenth-century philosophy” in The Cambridge Companion of SeventeenthCentury Philosophy, Vol. 1 (op. cited), ff. 393. This is the century of mystics, quietists, visionaries, and
enthusiasts – of Madam Guyun, George Fox, John Bunyan, and so on.
394 Ibid. 478. Part of Voetius’ argument against Descartes was because he feared that if Cartesianism
were to be part of the university curriculum (or to replace Scholasticism), students would no longer
have enough time to learn from the riches of Scholastic theology and philosophy (see Ariew’s
Introduction to Rene Descartes: Philosophical Essays and Correspondence, xiv) . Along with this
motivation, however, is also the usual orthodox one: the need to make sure every philosopher’s and
theologian’s teachings are compatible with scripture. Thus the teachings that Voetius condemns as
391
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With these brief arguments that show Descartes as a precursor to the Radical

Enlightenment, let us look more closely into some of the aspects of Descartes’ work that

challenged the traditional theological thinking of his world. We’ve seen that many in the
early modern period identified Descartes as the spearhead that led to irreligion and

Spinozism, and that many in the Church condemned his philosophy as a result. Let us now
look with more specific detail on some of the planks of Descartes’ philosophical platform
that were widely condemned. One of the central teachings of Descartes’ works that was

widely condemned was his method of doubt – even though Descartes himself meant it to be

used toward the sciences and not theology. But what Descartes thought of his method of

doubt and what many in the Church thought of are not of the same cloth. As another way of
seeing Descartes as a precursor to irreligion and Spinozozism (aka the Radical

Enlightenment), let us therefore look more closely at this doctrine, at the Church’s
condemnation of it, and why the Church condemned it.

the result of Cartesianism is that it is “incompatible with scripture.” This scriptural litmus test is
made evident in its “rejecting the Christian doctrine of the soul, the incarnation, demonic possession
and miracles.” Ariew’s quote of Voetius’ condemnation ends on the same note. Descartes’
philosophy must be rejected “above all” because it too often conflicts “with orthodox theology” (Ibid.
op. cited).
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Why the Church Condemned Descartes’ Method of Doubt – from the Church’s Perspective 395
“he who doubts is like a wave of the sea, blown and tossed by the wind. That man should not
think he will receive anything from the Lord; he is a double-minded man, unstable in all he
does” – James 1:6
“Don’t you know that a little yeast leavens the whole batch of dough?
Get rid of the old yeast”
(1 Cor. 5:6)

Introduction
In the Introduction to his Descartes Embodied: Reading Cartesian Philosophy Through

Cartesian Science, early modern philosophy scholar Dan Garber tells us the story of his first

readings of Descartes. He couldn’t make much sense of it. “I couldn’t figure out his point of
view, why he was giving the kinds of answers he was giving. Something about his larger
intellectual context seemed to be missing.” 396

Indeed, I myself had similar feelings when I read over and over again in the

literature on Descartes how the Church condemned his philosophy. Why did many in the

395. Two points for clarification: First, by “Church” I mean both Roman Catholic and Protestant
churches and their affiliated institutions of schooling and government. Second, by “method of doubt”
I have in mind Descartes’ specific teachings to practice a thorough and systematic doubt for the
purpose of weeding out all prejudices, errors, and any claim that cannot be known clearly, distinctly,
and with certainty (but also, in general, many of the rules he lays down to attain truth). He makes
such arguments in most of his works – most notably in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind,
Discourse on Method for Conducting One’s Reason Well and for Seeking the Truth in the Sciences,
Meditations on First Philosophy, and the Principles of Philosophy. Though Descartes states that these
strictures ought to be followed in natural philosophy or in the sciences, many of his religious critics
interpreted this as too dangerous because of the fear that it would lead some to practice this method
on Christianity itself – that is, on the scriptures, the Church Fathers, and the legitimacy of the Church
itself. Their fears were both prescient and correct, as we now know in historical hindsight. A caveat
is needed here on the question of Descartes’ method. As in most things philosophical and historical,
this business of Descartes’ method is actually very complicated. I can’t go into these complications
here, except to say that Descartes later changed his method and even forsook it! I will refer the
reader to Dan Garber’s Descartes Embodied, especially to the illuminating essay “Descartes and
Method in 1637.” It would appear, however, that those who criticized Descartes’ methodology, in
defense of the faith, were not as astute or as careful as Garber in their study of Descartes’ works. But
these considerations need not enter our discussion at this point.
396. Daniel Garber. Descartes Embodied: Reading Cartesian Philosophy through Cartesian Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 1.
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Church condemn his work? Anyone who reads Descartes will find that he seems almost

obsessed with God, with proving his existence, with proving the ontological distinctness of

the soul, and so on. Didn’t he write to put to rout the evil atheists and to defend the faith for
the glory of God? He did say that he wrote his philosophy “For the urgency of the cause, as

well as the glory of God”, didn’t he? 397 He was a good son of the Church and one who sought
to carry out the orders of the Lateran Council under Leo X, wasn’t he? 398 So why did the

Church (and so many universities and governments) condemn his teachings? 399 That is
what this section will reflect upon.

More specifically, I’m going to focus on the biblical grounds for these condemnations

rather than the scholastic-philosophical grounds usually presented and highlighted in the

secondary literature on Descartes. Garber found help in understanding Descartes from “his

larger intellectual perspective,” that is, from the perspective of the context of the history of

science (particularly physics). This study finds help in understanding Descartes and the

condemnations against him from the context and perspective of the 17th century Church’s
biblical and theological beliefs. The focus of this section will therefore be on the Church’s
condemnations against what they saw as Descartes’ nefarious influence against faith in

Scripture due to the influence of the method of doubt that he preached. In this section we
will not deal with those condemnations that had to do with Descartes’ natural philosophy

and science, that is, with his perceived arguments against final causes, against teleology, and

Letter of Dedication to the Sorbonne in the Meditations on First Philosophy in Which the Existence
of God and the Distinction of the Soul from the Body are Demonstrated (Rene Descartes: Philosophical
Essays and Correspondence, ed., Roger Ariew, 98.
398. Ibid.
399. My summary account adheres to and adds to the following two works, but I do so highlighting
only the biblical and/or theological aspects of these condemnations. See the “Appendix:
Condemnations of Cartesianism” in Descartes’ Meditations: Background Source Materials, ed. Roger
Ariew, John Cottingham, and Tom Sorrell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; and
Nicholas Jolley’s essay in “The reception of Descartes’ philosophy” in The Cambridge Companion to
Descartes, edited by John Cottingham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
397
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for a purely secular mechanization of nature - though these too of course contributed to the

conclusion that Descartes must be up to no good). 400

I write on this subject of the Church’s condemnations against Cartesianism because I

see it as filling a need. In our time (as opposed to that of the seventeenth-century), many
scholars, and certainly many students (both undergraduate and graduate), do not know

much about the Bible, theology, or Church history. These subjects are simply not high on

the agenda in philosophy departments today (as they were in the 17th century). And so, as
a result, 21st century students of Descartes often cannot fathom all that is going on when
they read Descartes. They thus don’t fully understand the highly charged and dangerous

atmosphere of the time. And they thus miss out on much of the drama that makes Descartes
and seventeenth-century philosophy exciting to read.

Books such as Roger Ariew’s Descartes and His Contemporaries and Descartes and

the Last Scholastics help a great deal in pulling back the curtain for us to see and feel the

historical, social, and philosophical context in which Descartes wrote. There is no doubt

how such information is needed to properly interpret a philosopher. The contemporary

reader of Descartes who doesn’t understand Descartes’ world cannot know of the dangers

or the courage or the slyness that Descartes and early modern philosophers had to exercise.
Once the reader is made privy to the flesh and blood, existential needs and fears of the age,
the reader can better appreciate what he is reading. We must remember, once again, that
the world of 16th and 17th seventeenth century Europe was rife with theological discord
and wars – the Protestant Revolution, St. Bartholomew’s Massacre, the Thirty Years War,
the Vicar of Christ versus the Protestants in Germany and England, the Catholic and

In keeping with the thesis of this dissertation, I purposely concentrate on the biblical versus
philosophical (and vice versa) theme (rather than on Descartes’ mechanistic philosophy against final
causes and teleology) in hopes of saying something new in the literature. All or most works on
Descartes’ relation to the Enlightenment emphasize his rejection of final causes and teleology. I wish
to make a contribution that may help some people who may not have been as aware or as
knowledgeable about these matters.
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Calvinist Inquisitions, Catholic and Protestant religious persecution and censorship, and so
on – most of which had to do with biblical, theological, and philosophical matters.
Ariew rightly states:

A philosophical system cannot be studied adequately apart from the intellectual
context in which it is situated. Philosophers do not utter propositions in a vacuum,
but accept, modify, or reject doctrines whose meaning and significance are given in
a particular culture … Thus, Cartesian philosophy should be regarded, as indeed it
was in Descartes’ day, as a reaction against, as well as an indebtedness to, the
scholastic philosophy that still dominated the intellectual climate in early
seventeenth-century Europe.” 401

I entirely agree. What I wish to focus on, however, is not so much Descartes’ and the

Church’s indebtedness to scholastic philosophy as to the indebtedness to the Christian

scriptures and the Christian theology that undergird scholastic philosophy. We must not
forget that Aristotle was only one part of the theological-philosophical world-view called

“scholasticism.” The other part, which is the foundation for all Christian theology and

Christian philosophy, comes from the scriptures themselves. Read any Summa of Thomas
Aquinas, for instance, and you will see plenteous references to Aristotle, but along with
these, and constraining these, are all the references to the scriptures and the Church

Fathers’ understanding of the scriptures. Aquinas makes it patently clear throughout his

writings that the scriptures, that is, the Word of God, are to be considered as the supreme
authority – even over “The Philosopher.”

Before we begin though, some qualifications are in order here. For instance, it is not

the case that all Christians think that all doubt and skepticism are through and through evil.
On the contrary, for instance, the scriptures and the Church themselves recommend

doubting and skepticism of “the lies of the devil”, of “deceitful philosophy”, and of anything
that can hurt one’s faith. Another important point that must be made is that many

401

Roger Ariew. Descartes and the Last Scholastics, op. cited, p. 1.
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Christians, in the history of Christianity, are what have been called “fideists.” 402 In the 16th

and 17th centuries, various fideists have used skepticism as a way to disarm the claims

either of the New Philosophy or the all-knowing Protestants such as the Calvinists. Luther’s

and Calvin’s fideism fits the bill for the former, while Roman Catholic thinkers such as Pierre
Charron fit the bill for the latter. 403 The subject of “fideism” is a vast and complicated one.
This is not the place to parse all the many important differences in the use of this term. I

bring it up here so as to alert the reader that there are important qualifications to be made

in reference to our discussion of the Church’s general condemnation of doubting, and more
specifically of the Cartesian method of doubt.

Another very important qualification that we must make is that we should note that

just as there were different denominations of Christianity, so also there were different

responses to Descartes’ works. Not all Christians judged Descartes’ works as of the devil. In
fact, there were many Cartesians who were devout. Thinkers such as Arnauld, Malbranche,
and the early Pascal thought that many of the central planks in Descartes’ philosophical

platform were basically correct. Not only that, but many Cartesians believed with Descartes

Richard Popkin defines fideists as “persons who are skeptics with regard to the possibility of our
attaining knowledge by rational means, without our possessing some basic truths known by faith (i.e.
truths based on no rational evidence whatsoever).” Popkin sees writers such as St. Augustine,
Luther, Calvin, Pascal, and Kierkegaard as fideists. Richard Popkin. The History of Scepticism: from
Erasmus to Spinoza (California: University of California Press, 1979), xix-xx. The reader should know
that this description or definition of fideism has several different important distinctions, which the
study of Popkin’s book, and others works on this subject delineate.
403 For an excellent example of Charron’s fideism, see chapter 5, “Pierre Charron, Wisdom” in
Descartes’ Meditations: Background Source Material, edited by Roger Ariew, John Cottingham, and
Tom Sorrell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). It should be noted that though the
skeptical fideism of thinkers like Charron were used in order to destroy Protestant dogmatism, the
Jesuits and others within the Roman Catholic Church nevertheless still condemned it. To their
thinking it evinced too much skepticism and doubt. Besides, it smacked of 16th and 17th century
Protestantism (Jansenism and some mysticism) in its strong reliance on the Holy Spirit for religious
knowledge. Note for instance Charron’s use of scripture on pages 58 and 62. The editors don’t cite
the scripture texts, but they are important. Take the one which Charron quotes on page 58: “a
spiritual person judges all things and is judged by none.” This comes from Paul’s first letter to the
Corinthians 2:15 (See this passage also in its context). It is a central passage in Pauline theology and
has been the linchpin in all sorts of theologies of fideism. We have spoken at length in this
dissertation on this aspect of religious enlightenment thinking. At any rate, Charron’s use of it is
highly ironic because most of the early Protestant groups (especially the “enthusiastic” among them)
used this passage and others like it in the New Testament to justify some of their key doctrines.
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that his system would put Christian philosophy and theology on better foundations than
Aristotelian Scholasticism.

Having noted that many Cartesians were devout Christians however, we must

qualify the extent of their Cartesianism, that is, the extent of how much they agreed with

and followed Descartes’ teachings. Many believing Cartesians, though supporting Descartes
in some things, did not support him in other things. For instance, many expressed serious
reservations about the method of doubt. We may take Arnauld as a good example of this.

In his Interpreting Arnauld, Elmar J. Kremer reminds us of Arnauld’s remarks in the

Fourth Objections to Descartes’ Meditations, that “Although philosophy can claim this entire
work [Descartes’ Meditations] as its own, nevertheless, because the author has respectfully
and willingly submitted himself to the tribunal of the theologians, I shall here act in two

capacities” – that is, he will examine Descartes’ work as a philosopher, “and then I shall set

forth what could be offensive to theologians in the entire work.” 404 Did Arnauld find
anything theologically offensive in Descartes’ work? Yes. In his essay “Arnauld’s

Interpretation of Descartes as a Christian Philosopher”, Kremer sizes up Arnauld’s
assessment as follows.

But although Arnauld admired Descartes’s philosophy and was prepared to defend
it against the charge that it was heretical, he did not accept some of its most
important principles, and cannot properly be said to be a disciple of Descartes. He
considered himself a professional theologian rather than a philosopher, and his
primary allegiance was to the Catholic theological tradition as he understood it.
Hence, he was prepared to depart from Descartes whenever he thought it necessary
to do so in order to maintain theological orthodoxy. For example, from the Fourth

“Arnauld emerges … as a figure who wanted to continue the medieval theological tradition and, at
the same time, to embrace the new philosophy… [He] understands, and fears, in his contemporaries
what Sleigh has characterized as a certain ‘boldness of reason which would, in time, spark the
Enlightenment’” (Elmar J. Kremer. Interpreting Arnauld, ix). In his essay, “Arnauld and the Modern
Mind” (in Kremer’s book), Peter A. Schouls argues that Descartes’ philosophy “is the first sounding of
Kant’s Enlightenment call for each to be self-emancipated from self-incurred tutelage…. Here is the
typically modern mind” (44). But Arnauld “is not a modern mind. To the contrary, he is so enveloped
in pre-modern Augustinianism that he fails to recognize modernity’s character when it faces him”
(44).
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Objections on, he rejected the method of doubt, at least in part for theological
reasons ... [In an endnote Kremer remarks that] “In response to Arnauld’s
misgivings, Descartes added a clause in the Synopsis of the Meditations to make
clear that the work dealt only with speculative truths knowable by the natural light,
and not with matters of faith or morals … But [Kremer says] I know of no passage in
his later works in which Arnauld speaks favorably of the method of doubt. 405

And so we see the need to qualify the extent of those interpreted to be Cartesian and

devout. At any rate, our concern is with those believers who fought against and condemned
the Cartesian method of doubt. Whatever the case may be here, one thing is clear, and that
is, if you are a genuine or devout believer in the seventeenth century, you may (generally

speaking) look upon Descartes’ method of doubt with suspicion. In fact, many of Descartes’
contemporaries saw this method as being just as dangerous and open to condemnation as
the Copernican-Galileo unbiblical heliocentric doctrine. 406 Galileo’s Copernican teachings
seemed to undermine scripture, and everybody knows what happened to him because of

this. Descartes’ method of doubt also seems to contradict scripture, and we know that this

too was condemned by the Church because this method (as they perceived the danger of its
use in theological matters) contradicted scripture.

There are several biblical and theological criteria that the devout know and follow

to determine whether someone is indeed a genuine Christian (just as there are some

philosophical criteria to help one identify a Platonist, Aristotelian, a Spinozist, etc.). There

are tell-tale signs of a genuine believer that can be elicited with very little trouble. In fact,
litmus tests of orthodoxy have been part of the reason behind many of the Church’s

Councils: they list all that is considered theologically acceptable. Everything that diverges

seriously enough from the central tenets of the faith is thereby condemned as heresy. Just
as there are criteria for determining whether a law is constitutional, so also are there

Ibid. 87-88. Kermer goes on to say that Arnauld also “did not hesitate to reject important
Cartesian doctrines, including the doctrine on free will and on judgment as an act of will” (76).
406 There were several other factors behind Galileo’s condemnation – political, social, and, not least,
his own abrasive personality.
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criteria if a philosophical teaching is biblically and theologically sound: Does the author
glorify God? Is Christ properly presented in all his teachings? Does he believe in the

resurrection of the dead? Does the author’s opinion in any way contradict scripture? Are

the author’s teachings clearly in harmony with the Word of God? Does he confess that Jesus
is the Son of God sent by God to atone for the sins of the world? Can the work do anything
to harm the faith of the faithful or question the authority of the Church? And so on.

And then there’s the phenomenon in every religion that some are totally devoted,

some only partly devoted, and some pretty oblivious to their faith, even though they talk as
if they were genuine believers. Moderate or liberal Christians such as Leibniz, Bacon, or

Locke, for instance, would not have as serious a problem with Descartes’ epistemological

rules as the more orthodox and fervent - though this claim too has its caveats. For instance,

regarding Descartes’ criterion of truth, a matter logically and philosophically entailed in

Descartes’ method of doubt, Leibniz early on expressed deep concern. Regarding

Descartes’s dictum of accepting as true only that which is clear and distinct, one Leibniz

scholar states:

The danger, for the mysteries of the faith, of Descartes’ criterion of truth was noted
by the young Leibniz, as is shown by some remarks contained in his first long letter
addressed to Arnauld. What place can there be for truth superior to human reason
(and of which it does not, and cannot, have clear and distinct ideas) in a philosophy
whose first principle is that of admitting as true only that which is clear and
distinct? 407

These and many more worries and criticisms were leveled against Descartes’

method. Most of these were leveled by the more fervent devotees of the faith (though many
moderates joined in this chorus). This section will focus on their perspective. Just as

Garber’s essay is interested in only Descartes’ scientific thought (“Descartes was a

multifaceted character, and there are a number of approaches that one can take to illumine
Maria Rosa Antognazza. Leibniz on the Trinity and the Incarnation (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2007), endnote 24, p. 203.
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his thought. All I mean to assert is that this is one of them” 408), so also this facet of the

religious reception of Descartes’ method of doubt will be what interests us.

My goal, like Garber’s, is to provide (as far as possible) a “disinterested historical

reconstruction” of the Church’s biblical theological perspective in condemning Descartes.
Descartes’ contemporaries and the Church were not only responding to threats against
scholasticism. That is why they so often explicitly and implicitly refer to scripture.

Descartes himself makes many references (explicit and implicit) to the scriptures in his
writings and correspondence. He too makes it clear that “the Holy Scriptures are to be
believed because they have God as their source” and that “one may infer from the Holy

Scriptures that the knowledge of [God] is much easier than the manifold knowledge that we
have of created things.” 409

The Church’s condemnations of Descartes based on biblical-theological grounds
Why did the Church condemn Descartes’ method of doubt? That’s easy to answer:

Because God is against it and because He commanded the Church to defend the faith and keep
it from being corrupted. But is this issue that clear? Is it clear that God Almighty (e.g. the

Bible) feels this way? Yes, it is. The following account should prove this.

The central problem of the place of doubt in human life was highlighted in sacred

history from the very beginning. Samuel Preus says,

Against Descartes, the theologians cite several faith-threatening themes from his
program: first, they charge that Descartes’s principles of methodical doubt … leads
to atheism. The very principle of doubt, they aver, has its roots in the primal sin of
Adam: we all know who first introduced doubt into the world, and who fell for it. 410

Descartes Embodied, op. cited, 3.
Letter to Sorbonne, op. cited.
410 410. J. Samuel Preus. Spinoza and the Irrelevance of Biblical Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 76-7.
408
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And who was it that introduced doubt in the world? You guessed right: “the Devil, who

suggested to the first man the Cartesian principles of philosophizing, namely doubt, on the
basis of which the divine warning not to eat was interpreted.” 411

In order to make the Church’s position on this subject simple and clear, it may be

helpful if I spoke in the voice of what we can take as a representative 17th century believer.
The following then can be likened to a typical sermon:

‘As far back as the Garden of Eden it all started. After Eve told the serpent that she

and Adam were not allowed to eat the fruit of the tree in the middle of the garden on

penalty of death, the devil said, “You will not surely die” (Gen. 3:4). Well, we know what

happened after that. The woman she did eat; and she gave to her husband, and he did eat.
And the rest, as they say, is history – out of Paradise! We must remember that almost all
Christians, Roman Catholic and Protestant, believed in the plain truth of the Genesis
accounts. 412

Because of doubt, Adam and Eve disobeyed God. Because of that doubt, as God

revealed to St. Paul thousands of years later, “all die” (1 Cor. 15:22). The consequences of
doubt according to the Bible are almost always destructive in some way. Due to our first
parents’ doubts, the great Fall or Curse came upon all nature. God curses the very earth.
This curse is everywhere and always a sign of what doubt leads to:

Cursed is the ground because of you; through painful toil you will eat of it all the
days of your life. It will produce thorns and thistles for you, and you will eat the
plants of the field. By the sweat of your brow you will eat your food until you return
to the ground since from it you were taken; for dust you are and to dust you will
return (Gen. 3:17-19).

Ibid.
For instance, Pierre Daniel Huet, a well-known scholar and opponent of Descartes, actually
“produced a work on the location of the Garden of Eden” (see Pierre-Daniel Huet: Against Cartesian
Philosophy, ed. Thomas M. Lennon (New York: Humanity Books, 2003), 19. Such works were typical
in the 17th century.
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Had Adam and Eve not doubted, all humans would have been able to live forever in

Paradise in a universe of total peace and joy. But, because of their doubt, all things have

“fallen.” Because of Eve’s doubt all women must suffer pain when giving birth to children
and they must all submit to their husband’s rule (Gen. 3:16). Of this horrible Fall of man

and the dreadful Curse that then permeated and corrupted all of nature, the Bible has much
to say. This curse and corruption of nature will be removed only after Messiah returns and
punishes all unbelievers. At that time children will be able to play with snakes, and lions

and lambs will dwell in harmony and peace. And then a new heaven and a new earth will be
created. Then God will live with men and “He will wipe every tear from their eyes. There

will be no more death or mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things has passed
away” (Rev. 21:4). And who will not be allowed to enjoy this new heaven and new earth?

Answer: “the cowardly, the unbelieving, the vile, the murderers, the sexually immoral, those
who practice magic arts, the idolaters and all liars – their place will be in the fiery lake of

burning sulfur. This is the second death” (Rev. 21:8). Note that in this passage of the Word
of God, “the unbelieving” are clumped together with murders, thus indicating just how

seriously God hates doubting. And where do the doubters go? “In the fiery lake of burning
sulfur.” 413

The writer of the famous 11th chapter of Hebrews in the New Testament provides us

a summary of the whole history of God’s inspired Word on the heroes of the faith. 414 You

As you can see then, this doubting business is very serious business indeed. Now, imagine that
you are back in the 1600’s and much of what you have been taught since childhood is the Bible’s view
of things; and then you hear about some new, upstart French philosopher who is spouting out stuff
about the need for people to practice a methodological and systematic doubt to rid oneself of all false
beliefs and biases! Do you imagine that you would be kindly toward such an one? But I have perhaps
still not made my case clear enough to those who really don’t know the mind-set of believers.
There’s more. A lot more. For, you see, much of the believer’s life, from infanthood till death, is lived
in the shadow of the Church’s teachings. And faith, that is, not doubting, is one of the three chief
characteristics of the true Christian (1 Cor. 13:13).
414 Incidentally, as this 11th chapter of Hebrews is the roll call of the great heroes of the faith,
Jonathan Israel’s The Radical Enlightenment is the opposite: it is the roll call, chapter by chapter, of all
those radical enlighteners who preached, campaigned, and wrote against the faith.
413
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need to read this chapter carefully because it contains the life blood of the Jewish and
Christian religions. We can only quote some passages here.

“Now faith is being sure of what we hope for and certain of what we do not see. This

is what the ancients were commended for” (Hebrews 11: 1). Note the terms used here to

describe what faith is: it’s “being sure … and certain.” The essence all of Descartes’ works in

epistemology and methodology is to attain certainty. But he goes about it in a very different
way then holy writ tell us that true believers are to go about it. The ancients were

commended for their faith and not for any high-falutin’ philosophical mumbo-jumbo about
finding certainty after only subjecting everything to complete doubt. By faith Noah saved
the fate of humankind (that is, by being the only ones to survive so that they could re-

populate the world) from the great flood. Because Abraham believed, not only did all the

Jews originate from him, but the Messiah did too: “I will make you into a great nation and I
will bless you; I will make your name great, and you will be a blessing. I will bless those

who bless you, and whoever curses you I will curse; and all peoples on earth will be blessed
through you” (Gen. 12:2-3).

St. Paul calls Abraham “the father of all who believe” (Rom. 4:11). Paul lifts

Abraham up as the model for the Christian religion: “Against all hope, Abraham in hope

believed” and “Without weakening in his faith, he faced the fact that his body was as good as
dead – since he was about a hundred years old – and that Sarah’s womb was also dead. Yet

he did not waver through unbelief regarding the promise of God, but was strengthened in hi
s faith and gave glory to God” (Rom. 4:18-21; Heb. 11:8-12, 17-18).

So then, when we read Descartes’ works, even though he talks a big talk about God

and how he wants to convince atheists, we do not believe him. As the Good Book says,

“Watch out for false prophets. They come to you in sheep’s clothing … Not everyone who

says to me, ‘Lord, Lord,’ will enter the kingdom of heaven, but only he who does the will of
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my Father who is in heaven” (Mt. 7:15-23). For Descartes is not doing the will of the Father
by spreading the message of doubt, when he should be spreading the message of faith.

Descartes’ method of doubt puts the Lord to the test. But our Lord made this clear: “Do not
put the Lord to the test” (Mt. 4:7). 415

I fear that this is what M. Descartes is doing. But he should remember what God said

about his own people who for forty years kept doubting and testing Him: “That is why I was
angry with that generation … and declared on oath in my anger, ‘They shall never enter my
rest’” (Ps. 95:7-8). And we all know what that means. God was so angry at their doubting

that he slew most of them.

This same test occurred over and over again in the history of His people in the Old

Testament. And over and over again, He would judge them – and judge them harshly and

unmercifully. Whenever Israel doubted, God punished. The New Testament writers knew
this very well, and used such examples purposely to whip their faith into shape: “See to it,
brothers, that none of you has a sinful, unbelieving heart” (Heb. 3:12) and “He who is

coming will come and will not delay. But my righteous one will live by faith. And if he
shrinks back, I will not be pleased with him” (Heb. 10:38).

Descartes is worried about all sorts of things, but Jesus tells us clearly that only one

thing is needful, and that is to trust God. In fact, it was doubting or lack of faith that our

Lord excoriated more sharply than every evil (except for pharisaical hypocrisy). He was

always sighing “O ye of little faith” (Mt. 6:30) and getting angry, even with his own disciples
for doubting him. On the other hand, there was nothing the Lord praised more highly than

faith. For example, a woman whose daughter was demon possessed, kept pursuing Jesus to
415. Op. cited, Preus. Part of the 1656 decree of Holland and West Frisia that prohibited the teaching
of Descartes’ ideas to the young reads: “whatever is revealed by God in Holy Scriptures is to be held
to be firmly and undoubtedly the most certain of all, even if human reason seems to dictate
something else for itself, however clearly and distinctly: for more is always to be attributed to divine
authority alone than to human judgment”, 76.
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heal her daughter. Jesus’ disciples tried to get rid of her, but she would not go because she
fully believed that Jesus could perform this miracle. Because of her tenacity, “Jesus said to

her, ‘Woman, you have great faith. Your request is granted.’ And her daughter was healed
from that very hour” (Mt.15:28). Over and over again, he told people “According to your
faith will it be done to you” (Mt. 9:29) and “your faith has healed you” (Mt. 9:22). Jesus

despised doubting.

All the Christian apostles and evangelists, after Jesus’ resurrection and ascension

into heaven, preached the same: “Jews demand miraculous signs and Greeks look for

wisdom”, St. Paul wrote (1 Cor. 1:22). The Word of God condemns all such doubting. And
God makes it clear that He means intellectuals, like Descartes, too. For it is written: ‘I will

destroy the wisdom of the wise; the intelligence of the intelligent I will frustrate.’ Where is
the wise man? Where is the scholar? Where is the philosopher of this age? Has not God

made foolish the wisdom of the world? For since in the wisdom of God the world through
its wisdom did not know him, God was pleased through the foolishness of what was
preached to save those who believe (1 Cor. 18-21).

As we have said above, Jesus says the same thing. The scholars of his time used to

crowd around him and make all sorts of demands on him – all because they doubted. “The
Pharisees and Sadducees came to Jesus and tested him by asking him to show them a sign
from heaven”, but Jesus mocked their doubting and said to them in cryptic terms they

would not understand [because he would not teach doubters]: “A wicked and adulterous
generation looks for a miraculous sign, but none will be give it except the sign of Jonah.’
Jesus then left them and went away” (Mt. 16:1-4).

Against doubting, Jesus praised believing. “I tell you the truth, anyone who will not

receive the kingdom of God like a little child will never enter it” (Mark 10:15). And, in
another place:
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At that time the disciples came to Jesus and asked, “Who is the greatest in the
kingdom of heaven?’ He called a little child and had him stand among them. And he
said: ‘I tell you the truth, unless you change and become like little children, you will
never enter the kingdom of heaven. Therefore, whoever humbles himself like this
child is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven” (Mt. 18:1-4).
Jesus told the great Jewish teacher Nicodemos the same thing:

‘You are a teacher of Israel,’ said Jesus, ‘and do you not understand these things? I
tell you the truth, we speak of what we know, and we testify to what we have seen,
but still you people do not accept our testimony. I have spoken to you of earthly
things and you do not believe; how then will you believe if I speak of heavenly things
… Whoever believes in [the Son] is not condemned, but whoever does not believe
stands condemned already because he has not believed in the name of God’s one
and only Son” (Jn.3:10-18).
Do you now see how important believing is and how damnable doubting is,

according to the Word of God? Jesus actually taught that God hid the truth from the hot shot

intellectuals. One time, when Jesus was “full of joy through the Holy Spirit”, he said, “I

praise you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because you have hidden these things from the
wise and learned, and revealed them to little children. Yes, Father, for this was your good
pleasure” (Lk: 10:21). So you see, learned scholars and philosophers, all this doubt that
Mons. Descartes preaches, is in reality against God and is therefore of the devil. For

Christianity is all about faith. If you threaten that, you threaten the very foundations of our
holy religion. So, if you look very closely at what Descartes is propounding – despite all his

fine sounding words about God - you will see that he is preaching unbelief, the greatest evil

there is. The Bible tells us that we must “test the spirits”: “Dear friends, do not believe every
spirit, but test the spirits to see whether they are from God, because many prophets have
gone out into the world” (1 Jn. 4:1).

Much more can be said to prove the centrality of faith and the Bible’s constant

teachings and commandments against doubting, but this quick biblical overview, I hope, will
suffice for now, and show you why the Church condemned Descartes’ teaching about the
method of doubt. But before I end, let me briefly explain and justify the Church’s role in
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condemning and disciplining those under her charge. The Church condemns and disciplines
because God says to. It’s what the scriptures teach. Jesus said

If your brother sins against you, go and show him his fault, just between the two of
you. If he listens to you, you have won your brother over. But if he will not listen,
take one or two others along, so that ‘every matter may be established by the
testimony of two of three witnesses.’ If he refuses to listen to them, tell it to the
church; and if he refuses to listen even to the church, treat him as you would a pagan
or a tax collector. ‘I tell you truth, whatever you bind on earth will be bound in
heaven, and whatever you loose on earth will be loosed in heaven’ (Mat. 18:15-18).
Regarding serious sins, Paul the apostle commands the Church to “put out of your

fellowship the man who did this” (1 Cor. 5:2). “When you are assembled in the name of our
Lord Jesus and I am with you in spirit, and the power of our Lord Jesus is present, hand this

man over to Satan, so that the sinful nature [or that his body; or that the flesh] may be

destroyed and his spirit saved on the day of the Lord.” And “Don’t you know that a little

yeast works through the whole batch of dough? Get rid of the old yeast that you may be a

new batch without yeast – as you really are…. But now I am writing you that you must not

associate with anyone who calls himself a brother but is sexually immoral or greedy, an

idolater or a slanderer, a drunkard or a swindler. With such a man do not even eat. What
business is it of mine to judge those outside the church? Are you not to judge those inside?
God will judge those outside. ‘Expel the wicked man from among you’” (1 Cor. 5, my
emphases).

Many other passages of scripture can be cited to prove to you the legitimacy of the

Church’s need and power to discipline, but these should suffice for now. Let me end here by
citing one more point in passing so that you get a fuller picture of why the Church (like

ancient Israel) has to punish and discipline. We are ordered not to countenance false
believers or their poisonous doctrines. The scriptures teach that if we don’t judge or
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discipline them, God will judge and discipline us. 416 It is our pastoral duty to protect the

flock. Even as the learned Marin Mersenne wrote in his “The Truth of the Sciences” 417:

That is why the church, the bishops and doctors, can suppress, prohibit, or condemn
all the books that the heretics use in order to attack the faith, as they judge
necessary, for a time or for always, for they have the right to do everything required
for the preservation of the church and of the souls that God has put into its hands for
their welfare.
Now that I have explained to you the teachings of the Word of God and the Church, I

hope that you understand why the Church condemned Descartes’ teachings about the
centrality and value of doubting for one’s beliefs.’

Thus saith the believing voice of 17th century Europe against Descartes’ method of

doubt and why so many in the Church attacked it. Aspects of Descartes’ philosophy, such as

This doctrine, of course, was not restricted to the ancient Hebrews or the Christians. The Greeks
also preached this. Dodds’ says, “To offend the gods by doubting their existence, or by calling the sun
a stone … was practically treason – it amounted to helping the enemy. For religion was a collective
responsibility. The gods were not content to strike down the individual offender: did not Hesiod say
that whole cities often suffered for one bad man”, The Greeks and the Irrational, 191.
417 This was published in 1625 four years before the correspondence with Descartes begins (so far as
can judged by Descartes’ correspondence). I’m afraid that my use of the Mersenne quote above may
be misleading. I don’t know that Mersenne at this time did or would have joined the Church if the
Church at this early date had condemned Descartes (assuming, of course, that Descartes had
published his works at this earlier date). I do know is that Mersenne and Descartes eventually
became colleagues and friends. But I also do know that Mersenne at this early date must have been
very conservative - so much so that in his 1624 The Impiety of the Deists he supported the Church’s
condemnation of Noel Fournet. Fournet was a French school teacher who after comparing the gods
of the Greeks and the Romans with the God of the Bible argued that the God of the Bible had to be far
more evil because of the heinous immorality of predestining most of the world to eternal torment in
hell. For his honesty and courage, Fournet was rewarded by the Church when they gouged out his
tongue and then burnt him to the stake. From my little study of Mersenne and of the chronology of
Mersenne’s works, I take the position that he grew more liberal, or worldly, and mature as his
education and his years increased (it is, after all, a common phenomenon that many believers start
out with extreme fervor only to grow more liberal and worldly as knowledge and the years wear on).
Surprisingly, Daniel Garber doesn’t consider or mention this as a possible explanation for Mersenne’s
changing views from originally being against Galileo (and Copernicanism) to finally coming around to
his thought. Garber knows that “Mersenne started his career in a rather different way” – that is, as
“primarily a writer on religious topics.” He was also something of a supporter of Aristotelianism: “on
his view, the opponents of Aristotelianism were worse than merely mistaken. They were dangerous:
dangerous to religion” (this give more reason to think that at this time he would have condemned
Descartes too). Thus, “In the early 1620s, Mersenne lists Galileo among the innovators in natural
philosophy whose views should be rejected” [since this is so, there is good reason than to believe that
at this time Mersenne would have supported a condemnation against, or rejection of, Descartes by
the Church]. Garber continues: “However, by the early 1630s, less than a decade later, Mersenne has
become one of Galileo’s most ardent supporters.” See Daniel Garber’s “On the Frontlines of the
Scientific Revolution: How Mersenne Learned to Love Galileo” in Perspectives on Science, edited by
Roger Ariew (Mass: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004), 141 and 135.
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the method of doubt, then, were seen by many to be a major precursor and also a central
characteristic of the Radical Enlightenment.

In praise of doubt and innovation versus the scriptures and the Church
Descartes’ radical use of doubting as an aid to test knowledge claims and to obtain truth
Now that we’ve shown the theological response to such Cartesian doctrines as the method

of doubt, let us look at this doctrine from the perspective of the Enlightenment. We’ve seen
that the scriptures have a very negative view of doubt. From Genesis to the book of

Revelation, doubting, “testing the Lord”, and unbelief are fanatically railed against. In his
Descartes and the Enlightenment, Peter Schouls lists three key concepts of the

Enlightenment in which Descartes made great contributions: freedom (especially of

thought), mastery (especially of self-mastery), and progress (especially in the sciences and
philosophy).

Schouls rightfully makes much of Descartes' method of doubt as the way to freedom

and truth – which is the exact opposite of the Christian view of doubt as sin, pride, rebellion,
and lack of trust in God. If one acted on Descartes' methodology of doubt, one would, in

Descartes’ words, "acquire the habit of never going astray" with regard to true

knowledge. 418 The language of “going astray” is language that the Bible and theology uses a

great deal. But for Descartes, it is used as an essential part of his philosophy. In almost all

his philosophical writings, one can tell that Descartes is more concerned to come up

with strategies in avoiding error and falsehood than he is of sin or the devil. For Schouls,
Descartes’ great contribution to the reformation and revolution in philosophy was to

Peter A. Schouls. Descartes and the Enlightenment (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1989), 35.
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liberate reason from the bondage of prejudice 419 and slavery to the ancients. This new

Luther is said to have labored to liberate man's reason. 420

In spectacular contrast to the scriptural view of doubt, for Descartes (as Schouls’

superbly delineates it) the use of method

including the principle of doubt [is] a necessary condition for obtaining knowledge
... Doubt is, therefore, not a defect ... doubt is not a negative quality like, for example,
evil or error ... It is a doubt which is to be pursued and used ... This doubt plays a
positive role in that it is the road to freedom from prejudice. Once a person is free
from prejudice, the use of doubt is the means to avoid subsequent error and
renewed prejudice ... it is the practice of doubt which allows for the manifestation of
an individual's autonomy. For doubt clears the slate and thus makes it possible for a
person to have only such beliefs as his own self-authenticated reason has
authorized. Fundamentally, the exercise of doubt is what constitutes revolutionary
activity ... The exercise of methodic doubt is therefore a prerequisite for acquiring
mastery. Both the Meditations and the Principles begin with doubt but end with
knowledge. 421
Schouls' Descartes and the Enlightenment does a good job in highlighting those

passages in Descartes’ writings in which his radical new methodology takes him. It was

passages such as these that helped persuade many divines, universities, and even

governments to condemn his teachings. For instance, in Descartes' Discourse on the Method

of Rightly Conducting the Reason, he makes revolutionary demands: "as regards all the

opinions which up to this time I had embraced, I thought I could do no better than endeavor
once for all to sweep them completely away.” All these opinions or beliefs need to be swept

"completely away, so that they might later on be replaced, either by others which were
better, or by the same, when I had made them conform to the uniformity of a rational

419 For many in the 17th century, the term “prejudice” is used as a watchword for “superstitious
religious beliefs.” We will especially see this point in our Spinoza chapter.
420 Ibid. 28.
421 Ibid. 35-36. Schouls’ book was published over 20 years ago. A great deal of work on the
Enlightenment has been done since then. In a personal communication to Professor Schouls, I asked
him about this and whether he had any changed views since the writing of his book. Professor
Schouls made it clear that, happily, none of the latest research and work done on Descartes or the
Enlightenment challenges the central arguments of his book.
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scheme." 422 This kind of talk of conforming “to the uniformity of a rational scheme”, to the

orthodox theological mind, does not sound anything like the New Testament’s teaching to
“not conform any longer to the pattern of this world, but [to be] transformed by the

renewing of your mind” by offering “yourselves as living sacrifices” as the only way “to test
and approve what God’s will is” (Roman 12:1-2). And why does Descartes adopt these

rationalist principles? He tells us in his Discourse: "I have adopted them ... only because

Reason has persuaded me of their truth." 423

Descartes’ method leads to novel or innovative thinking
Descartes knows that his method is something new under the sun (despite his claim that

his work does not present any novelties in his Letter to the Faculty of Theology of Paris in
his Meditations). 424 We know that he was quite aware that he was doing something

different and new. For instance, in the "Author's Letter” to his Principles of Philosophy he

says that his method shows a "difference which is observable between these principles and
those of all other men.” 425 Speaking about the passions in his The Passions of the Soul, he

says, in words that were sure to worry those who were always concerned about the

dangerousness of innovations and novelties: "I shall be here obliged to write just as though I
were treating of a matter which no one had ever touched on before me." 426 This, says

Ibid. 15.
Ibid. 16.
424 One way of reading Descartes’ meaning about novelties here is to refer to some of the
qualifications he makes elsewhere in which he specifies “novelties in theology.” Not everyone is
convinced of this, however - and this not only from those concerned for the faithful, and not only
from 20th century Descartes’ scholars that question his sincerity, but also from many of his own
contemporaries, both moderate and unbelieving. I take it that Descartes’ philosophy which gets rid
of the Scholastic apparatus of forms, four causes, etc. is part and parcel of some Scholastic theology as
well. Since this is the case, it is not the case that his philosophy does not introduce novelties in
theology.
425 Ibid.
426 Ibid.
422
423
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Schouls, "is the strategy of the person who denies the existence of links with the past rather
than that of the one who holds that there is continuity. It is the procedure of the

revolutionary rather than that of the reformer." 427 And this rejection of all past knowledge

is not only about the passions. As Descartes says in his The Search after Truth, he means the

"upsetting [of] all the knowledge ... hitherto acquired." 428

How radically different Descartes’ attitude and principles are compared to the

pedagogical attitude and principles of his former teachers the Jesuits! In his Descartes and

the Last Scholastics, Professor Ariew makes the radical difference patently clear (especially
in the chapter “Descartes Among the Scholastics”). Though many of Ariew’s works were
written partly with the purpose of showing how the context (historical, social, etc.) of a

philosopher usually demonstrates similarities and continuities with his predecessors and

contemporaries, at the same time, these same works also show the dissimilarities and

discontinuities.

The foundational principle for the Jesuits, as for all orthodox Christians, is that “One

should have as the primary goal in teaching to strengthen the faith and to develop piety.
Therefore, no one shall teach anything not in conformity with the Church and received

traditions, or that can diminish the vigor of the faith or the ardor of a solid piety.” 429 Ariew

quotes from one of the memorandum of Claudio Aquaviva, the fifth general of the Jesuits, to
make their strictures even clearer:

Let us try, even when there is nothing to fear for faith and piety, to avoid having
anyone suspect us of wanting to create something new or teaching a new doctrine.
Therefore no one shall defend any opinion that goes against the axioms received in
Ibid.
Ibid. 17.
429 Descartes and the Last Scholastics, op. cited, 17. See this chapter to get the full context and
nuances that Ariew delineates. Ariew especially highlights the rules set for the teaching and
following of Scholastic philosophy and theology. In this study, I highlight the biblical and biblical
theological aspects from which many of the strictures of Scholastic philosophy and theology derive.
427
428
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philosophy or theology, or against that which the majority of competent men judge
is the common sentiment of the theological schools. 430
Descartes’ works fail this test. Compare Aquaviva’s litmus test for orthodoxy with

Descartes’ parsing of the distinct role of philosophy (particularly against scholastic
philosophy) as opposed to theology:

So it is quite irrational for those who have learnt such opinions, which they
themselves confess to be uncertain, to condemn others who are trying to discover
more certain ones. The desire for innovation is indeed to be condemned in matters
of religion ... But in matters of philosophy, which, as everyone readily admits, men
do not yet have sufficient knowledge of, and whose scope can be expanded by many
splendid discoveries, there is nothing more praiseworthy than to be an innovator.

As opposed to the Jesuits and the principles they laid down for all teachers to follow,

Descartes says that we can't have certain knowledge unless one takes all of one's previous

beliefs and "sweeps them completely away." 431 In the Discourse he talks about building "on

a foundation which is entirely my own." 432 For Schouls, "Modest though Descartes’

'reformation' may seem in some of his comments, very little probing is needed to show it up
for what it is, namely a complete revolution." 433

Like many other Descartes’ scholars, Schouls seems to doubt the sincerity of

Descartes' faith: "Of course Descartes often professed his adherence to Christianity; and a
recent commentator may well be right when he remarks that 'To the end, Descartes
remained a devout Catholic.' Nevertheless his philosophy was quite opposed to it." 434

Schouls says that "In the end, the spirit of Descartes' philosophy is caught better ...

Ibid. 17. Of the difference between his view and those of the scholastic followers of Aristotle,
"there is no way in which we can better prove the falsity of those [principles] of Aristotle, than by
pointing out that no progress has been attained by their means in all the centuries in which they have
been followed" (36).
431 Schouls’ Descartes and the Enlightenment, op. cited, 17.
432 Ibid.
433 Ibid. 18.
434 Ibid 37, my emphasis.
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when [one commentator] speaks of 'Descartes' “’faith in human reason' as giving him 'a
non-Christian ... conception of man.’” 435

Ariew quotes a letter written by Descartes to a Jesuit (who had been one of his

teachers at La Fleche) stating that he knows that “the principal reason which requires those

of your order most carefully to reject all sorts of novelties in matters of philosophy is the

fear that they have that these reasons would also cause some changes in theology.” 436 The
chief reason against new ideas in such fields as philosophy is because of the danger or the
threat that they may pose to theology. Descartes clearly understood that “the Jesuits’
distaste of novelty” arose “out of their desire to safeguard theology.” 437

Descartes goes on to assure his old Jesuit teacher that “there is nothing to worry

from this quarter about these things” (that is, that there is nothing new or challenging to
theology from his philosophy). But I think that there is. For one thing, even trying to

separate philosophy completely from theology is, in my view, not only unbiblical 438, but also
impossible – even if one talks of “secondary causes.”

Ibid. 38. "Koyre labels the Discourse on Method "the Cartesian Confessions"!!! (37). Though I think
this overstates the case between Descartes Discourse and Augustine’s Confessions, I think that Koyre’s
remark nevertheless captures the spirit of Descartes and his Discourse quite well. As a caution to this
claim, though, I should perhaps notify the reader that not all scholars of the Discourse judge it to be
accurate autobiography. They see it, at least in the early sections, as a conventional, rhetorical devise
that early moderns would sometimes use. Whether this so or not, I think that the overall spirit of the
Discourse supports our contentions in this section.
436 Ariew, Descartes and the Last Scholastics, op. cited, 12.
437 Ibid.
438 The Medieval Theology (ed. by G. R. Evans) plots the slow rise of the separation of philosophy from
theology to the twelfth-century: “The twelfth-century distinction between philosophy and theology is
not only non-Augustinian; it is more generally nonpatristic. There is a sense in which Augustine
would think of Plato and Plotinus as both philosophers and theologians. ‘Theology’ and ‘Philosophy’
are concerned with the same enterprise: to understand the nature of God, the nature of the world
and man’s place in that world” (p. 7). So then, what a radical change occurs from the twelfth-century
to Descartes and then to the nineteenth-century: “Perhaps the single most important alteration
which took place from the nineteenth-century was the mover from disapproving innovation to
valuing originality” (p.vii). And why is the question of innovation such a big deal to theology and the
faith? Because “Unity and continuity are of the essence of the faith and no greater strain has been put
on the survival of Christianity than that which has been created by the modern expectation that a
leading thinker will be saying something new” (ibid).
435
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Take Descartes’ way of talking about physics and natural causes, for instance. He

often does so in a way that seems to completely preclude discussion of God or any theology.

Of course, in his metaphysical sections, he is careful to note the occurrence of God in nature;
but in other parts, he speaks of nature in a way in which does not need to evoke God’s

power. Instead, the picture one more often gets is that of a universe that runs according to
naturalistic or mechanical processes. This picture is a far cry from the picture the reputed
inspired Holy Scriptures gives of God’s involvement with nature. In these passages,

Descartes’ explanations of matter, meteors, and the earth say nothing about the creator and
sustainer and planner of all these things. From a theological perspective therefore, some

called this “atheistic”, for again, in a vast amount of passages giving explanations of nature,

nothing is acknowledged about the designer and creator of nature, “to whom all glory

belongs.” Though Descartes says that “the opinions which have seemed to me most true in
physics, when considering natural causes, have always been those which agree best of all
with the mysteries of religion” 439, many could not agree.

For conservatives or the orthodox, any explanations that don’t conform to the

theological and scriptural perspective, of course, must be false. All such novelties or

innovations must be false because Christian teaching stems from the Word of God, which
does not change, but stands forever. As the traditional Church (the “Counter-

Enlightenment”) understood truth, and as they preached it in sermons and in Church

councils via the authority of the Scriptures, “The grass withers and the flowers fall, but the

Word of our God stands forever” (Isa. 40:8). “Your word, O Lord, is eternal; it stands firm in
the heavens” (Ps. 119:89). As Jesus put it, “I tell you the truth, until heaven and earth

disappear, not the smallest letter, not the least stroke of a pen, will by any means disappear
from the Law until everything is accomplished” (Mt. 5:18). Moses explains the truth and
439

Ibid.
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faithfulness of God’s Word in this way: “God is not a man, that he should lie, nor a son of

man, that he should change his mind. Does he speak and then not act? Does he promise and
not fulfill?” (Num. 23:19). The New Testament and Christianity charge all believers to

“Contend for the faith that God has once and for all entrusted to the saints. For certain men

whose condemnation was written about long ago have secretly slipped in among you” (Jude
3); for “Jesus is the same yesterday, today, and forever” (Heb. 13:8).

We see this same spirit played out throughout the history of Christianity. Indeed,

how could they not have this attitude – if the scriptures are true? Since the Church thinks
and believes that the scriptures are the Word of God, they are fully persuaded that they

have The Way and The Truth and The Life. There is no other way. There is only one God

and one plan of salvation. It’s only their way or the highway, as the expression goes; for the
Church knows the mind of Christ and of God, and “the spiritual person judges all things and
is judged by none” (1 Cor. 2:15-16). They therefore know God’s view on things. They know
what God wants them to do in life. They know also what God wants them to do with

members who don’t follow the Word rightly. They are enjoined to not only to preach the
Word, but to also try to persuade everyone to follow it:

In the presence of God and of Christ Jesus, who will judge the living and the dead,
and in view of his appearing and his kingdom, I give you this charge: Preach the
Word; be prepared in season and out of season; correct, rebuke, and encourage –
with great patience and careful instruction. For the time will come when men will
not put up with sound doctrine. Instead, to suit their own desires, they will gather
around them a great number of teachers to say what their itching ears want to hear.
They will turn their ears from the truth and turn aside to myths. But you, keep your
head in all situations, endure hardship, do the work of an evangelist, discharge all
the duties of your ministry (2 Tim. 4:1-4).

And why is the Church charged to obey such things? Again, because “All Scripture is

inspired by God and is useful for teaching, rebuking, correcting and training in

righteousness” (2 Tim. 3:15). Note again, that these scriptures don’t just say that the

scriptures are useful for teaching. They also say that they are to be used to “correct” and to
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“rebuke” others who are of a different mind. I take the trouble to type out all these passages
from the scriptures in hopes of giving the reader (who may not know these things well) a

clearer picture of why the Church behaved toward Descartes (etc.) as they did, and, at the
same time, to educate (or remind) the reader as to exactly what Christianity stands for.
Christian theology takes the position that God has already given his children

everything that is needed. As Peter, reputed to be the first Bishop of the Church, says:

His divine power has given us everything we need for life and godliness through our
knowledge of him who called us by his own glory and goodness. Through these he
has given us his very great and precious promises, so that through them you may
participate in the divine nature and escape the corruption in the world caused by
evil desires (2 Pet. 1:3-4).
And how does St. Peter know this? Listen to this amazing claim. Let me quote his

explanation here in full:

We did not follow cleverly invented stories when we told you about the power and
coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but we were eyewitnesses of his majesty. For he
received honor and glory from God the Father when the voice came to him from the
Majestic Glory, saying, ‘This is my Son, whom I love; with him I am well-pleased.’
We ourselves heard this voice that came from heaven when we were with him on
the sacred mountain.
And we have the word of the prophets made more certain, and you will do
well to pay attention to it, as to a light shining in a dark place, until the day dawns
and the morning star rises in your hearts. Above all, you must understand that no
prophecy of Scripture came about by the prophet’s own interpretation. For
prophecy never had its origin in the will of man, but men spoke from god as they
were carried along by the Holy Spirit (2 Pet. 1:16-21).
Anyone who reads the scriptures and the teachings of the great Church Councils

throughout the centuries and believes these things must perforce act as they do. Those
whose minds are filled with these things unsurprisingly then do not think that the New

Philosophy and the explosions of knowledge by the new sciences should compete with or

get in the way of God’s Way. The reaction of the faithful is, “If God had wanted his people to

love reason and philosophy and nature, then he would have told us! As it is, we have several

hundreds of pages of information from God in His Word and none of them tells us to ‘live by
reason’ as Descartes tells us. The scriptures tell us to ‘live by the Spirit’ (Rom. 8). This is
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why the scriptures tell us to keep philosophy and philosophers at bay: ‘See to it that no one
takes you captive through hollow and deceptive philosophy, which depends on human
tradition and the basic principles of the world rather than on Christ” (Col. 2:8).”

And it’s not only the scriptures or the most devout that rail against novelty and

innovation. In the context of the horrible religious wars between Catholics and Protestants,
cultured fideists such as Montaigne also condemned innovation.

I am disgusted with innovation, in whatever guise, and with reason, for I have seen
very harmful effects of it ... It seems to me, to speak frankly, that it takes a lot of
self-love and presumption to have such esteem for one’s own opinions that to
establish them one must overthrow the public peace and introduce so many
inevitable evils and such a horrible corruption of morals, as civil wars and political
changes bring with them in a matter of such weight – and introduce them into one’s
own country. 440
Jean-Baptiste Morin also spoke out against novelties. Dan Garber quotes Morin:

“There is nothing more seditious and pernicious than a new doctrine. I speak not only in
theology, but even in philosophy.” Garber says that “Morin goes on to argue that since

knowledge of natural philosophy leads us to knowledge of God, false principles lead us to
heresy and atheism. It is obvious, then, why the Church should be interested in what

philosophers teach” – and the State: “For false philosophical views, and the heresies they
lead to might cause sects to be formed, sects ‘from which follow division and the ruin of
provinces and whole kingdoms.’” 441 Garber adds: “Contemporaries were probably not

wrong in worrying that differences of opinion might lead to armed conflict, just as they had
in the sixteenth century.” 442

Daniel Garber. “On the Frontlines of the Scientific Revolution: How Mersenne Learned to Love
Galileo.” Perspective on Science, ed. Roger Ariew (Mass: MIT, 2004), Summer 2004, Vol. 12, No. 2, p.
138.
441 Ibid. 138-139.
442 Ibid. 149.
440
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For the young Mersenne, opponents of Aristotelianism were “dangerous to religion”,

so they needed to be opposed. 443 Galileo, Campanella, Bruno, Telesio, Kepler, and Gilbert

were on Mersenne’s list of wicked evil anti-Aristotelian heretics. 444 These, it seems then,
were the early “New Philosophers.” Note that this was in the 1620s, much earlier than
Descartes’ Discourse of ’37 and of his Meditations of ’41.

Their warfare was not so much to defend Aristotle’s philosophy as it was to defend

the Holy Scriptures and right theology that should proceed there from. We see this even
today in many respects: in the clash between creationists or intelligent designers versus

those who would dispute the 6000 year old earth, or about Noah’s ark or the special and

instantaneous creation of the humans Adam and Eve – and not of primates and evolution.

This attitude, I contend, should be seen as proof of how earlier Christians viewed thinking
that was not in accord not only with tradition and Ptolemy and Aristotle, but, more
importantly, with Scripture.

It is hoped that this brief discussion has illuminated readers as to why many in the

17th century Church judged Descartes’ method of doubt and his other philosophical

novelties as the fanning of the fires of the Radical Enlightenment. Arguments such as those

given above were also used to portray him as an imposture and not a genuine Christian.

Was he an imposture or was he a Christian? Was he only a precursor to the Enlightenment?

Were there any respects in which he was not a precursor to the Enlightenment? This will be
the subject of our next section.

The Dutch Reform theologian Gisbertus Voetius tried to get Mersenne against Descartes’ novelty:
“He is trying to found a new sect … never before seen or heard of in nature, and there are those who
admire him and adore him, as if he were a new god who has descended from heaven” (Ibid. 153).
444 Ibid. 141.
443
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Chapter Nine
Christian or Not? Precursor or Not?
Respects in which Descartes was not a Precursor

Introduction
In the last chapter I investigated some of the reasons why many in the Church condemned
Descartes and his work. I mentioned then that I thought this strange given the fact that

Descartes says so much about God and the immateriality of the soul in his writings. And

“Didn’t he write to put to rout the evil atheists and to defend the faith for the glory of God?”

He did say that he wrote his philosophy “For the urgency of the cause, as well as the glory of
God”, didn’t he? 445 He was a good son of the Church and one who sought to carry out the
orders of the Lateran Council under Leo X, wasn’t he? 446 So why did the Church (and so

many universities and governments) condemn his teachings? 447

We answered some of these questions in our last chapter. We saw that among his

contemporaries many saw him as an enemy of Christianity, but that many also saw him as a
Letter of Dedication to the Sorbonne in the Meditations on First Philosophy in Which the Existence
of God and the Distinction of the Soul from the Body are Demonstrated (Rene Descartes: Philosophical
Essays and Correspondence, ed, Roger Ariew, p. 98.
446. Ibid.
447. My summary account adheres to and adds to the following two works, but I do so highlighting
only the biblical and/or theological aspects of these condemnations. See the “Appendix:
Condemnations of Cartesianism” in Descartes’ Meditations: Background Source Materials, ed. Roger
Ariew, John Cottingham, and Tom Sorrell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; and
Nicholas Jolley’s essay in “The reception of Descartes’ philosophy” in The Cambridge Companion to
Descartes, edited by John Cottingham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
445
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genuine Christian whose philosophy was better able to support Christianity. In this chapter

we will inquire among some Descartes’ scholars whether Descartes was a genuine Christian

or an imposter, a precursor to the Radical Enlightenment or a medieval holdover preserving
Christianity come what may.

Descartes as an imposter?

Hobbes “could not pardon [Descartes] for his writing in defense of transubstantiation, which he knew
was absolutely against his opinion and done merely to put a compliment on the Jesuits” 448

In our last chapter we cited several of Descartes’ contemporaries and near contemporaries
who thought that Descartes’ philosophy was a precursor to the Radical Enlightenment.

Based on some of their arguments, some of these, such as La Mettrie, felt that Descartes
couldn’t have been a sincere Christian.

We also mentioned some contemporary Descartes’ scholars, such as Peter Schouls,

who thought the same thing. For instance, we quoted Schouls saying: "Of course Descartes
often professed his adherence to Christianity; and a recent commentator may well be right
when he remarks that 'To the end, Descartes remained a devout Catholic.' Nevertheless his

philosophy was quite opposed to it.” 449 Schouls' says that "In the end, the spirit of Descartes'

philosophy is caught better ... when Vrooman speaks of 'Descartes' faith in human reason' as
giving him 'a non-Christian ... conception of man'.” 450

Schouls and Vrooman see in many of Descartes’ writings including his

autobiographical statements that he loved and adored reason more than Christ. For such
Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes: Leviathan, edited by Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1994), lxvii.
449 Peter A. Schouls. Descartes and the Enlightenment, op. cited, 37, my emphasis.
450 Ibid. 38.
448
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scholars, this spirit bespeaks more of a non-Christian than a devout Christian. And there are

other scholars who think similarly. Some, for instance, could point to Descartes’ putative

intellectual autobiography, the Discourse on Method, in which Descartes seems to put all his
cards on the table. "Koyre labels the Discourse on Method "the Cartesian Confessions" 451!

I took it upon myself to review the various occupations that men have in this life, in
order to try to choose the best one; and, not wanting to say anything about the
occupations of others, I thought I could do no better than to continue in that very
one in which I found myself, that is to say, spending my whole life cultivating my
reason and advancing, as far as I could, in the knowledge of the truth, following the
method I had prescribed to myself. 452
And again:

looking with a philosopher's eye at the various actions and enterprises of all men,
there is hardly one of them that does not seem to me vain and useless, I cannot but
take immense satisfaction in the progress that I think I have made in the search for
truth, and I cannot but envisage such hopes for the future that if, among the
occupations of men purely as men, there is one that is solidly good and important, I
dare to believe that it is the one I have chosen. 453
This does not sound like a man who fulfills God’s chief commandment, "to love the

Lord thy God with all thy mind and heart." This sounds more like the sentiments of the

integral Aristotelians condemned by the Bishop of Paris in 1277 for holding such views as:
That there is no more excellent way of life than the philosophical way.
That the highest good of which the human being is capable consists in the
intellectual virtues.
That the philosophers alone are the wise man of this world. 454

St. Jerome may have said of Descartes something like what the Lord told him in a

dream because his actions showed that he loved learning and books by Cicero more than
Christ: “You are a Ciceronian and not a Christian." 455 For what is Descartes’ highest

Schouls, op. cited, 37.
Rene Descartes. Rene Descartes: Philosophical Essays and Correspondences, edited with
introduction by Roger Ariew, op. cited, 58.
453 Ibid. 47.
454 Aquinas: Disputed Question on the Virtues, edited and introduced by Thomas Williams, op. cited,
xxii.
455 Barclay, op. cited, 212-213. See above in my section on the Church Father’s for the full account of
this experience of Jerome’s.
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452

212

pleasure? Is it God? Descartes tells us: "the satisfaction I had from [my studies] so filled my

mind that nothing else was of any consequence to me.” 456 Compare this to St. Paul's

autobiographical statement: “But whatever was to my profit I now consider loss for the sake
of Christ. What is more, I consider everything a loss compared to the surpassing greatness
of knowing Christ Jesus my Lord, for whose sake I have lost all things. I consider them
rubbish, that I may gain Christ and be found in him” (Phil. 3:7-9).

Hiram Caton says, “science, not salvation, seems to be his primary concern.” 457 He

quotes Maurice Blondel who summarized Descartes’ faith as that of “common and banal

faith.” 458 Maritain agrees: “he shuts himself up within himself… not to pray but to think, not

to make his devotions but to philosophize; thus he transposes in the most curious way a

procedure of Christian spirituality to the level of nature and of reason.” 459 For Maritain,

Descartes knew “the profound incompatibility of his philosophy with the whole authentic

tradition of Christian wisdom. 460 This reminds me of Hobbes’ outburst when he said that he
“could not pardon [Descartes] for his writing in defense of transubstantiation, which he
knew was absolutely against his opinion and done merely to put a compliment on the

Jesuits” 461 We will see in the next chapter that fellow philosopher Gottlieb Leibniz also

worried that Descartes’ philosophy belied elements which undermine some important
orthodox theological tenets.

Caton wrote a whole essay on “The Problem of Descartes’ Sincerity” that cites

several apparently strong arguments to doubt Descartes’ sincerity. 462 But not all Descartes’
Rene Descartes: Philosophical Essays and Correspondence, op. cited, 58.
Hiram Caton. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. I, No. 4, Winter 1970, 222.
458 Ibid. 220.
459 Jacques Maritain: The Dream of Descartes: together with some other Essays. Translated by Mabelle
L. Andison (New York: Kennikat Press, 1944), 38.
460 Ibid.
461 Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes: Leviathan, edited by Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1994), lxvii.
462 Hiram Caton. “The Problem of Descartes’ Sincerity” in Rene Descartes: Critical Assessments, edited
by Georges J. D. Moyal, Vol. III (New York: Routledge, 1991).
456
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scholars agree with Caton, Maritain, and company. They argue that Descartes was a

genuine Christian, but that he is misunderstood. He separated philosophy from theology

not for covert diabolical purposes, but “for the glory of God”, that is, to put Christianity on a
better foundation than Aristotelianism.

Descartes as a genuine Christian
As we saw, Hiram Caton argues that Descartes was not a genuine Christian, but rather, along
the line of “Descartes’ interpretation that was dominant in the way of 17th and 18th

centuries”, saw Descartes “as a rationalist in the modern sense.” Caton refers to the cogito

as one of the key signature elements of Descartes’ modernity. He goes on to praise a quote

from Gerhard Kruger who formulated the cogito in this way: “Self-consciousness constitutes
itself in defiance of all divine omnipotence. This is not ‘Christian inwardness’; rather here
begins in philosophy as such the rebellion against Christianity that we call
Enlightenment.” 463

But there is a problem with this account of the cogito. It’s wrong. In his insightful

essay “The Cogito in the Seventeenth Century”, Roger Ariew demonstrates that this

presentation of Descartes as “the father of modern philosophy,” which holds that Descartes’
“primary motivations were epistemological, in opposition to the metaphysico-theological
concerns of the Scholastics,” is a mistake. 464 Descartes’ formulation of the cogito “is often

Caton, op. cited, 231.
Roger Ariew. Descartes Among the Scholastics (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, June 2011),
379, my emphasis. Ariew demonstrates that Descartes’ contemporaries gave little attention to
Descartes’ “modern” epistemology, but rather to his anti-scholastic metaphysics.
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emblematic of modern philosophy, even though [his] line of argument continues in an effort
to prove the existence of God and immortality of the soul from these foundations”! 465

On the complex subject of what constitutes “atheism” in the 17th century and

Descartes in particular, Theo Verbeek says that “Descartes, whom nowadays few, if any,

would call an atheist, was called an ‘implicit’ or ‘indirect’ atheist by Reformed theologians of

his day only because he rejected the traditional proofs of God.” 466 We learn from statements
like this that allegations of “atheism” and the like were used quite liberally in the 17th

century – and in ways in which we of the 21st century don’t.

I think that Verbeek overstates this claim here, for the Reformed (and non-

Reformed alike) cited many other reasons why he thought he was if not an “atheist” at least
certainly a threat to Christianity – and these reasons were based on some of the central
planks in Descartes’ philosophical platform. Verbeek would no doubt concur with this.

At any rate, there are many apparently strong arguments in defense of the view that

Descartes was a genuine Christian. We saw earlier that Arnauld and many other Christians

and Cartesians interpreted him as such. And they judged his philosophy as a better ground
for Christianity than scholasticism. Many of the philosophes and radical enlighteners also

judged Descartes to be a Christian and therefore – from their point of view – a Counter-

Enlightenment figure. Spinoza, for instance, makes this clear in his letter to Henry

Oldenburg. He cites three serious errors that Descartes (and Bacon) makes, the first two of
which I will cite here:

The first and most important error is they, that they have gone far astray from
knowledge of the first cause and origin of things. Secondly, they have failed to
achieve understanding of the true nature of the human mind … Only those who are
Ibid. 378.
Theo Verbeek. Spinoza’s Theologico-political Treatise: Exploring ‘the Will of God (VT: Ashgate
Publishing Limited), 4.
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completely destitute of all learning and scholarship can fail to see the critical
importance of true knowledge of these points. 467

In a nutshell, Spinoza seems to be saying, “If you think that a supernatural,

anthropomorphic, creator and sustainer of the universe exists, and if you think that all

humans are privileged with an immaterial soul, then your philosophy can’t help but to fall
into several important errors.”

Descartes not only preached dualism and creationism, but he also fought against

atheists and infidels. He tried to buttress the case of Christianity through his philosophy. If
he rejected scholasticism, the geocentric view of the universe, final causes and teleology, it
wasn’t because he was an atheist or an imposture, it was because he thought that by

separating philosophy from theology he could do a better job in defending Christianity by
showing what philosophy could find in its defense instead of the usual begging of the
question by citing revelation.

Trevor McClaughlin’s essay “Censorship and Defenders of the Cartesian Faith in

Mid-Seventeenth Century France” cites many who – even upon being deposed – testified to

Descartes’ piety and orthodoxy, including the Queen of Sweden who “declared that God had

used Descartes to bring her to the Catholic fold.” 468 Clerselier, Descartes’ friend, “swore that
Descartes, in his works, correspondence, speech, and way of life, had shown reverence for

and faith in the Catholic Church, kept religious feasts, had frequently taken the sacraments
and had died as he lived, close to the bosom of the Roman Catholic and Apostolic Mother
Church.” 469

Spinoza quote from Modern Philosophy: An Anthology of Primary Sources, Second Edition, Edited
by Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2009), 138.

467

468 Trevor McClaughlin. “Censorship and Defenders of the Cartesian Faith in Mid-Seventeenth
Century France” in Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 40, No. 4, Oct.-Dec., (Penn: University of Penn.
Press, 1979), 576.
469 Ibid. 576.
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Summary of general pro’s and con’s on the question of Descartes as a precursor to the
Radical Enlightenment
Cons: The case against seeing Descartes as a precursor to the Radical Enlightenment

We may quickly summarize a few general points against the view that Descartes

should be considered a radical enlightener or even as a precursor to the Radical

Enlightenment: his Roman Catholic conservatism (see next paragraphs for more on this),
his theological-metaphysical dualism, his “I” as an immaterial substance, his program to

prove the existence of God (which is, to my mind, more than conspicuously like the God of

biblical theism), his program to prove the immortality of the soul, his determination to fight

atheists and infidels, his belief in and dependence on the scriptures as the Word of God (and
the many beliefs derived from that – such as angels, the afterlife, the Holy Spirit, God as
Creator, etc.), his belief and promotion that his philosophy should supplant scholastic

Aristotelianism as the better and more biblically sound foundation to support Christian
theology.

Descartes did not reject the following as radical enlighteners (or atheists or deists)

do: He did not reject the Roman Catholic Church (cf. Spinoza’s letter to Albert Burgh -which

can be read also as a criticism of Descartes’ Catholicism - for Spinoza’s list of arguments

against the Roman Catholic institution and its theology). He did not reject the mass (to

accept the theology and philosophy of the mass is to accept a whole range of theologically
and philosophically significant beliefs that are completely antithetical to Radical

Enlightenment naturalism). He did not reject the divinity of scripture, or of miracles, or of
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divine providence. He did not reject the supernatural or the spiritual. He did not reject the
“soul.” He did not reject God.

As a faithful Roman Catholic, he had his daughter baptized in the Church (the

purpose of baptism is the magical belief that without it one will not be protected from sin,
the devil, and from possible punishment from the wrath of God). He sought to defend the

Eucharist. He publically vowed to abjure anything that he wrote that may seem antithetical
to the Church or to theology. At bottom, his epistemology, his philosophy of physics (or

nature), and his philosophy of mind are all founded on God as a perfect, infinite, eternal, allgood, all just, supernatural Person. Without this God, knowledge and truth and certainty

are not possible. Without God in Cartesian epistemology and philosophy of science, there
would only be skepticism or fideism. He may say in many places that matter is only

extension, yet in other places he shows that all extension, all the world, all creation, and all
motion is only made possible through the occurrence of God.

Is one is indeed a radical enlightener (as opposed to a moderate enlightener), one

cannot hold these theologically-philosophically fraught positions. As we will see in our
chapter on Spinoza, the Radical Enlightenment by and large repudiates the divinity of

scripture, miracles, prophecy, the Holy Spirit, supernatural salvation, the sacraments, the

theological efficacy of holy water, praying to the saints, the rosary, the Virgin Mother of God,
incense, the work of the Holy Spirit, omens, signs in the heavens, the rainbow as a sign from
God, belief in a creator, belief in creation, belief in God, belief in Adam and Eve, the story of
Noah and all the animals of the world entering the ark, demon possession, witches, the

millennium, the kingdom of God, and of Christ as the blood-sacrifice needed to atone for the

sins of the world and to assuage the holy and just wrath of God – all these claims are at stake
in the Christian view of the world.
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[I don’t know if I need to belabor the following ---] Contrary to the Counter-and

Moderate Enlightenments, the Radical Enlightenment rejects the notion of divine

inspiration, the Abrahamic and Mosaic covenants, the notion of revelation, of dreams and

visions sent from God, of the Ten Commandments, of the Love of God, of the Providence of
God, of Judgment Day, of hell, of God’s involvement in nature, the Hope of eternal life in
heaven, that God hears and answers prayer.

The Radical Enlightenment is atheistic, naturalistic, secular, and humanist. It honors

reason and natural experience over claims of revelation, visions, dreams from God, oracles,
and eschatological prophecies. It argues that reason, empirical science, and humanistic
values should replace theology, religious-magic ceremonies, and the clergy.
Pros: The case for Descartes as a precursor to the Radical Enlightenment
To get a clearer picture of how different a philosopher Descartes was compared to most of
the philosophers in the history of western philosophy since the Church Fathers, compare
his writings with St. Augustine’s. Compare his philosophy with Thomas Aquinas’s.

Compare his thinking also with Protestant philosophers and theologians such as Martin

Luther and John Calvin. When one takes up Descartes’ pages and then directly compares
the typical pages from these other philosophers, the difference comes home more
powerfully.

Here we may cite his revolution against scholasticism. He rejected the four causes.

He rejected teleology and final causes in nature. He rejected the four elements and argued

that matter was only extension. He was against occult qualities, against Pyrrhonism, and

against fideism. We must also cite his commitment to and promotion of natural reason, his
commitment to and promotion of the progress of science; his demand that all claims to
219

knowledge must be severely tested; his method of doubt; the founding of his philosophy not
on the rock of revelation, theology, or scripture, but on the foundation of his own self as a
thinking thing; and of his definition of matter as extension. Finally, we should cite the

philosophical and biblical critical radical influence he had on many of Europe’s intelligentsia
(Bayle, Spinoza, the latter Enlightenment philosophes, etc.) and the fierce theological
condemnations against him from both Roman Catholic and Protestant camps within

Christianity (we will take up the very important subject of the influence that Cartesian
biblical criticism had in leading to radical conclusions in our chapter on Spinoza).

How do we sum up the question of Descartes being a Christian and precursor to the

Radical Enlightenment? There is no black and white, one way or the other, answer. He was
both. He was no doubt a Christian, but he was also probably what the devout would call a

worldly or lukewarm Christian. As such his philosophy was partly against and partly for
some Radical Enlightenment ideals. In the long run though, I think the overall evidence

points to the position that he was far more a precursor to the Radical Enlightenment than
against it. There is one more very powerful argument to make for this. In our Spinoza

chapter we will see that Descartes’ influence led to some Cartesian biblical criticism that

that eventually greatly contributed to Radical Enlightenment destructive criticism against
the traditional belief that the Bible is the Word of God. I concentrate on the issue of

Cartesian biblical criticism for two reasons: one, because it is hardly known, and two,

because it had a far greater impact on radical thinking than is commonly given credit for. As
Richard Popkin hyperbolically expresses it: “the warfare between religion and science was
not the consequence of the development of the new physics and the astronomy of the
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seventeenth century, nor of its mechanistic formulation but, rather, of the application of
some of the features of the new science to Bible criticism.” 470

But before we go to our Spinoza chapter, we have to first fulfill our promise to tell

the story of Leibniz’s criticism of Descartes and of some of the respects in which Leibniz was
not a precursor to the Radical Enlightenment.

Richard Popkin. Problems of Cartesianism, edited by Thomas M. Lennon, John M. Nicholas, and
John W. Davis (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1982), 62. He also argue this thesis in
“Scepticism, Theology and the Scientific Revolution in the Seventeenth Century” in Problems in the
Philosophy of Science, eds, I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (Amsterdam, 1968).
470
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Chapter Ten
Some Respects in which Leibniz was Not a Precursor to the Radical Enlightenment
“Jesus Christ has revealed to men the mystery and admirable laws of the kingdom of heaven and the
greatness of the supreme happiness that God prepares for those who love him” – Gottfried Leibniz 471

Introduction and problematic
The following chapter offers only a partial account of the question of Leibniz’s relation to

the Radical Enlightenment. One can only do so much with Leibniz in any essay – or tome! –
because he wrote and accomplished so much. This essay only looks at Leibniz’s relation to

the Radical Enlightenment in terms of his Christianity (e.g. his defense of and promotion of a
Christian view of things rather than the Radical Enlightenment’s atheistic or anti-Christian

view of things). As a result, we do not take up his many contributions in the sciences along
with his many other achievements that have advanced the cause of Enlightenment and

Gottfried Leibniz. G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, edited and translated by Roger Ariew and
Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 68. This passage is taken from the
final, culminating section in Leibniz’s classic 1686 Discourse on Metaphysics. The phrase about the
supreme happiness “that God prepares for those who love him” comes from Romans 8:28: “And we
know that all things work together for good to them that love God.” This is educated speculation
based on Leibniz’s thorough knowledge of the scriptures and theology, but I believe that passages
like this verse may have impressed Leibniz a great deal because they provide the scriptural warrant
that underpins his famous metaphysical formula that “this is the best of all possible worlds.”
Nevertheless, in point of theological detail, all things eventually do not work together for good for
them that do not love or believe in God.
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Radical Enlightenment elements in the world. The following thoughts also represent only
some reflections on Leibniz’s theology (which is part and parcel of his philosophy). 472

No one knows the full story of Leibniz’s theology simply because all of his theological

writings have not yet been made public. Even so, there are so many volumes of Leibniz’s

writings that have been translated and made public that it is a daunting task to master them

all to decipher from them “The” definitive account of Leibniz’s theology (especially in

relation to his philosophy throughout his long life). One can therefore only guesstimate. As
Roger Ariew aptly says regarding Leibniz’s prodigious amount of writings: “Leibniz wrote
too much.”

Leibniz’s massive amount of writings is not the only challenge facing the scholar

wishing to know Leibniz’s theological views and how they fit in (or do not fit in) with his

philosophy. In actuality, as scholars such as Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber have come to
learn, Leibniz altered, revised, changed, edited, and improved his views on many issues

many times throughout his life. Not only is this so, but much of what he wrote he did not
publish. What interpretive rule should we follow then in the face of these contextual

realities? Do we privilege his published over his unpublished writings – or vice versa? Do
we privilege his later writings over his earlier writings? The truth is this: there are many

Leibniz’s. He is chameleon. Since this is the case, a good approach to making claims about
Leibniz’s position on many things, is to keep in mind when he took said position and if he
published it. Still, this approach is also no panacea.

Unfortunately, in this study we will not be able to go into any great detail on any of his works,
including some that are important to understanding his overall philosophy. For instance, a great deal
of recent important work (as of the fall of 2010) has been done on his only theological work that he
published (the Theodicy). Various Leibniz scholars think other works of Leibniz are even more
important than the Theodicy to know Leibniz’s richer views on theology. We will not be able to look
in detail on these works either. Our purpose in this selective rendering of Leibniz is to summarize
our view of Leibniz from the results of our investigation.
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Another challenge to determining the extent of Leibniz’s theological orthodoxy has

to do with the mind-boggling difficulty in understanding some of his more arcane writings –
such as, preeminently, his Monadology. The details on how his metaphysics, physics and

philosophy of mind blend and work in concert with some rendition of orthodox Christian
theology are outside my pay grade. This chapter therefore claims no expertise in these
aspects of Leibniz.

One further serious challenge: the problem of his sincerity. 473 The problem of

sincerity is one of the staple occupational hazards that early modern scholars of philosophy
have to struggle with (this challenge is operative in Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Bayle, and

the list goes on). How do we know that what Leibniz wrote (at various times and places in
the context of his personal career ambitions and geo-political changes) was what he

personally believed. We have not only to deal with a time in history in Europe which in a lot
of respects was like being in communist Russia during the 20th century, but we also have to
deal with the fact that through most of his life Leibniz was a public servant. He worked for
the government. He not only had to watch his step with the ecclesiastical powers of the
time; he had to also watch his step with the political powers of the time – including his

employers.

My focus in this chapter is on Leibniz not as politician, not as physicist, not as

logician or mathematician, but on Leibniz as anti-Radical Enlightenment, Leibniz as

theologian, Leibniz as Christian, Leibniz as Bible-believer and Bible-follower (at least

according to what he has written as perhaps opposed (or not opposed)to his personal
Leibniz scholar Gregory Brown, for instance, argues that Leibniz was far from an orthodox or
conservative Christian. According to Brown (to take one key plank in the orthodox platform) Leibniz
rejected miracles. See his “Miracles in the Best of All Possible Worlds: Leibniz’s Dilemma and
Leibniz’s Razor” (History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 12, Number 1, January 1995). If this position is
true, then much of what Leibniz wrote that were apparently of an orthodox nature, were not. If this
position on miracles is true, it will also have many ramifications on several other theological issues
such as transubstantiation. As we will show in this section though, other Leibniz scholars such as
Maria Antognazza disagree with this wholesale denial of Leibniz’s sincerity as a Christian.
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beliefs). And this is just as well because there has not been much written on this subject

(though in the last decade this has begun to change). The scarcity of interest on this subject
is due to several factors, I think: it is due partly, I suspect, because scholars don’t have all of
Leibniz’s theological writings yet; partly because it’s hard to decipher Leibniz’s genuine

theology from the writings that we do have; and partly because theological issues are not as
important to contemporary philosophers. After all, the profession of philosophy is

philosophy and not theology, right? The two are utterly different and they’re not supposed
to be mixed, right? Therefore, there has been a definite tendency to gloss over the

theological stuff. In my opinion, this might even be reflected in what the editors and

translators of Leibniz’s manuscripts at the Berlin Academy of Sciences (who alone possess
all of Leibniz’s manuscripts) have thus far chosen to publish. They chose to translate and

publish many volumes of his political writings, many volumes of his mathematical writings,
many volumes on his historical and linguistic writings, and many of his philosophical
writings. But there is as yet no volume devoted to his theological writings.

Robert Adams’ 1994 essay “Leibniz’s Examination of the Christian Religion” makes

similar observations. He asks, for instance, how many philosophy graduate students know
that Leibniz “wrote a complete treatise of systematic theology” a hundred pages long

around the same time he wrote the Discourse on Metaphysics. Leibniz’s contemporaries

didn’t know about it. Neither did any 18th century thinker. It wasn’t published until the 19th

century. That means that Wolff, Kant, and so on were not privy to it. But it still has not

received much attention. “The twentieth century has paid little attention to it, no doubt in

part because many of our century’s Leibniz scholars have not been interested in questions
of Christian theology.” 474

474

Robert Adams’, op. cited, 517.
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As a result of the dearth of Leibniz’s theological works that have not been translated

or published yet, anthologies of Leibniz’s writings deal mostly with other subjects. Thus, for
example, in Loemker’s and Ariew-Garber’s English editions of Leibniz’s philosophical

writings, most of Leibniz’s specifically theological writings are naturally precluded. And yet
there’s a good deal more theological-biblical-Christian aspects in Leibniz’s philosophy than

some have yet to fully appreciate. And some of these aspects determine some of his
philosophy. 475

Maria Rosa Antognazza raises all these same issues and problems in her excellent

recent work, Leibniz on the Trinity and the Incarnation.

The first and most immediately apparent characteristic of Leibniz’s writings on
revealed theology is that they are very numerous and extremely fragmentary. In
itself, this is not unusual: Leibniz scholars have come to realize that the full scope of
his thinking on any issue can only be reconstructed by relating his major statements
to far larger collections of more fragmentary texts. But the case of revealed theology
is nevertheless exceptional. In part this is because a major, mature, and synoptic
statement is lacking, around which the minor writings could readily be grouped.
While key aspects of Leibniz’s natural theology are expounded in the Theodicy …
nothing strictly similar pulls together his key reflections on revealed theology. This
imbalance alone has doubtless contributed to the preconception in the minds of
some students of Leibniz that he is a deist rather that a theist; and in an age of
increasing secularization, Leibniz’s reputation as a hard rationalist further
distracted serious and sustained attention from his scattered reflections on revealed
theology. Perhaps in consequence, in the definitive, ongoing edition of his complete
works being produced by the Academy of Sciences, which he founded in Berlin, no
separate series has been devoted to theological writings, which the diligent student
must therefore hunt down and abstract from collections of material on other
subjects before even becoming fully aware of their numerical extent, thematic range,
technical sophistication, and substantial consistency. 476

Robert Adams’ 1994 essay “Leibniz’s Examination of the Christian Religion” makes similar
observations. For instance, he asks how many philosophy graduate students know that Leibniz
“wrote a complete treatise of systematic theology” a hundred pages long around the same time he
wrote the Discourse on Metaphysics (517). Leibniz’s contemporaries didn’t know about it. Neither
did any 18th century thinker. It wasn’t published until the 19th century. That means that Wolffe,
Kant, and so on were not privy to it. But it still has not received much attention. “The twentieth
century has paid little attention to it, no doubt in part because many of our century’s Leibniz scholars
have not been interested in questions of Christian theology” (ibid).
476 Maria Rosa Antognazza. Leibniz on the Trinity and the Incarnation (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2007), xiv.
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It is true that Descartes, Spinoza, and contemporary philosophers separated

philosophy from theology, but Leibniz didn’t.477 Leibniz differed from many of his New
Philosophy contemporaries. He not only didn’t think that scholasticism should be

completely jettisoned, he also didn’t think that theology should always be precluded from

philosophy and science either. Many of the most serious controversies of his day (the 17th

century) were theological. Worrisome controversies over the Eucharist, the incarnation,

the trinity, and scores of other theological issues were among the most serious intellectual
problems of the day. And many of these problems not only solicited the attention of most

philosophers, but they were treated philosophically (in varying degrees), as well. Take only
the Trinitarian controversy as an example.

Although theological in origin, these Trinitarian debates were interwoven with
many philosophical problems, such as the relationship between reason and
revelation, knowledge and faith; the issue of the limits of human understanding, of
the degrees of knowledge, and of the epistemological status of belief; the question of
the scope and validity of the principle of noncontradiction; the reflection on the role
and meaning of analogy; the inquiry into the concepts of ‘nature,’ ‘substance’, and
‘person’; and the theory of relations … Indeed, Leibniz’s active participation in
theological debates repeatedly compelled him to reflect on problems fundamental to
his own philosophy. 478
Indeed, Leibniz believed that he had come up with a set of solid metaphysical

principles that could found, or at least give some philosophical justification to some of the
essential Christian theological dogmas. As Robert Sleigh puts it:

Leibniz didn’t separate philosophy from theology as much as philosophers like Descartes and
Spinoza. Still, Leibniz well-understood the value of separating the two as an exceedingly powerful
tool to do as much work based on our own God-given reason as possible. And, in fact, Leibniz himself
did a great deal of philosophy and science from this perspective. But, in the final analysis, theology
and special revelation should be believed as God’s way of guiding and constraining what our natural
reason cannot attain to. Because of beliefs such as this Leibniz felt that the New Philosophy’s
tendency to banish final causes and teleology was therefore unacceptable. See below for further
details on the way Leibniz, as opposed to the scholastics, defended and utilized the scholastic
theology-philosophy (of substantial forms, teleology, revelation, and final causes). I make it a point
here to add revelation in this list here because it is often overlooked that part and parcel of
scholasticism was the inclusion (and not the separation) of revelation and theology in their
philosophizing.
478 Ibid. xiii.
477
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Leibniz believed that his metaphysical system provided a structure acceptable to all
Christian intellectuals of good will and sound reason, within which the leading
issues of philosophical theology could be given a sharp formulation, and, at least in
some cases, adequately resolved. 479
Now that we have delineated a few of the problematic issues involved in our

subject, let us see what positions Leibniz took with respect to some theological-

philosophical issues. Our modus operandi will be to focus on some examples to show some
respects in which Leibniz should not be considered as a precursor to the Radical

Enlightenment.

Some respects in which Leibniz was not a precursor (according to Antognazza)

There are many respects in which we can argue that Leibniz was not a precursor to the

Radical Enlightenment. In this section we will mention a couple of them from the

specialized work that Antognazza has done on this subject (which doesn’t go over the usual
translated Leibniz material). 480

To begin then, let us take Leibniz’s Demonstrationes Catholicae Conspectus 481. Maria

Antognazza sees this work as important in determining Leibniz’s general theological

position. If I’m reading her rightly, she argues that Leibniz’s plan of the Demonstrationes

See Robert Sleigh’s “Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge” in Faith and Philosophy, Vol 11, No. 4
October 1994.
480 All the while, though (besides some of Leibniz’s key writings that deal more directly on theological
issues), I also have other works in mind such as: Robert Adams’ “Leibniz’s Examination of the
Christian Religion”, Mogens Laerke’s “Leibniz’s Enlightenment” and “Apology for a Credo Maximum:
On Three Basic Rules in Leibniz’s Method of Religious Controversy”, Lloyd Strickland’s “Leibniz on
Eternal Punishment” and “Leibniz’s philosophy of purgatory”, Daniel Cook’s “Leibniz and
Millenarianism” and “Leibniz and Superstition” and “Leibniz on ‘prophets’, prophecy, and revelation”,
and George MacDonald Ross’s, “Leibniz on the Origin of Things”, and “Occultism and Philosophy in
the Seventeenth Century.”
481 Though an early work of Leibniz (composed around 1668-1669), Antognazza takes it very serious
as a strong indication of positions that Leibniz continued to hold.
479
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Catholicae Conspectus 482 shows that much of the rest of Leibniz’s philosophical career in

taking up the defense of Christianity stems from this period and from works like this.

Antognazza brings up the problem of determining the extent of Leibniz’s sincerity in this
theological project and then gives her conclusion:

That Leibniz was serious about theology (and, as this book will try to show, the
theology of the Trinity in particular) is immediately obvious to anyone who reads
Leibniz’s work without the distorting lens of modern priorities. A warning against
hasty conclusions tending to underestimate the presence of an authentic
theological-religious interest in Leibniz comes from the philosopher himself. In a
curious letter probably dating from the autumn of 1679, Leibniz speaks of a person
he met in Paris; in actuality, this person, who studied and successfully practiced the
human, and legal sciences, and went to Paris to improve his knowledge of
mathematics, is Leibniz himself. Concluding his self-description, Leibniz writes: “I
discovered him one day reading some books of controversies, and I expressed my
astonishment, having been led to believe he was a professional mathematician
because he had done practically nothing else in Paris. It was then that he told me a
big mistake had been made, that he had quite other views, and that his main
meditations concerned Theology. He said that he had applied himself to
mathematics as if it were Scholastic philosophy, that is, only for the perfection of his
spirit and to learn the art of invention and demonstration.” 483
Say what you want about Leibniz’s moderateness in the Enlightenment, he still

nevertheless was not so moderate or liberal that he would let anti-Trinitarian Socinianism,

deism, and so many other unorthodox theologies and philosophies slide. He attacked these
for most of his 50 year career. “Leibniz’s commitment to combating Socinianism, which
began in his early period, never waned.” 484

In a letter in January of 1684, explaining why he does not want to convert from

Lutheranism to Catholicism 485, Leibniz states: “There are some philosophical opinions, for

which I believe I have a demonstration, and which it would be impossible for me to change
in my present state of mind.” He follows this letter with another saying, “I can assure you

Antognazza, op. cited, 5-6.
Ibid. pp. 11.
485 Adams (op. cited) says that Leibniz was “a lifelong member of the Lutheran Church” (517). I’m
reminded of another correspondent who zealously tried to convert Leibniz to Roman Catholicism
(with dire eternal warnings, too) – Arnauld. He also did not succeed. Yet there was no question in
this correspondence that Leibniz was not sincere or a deist or even liberal.
483
484
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that the philosophical doubts I mentioned in my previous letter hold nothing against the
Mysteries of Christianity such as the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Eucharist, and the

resurrection of bodies. I do think these things are possible, and since God has revealed
them I hold them to be true.” 486

It would appear from this statement to Landraf Ernst von Hessen-Rheinfels that

Leibniz believes in the central orthodox dogmas of the Christian faith. There might be
philosophical room in explaining bodies and then the resurrection of bodies and the

Eucharist in a uniquely Leibnizian way, but there is not as much elbow room for also

assenting to the Trinity and the Incarnation. If this is so, then Leibniz is more orthodox than
many think.

In a brief discourse sent to Duke Johann Friedrich in 1671, Leibniz tells of his plan to

write “the Elements of Mind” [Elementa de Mente] to “provide the hypothesis whereby all

these phenomena or mysteries of faith can be salvaged, since it is not their truth that can be

demonstrated, but their possibility (for, as the truth of the phenomena of nature depends on
the senses, so the truth of these depends on revelation: and indeed, the task of justifying
Revelation pertains to a separate doctrine to be evinced in the light of the Histories,
regarding the Truth of the Christian Religion).” 487

Leibniz uses the term ‘salvaged’ here. This is a strong word to use. It conjures up an

image of traditional Christianity as a ship or house in danger of sinking or burning to the

ground – as if it cannot be completely preserved. At this point his mission is to salvage as

much as possible of Christianity and the mysteries of the faith, for, in his time, the mysteries
of the faith were being attacked, and many were abandoning them. Part of this salvaging

mission then was in trying to put the brakes on the New Philosophy movement to banish
scholasticism and the ancients with their roots firmly implanted in the metaphysics of
486
487

Antognazza 173, endnote #6.
Antognazza 34.
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substantial forms, revelation, teleology, and final causes. In his 1686 Discourse on

Metaphysics, Leibniz defends his stand to defend some of the old philosophy: “I know that I
am advancing a great paradox by attempting to rehabilitate the old philosophy in some
fashion and to restore the banished substantial forms to their former place.” 488 But, he

explains, the ancient and scholastic abuse of this doctrine in explaining nature “must not

cause us to reject something whose knowledge is so necessary in metaphysics that, I hold,
without it one cannot properly know the first principles or elevate our minds sufficiently
well to the knowledge of incorporeal natures and the wonders of God.” 489

So then, there it is: Leibniz felt that his contemporaries should not throw out the

baby with the bathwater, as the expression goes; for some of the scholastic’s metaphysics at

least is still needed in order to preserve the enchantment of God in nature. The

consequence of banishing forms, final causes, and revelation are “dangerous to me”, he says.
Moreover,

And I advise those who have any feelings of piety and even feelings of true
philosophy to keep away from the phrases of certain would-be free thinkers who
say that we see because it happens that we have eyes and not that eyes were made
for seeing. When one seriously holds these opinions ascribing everything to the
necessity of nature or to some chance … it is difficult to recognize an intelligent
author of nature. For the effect must correspond to the cause. Moreover, it is
unreasonable to introduce a supreme intelligence as orderer of things and then,
instead of using his wisdom, use only the properties of matter to explain the
phenomena. 490
Leibniz is not advocating the preservation of the whole explanatory scheme of

scholasticism, though. No, his scholasticism is less robust, more detailed, more liberal and
refined, “scholasticism light”, if you will.

I agree that the consideration of these forms serves no purpose in the details of
physics and must not be used to explain particular phenomena. That is where the
Scholastics failed … believing that they could account for the properties of bodies by

Leibniz, Discourse, op. cited, 43.
Ibid. 42.
490 Ibid. 52-53. Such an argument seems to be an attack on major planks (or interpreted
consequences) in the philosophies such as Hobbes, Descartes, and Spinoza.
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talking about forms and qualities without taking the trouble to examine their
manner of operation. It is as if we were content to say that a clock has a quality of
clockness derived from its form without considering in what all of this consists; that
would be sufficient for the person who buys the clock, provided that he turns over
its care to another. 491
But to resume the thread of our discussion on revelation, Leibniz recognizes that

“the truth of [the mysteries of faith] depends on revelation.” Because of this, he also

recognizes “the task of justifying Revelation.” To accomplish this “pertains to a separate

doctrine to be evinced from the light of the Histories, regarding the Truth of the Christian
Religion.” I’m not sure what he means by this. It seems to mean that Leibniz hopes that a
right knowledge of history (particularly the history of the scriptures) can argue for, or

“justify”, the claim that the scriptures are “Revelation” from God. This is written in 1671, a

year after the publication of Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise (TTP), which argues the
very opposite! Work by Edwin Curley and Mogen Laerke’s show that Leibniz did in fact

read the TTP in 1670 or 1671. 492 If this is so, then Leibniz may have written the passage

above hoping for a historical antidote to Spinoza’s views, which argues that history
undermines and refutes the claim that they are inspired or revelation from God.

Antognazza’s Leibniz on the Trinity and the Incarnation delineates many other

arguments that can be cited as evidence that Leibniz was not an abettor or precursor to the
Radical Enlightenment’s warfare against Christianity. Her book also makes it clear that
Leibniz was more conservative in faith than many are aware of.

Idid. 42.
See Edwin Curley’s “Homo Audax: Leibniz, Oldenburg and the TTP” from Studia leibnitiana
Supplementa: Leibniz’ Auseinandersetzung mit Vorgangern und Zeitgenossen, ed. by Ingrid Marchewitz
& Albert Heinekamp, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1990, pp. 277-312. See also Mogens Laerke’s
“G.W. Leibniz’s two readings of the Tractatus theologico-politicus from Y. Melamed and M. Rosenthal
(eds) Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise: A Critical Guide (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010).
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Leibniz not a precursor, but a staunch defender of Christianity (based on his many defenses
of Christianity and his attacks against all perceived serious threats to Christianity)
Another powerful argument to show Leibniz as defender of the faith and not

precursor to the Radical Enlightenment was his consistent attacks against any thinkers
whose works were perceived as dangerous to, or deviations from, the faith. He was

consistent in this throughout most of his career (except the one short period in which he
almost fell into the clutches of Spinozism). Up until his last years, Leibniz railed against
Hobbes and Spinoza, for instance. As we will see, he also railed against Descartes.

In a 1669 essay in the Catholic Demonstrations, under the title “The Confession of

Nature Against Atheists” and “That Corporeal Phenomena Cannot Be Explained without an

Incorporeal Principle, That is God”, Leibniz makes the following very important statement. I
say it is important because it shows very clearly that Leibniz sensed the new age that was
developing and the two primary causes of it. 493 He knew it to be an age of enlightenment,

but he also saw in it the seeds of a radical enlightenment. And it is patently clear from this

passage that Leibniz did not like this radical enlightenment. In an earlier chapter, we laid
down some arguments on how the New Philosophy, the Scientific Revolution, and the

biblical critical revolution should be seen as precursors to the Radical Enlightenment. In

this passage we see that Leibniz himself agrees. He considered them the chief causes that
lead to atheism (or the “Radical Enlightenment” using our language). At the end of this

493 17th century passages such as this confirm or support the contention of Enlightenment historians
that this period of time in Europe was indeed something new under the sun and is thus deserving of a
special historiographical term. I’m curious to know how relativizing historians (whose professional
lives seem to be largely taken up with blurring the periodization lines of previous historians) would
respond to this passage. This passage also supports or confirms the thesis of Jonathan Israel and
others who argue that the Scientific Revolution (and New Philosophy) and biblical textual revolution
are the great precursors and causes of the Radical Enlightenment. Do you want a quick and easy
explanation of two of the primary precursors and causes of the Radical Enlightenment? Here it is.
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passage he singles out Hobbes and Spinoza (?) as being the major culprits behind this evil
cabal. 494

For through the admirable improvement of mathematics and the approaches which
chemistry and anatomy have opened into the nature of things, it has become
apparent that mechanical explanations – reasons from the figure and motions of
bodies, as it were – can be given for most of the things which the ancients referred
only to the Creator or to some kind (I know not what) of incorporeal forms. The
result was that truly capable men for the first time began to try to save or to explain
natural phenomena, or those which appear in bodies, without assuming God or
taking him into their reasoning. Then, after their attempt had met with some little
success, though before they arrived at foundations and principles, they proclaimed,
as if rejoicing prematurely at their security, that they could find neither God nor the
immortality of the soul by natural reason, but that in these matters faith must rest
either on civil laws or on historical records. This was the judgment of the most
acute Mr. Hobbes, whose great discoveries should earn for him our silence on this
matter if his authority had not explicitly affected this view for the worse.
Unfortunately there are others who have gone even further and who now doubt the
authority of the sacred scriptures and the truth of history and the historical record,
thus bringing an unconcealed atheism into the world. 495

In essence, this passage also seems to support or confirm Jonathan Israel’s (and others)
Enlightenment historiography that argues that Hobbes and especially Spinoza (or destructive biblical
criticism) are the backbone of the Radical Enlightenment.
495 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Philosophical Papers and Letters, translated and edited by Leroy E.
Loemker, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1970), 109-110. Note Leibniz’s
treatment of Hobbes and what appears to be Spinoza. (Leibniz does not explicitly state Spinoza; but
it looks like Spinoza is the one he is referring to. It is true that there were other works that cast
doubt on traditional views of the Scripture; but none so much as Spinoza’s TTP, which seems mostly
likely to fit Leibniz’s description of “an unconcealed atheism.” At this time, Leibniz wouldn’t have
known that Spinoza was the author of the TTP because Spinoza did not append his name to the work.
One final comment: Though the TTP is usually understood to have been published in 1670, in
actuality it was published in late 1669.) Leibniz disregards all the language of faith and piety that
one can find in Hobbes’ and Spinoza’s (?) writings (which even some contemporary scholars (ex.
Martinich for Hobbes and Verbeek for Spinoza) use to argue that they were not atheists but only
unorthodox believers). I assume from this passage that Leibniz doesn’t believe in their sincerity, but
judges their claims about God and the soul and other seemingly orthodox positions to be a fraud.
More, for Leibniz, their “atheism” is so obvious that it is presented unconcealed - “thus bringing in an
unconcealed atheism into the world.” Note also that this passage entails or strongly implies that
Leibniz believed in “the authority of the sacred scriptures and the truth of history and the historical
record.” I take this to mean that he accepted (at least as of 1669) the genesis and chronology of the
earth, humans and animals that the Bible’s “history” presents. His later geological work, the
Protogaea, however, will show some differences from his apparently earlier strict orthodox position.
In fact, the Protogaea sometimes explains the forces of nature in a way that he criticizes in the above
quote – that is, of explaining natural phenomena in largely naturalistic and not theological terms. On
the one hand, I would take such a difference in approach to be a sign that Leibniz’s faith had
weakened as he matured. Indeed, some Leibniz scholars such as Robert Adams have suggested this.
Yet, on the other hand, there are late works by Leibniz that seem just as theologically conservative (at
least on some points of theology) as his earlier ones.
494
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Leibniz argued against even perceived unorthodoxies in fellow Christian philosophers
A year before his death, he even fights fellow Christians against their threats to

natural religion. In his correspondence with Clark via the Royal Highness of Wales, he

begins his letter complaining about the materialism in England. “Natural religion itself

seems to decay [in England] very much. Many will have human souls to be material; others
make God himself a corporeal being.” 496 Leibniz no doubt has materialists such as Hobbes
in mind here. But he goes on to complain about Locke and then Sir Isaac Newton himself.

Of Locke he says: “Mr. Locke and his followers are uncertain at least whether the soul is not
material and naturally perishable.” And of Newton he makes several charges, two will be

listed here. Both have to do with the presentation of a physics in which God’s workmanship
seems to be impugned. Leibniz won’t have that. He must defend the glory of God. He must
declare His perfections against all slanders to the divine greatness. He first takes Newton’s
concept of space to task: Newton “says that space is an organ which God makes use of to
perceive things by.” 497 Secondly,

According to [Newton and his followers’] doctrine, God Almighty needs to wind up
his watch from time to time, otherwise it would cease to move. He did not, it seems,
have sufficient foresight to make it a perpetual motion. No, the machine of God’s
making is so imperfect, according to these gentlemen, that he is obliged to clean it
now and then and by an extraordinary concourse, and even to mend it, as a
clockmaker mends his work; he must consequently be so much the more unskillful a
workman as he is more often obliged to mend his work and to set it right. 498

Whoever thinks such things “must necessarily have a very mean notion of the

wisdom and power of God.” 499 Leibniz cares very much to defend not only the existence of
God and the immortality of the soul with reward and punishment in the after world, he

G. W. Leibniz and Samuel Clark. G.W. Leibniz and Samuel Clark: Correspondence, ed. Roger Ariew
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.), 4.
497 Ibid.
498 Ibid.
499 Ibid.
496
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cares very much to exalt the wisdom and power and perfections of God. Any major

theologian or philosopher whose works seem to diminish these, he will take up the cudgels
against them. Thus he also takes up the Cause against the great Descartes.

Leibniz also shows his anti-Radical Enlightenment stance in his attacks against

aspects of Descartes’ philosophy that, according to Leibniz, leads to un-Christian theological
results – such as, the view of the immortal soul without personality and a view of God

devoid of his biblical role of judge, punisher, and rewarder of humankind. In our Descartes

chapter under the section “Descartes as Enlightenment revolutionary supported by many
testimonies of his contemporaries up to the high Enlightenment”, we promised to add

Leibniz’s criticisms of Descartes. This we will do now. We will see that even geniuses and
moderate enlightenment voices had fierce words against Cartesianism because of its
perceived degenerate influence against Christianity.

Leibniz’s God Versus Descartes’ God

“Since you want me to frankly tell you my thoughts on Cartesianism, I will hide nothing from you that I
think, at least nothing that can be stated briefly; and I will make no claims without giving or being able
to give a reason for them … Descartes’s God, or perfect being, is not a God like the one we imagine or
hope for, that is, a God just and wise, doing everything possible for the good of creatures. Rather
Descartes’ God is something approaching the God of Spinoza ... a God like Descartes’s allows us no
consolation….it is impossible to believe that this God cares for intelligent creatures….That is why, in
order to satisfy the hopes of humankind, we must prove that the God who governs all is wise and just” -Leibniz 500

Introduction: Problematic
How can Leibniz say all these things (in the epigraph above) against Descartes’ God?

Did not Descartes write the epoch-making work Meditations on First Philosophy In Which

Leibniz’s Letter to Molanus (?), ca. 1679, from G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays (translated and
edited by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 240245, or Readings in Modern Philosophy, ed. Ariew/Watkins, p. 121-122
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The Existence of God And The Distinction of the Soul from the Body Are Demonstrated? And

wasn’t the purpose of this great work the “righteous cause” of demonstrating the truth of

the existence of God and the immortality of the human soul “by the aid of philosophy rather
than of theology” in order to persuade unbelievers and thus leave all “without excuse”? 501

Isn’t he only following the Church’s admonition of the Lateran Council (as Leibniz did) that

“enjoined Christian philosophers to refute [atheist’s] arguments”? 502 Descartes offered this

testimony to his work: It is to “the glory of God to which all this is referred.” 503 And again, at

the end of his Principles of Philosophy: “recalling my own insignificance, I affirm nothing, but
submit all things to the authority of the Catholic Church, and to the judgment of those wiser
than myself.” 504

Descartes has called thinkers to “lift their minds above sensible things” to meditate

long and hard on one’s soul and the ideas which God has implanted therein.” 505 He says
that “If you spend long enough time on this meditation, you acquire little by little a very

clear, and if I may say so, an intuitive knowledge of intellectual nature in general, the idea of
which, considered without limitation, is what represents God for us … But it is not possible
to understand fully what I said afterward about the existence of God if you have not begun
in this way.” 506 Descartes claims to corroborate the claim of Holy Scriptures that “What is
known of God is manifest in them”, saying “that everything that can be known about God
can be shown by reasons drawn exclusively from our own mind.” 507

Descartes. Meditations, translated by Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
1979), 1.
502 Ibid. 2.
503 Ibid.
504 Descartes. Rene Descartes: Philosophical Essays and Correspondence, edited with Introduction by
Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 272.
505 Ibid. 63. This comes from his Discourse Part IV #37.
506 Ibid. 83, in his letter to Silhon.
507 Ibid. 97-98.
501
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Again, how can Leibniz criticize Descartes’ God this severely? For we know, from

the study of all Descartes’ works and especially his correspondence and the Conversations

with Burnam, that he was also personally a believer, a Catholic. We know that his friends

didn’t question his faith, but accepted his sincerity. And we know such things as that he had
his daughter baptized. He accepted the scriptures as the very words of the Holy Spirit. He
therefore also accepted prophecy, miracles, the Virgin birth, transubstantiation of the
Eucharist, a 6000 year history of earth (?), Adam and Eve, Noah’s ark, and the rest of

scriptural claims. He also accepted the authority of the Pope and Church and submitted to

it. He fought against atheists and infidels and sought to serve God, the Pope, and the Church
in his writing and philosophy. And he believed that his philosophy grounded Christianity
better than all past philosophy, particularly scholastic philosophies. What can be said

against a philosopher who writes: “Above all, we should impress on our memory as an

infallible rule that what God has revealed to us is incomparably more certain than anything
else, and that we ought to submit to divine authority rather than our own judgment even
though the light of reason may seem to us to suggest something opposite with the utmost
clearness and evidence”? 508

Context: How did Leibniz go from defender of Descartes to severe critic?
Some problems
Taking Leibniz’s 1679 Letter to Molanus (?) as our jumping off point into Leibniz’s

criticisms of Descartes’ God, and, by implication, to what Leibniz’s God is, we must first deal
with a few questions to shed light on what led up to this severe criticism. Many issues and
questions arise when we ask questions of context and accurate chronology: How well and
508

Ibid. 253, my emphasis.
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how accurately did Leibniz know Descartes’ philosophy at this time? When and where did
Leibniz derive his opinions, especially since Descartes’ works were put on the Index of

Prohibited Books in 1663? Did he receive them second hand from enemies of Cartesianism

or from scholastics and neo-scholastics? What writings of Descartes did Leibniz read? Did
he have access to all Descartes’ works?

We know from some of Leibniz’s letters on Descartes from 1675 to 1679 that

Leibniz “first studied Descartes’s philosophy seriously when he resided in Paris from 1672
to 1676”, yet as late as 1675, in his Letter to Foucher, Leibniz admits that he has still not
“been able to read all [Descartes’] writings with all the care I had intended to bring to

them.” 509 Professor Ariew mentions that when Descartes was in Paris from 1672 to 1676

that, “He managed to gain access to the unpublished manuscripts of Pascal and Descartes.
(In fact, some of Descartes’ papers have survived only through copies Leibniz made of
them.)” 510 But here too we don’t know all the details.

Leibniz also confesses that what he does “know of Descartes’s metaphysical and

physical meditations is almost entirely derived from reading a number of books, written in a

more familiar style, that report his opinions.” 511 What were these books? Did they interpret
Descartes correctly? Could they have been part of what caused Leibniz’s criticisms to be so
severe? At any rate, he finally concedes, “So perhaps I have not yet understood him well.”
Nevertheless, based on “the extent that I have leafed through his works myself,” Leibniz

believes that he has received enough of an insight ( a “glimpse”, as he calls it) to know “what

[Descartes] has not accomplished and not even attempted to accomplish, that is, among

Readings in Modern Philosophy Volume I: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Associated Texts
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000), 116-117.
510 Cambridge Companion to Leibniz 26.
511 Readings, op. cited, 117.
509
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other things, the analysis of all our assumptions.” 512 Descartes, I think, would argue with

this last point – not to mention the questionability of whether Leibniz himself accomplished
a complete analysis of all assumptions (as Kant bore out not too many years hence).

How much did Leibniz really read and take in as he “leafed” through his works, and

what works he leafed through, we don’t know. From these passages, it seems fair to say
that we should be on our guard as to the accuracy of Leibniz’s criticisms of Descartes
because they don’t stem from a scholarly study of the material.

How did Leibniz go from defender of Descartes to severe critic according to contemporary
Leibniz scholarship?
Is this apparently accurate account true? Contrary to Leibniz’s self-effacing

remarks, contemporary scholarship of Leibniz argues that he knew a good deal more about
Descartes’ writings, and the Cartesians, and, finally, what their works led to – the dreaded
Spinozism. In fact, Leibniz scholars today know more about this than in any previous

generation. We know now, for instance, that Leibniz had access to many of Descartes’

works in Paris from Descartes’ right hand man, Clerselier. We also know a great deal more

about Leibniz’s knowledge of Spinoza, which, as we will see, culminated in Leibniz’s change
of tone toward Descartes.

To fill in our historical account, then, let us back up and also explain Spinoza’s role

in Leibniz’s eventual explosion against Descartes. Before the TTP was published, Leibniz

only knew Spinoza as the writer of The Principles of Cartesian Philosophy. We know from

essays such as Edwin Curley’s and Mogens Laerke’s that Leibniz had first read Spinoza’s

Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP) in 1670 when it was published. Laerke agrees with

Paul Verniere’s assessment that “it is not exaggerated to say that during these two years [i.e.

Ibid. 117. This has always struck me as hypocritical of Leibniz because he himself failed miserably
on this score in relation to his thinking about the scriptures and thus his theology.
512
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1670-71] the publication of the Tractatus was for Leibniz the greatest intellectual event in
Europe.” 513

As early as February 1672, Leibniz knew that Spinoza’s TTP “develops a critique

which is indeed erudite, but also scattered with venom against the very antiquity,

authenticity and authority of the sacred writings of the Old Testament.” 514 Some time near

the end of his time in Paris (probably at the end of 1675 or beginning of 1676), Leibniz read
the Tractatus again. 515 On his way home to Germany, he first visited Henry Oldenburg in
London towards the latter part of October 1676. During this eleven day visit, Oldenburg
allows Leibniz to see and copy three letters that he had received from Spinoza about the
TTP. This may be the first time that Leibniz perceives Spinoza’s necessitarianism. He

realizes, for instance, that if Spinoza’s necessitarianism is true, “moral philosophy will be

destroyed.” 516 This then disturbs Leibniz’s philosophical understanding of God Himself and

not just issues of biblical interpretation. We know, for instance, that by 1676 Leibniz

already had much of his philosophy formed, including his doctrine of pre-established

harmony. 517 It was also around this time (1675-76) that Leibniz made progress on the
ontological argument for the existence of God that he had started working on in 1671.
Leibniz had also been well acquainted with the important exchange of letters

between Spinoza and Albert Burgh and Nicolas Steno, but he didn’t think that vituperation
was the best way to respond to Spinoza. For Leibniz, Spinoza could only be properly
refuted by a “more erudite and solid than vehement and harsh” response. 518

M. Laerke, “Leibniz’s Enlightenment,” in H. Rudolph et H. Poser (eds.), Leibniz und die Ökumene,
Studia Leibnitiana Sonderheft, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, [forthcoming], 3.
514 Ibid. 10.
515 Ibid. 4.
516 Ibid. 5.
517 See “The early period to the Discourse on Metaphysics by Mercer and Sleigh, Cambridge Comp. to
Leibniz, p. 100.
518 Laerke, op. cited, 5-6.
513
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Spinoza died in 1677 and all his works were published soon afterward in the same

year. Leibniz then got all of Spinoza’s works. By 1678 Leibniz’s own views and philosophy
were becoming more settled and assured. By this point Leibniz had a deeper insight into

just how threatening to the Christian faith the growing movement of the New Philosophy,
Cartesianism, and its apparent offshoot, Spinosism, was becoming. One of the turning

points in Leibniz’s attitude toward Descartes came probably sometime in 1678 after Leibniz
had had time to study Spinoza’s Ethics. In his notes in that year, Leibniz records his

impressions from reading the Appendix at the end of Part I of the Ethics. Here it becomes

clear to him just what Spinoza represents – everything against his own philosophy and that

of Christianity. He reads from Spinoza that “all things have been predetermined by God, not
from his free will or absolute pleasure, but from the absolute nature of God, his infinite
power”; he reads that it is only ignorance, vanity, prejudice, egoism, and even “blind

cupidity and insatiable greed” that humans imagine that nature acts “with an end in view”

and “that God directs everything to a fixed end”, that is, that “God has made everything for
man’s sake.” 519

But, Spinoza continues, if all things are made for man’s sake, then how should the

great number of “disasters, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases and so forth” be

explained? Man has explained that “these occurred because the gods were angry at the

wrongs done to them by men … And although daily experience cried out against this and
showed by any number of examples that blessings and disasters befall the godly and the

ungodly alike without discrimination, they did not on that account abandon their ingrained
prejudice … they made it axiomatic that the judgment of the gods is far beyond man’s
understanding.” 520
519
520

Readings in Modern Philosophy, op. cited, 174-5.
Ibid. 176.
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Toward the end of his Appendix (in the Ethics, Part I), Spinoza replies to critics who

argue in the following way: “If everything has followed from the necessity of God’s most

perfect nature, why does Nature display so many imperfections, such as rottenness to the
point of putridity, nauseating ugliness, confusion, evil, sin, and so on?” Spinoza answers

that “the perfection of things should be measured solely from their own nature and power;
nor are things more or less perfect to the extent that they please or offend human senses,
serve or oppose human interests.” 521

Similarly, men call “good or bad, healthy or rotten and corrupt” only “according to

its effect on them”; but “all the notions whereby the common people are wont to explain

Nature are merely modes of imagining, and denote not the nature of any thing but only the
constitution of the imagination.” 522 The ignorant say that the human body was fashioned

“by divine or supernatural art” instead of natural mechanical principles. God hasn’t created
all things in an orderly way, says Spinoza. This projection on reality is really only
“attributing human imagination to God.”

These are all superstitions, writes Spinoza, for “Nature has no fixed goal and that all

final causes are but figments of the human imagination.” Instead, “all things in Nature

proceed from all eternal necessity and with supreme perfection … for if God acts with an

end in view, he must necessarily be seeking something that he lacks.” Thus it is shown that
the doctrine of final causes “negates God’s perfections.” Spinoza won’t have it. He won’t
have this anthropomorphic God at all. For Spinoza’s man’s flight from himself to “take
refuge in the will of God” is only a “sanctuary of ignorance.”

My hypothesis is that facts such as these provide the background and consequent

explanation for the change in Leibniz’s tone. Hence the extreme tone in the 1679 Letter.
521
522

Ibid. 177-8.
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By 1678 Leibniz’s command of Descartes seems stronger. He certainly expresses

different views about Descartes compared to his 1675 Letter to Foucher. In this letter,

Leibniz was partly trying to persuade Foucher, who was an anti-Cartesian and skeptic, of
the virtues of Descartes and Cartesianism. In this letter he calls Descartes “the world’s

greatest genius” and “when I think of everything Descartes has said that is beautiful and

original, I am more astonished with what he has accomplished than with what he has failed
to accomplish”; but now, in his 1679 letter he says things that would lead one to think

differently. While maintaining that Descartes was a great genius and that the sciences are in
debt to him, he nevertheless also says: “Descartes himself had a rather limited mind” and
“he discovered nothing useful for the portion of life which falls under the senses, and

nothing useful in the practice of the arts. His meditations were either too abstract, as in his
metaphysics and his geometry, or too subject to the imagination, as in his principles of
natural philosophy.” 523

In his Letter to Foucher he admits that he had not given as much careful study to all

of Descartes’ writings as he wished for, and that, as a result, he might be mistaking some
aspects of Descartes. But now, in this 1679 letter, we see a powerful assurance of his

knowledge of Descartes: “I will make no claims without giving or being able to give a reason
for them”; 524 he tells his correspondent all sorts of things about Cartesians and Descartes,
even specifics and examples “of what [Descartes] borrowed from others, what he himself

accomplished, and what he left us to accomplish. We shall see in this way whether I speak
without knowing what I am talking about.” 525

Having said this, however, we will see that despite some errors, several of Leibniz’s

criticisms of Descartes’ philosophy and God are accurate. The focus of my remarks will be
G, W. Leibniz, ed. Ariew and Garber, op. cited, 241.
Ibid. 240.
525 Ibid. 241.
523
524

244

on his depiction of Descartes’ God and not on details in his epistemology or philosophy of
mind. For one thing, from this same letter, Leibniz claims that there are better ways to

“bring us farther along” to demonstrate the existence of God than Descartes’ arguments. 526
First, Leibniz does not deny that Descartes has a God. Hence Leibniz’s issue is not

against an out-and-out atheist argument. He acknowledges that Descartes has a belief in
God and in the immateriality of the soul. His complaint has to do with the kind of God

Descartes’ philosophy constructs and some “dangerous” ramifications from this. Leibniz’s

complaint is that the God that Descartes’ philosophy constructs is not orthodox enough. It is
not anything like the God of Christianity and therefore dangerous. Let me once again quote
what Leibniz says:

Descartes’s God, or perfect being, is not a God like the one we imagine or hope for,
that is, a God just and wise, doing everything possible for the good of creatures….a
God like Descartes’s allows us no consolation….it is impossible to believe that this
God cares for intelligent creatures….That is why, in order to satisfy the hopes of
humankind, we must prove that the God who governs all is wise and just. 527

It seems to me that Leibniz’s criticisms of Descartes’ God are not directed against

the God of Descartes the believer, but against Descartes the philosopher. And indeed, there
are just grounds for this because Descartes over and over again in his writings and letters

made it clear that he wished to do philosophy and not theology, and that he felt it his duty to
see how much philosophy and the natural light of reason can reveal about God and the soul.
This position in the philosophy of religion was not unusual or unique. Thomas Aquinas, for
instance, also made some strong distinctions between natural philosophy and revealed
theology.

I don’t know to what extent Leibniz had his philosopher’s hat on when he wrote this

letter, but I do suspect that it expresses his most cherished wishes. Nietzsche once noted

Reading in Modern Philosophy, eds. Ariew & Watkins, op. cited, 119.
Leibniz’s Letter to Molanus (?), ca. 1679, from Readings in Modern Philosophy, eds. Ariew/Watkins,
121.
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that “every great philosophy so far has been … the personal confession of its author and a
kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir.” 528 I think this is ultimately correct with

respect to Leibniz’s God and to his teaching that this is the best of all possible worlds, for

human beings naturally wish for a Leibnizian Best of all possible worlds – a world in which

there are no real accidents; a world in which everything that happens, happens according to
the most infinitely wise and good plan; a world in which, ultimately speaking, everything
works for the best for everyone and everything.

Philosophical his God may be (as is abundantly made clear by great works such as

his Discourse on Metaphysics, Monadology, and, to a lesser extent, his Theodicy); but at

bottom, Leibniz’s God seems more like the product of “a desire of the heart … that [he]

defends with reasons [he has] sought after the fact.” 529 Of course, Leibniz doesn’t think this.

He thinks he has arrived at the first principles about God and knowledge from purely
philosophical and metaphysical reasoning, or, to use Leibniz’s words, from precisely
following “the thread of meditating.” 530 In fact, Leibniz says that “If [Descartes] had

followed precisely what I call the thread of meditating [filum meditandi] I believe that he

would have achieved the first philosophy” (that is, like Leibniz’s).

Given the premises of the divine as absolutely perfect for Leibniz, the arguments

that he builds from these are powerful and insightful. Indeed, when I first read them (in his
Discourse on Metaphysics), I wondered why other theologians and philosophers over the

centuries hadn’t come up with this notion earlier. However, it would be a serious injustice
to Leibniz’s philosophy of religion if one were to imagine that this focused summary of

Leibniz’s relation to Scripture and the Scripture’s God tells the complete story of Leibniz’s

God. This is particularly the case with respect to his last work, the Monadology. There are
Friedrich Nietzsche, translated by Walter Kaufmann, Beyond Good and Evil (New York: Vintage
Books, 1966), 13, #6.
529 Ibid. 12, #5.
530 Readings, Ariew/Watkins, op. cited, 117.
528
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depths and nuances to Leibniz’s thinking about the relation of his doctrine of monads to
that of his doctrine of pre-established harmony, and indeed to his philosophy of mind

(particularly his prescient thoughts on the soul or mind) that requires far more in-depth
analysis than this section can do justice to.

Further respects in which Leibniz was not a precursor
On various theological issues, Leibniz is certainly less fanatical, less Christian, less Pascalian,
less Jansenist, less Augustinian, less Calvinistic than his more enthusiastic “fundamentalist”

brothers and sisters. 531 To take only one concrete example of this, let us take Leibniz’s view

of how to regard pagans (such as the ancient Platonists and Stoics) in relation to their

virtues and salvation. Instead of wholesale condemning them in the manner of Jesus, Paul,
Augustine, Luther, Calvin, and Pascal, Leibniz thinks that they “had excellent views about

the virtues.” Because of this more liberal perspective, he says that “Augustine is too severe

with them. For not content with having sought perpetual sins in their virtues, which is itself
too much, he also considered the precepts of the philosophers as entirely evil, as if they had

measured everything bearing the name of virtue by the vanity of praise and by pride.” 532 He
goes on to say: “But we know they often rightly commended the wise man, not out of hope
of reward or fear of punishment, but out of love of virtue, and there is no difference

between this love of virtue and that devotion to justice which Augustine teaches and which

Like Locke (and of course Hobbes and Spinoza), Leibniz rejected religious enthusiasm and what
he calls false mysticism. “Hence you may reject the quietists, false mystics, who deny individuality
and action … as if our highest perfection consisted in a kind of passive state, when on the contrary,
love and knowledge are operations of the mind and will. Blessedness of the soul does indeed consist
in union with God, but we must not think that the soul is absorbed in God, having lost its individuality
and activity … for this would be an evil enthusiasm…”(Ibid, Loemker, op. cited, 594).
532 Loemker, op. cited. 593.
531
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he refers to the essential justice, that is, to God himself, in whom is the source of the good
and the true.” 533

Leibniz shows in places like this that he does not follow Luther’s or Paul’s or

Augustine’s theology on pagans and non-Christians. The former see pagans and all non-

Christians, including Jews as “unregenerate”, “by nature sinful”, “depraved”, “even to the

point in which their reason and therefore philosophy are totally corrupt.” Leibniz’s thinking
then differs in some respects (but not too radically) also from their teachings about morals
or ethics, about human nature, God, Christ, sin, the devil, the world, philosophy, the Holy
Spirit, the need for the Holy Spirit to enlighten people about God, the need for the Holy

Spirit to regenerate, to un-blind, to save, to give rebirth, to show the truth of scriptures, etc.
Still, while he highly admires and agrees with Plato in some regards, especially

because “No ancient philosophy comes closer to Christianity”, he also says that we should

“justly censure those who think that Plato is everywhere reconcilable with Christ.” All in all,

Leibniz thinks that “the ancients must be excused for denying the beginning of things, or
creation, and the resurrection of the body, for these doctrines can be known only by
revelation.” 534

So while Leibniz seems to honor revelation over pagan philosophy here, he

nevertheless also seems to deny orthodox Catholic and Protestant theology that stipulates

that all who are not in Christ are by nature objects of the wrath of God, and therefore all the
Greeks, all the Romans, and all the philosophers, the sages, the wise of this world were on

the wide road that leads to destruction and eternal damnation; for he says, “But the ancients
must be excused for denying” these various Christian teachings because these teachings can
only be known via Christian revelation, and they did not have that. Still, he may only be
Ibid. 594.
Ibid. 592, my emphasis. This is written in 1707, late in his career, only nine years before his
death.
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saying that the ancients may be excused “for denying the beginning of things, or creation,
and the resurrection of the body” and not excused from the judgment and eternal
condemnation.

The statement above would seem to affirm that Leibniz believed in revelation. And

that’s a big thing. I take it then that his attitude toward Plato and the Stoics is not the same
attitude of the New Testament’s – certainly not of Paul’s toward philosophy and

philosophers. This letter is also telling in that I think it shows how and when Leibniz’s
philosophical thinking (which is largely derived from Christianity) over-rules, trumps

certain orthodox and Reformed theological beliefs (in this case, Reformed, Lutheran,

Pauline, Augustinian theology).

So, on the one hand, his philosophy overall is aligned with Christian theology (such

as that God is the creator, that He is perfect, that He is good, providence, belief in scripture
as revelation, and more); on the other hand, it is not aligned with some elements of the
Bible, the New Testament, with Paul’s teachings, with Augustine’s, with Luther’s, with

Calvin’s, with Pascal’s, or with Arnauld’s. In this sense then, there are aspects in Leibniz’s

philosophy and theology that are both unique. Like Augustine and Pascal, he theologizesphilosophizes his own way. Leibnizian theology (and philosophy) overall then may be

considered Christian, yet it is distinct in its own way, for Leibniz does not always tow the
Christian conservative line. He also can be unorthodox or, at least un-Calvinistic (for

example, as we saw, against the view of the total depravity of man and the doctrine of

original sin). This shows a more independent mind. This shows a more courageous man.
This shows a serious thinker on theological and philosophical issues. In this sense, then,

Leibniz doesn’t always buy the Word of God or Christian theology when it conflicts with his
sense of right and wrong and truth. Thus, for Leibniz, he probably didn’t think that most
people go to hell.
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One can also consider Leibniz as a more moderate Christian in that on the whole

(outside of the way he wrote sometimes wrote about Hobbes, Spinoza, and Descartes),

Leibniz’s manner of writing and speaking about other theologians and philosophers and the
differences he has with them is generally much more civil, gracious, and kind then the usual

kind of theological venom displayed by Jesus, Paul, Peter, James, John, Augustine, Tertullian,
Luther, Calvin, some of the Jesuits, Pascal, and many of the bulls of popes.

Now this can

be interpreted as ‘more Christian’ or less. Some devout Christians might aver that he is

more civil, urbane, ‘kind’, ‘friendly’, etc. toward heretics and infidels because he is more

worldly and because he is not as God-filled as he should be. Other could argue that being

civil, kind, etc. is what the Christian demeanor in the world should be.

Whatever the case may be here, in some respects Leibniz and Descartes were

certainly not liberal or worldly insofar as they both attacked atheists, infidels, and

movements and philosophies that were not in line with orthodoxy. There’s much that we
can say, for instance, about Leibniz’s “worldliness” or “liberalness”, but we cannot accuse

him of being liberal toward anti-Christian philosophies such as Spinoza’s, or toward deists,
Socinians, and many other heterodox theologies and philosophies. He attacked these
throughout his fifty-year career.

Some will perhaps disagree with me, but I take it that simply supporting “a more

Enlightened view” of Christianity is to support a more false view of (original) Christianity,
and therefore, eventually leads to a further undermining of Christianity when more and

more people see the disparities between the traditional-biblical view of Christianity and the

latest, “modern”, “Enlightened” view of Christianity.

Working on and supporting the progress of geology, astronomy, biblical criticism, and so on,
along with Christian theology is like Peter working against Paul. I know that this is not how
men like Descartes and Leibniz saw it. But I think that we can conclude in this manner due
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to our vantage point – that is to say, in historical hindsight. For we know what the New

Philosophy and the Scientific Revolution will lead to – Nietzsche, Mendel, Darwin, Marx,
Freud, and to advances in biblical scholarship that completely undermine traditional or
orthodox Christianity .

I need to qualify my point above, for while Descartes and Leibniz tried to

incorporate and synthesize (or harmonize) the New Philosophy with some kind of orthodox
Christian theology, they both recognized that if they did not provide some metaphysical
arguments along with their Enlightened philosophies, an atheistic (that is to say, a
completely naturalistic) world view could easily ensue. Hence they both worked

energetically to provide philosophical bases to buttress their view of nature with God.

For example, Leibniz’s philosophy demands that mechanical philosophy requires

God. In 1668 or 1669 in his “Confessio naturae contra atheistas”, Leibniz writes that

“corporeal phenomena cannot be explained without an incorporeal principle, that is, God.”
Daniel Garber says that “Leibniz argues directly that not only is mechanistic philosophy

consistent with theology, but that mechanistic philosophy demands that there is a God.” 535

But the mechanical philosophy of some of the New Philosophers seems to lead to atheism.

As we stated and quoted above, Leibniz understood that there was something new going on

under the sun in his time. His 1668 or 1669 “Confessions of Nature Against Atheists,” states
the following:

535

Through the admirable improvement of mathematics and the approaches which
chemistry and anatomy have opened into the nature of things, it has become
apparent that mechanical explanations – reasons from the figure and motion of
bodies, as it were – can be given for most of the things which the ancients referred
only to the Creator or to some kind (I know not what) of incorporeal forms. The
result was that truly capable men for the first time began to try to save or to explain
natural phenomena, or those which appear in bodies, without assuming God or
taking him into their reasoning. Then, after their attempt had met with some little
success, though before they arrived at foundations and principles, they proclaimed,
as if rejoicing prematurely at their security, that they could find neither God nor the

Daniel Garber. Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 11.
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immortality of the soul by natural reason, but that in these matters faith must rest
either on civil laws or on historical records. 536

For Leibniz then, when we go deeper into the mechanical philosophy, and ask how

the principles thereof are possible, then we are forced to refer to metaphysical or

theological sources. Leibniz concludes then that “through the analysis of bodies, it becomes
clear that nature cannot dispense with the help of God”; moreover:

since we have demonstrated that bodies cannot have a determinate figure, quantity,
or motion, without assuming an incorporeal being, it readily becomes apparent that
this incorporeal being is the one [cause] for all [these phenomena] because of the
harmony of things among themselves, especially since bodies don’t derive their
motion each from its own but mutually. But no reason can be given why this
incorporeal being chooses one magnitude, figure, and motion rather than another,
unless he is intelligent and wise with regard to the beauty of things and powerful
with regard to their obedience to his command. Therefore such an incorporeal
being will be a mind ruling the whole, that is, God. 537

Leibniz would not completely jettison the scholastics’ roots in Aristotle. Leibniz is in

agreement with Aristotle’s Metaphysics when Aristotle says that it “would be inappropriate

to relegate so momentous an issue to automatism [mechanism] and chance.” 538 Leibniz also

seems to mimic Aristotle’s view of science, as the latter expresses it in the opening lines to
his Physics:

In any subject which has principles, causes, and elements, scientific knowledge and
understanding stems from a grasp of these, for we think we know a thing only when
we have grasped it first causes and principles and have traced it back to its
elements. It obviously follows that if we are to gain scientific knowledge of nature
as well, we should begin by trying to decide about its principles. 539

Loemker, 109-111, op. cited, or Garber, op. cited, 11. This says a lot. It says, first, that there are
people (so-called ‘atheists’ and real atheists) who are arguing that God is no longer needed to explain
nature or natural phenomena; that nature functions by mechanical laws and hath no need for further,
transcendent posits – which reminds one of the story of Laplace’s reply to Napoleon’s question,
“Where is God in all this astronomy?” To which Laplace is said to have answered: “Sire, we no longer
have need of that hypothesis.”
The New Philosophy, the new science, of Galileo, Descartes, Gassendi, and so on, seemed to show
that God was no longer needed to explain the world, that explanations without the use of scripture or
theology not only can be used, but, are also actually even more serviceable. This, needless to say,
represented science’s great challenge of Christianity in the seventeenth century.
537 Garber, op. cited, 12.
538 Aristotle. Aristotle Metaphysics, translated by Richard Hope (Michigan: University of Michigan
Press, 1952), Book Alpha, 12.
539 Aristotle. Physics, translated by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 9.
536
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Knowing Leibniz’s view of these things then, it should come as no surprise that

Leibniz would attack philosophies that denied the first principles he believed were

necessary for a true understanding of nature and for the preservation of the true religion.

In this sense then, Leibniz’s harsh words about Descartes and Descartes’ God often remind
me of Pascal harsh words about Descartes and Descartes’ God. Pascal railed:

I cannot forgive Descartes. In all his philosophy he would have been quite willing to
dispense with God. But he could not help granting him a flick of the forefinger to
start the world in motion; beyond this he has no further need of God” 540

Descartes proves the existence of God and the distinctness of the soul from the body,

and then shows how God orders everything. But, says Leibniz,

it is unreasonable to introduce a supreme intelligence as orderer of things and then,
instead of using his wisdom, uses only the properties of matter to explain the
phenomenon. This is as if, in order to account for the conquest of an important
place by a great prince, a historian were to claim that it occurred because the small
particles of gun powder, set off by the contact of a spark, escaped with sufficient
speed to push a hard and heavy body against the walls of the place, while the little
particles that make up the brass of the cannon were so firmly interlaced that this
speed did not separate them, instead of showing how the foresight of the conqueror
enabled him to choose the suitable means and times and how his power overcame
all obstacles. 541
Indeed, what Leibniz says here seems to hit the mark. But if Descartes read this, I

imagine that he would respond in something like the following way: ‘Through the light of
natural philosophical reasoning I established the existence of God and the distinctness of

the soul. This is as much as can be proven by natural philosophy. Ultimately, I don’t deny
final causes. In fact I believe in them just as much as you do. The difference between us

evidently has to do with the fact that I think that the only way to truly explain final causes is
by referring to special revelation or theology. I can do this, too; but it has been my aim, as I

wrote to the Theological Faculty of the Sorbonne, to follow the urging of the Council of Trent
Quoted by Peter A. Schouls in his essay “Arnauld and the Modern Mind” in Kremer’s Interpreting
Arnauld (Toronto: University or Toronto Press, 1996), 43.
541 G. W. Leibniz. Philosophical Essays, Ariew/Garber, op. cited, 53.
540
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to confute the atheists and heretics, and to defend the faith as a philosopher and not as a
theologian. As I mentioned in that letter of dedication, if I were to refer to special

revelation, as it seem to me that at bottom you do, unbelievers will take me to be begging

the question at issue. That is why I don’t. I separate theology from philosophy for the glory
of God and not as you have accused me of doing as a ‘clever pretext’. 542
Concluding remarks
To my thinking Leibniz was not a precursor to the Radical Enlightenment primarily

in those respects in which he was not only a Christian, but also a zealous promoter of

Christianity. However, like Descartes’ work, some of Leibniz’s philosophical and scientific

work unbeknownst to him, did strengthen the forces of the Enlightenment. I therefore see
Leibniz as I see Descartes, namely, as a moderate or somewhat “liberal” Christian whose

compromise with rationalism strengthened the Enlightenment movement move away from
tradition, orthodoxy, and, eventually, Christianity.

After mulling over Descartes’ and Leibniz’s works (and a lot of scholarly books on

their works, including books on the question of their sincerity as Christians) on questions
like this for many months, I conclude that in general one can take Descartes at his word;

that is, that he genuinely held to the positions that he says he held and for the reasons he
says. However, I agree with Leibniz in that he recognized that if enough people followed

Descartes’ way of philosophizing, and if enough people accepted his philosophical-scientific

non-teleological view of the world, that it could lead people away from the Judaeo-Christian

God. The Radical Enlightenment is a proof that he was right.

542

Ibid. 242.
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PART V

SPINOZA: APOSTATE, ANTICHRIST 543, RADICAL ENLIGHTENER

Chapter Eleven
Historical Context of the “Antichrist”
“Who is the liar? It is the man who denies that Jesus is the Christ. Such a man is the antichrist – he
denies the Father and the Son. No one who denies the Son has the Father, whoever acknowledges the
Son has the Father also…. I am writing these things to you about those who are trying to lead you
astray… Dear friends, do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits to see whether they are from God,
because many false prophets have gone out into the world. This is how you can recognize the Spirit of
God: Every spirit that acknowledges that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is from God, but every spirit
that does not acknowledge Jesus is not from God. This is the spirit of the antichrist” – St. John, “the
beloved disciple” (1 Jn. 2-4) 544

My title is somewhat reminiscent of Walter Kaufman’s study of Friedrich Nietzsche which he
entitled Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. Substituting Nietzsche for Spinoza, this would
also be an apt title for this chapter. Spinoza was an apostate to both his Jewish and Christian critics.
Christians often referred to him as “the apostate Jew.” But, even more seriously, his Christian critics
also saw him as the “antichrist.” They didn’t literally mean that they thought that Spinoza was the
antichrist, that is, the New Testament end times antichrist or “beast” modeled on various passages
from the Jewish Bible and then developed into a full-blown eschatology in the New Testament.
According to various theologians and Bible scholars, New Testament passages such as 2
Thessalonians 2:7-8 and chapters from the book of Revelation (such as 13, 17, 19) tell the story that
“the” antichrist is Satan’s incarnation in the world to “lead the whole world astray.” He will produce
wondrous miracles in full view of all the eyes of mankind. And many will be deceived by him. And
then the end will come. The “antichrist” that Spinoza’s accusers meant when they used the term is
what it means in Koine Greek, that is, against, opposite of, in place of, Christ or Messiah. Thus, in its
wider sense, “antichrist” is anyone who does not accept the incarnation of God as the man Jesus (this
is how the epistles of John put it. See epigraph of chapter above). One last important point on this
subject: Spinoza was a Jew, and Jews don’t believe in Jesus Christ. They reject the Christian Christ. In
this sense, according to the Christian perspective, Spinoza and all Jews are anti-Christ or antiChristian. But for Spinoza the epithet “antichrist” carries far more seriousness to his accusers
because his works attack all the central presuppositions of Holy Scripture and biblical theology. To
undermine the Jewish scriptures is to also undermine Christ and Christianity because Christ and
Christianity are absolutely and irrevocably dependent on Moses and the prophets. In this sense,
Spinoza is antichristian. But to the Jew he is an apostate. For the meaning of “apostate” and
“apostasy”, see next chapter under “Apostasy.”
544 Spinoza was a master of the Jewish scriptures; not so with the New Testament however, at least in
my opinion. In his in-depth analysis of the Torah and the prophets in his Theological-Political
Treatise (TTP), he demonstrates that the traditional-orthodox interpretations of authorship and
dating of most of the books of the Bible are erroneous. But when he gets to the New Testament, indepth analysis falls off. Had he subjected the books of the New Testament with the same detailed
study and vast erudition as he did the Jewish Bible, he may have discovered that the epistle of John,
like the Pentateuch, was not written by the authors traditionalists have claimed (more on this later in
543
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“Lastly, to open my mind [to you] more clearly …, I say, that it is not entirely necessary to salvation to
know Christ according to the flesh… For the rest, as to the doctrine which certain Churches add to these,
namely that God assumed human nature, I expressly warned them that I do not understand what they
say. Indeed, to confess the truth, they seem to me to speak no less absurdly than if some one were to tell
me that a circle assumed the nature of a square” – Benedict Spinoza 545

Introduction: historical background and context of “the antichrist”
We finally arrive at the finale of our study. We are come now to “the antichrist”, “the devil”,
“Beelzebub”, “the great apostate.” These are only some of the ferocious theological

denunciations conservative Jews and Christians (or the Counter-Enlightenment) used to
demonize Benedict Spinoza. Here the Radical Enlightenment and the Counter-

Enlightenment meet head on. 546 But before we proceed, a few words are in order about

what this chapter will focus on and then a quick recapitulation over the ground we have

covered to provide background to put our philosopher, and the Radical Enlightenment he
helped to spawn, in context.

Our focus: There are many aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy. This chapter does not

aim to give an exhaustive analysis of his epistemology, philosophy of government,

this chapter). While conservatives maintain the ancient tradition that John the Apostle was the
author of 1 John, many contemporary scholars argue that he was not the author of any of the epistles,
or the Gospel of John, or the Book of Revelation. For background and arguments on this subject, see
for example Stephen Harris’s Understanding the Bible (Palo Alto: Mayfield, 1985), 355.
545 The Correspondence of Spinoza, translated by A. Wolf. New York: Russell & Russell, 1966, p. 344,
Spinoza 1675 letter to Henry Oldenburg. Oldenburg was a German theologian, diplomat, secretary of
the Royal Society, and aspiring natural philosopher.
546 Yovel states that despite the fact that “his role is not always fully recognized”, Spinoza’s
“philosophical revolution anticipated major trends in European modernization, including
secularization, biblical criticism, the rise of natural science, the Enlightenment, and the liberaldemocratic state. Above all, he put forward a radically new philosophical principle that I call the
philosophy of immanence. It views this-worldly existence as all there is, as the only actual being and
the sole source of ethical value. God himself is identical with the totality of nature, and God’s decrees
are written not in the Bible but in the laws of nature and reason” (Spinoza and Other Heretics: The
Marrano of Reason, 1989), ix.
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philosophy of mind, or metaphysics. In keeping with the focus and aim of this dissertation,
we continue our investigation about some aspects of what some have seen as a warfare
between philosophy (or reason) and faith in revelation. We will therefore give special

attention to major aspects in Spinoza’s writings (especially his TTP and Ethics) that reveal

his attitude and arguments against revelation, prophecy, miracles, spiritual enlightenment,
the scriptures, Moses, the prophets, Jesus, the apostles – that is, against Judaism and

Christianity. 547 And indeed, this is not something out of the way or of minor or merely

scholarly interest. Nor is it out of keeping with what his contemporaries (as opposed to

later generations) were most exercised by. 548 On the contrary, questions about God, the

scriptures, and theology inform, either explicitly or implicitly, much of his work. This is
simply a fact.

There are multitudes of studies about Spinoza on most things under the sun - his

metaphysics, his work on Descartes, and so on and so on. But, strangely, there is no

exhaustive work (that I have found) that offers a full commentary on how many of Spinoza’s
philosophical doctrines are anti-theological; nor is there any full commentary on Spinoza’s
biblical exegesis. We will be studying his philosophy of religion, which is not only just as

547 In the Preface to his Theological-Political Treatise, the Appendix of Part I of his Ethics, and in many
of his letters, Spinoza not only delineates his philosophy of religion toward Judaism and Christianity,
but actually formulates a full blown general theory of the origin and development of religion.
Spinoza argues that “Numerous examples of [his theory that fear and hope are the springs of all
religion] can be cited, illustrating quite clearly the fact that only while fear persists do men fall prey
to superstition, that all the objects of spurious reverence have been no more than phantoms, the
delusions springing from despondency and timidity…. This being the origin of superstition … like all
other instances of hallucination and frenzy, is bound to assume very varied and unstable forms, and
that, finally, it is sustained by only by hope, hatred, anger, and deceit. For it arises not from reason
but from emotion …” (TTP, Shirley trans., 1-2).
548 I’m reminded of Professor Ariew’s chapter “The Cogito in the Seventeenth Century” (see his
upcoming new edition of Descartes and the Last Scholastics). He tells us in the introduction to this
chapter that “My contribution to this mass of commentary [on the cogito] takes the form of an
investigation of its intellectual context and the criticisms it received by seventeenth-century
philosophers. I do so in part for what these can tell us about the seventeenth-century philosophers
and in part for what they can reveal about Descartes and the cogito itself” (356). I try my hand at this
in putting Spinoza’s work in its intellectual and religious context and what most of the criticisms he
received were about. See also Wiep van Bunge’s essay “On the Early Dutch Reception of the
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus” and Stephen Nadler’s “A Book Forged in Hell.”
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legitimate as his philosophy of physics, philosophy of mind, etc. but, in the case of Spinoza,

of similar if not greater importance. Indeed, as we hope to show in a later section, even his
purportedly “purest” philosophical work, the Ethics, is in many of its parts largely taken up

with arguments that upon analysis shows that biblical theology is ultimately one of his foils.
I take it that many of the central philosophical positions in the history of western

philosophy in Christendom (the concept of God as transcendent to the world, God as

creator, the notion of some kind of dualism of soul and body, of empirical and spiritual

causation, belief in final causes, and so on) are primarily or largely kept alive and inspired

by Christian theology. While Galileo argues that we must accommodate our interpretation
of scripture to fit with scientific truth (see the Grand Duchess Christina for this), while

Descartes argues in part “For the urgency of the cause, as well as the glory of God to which

all this is referred” (see his Letter of Dedication to the Meditations), while Pascal argues for
the truth of the Christian scriptures and salvation in Jesus Christ based on the messianic

prophecies that have been fulfilled (see his Pensées), Spinoza’s cause, arguments, and proofs
are against all these. 549 This is not to deny that his philosophical works don’t speak to

specific philosophical issues such as the doctrine of substance, which have a heritage from

Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle. Or that he does not take Descartes and his

philosophy on as a philosopher. On the contrary. The point I’m trying to make here is that
Spinoza also often addresses Jewish and Christian theological concerns that are often the
subtext of some of these philosophical arguments.

If we could speak psychologically (which is admittedly abused and speculative), how could
Spinoza not deal extensively with biblical theological issues, for he suffered so much from it most of
his life. He could not have been unaffected by being despised and rejected by his own, by his horrible
excommunication, by the labors of the Jewish rabbis to persuade the leadership of Amsterdam to get
rid of him, by the rejection of his whole family, friends, teachers, and community. And then there are
the constant accusations in letters to him (and about him) by so many people, the persecution of
friends, the imprisonment of friends, and even the memory of the stories of the Inquisition in Spain
and Portugal that caused so much grief. All these things, and the intensely religious time in which he
lived, all make it natural that these issue would percolate in his writings.
549
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I also treat something here which I have not found written about in all the major

books and papers on Spinoza that I have read beyond vague generalities. I have two things
in mind here: one, I will show how Spinoza’s views directly contradict various central and
specific scripture passages and orthodox theological teachings by citing specific central

scripture passages and theological teachings that he contradicts; and two, I will provide
some justificatory information from the biblical Counter-Enlightenment’s side of things

(though I think that much more of both these need to be done in early modern works in

order to better understand Spinoza and his world). We only read of general statements
such as that the Jewish community or the Calvinists or the Roman Catholics, etc. were

hostile against Spinoza, that they called his works “blasphemous”, and so forth. But we
don’t often read the specifics or their full arguments, as we do for the “good guys”, the

Enlightenment guys. There are long treatises on the nuances of Descartes’ Meditations, of

Locke’s Two Treatises on Government, and so on. These scholars rightly go out of their way
to situate their authors and explicate the details of their arguments as sympathetically and

contextually as possible to help their readers to appreciate where their subjects are coming
from. But we rarely get the same treatment for the suspected enemies of the

Enlightenment. Of course, most of us know on a vague, general basis that religion and the
Bible say some things that might be interpreted by believers to make them hostile to the

likes of figures such as Spinoza; but beyond this, in any clear and specific detail, nothing. In
this part of my dissertation, I wish to make clearer wherein Spinoza was “blasphemous”,
“impious”, “the antichrist”, and so on by citing the biblical and theological texts that his
enemies based their arguments on in order to, once again, press the point of how the
struggle for the fate of the biblical God was preeminent in this early phase of the
Enlightenment.

259

Background and context: Now that we’ve seen the spiritual Enlightenment’s

viewpoint from the perspectives of Greek religion, Judaism, and Christianity in the early

chapters of this study, and now that we’ve seen what moderate Enlighteners like Descartes

and Leibniz say about theology, what says the Radical Enlightenment to their claims? What
saith Spinoza to Descartes, to Leibniz, the Torah and to the New Testament, and indeed to

all claims of revelation, inspiration, miracles, prophecy, theological ethics, dreams, visions,
and so on? That is what this part of the dissertation will show.

In an early section of this study we showed how the term “Enlightenment” was

originally and historically defined by religious writers as “God acting in and shedding light

and knowledge in an individual’s soul.” We saw that by the time of Kant’s “An Answer to the
Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” this term was “hijacked” or utilized by many to argue
for either a more sophisticated version of God and the things of God (the moderate

enlighteners), the total repudiation of the old God and all theological superstition (the
radical enlighteners), or the preservation of orthodoxy come what may (the counter

enlighteners). “Enlightenment” then has essentially fallen into three very different camps:

one relies on reason and science completely, another on revelation from God completely,
and the other on revelation plus reason and science. 550

Professors Roger Ariew, Theo Verbeek, and Wiep Van Bunge have expressed skepticism about this
neat tripartite division, and rightfully so. As usual, real history is a lot messier than what cut-anddried categories can encompass. For instance, there are some philosophers and theologians in each
of these camps that embrace some significant teachings of one of the other camps. What to do with
this mixing or blurring of the lines? The categories that historians often use towards their subjects
are, like the common use of general terms, set up for ease and simplification of communication. But
in the process nuances and important details are often missed. Israel is aware of this issue and does
make some qualifications on this model as he goes. He alludes to some of these problems in
historiographical type-casting, for instance, in the Preface and Introduction of Radical Enlightenment.
But he deals more explicitly and fully with some of these issues in his second volume on the
Enlightenment, Enlightenment Contested (see chapter 2 “Historians and the Writing of ‘Intellectual
History” and the “Postscript.”) More than this, he also provides details on the differing positions of
many philosophers in the course of his works, which provide the nuances as one goes (at least this
has been my experience reading and reflecting on his works). This summary presentation of Israel’s
views cannot not do justice to all the nuances and qualifications he makes during the course of his
works and in the context of many of his claims.

550
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We began our history of the precursors to the Radical Enlightenment with the

ancient Greeks by citing passages from Hesiod and Homer (that is, their Bible) and how

some philosophers rose up that questioned this Bible with its many claims of revelation,

inspiration, prophecy, divine providence, augury and so on. After that we showed how this

struggle between the claims of reason and revelation (and vice versa) continued among the
Jews from Hellenic times into the New Testament and Christian era up to St. Augustine.

From Augustine we summarily went through a thousand years of the medieval period and
the scholastics to the Renaissance, the Scientific Revolution, and Galileo. We then entered
the early modern period of Descartes, Leibniz, and other luminaries. As we noted in our
chapter on defining the Enlightenment, several precursor elements of the Radical

Enlightenment were necessary. One chief component was, without a doubt, that “triumph
of the mechanical philosophy” wrought by the Scientific Revolution. When John Donne
famously wrote “And new philosophy calls all in doubt”, he did “not allude to the latest
innovation in logic, metaphysics, or epistemology, but to the Copernican upheavals in
astronomy and cosmology and to the Renaissance revivals of ancient atomism.” 551

“Philosophy” at the time had a much wider application than it does now. At any rate, the
Scientific Revolution was making itself felt throughout European civilization.

Yet is was unquestionably the rise of powerful new philosophic systems, rooted in
the scientific advances of the early seventeenth century and especially the
mechanistic views of Galileo, which chiefly generated that vast Kulturekampf
[culture war] between traditional, theologically sanctioned ideas about Man, God,
and the universe and secular, mechanistic conceptions which stood independently
of any theological sanction. 552

In this revolution we noted that Descartes played a considerable role, both in

science and in philosophy. But there was another absolutely necessary factor in the

development of the Radical Enlightenment, one which (as we referred to in our Descartes

Roger Ariew and Allan Gabbey. “The Scholastic Background” in The Cambridge History of
Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 429.
552 Jonathan Israel. The Radical Enlightenment, 14.
551
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chapter) Descartes and his followers had no small part - one arguably just as momentous as

the Scientific Revolution, and that was the revolution in the study and interpretation of the
Bible. It is here that philosophers such as Hobbes and Spinoza hold a preeminent place
(though their work too had precursors and contemporaries as major influences). 553

The Early Enlightenment revolution in biblical criticism from moderate Cartesian to radical
Spinozist according to Richard Popkin
“one of the major factors, if not the major one, in the development of modern irreligion
[i.e. Radical Enlightenment], was the application of the Cartesian methodology, and the
Cartesian standard of true philosophical and scientific knowledge, to the evaluation of
religious knowledge. When this was done by certain bold seventeenth-century thinkers, a
world shorn of the biblical deity was revealed” – Richard Popkin 554

The history of the development of biblical criticism in the 17th century is still being worked

out. At present there is no all-inclusive account of the subject. Differences of opinion on

who influenced who, who was more influential, and so on, are pervasive in the literature.

And, with the growth of history of philosophy in the last few decades, more biblical critical
writers are being discovered in this period than have hitherto been known or given credit
to. My treatment on this subject here is meant only to provide some background and

context in order to concentrate on the work of Spinoza. Consequently, this short discussion
Unfortunately, because the focus of our study is on Spinoza, we will not be able to delineate all the
respects in which Hobbes was a powerful precursor to the Radical Enlightenment. The reader should
know therefore that Hobbes’s philosophy and his exquisite humanist biblical criticism is underreported in this study. The author is currently at work on a fuller treatment of several facets of
Hobbes’s philosophical and biblical critical radical enlightenment work, but the results of this
research will not be completed until sometime after the current project is finished.
554 Richard Popkin’s “Cartesianism and Biblical Criticism” from Problems of Cartesianism, edited by
Thomas M. Lennon, John M. Nicholas, John W. Davis (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
1982), 61.
553
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will be cursory with an emphasis on the contributions that Cartesianism made to the
development of a more neutral, scientific, and secular study of the Bible.

As was mentioned in our chapter on Descartes, the Cartesians played no small part

in the development of the revolution in biblical criticism. Jonathan Israel notes that “the
rise of Cartesianism and the New Philosophy also meant that a new philosophically and
scientifically grounded criticism was being nurtured, a critique using the techniques of

philology but now chiefly concerned with the impartial, systematic study of the arguments

and belief structures revealed by ancient texts rather than testimony, dogmatic formulation,
rhetorical exercises, usage, and stylistic matters for their own sake” (more on Israel’s
interpretation of this subject below). 555

Several Enlightenment historians besides Jonathan Israel have referred to this

textual critical revolution. Take the work of historian of philosophy Richard Popkin, for
instance. He argues that

Two of the major intellectual developments of the seventeenth century were (1) the
launching of ‘the new philosophy’ … [with Descartes playing a major role], and (2)
the unfolding of the theological consequences of a historical and critical approach to
the Bible. Modern philosophy issuing from Cartesianism and modern irreligion
issuing from Bible criticism became two of the central ingredients in the making of
the modern mind, the ‘enlightened’ scientific and rational outlook. 556

Popkin notes that “These two movements, though developing at the same time and often

through the activities of the same persons, have rarely been studied as parts of a common
intellectual drama” (Ibid). The raison d’etre of this dissertation has been to address this

deficit in the literature, especially with regard to the works of the major philosophers of the
Enlightenment Contested 420-421.
“Cartesianism and Biblical Criticism” in Problems of Cartesianism, edited by Thomas M. Lennon,
John M. Nicholas, John W. Davis (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1982), 61. It must me
noted though that neither Descartes nor many or most of his followers were “atheists” or antiChristians. On the contrary, they thought that Cartesian principles set Christianity on better
foundations than Aristotle or Scholasticism. The devout Jansenist theologian and philosopher
Antoine Arnauld is an excellent example of this.
555
556
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period. The centrality of the Bible in the minds of the 17th century philosophers has not

been recognized or emphasized enough. And it needs to be, for as Popkin stresses it:

one of the major factors, if not the major one, in the development of modern
irreligion [read Radical Enlightenment], was the application of the Cartesian
methodology, and the Cartesian standard of true philosophical and scientific
knowledge, to the evaluation of religious knowledge. When this was done by certain
bold seventeenth-century thinkers, a world shorn of the biblical deity was
revealed. 557

This rational “evaluation of religious knowledge” and how this eventually led to “a

world shorn of the biblical deity” is the central focus of this chapter. Popkin’s research
results on this history are fully in accord with Jonathan Israel’s on this point.

Bible criticism, emerging from humanistic studies and Reformation and CounterReformation polemics … kept within an acceptable religious framework, at least
until the mid-seventeenth century. Those who were trying to establish a more
accurate text of Scripture and a more precise understanding of its meanings through
the utilization of historical and critical tools were, as far we know, trying to explicate
their own versions of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Prior to Spinoza (or maybe Uriel
da Costa and Juan de Prado just before him) we do not know of any Bible critics who
were denying that Scripture presents the fundamental message for mankind. The
Bible scholars had vehement disagreements, and very often denounced their
opponents as heterodox, as atheists, and the like. But, just the same, I think it can be
maintained that prior to about 1650 nobody was denying that Scripture contained
some special, revealed knowledge about the supernatural dimension of the world,
and that this knowledge was essential for comprehending the origin, nature, and
destiny of mankind. The interpretations of the nature and content of this
knowledge, of course, cover an enormous number of positions, many of which are
fundamentally incompatible with one another.
Out of the welter of theological views, a way of discerning the biblical
message began to become structured, namely, the historical and critical approach.
Its leading figure before Spinoza, from the Catholic Erasmus to the Calvinist Jacques
Cappel, pressed the importance of philological and historical information in order to
comprehend and interpret Scripture. 558

I skip over much of Popkin’s history of the rise of modern biblical scholarship dealing with
such figures as La Peyere, John Toland, Pierre Jurieu, Pierre Bayle, and others to focus on

the major philosophical stream that influenced Spinoza. Popkin states that Spinoza read La

Peyere’s views and that he wrote a long defense of them (which disappeared) shortly before
557
558

Ibid.
Ibid. 63-64.
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his excommunication. He also makes it clear that Spinoza carefully studied Descartes and

Cartesianism, and the result of this intensive study was not only Spinoza’s Principles of
Descartes’ Philosophy (1666), but much more.

Modern Bible criticism, as outlined by Spinoza, got much of its force and perspective
from his use of Cartesian methods and standards and from his extension of
Cartesian rationalism to evaluating the biblical framework of interpreting man and
his place in the universe. Spinoza’s application of these Cartesian elements to Bible
studies led him to remove Scripture from the intellectual world … The revolutionary
implications of Spinoza’s biblical criticism were immediately apparent… When
applied to biblical statements, many of them turn out to be impossible as claims of
what God is like. These statements, then, were analyzed by Spinoza in terms of how
their occurrence can be accounted for, since they cannot be true on philosophical
(i.e. Cartesian) standard. 559

This brief account summarizes Popkin’s research results. Our next section will cover some

of this same territory, only this time from the latest investigations in this area from

Jonathan Israel’s work. Israel’s mammoth studies both confirm and add to Popkin’s
account.

Jonathan Israel on the role the interpretation of the scriptures played in the Early
Enlightenment and how the views of Spinoza (and Hobbes) on biblical exegesis contributed
to the Radical Enlightenment
Israel’s interpretation of the place of the Scriptures in the Radical Enlightenment
We must remember that we’re not in Kansas anymore. We’re no longer in 21st century
semi-secular Europe. We’re in a century that in some respects is more like what is still

occurring in certain backwaters of Pakistan and Afghanistan. We’re in the seventeenth

century, a time in which some people are still being burned alive at the stake if they hold to
559

Ibid. 67.
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unorthodox religious beliefs. For instance, the same year in which Spinoza’s TheologicalPolitical Treatise was published (1670) a man was burnt at the stake for his heterodox

theology. 560 This is still a century in which witches (ex. Salem 1692) and others are still

being tried and hanged, and in which many can still not publically say anything too strongly

against the reigning religion of one’s country. 561

As almost everyone knows, even if only vaguely and on a superficial level, the

scriptures arguably played the most important cultural role in European civilization. The
scriptures have been considered the very Word of God, that is, God’s Book. Hence it has

been the foundation and cornerstone of our society for over 1700 years - and still is in many

people’s personal lives. The Bible has informed and guided western notions of right and

wrong, of reward and punishment, of truth and error, of freedom and censorship, of sin and
righteousness, of heaven and hell, and the list goes on and on.

So, since the Bible has been so central to the very essence and being of our culture, if

a philosopher were to discover errors in it, or some falsehood, and, moreover, learn that the
interpretation his world has given to it for the last 1700 years has been utterly wrong, well,
such a discovery would throw such a culture into confusion and hand-wringing. 562 And, as

See Yirmiyahu Yovel’s Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Marrano of Reason (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1989) for an excellent historical, social, and religious context to the world of
Spinoza, including details on Inquisitions, excommunications, and religious executions of the period.
561 And these persecutions were not only occurring in the provinces or hinterlands outside the great
cities of Europe. See Steven Nadler’s chapter “Rasphuis” in his upcoming (Spring 2011) “A Book
Forged in Hell”: Spinoza’s Scandalous Treatise on the awful ordeal Spinoza’s friend Adriaan Koerbagh
suffered in Europe’s “freest and most liberal” of city and country, Amsterdam and the Netherlands.
Such facts must be known in order to get a better feel of the great danger and fear there was for
heterodox thinkers. “Spinoza was deeply touched by Koerbagh’s death” (61). I think Nadler is wellaware of this background too because he uses as the epigraph of his book the following excerpt from
Spinoza (that seems to reflect such outrages as happened to his friend): “The vilest hypocrites, urged
on by that same fury which they call zeal for God’s law, have everywhere prosecuted men whose
blameless character and distinguished qualities have excited the hostility of the masses, publically
denouncing their beliefs and inflaming the savage crowd’s anger against them. And this shameless
license, sheltering under the name of religion, is not easy to suppress.”
562 Indeed, Jonathan Israel’s works, especially his Radical Enlightenment makes it a point to quote
people from every walk of life and in most countries throughout Europe (and in his 2010 book A
Revolution of the Mind from America) of the vertigo and horror that most people suffered from the
560
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it turns out, that is exactly what did happen. This “Crisis of the European Mind”, as historian
Paul Hazard calls it (or the “death of God”, as thinkers such as Nietzsche and others referred
to it), shook the world like an earthquake during the Radical Enlightenment. 563 As was

shown in chapter one of this study, most of this took place in a short amount of time, from
1650 to 1750, and its chief spokesman according to Israel was the philosopher Baruch
Spinoza. 564

Thanks to the new historical and philological investigations of incredibly

courageous thinkers 565 (which culminated in such 17th century thinkers as Spinoza and

Hobbes) God Himself is now put in question. And this means everything that belief in this

God represented is now put in doubt – history (from “Adam and Eve”), the races of mankind

challenges and threats to the faith which grew more and more severe towards the end of the
seventeenth century. Many have written on the subject of losing one’s faith, both from the socialhistorical and personal or psychological points of view. See for instance Mircea Eliade’s The Sacred
and Profane (for the affect it has on cultures) or Friedrich Nietzsche’s famous madman aphorism
(which I take to be largely an expression of his own personal horror upon realizing that “God is
dead”) for the affect it has on personal lives.
563 Rad. Enl. 14-22.
564 Israel’s case for Spinoza as the Radical Enlightenment’s principal apostle (over Hobbes, as well)
will be developed below. This, by the way, is one of Israel’s greatest claims to fame (at least
according to some students of the Enlightenment). He almost single-handedly demonstrated that
Spinoza was one of the key players who helped fuel the Radical Enlightenment’s rejection of biblical
religion and the many central theological and philosophical dogmas that biblical religion entails.
Before Israel’s great Radical Enlightenment, many did not see Spinoza’s place in history as that
influential. The most comprehensive treatment of this claim is made in his Radical Enlightenment,
especially chapter 8. However, in this last decade some Spinoza and Enlightenment scholars such as
Theo Verbeek and Wiep van Bunge have taken Israel to task on some claims such as Israel’s
definition of “Spinozism”, its purported pervasiveness, and his supposed liberal democratic views.
See for instance, Theo Verbeek (2007) 'Spinoza on Natural Rights', Intellectual History Review, 17: 3,
257 — 275 and Bunge’s From Stevin to Spinoza: An Essay on Philosophy in the Seventeenth-Century
Dutch Republic, Brill, 2001, especially chapter 5. According to personal correspondence to me from
Jonathan Israel, he will most probably answer some of these criticisms in his next work on the
Radical Enlightenment which is slated to be published in the summer of 2011. Verbeek, however,
also has made it clear (in personal correspondence) that Israel’s interpretation of Spinoza as one of
the chief philosophers whose work undermined western religious orthodoxy is sound.
565 See also, for instance, “Isaac La Peyrere and the Beginning of Religious Scepticism” in Richard
Popkin’s great The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza for a more detailed account of the
history of biblical criticism to Spinoza. Popkin (and Israel) credits La Peyrere “with starting modern
critical (and sceptical) Bible scholarship” (214-5). Popkin argues that “La Peyrere’s influence was
very great” (225), and that “Of La Peyrere’s contemporaries, the one whom he seems to have
influenced the most is Spinoza” (227). We know that Spinoza had a copy of La Peyrere’s work and
even used some of it in his Tractatus. “There he used material from La Peyrere to make out his
challenge to the Bible” (228).
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(“split up from the Tower of Babel”), demon possession, witches (“suffer not a witch to

live”), salvation, ultimate purpose, divine providence, man’s future hope, and so much more.
The ramifications of the Radical Enlightenment’s investigations into scripture and theology

were culture-changing from top to bottom, from government to education, from philosophy

to theology, from the churches to the taverns. 566 Indeed, what was initiated then has still

not really been fathomed by our world. 567

To get to the Radical Enlightenment and Spinoza though, some ground clearing was

needed. We briefly treated some of this from Richard Popkin’s 1980s research results in the
section above; but we will now go over some of this territory again from Israel’s latest

research results to both confirm and then add to Popkin’s work. As the previous section set
forth, this “ground clearing” was largely derived from Descartes, his followers the

Cartesians, and from the pioneering work of biblical critics such as Isaac La Peyrere. The
“New Philosophy” (as the new naturalistic, mechanistic view of philosophers such as

Descartes was called) gained fuel from such events as the Copernicus-Galileo controversy.

Israel writes that some groups, such as “the Calvinist orthodox were primarily concerned, in
this controversy, with upholding the authority of Scripture and the unity of truth, including
the Aristotelian conception of ‘substantial forms’, rather than assessing the astronomical

evidence as such.” 568 But the scientific view won out and thus caused many to wonder and
See Chapter One for Israel’s arguments for most of these claims.
As Nietzsche’s famous “God is dead” aphorism puts it: “This tremendous event is still on its way,
still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men” (aphorism #125 (p. 182), see also #108 (p.
167) in Walter Kaufmann’s The Gay Science).
568 The issue on how to interpret “the new mechanistic view” and the “Copernicus-Galileo
controversy” are actually very complicated. Some contemporary historians of philosophy and
science (and philosophy of science) have written much on both subjects. I don’t wish to take up these
issues here, but only to use Israel’s generalization that some people (in this case orthodox Calvinists)
interpreted the earth-is-in-motion and the sun-is-still business as a threat to the veracity of the God’s
Word. What Israel means by the “astronomical evidence” here I don’t know. Descartes and Leibniz,
for instance, didn’t think the “astronomical evidence” repudiated scriptural teaching. But then, like
Copernicus and Galileo, their method of interpreting scripture was also different in some important
respects from the more fundamentalistic orthodox Jewish, Christian, and Islamic interpreters. The
same goes for the question of “the new mechanistic view.” It wasn’t the end of the world for many
566
567
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to doubt how much of the Bible, tradition, and the Church could be relied on. Some began to
think that reason and philosophy may be a better interpreter of scriptures than faith and

spirituality. Perhaps now theology ought to defer to philosophy, instead of the other way
around. Worse, perhaps all the mysteries of the faith are not mysteries at all, but rather

falsehoods passed on and uncritically accepted generation after generation until finally this
generation - which will now subject everything to the test of criticism.

Israel points out in various places how many thought that the Cartesians wished to

subordinate Scripture “to a philosophy based on mechanistic principles, deeming Scripture
to be adjusted to the ‘ignorant notions’ of the common people.” 569 Israel reports

testimonies such as the following: “Cartesianism ... plainly generates radical offshoots

which, as everyone sees, destroys faith, tradition, and morality.” We’re told that “in his
youth Spinoza steeped himself in Descartes” and that “Spinoza’s doctrine that God is
equivalent to the unalterable laws of nature derives directly from the mechanistic

categories introduced by Descartes. If Spinozism demolishes Christian faith, Cartesianism …
corrodes true belief by rendering incomprehensible the Church’s teaching on the Trinity,
the Incarnation, and the Eucharist as well as making it hard to conceive of angels.” 570

The road was thus prepared so that in the fullness of the Radical Enlightenment

certain thinkers critiqued the Bible without the presuppositions of faith and devotion. They
approached it partly using the hermeneutical or literary principles learned from the

humanists since the Renaissance (which we explicated earlier in this study) and partly from
the more objective, rationalistic, scientific spirit of the New Philosophy (which was

Christians such as Boyle and Newton, for instance. Nevertheless, the major point still stands: many
people, including many theologians, philosophers, and scientists interpreted the new findings as
contradicting sacred writ.
569 See for example, Rad. Enl. 36.
570 Rad. Enl. 27. Again, as has been pointed out previously and in our Descartes’ chapter, Descartes
and most or many Cartesians didn’t see things this way. On the contrary, they saw Descartes’ world
picture as not only superior to Aristotle and the Scholastics, but also best in accord with Christianity.
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becoming emancipated and independent of theology). Thus they approached the scholarly
study of even “the Word of God” as they would the study of Homer’s Odyssey or Virgil’s
Aeneid. In a word, their literary-historical methodology was secularistic; the

presuppositions that they worked with assumed the falsehood of the old beliefs of divine

revelation, inspiration, prophecy, and miracles even before engaging in the work of biblical
interpretation. 571

Jonathan Israel’s The Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity

has a lot to say about the role that the new radical demythologizing interpretation of

scripture played in the Radical Enlightenment. In fact, in a very large sense, that’s what the
whole book is about, for the Radical Enlightenment is the product of the undermining and
repudiation of the old faith in scripture.

Ibid. 53-54. Of this new methodology, even well-educated and “moderate” thinkers were aghast.
In his well-researched biography of Spinoza, John Colerus reports that that: “If [Spinoza’s TTP is]
true, good Lord! What respect could we have for the Scripture? How could we maintain that it is
divinely inspired? That it is a sure and firm prophecy; that the holy men, who are the authors of it,
spoke and wrote by God’s order, and by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit; that the same Scripture is
most certainly true, and that it gives a certain testimony of its truth to our consciences; and lastly,
that it is a judge, whose decisions ought to be the constant and unvariable rule of our thoughts, of our
faith, and of our lives… The Lord confound thee, Satan, and stop thy mouth!” The Life of Benedict De
Spinoza (London, 1706), 58-59. Colerus supports a learned author’s assessment of the TTP as a book
that “ought to be buried forever in an eternal oblivion” as “very judiciously said seeing that [that]
wicked book does altogether overthrow the Christian religion by depriving the sacred writings of the
authority on which it is solely grounded and established” (59-60). Colerus knew whereof he was
speaking.
571
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Brief discussion of Israel’s comparison of Spinoza and Hobbes in relation to the Radical
Enlightenment 572
“Spinoza, the most impious and most dangerous man of the century” -- Antoine Arnauld 573

As we stated earlier, Israel gives a great deal of credit for the Radical Enlightenment to
Spinoza, “the backbone of the Radical Enlightenment”, and to his views on scriptural

exegesis. Israel states that “No other part of Spinoza’s assault on authority, tradition, and

faith proved so generally disquieting as his Bible criticism.” Hobbes also did a great deal to

shake up the biblical critical enterprise. 574 But Hobbes may not have completely repudiated

miracles (or magic), which was one of the major planks on which the Radical Enlightenment

As was mentioned earlier, because the focus of this study is on Spinoza, we will not be able to also
delineate in any sufficient and deserved detail the enormous contributions to the Radical
Enlightenment that Hobbes’s philosophy and biblical criticism made. Nor will I here discuss at length
the relations between the two. There are many essays on this latter question. For the reader who
would like to pursue this issue further, see, to start with , “Hobbes and Spinoza” in Noel Malcom’s
Aspects of Hobbes.
573 Steven Nadler. Spinoza: A Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 336-7. Arnauld was
considered by many, such as Leibniz, to be one of Europe’s greatest theologians. He was also a
Cartesian and an eminent philosopher. Israel’s work and Nadler’s cite testimonies about the large,
dark, threatening shadow that Spinoza was casting over Christendom from people in the know like
Arnauld in France, England, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and much of Europe. It is evidence like
this that lends support to Israel’s thesis that Spinoza was among the foremost forces of not only the
Enlightenment, but, more importantly, of the Radical Enlightenment (see both Nadler’s biography of
Spinoza just cited and, even more, his upcoming “A Book Forged in Hell”, especially chapter 10, “The
Onslaught”). His role as one of the world’s great religion-destroyers, however, is not well-known
today. Far more people think of Copernicus and Galileo as threats to the faith and Holy Scripture
than Spinoza. Yet the Copernican Revolution only showed a few scriptures about the sun and the
earth to be in contradiction to the truth, not most of the books of the Bible as Spinoza did. For more
on the undeserved neglect of Spinoza –especially of his Theological-Political Treatise – see Edwin
Curley’s “Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece: Spinoza and the Science of Hermeneutics” (From
Spinoza: The Enduring Questions, ed. By Graeme Hunter, Toronto, 1994, and also Nadler’s “A Book
Forged in Hell” (op. cited), especially his Introduction and in Chapter 10, “The Onslaught.”
572

In Spinoza: Critical Assessments, Vol. 1 by Genevieve Lloyd, in the essay “How Much of Hobbes
Might Spinoza Have Read?” by William Sacksteder, Sacksteder notes something I have pointed out:
First, that both the TTP and Hobbes’s works are usually treated as mostly or primarily political
treatises: “Neither of the works mentioned is exclusively political, though we have tended to truncate
our reading of Hobbes to that limited field alone and to overlook” the biblical criticism. Like the TTP,
biblical exegesis in the Leviathan “occupies more pages by far than the directly political portions,
even though we studiously ignore the former today” (227).
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stood. According to Israel, “Between the rise of Christianity and the mid-eighteenth

century then, only Spinoza categorically denies the possibility of miracles.” 575

This is a debatable point. For example, some hold that Hobbes ultimately did deny

the possibility of miracles and magic. To make this case, they argue that the primary

hermeneutical principle to follow in interpreting philosophers such as Hobbes should be the

philosopher’s philosophy over what he may have said in letters or in public. Leibniz is also
believed to have rejected miracles based on this interpretive principle (See Gregory

Brown’s “Miracles in the Best of All Possible Worlds: Leibniz’s Dilemma and Leibniz’s

Razor,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 12 (1995), pp. 19–39). Professor Doug Jesseph

formulates a similar argument as Brown’s. In his “Hobbes’s Atheism”, Jesseph

acknowledges “that Hobbes never publically announced his disbelief in a deity” and that “he
filled many pages of his published works with seemingly sincere references to God, even to
the point of appearing to offer arguments for the existence of a supreme being.” Despite

Hobbes’s many professions of faith however, Jesseph argues that Hobbes was not sincere

and that in actuality “Hobbes was really a sly and ironic atheist who concealed his disbelief
behind a screen of disingenuous theological verbiage while constructing a philosophical
system that makes the concept of God [and by implication miracles, magic, and

demonology] inadmissible.” But the way to make this case (as Brown does for Leibniz) is
“constructed from principles central to Hobbes’s philosophy.” 576

Edwin Curley’s essay “’I Durst Not Write So Boldly’ or How to Read Hobbes’s

Theological-Political Treatise” does the same thing. For instance, Curley nicely sums up

many of the central planks in Hobbes’s philosophical platform and then logically infers from

575
576

Rad. Enl. 218.
Douglas Jesseph. “Hobbes’s Atheism” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXVI (2002), 140-141.
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these that Hobbes must have been an atheist. Curley lists the following which he takes from
Hobbes’s works:

God is corporeal. The universe is the aggregate of all bodies. Therefore, God is
identical either with the whole of the universe or with a part of it (an inference from
the first and second premises). To hold that God is identical with the whole
universe is equivalent to atheism, since it denies that the universe has a cause. If
God is identical with a part of the universe, he is finite, since no part of any whole
can be infinite. To hold that God is finite is equivalent to atheism, since God, by
definition, is infinite. Therefore, to affirm that God is identical either with the whole
of the universe or with a part of it is to embrace atheism. 577

Israel concedes that many in England believed that Hobbes was the more evil free

thinker, but, when considered in the context of the fuller Radical Enlightenment picture,
Spinoza is the more radical.

Admittedly, in Britain many (but by no means all) writers deemed Hobbes more
widely pervasive than Spinoza as a promoter of free thinking, irreligion, and
incredulity. But given Hobbes’ politics, and his attitude to ecclesiastical power and
censorship, as well as his being (by his own admission) philosophically less bold and
comprehensive, he simply was not, and could not have been, the source and
inspiration for a systematic redefinition of man, cosmology, politics, social
hierarchy, sexuality, and ethics in the radical sense Spinoza was. When placed in full
historical context, Spinoza evidently had no real rival even in England ... [in]
eliminating divine Providence and governance of the world, in other words, the
Naturalistic, materialistic, one-substance undercurrent culminating [later]in [France
and elsewhere with] La Mettrie and Diderot. 578

See this whole chapter in Israel’s Radical Enlightenment (chapter 8) for a fuller delineation

of Israel’s argument for Spinoza as the one person who no one else “remotely rivaled” as
“the chief challenger of the fundamentals of revealed religion, received ideas, tradition,
morality, and ... divinely constituted political authority.” 579

This is my semi-paraphrase of his list given on page 65 in Hobbes e Spinoza, ed. By Emilia
Giancotti, Naples: Bibliopolis, 1992. See also Curley’s later “Calvin and Hobbes, or, Hobbes as an
orthodox Christian” in the Journal of the History of Philosophy, 34 (1996): 257-271.
578 Rad. Enl. 159.
579 Ibid.
577
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Some see Israel’s championing of Spinoza as something that the messiness of history

can’t decide. Some also argue against Israel’s contention that Spinoza was the chief
challenger of religion over Hobbes, such as in an excellent round table conference

discussion on this subject that I attended in New York (which one can see and listen to

online at http://philoctetes.org/Past_Programs/Spinoza). Finally, and very importantly for
this discussion, if Hobbes was indeed an atheist (as Curly and Jesseph argue for) then
Israel’s interpretation and claims on Hobbes are erroneous and false.

A Swiss Calvinist theologian of the time noted that “Hobbes and La Peyrere may

have begun the process of eroding confidence in Scripture as divine Revelation in some

men’s minds, and questioning the Mosaic authorship of the Five Books, ‘but no-one struck at

the foundations of the entire Pentateuch more shamelessly than Spinoza’. His principles of
Bible hermeneutics seemed to threaten the very foundations of theology and religion and,
for that very reason, had to be powerfully confronted and refuted” (Ibid. 447).

The perception that Spinoza’s work more than anyone else’s was a threat to the very

foundations of European culture was not only expressed by professional theologians, but
also by some of the greatest philosophical minds of the time, such as Gottlieb Leibniz.

Leibniz more than anyone else, except maybe Bayle, understood the radical implications of
Spinoza’s work for mankind. 580 As Israel puts it in his chapter on Leibniz: “if Spinoza’s
arguments against Revelation and divine Providence stand, revealed religion cannot

Rad. Enl. 38. For Leibniz, God chose this world because it was the best of all possible worlds. Yet,
as Leibniz was to learn later on when he read Spinoza’s Ethics, not only does Spinoza get rid of the
Bible’s God, he gets rid of any notion of God having rationality or goodness. As Nadler’s puts it
“Spinoza’s God does not choose the best of all possible worlds. Spinoza’s God, in fact, does not choose
anything whatsoever…. The metaphysics of God in the Ethics, motivated as it is by an extreme
antianthropomorphism, rules out any depiction of God that involves Him considering alternative
possibilities, acting for purposes, making choices based on reasons, and outcomes” (The Best of All
Possible Worlds: A Story of Philosophers, God and Evil Worlds: A Story of Philosophers, God and Evil,
227. See all of Chapter 8 “The Specter of Spinoza” also for further details on some of the major
differences between Spinoza and Leibniz on God).
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underpin the social, moral, and political order.” 581 Leibniz thus tried to get competent Bible

scholars to refute Spinoza’s scriptural exegesis. 582 Leibniz also understood how serious this

business was because he too almost fell in this precipice: “I once strayed a little too far in
another direction, and began to incline to the Spinozists’ view.” 583 To many observers,

philosophers, and theologians, it was Spinoza more than any other who was turning the
world upside down. 584

Ibid. 507.
Ibid. 504.
583 Ibid. 506. Israel gets this from Leibniz’s New Essays on Human Understanding, #73. Note that
Leibniz uses the term “Spinozist” here. It is not clear if Leibniz means “Spinoza” here or “Spinozist”
as in “the thought of Spinoza that some follow.” Some don’t think that Leibniz means to refer to
followers of Spinoza. But it’s hard to say. Literally, Leibniz says “to the side of the Spinozists.” The
context of the Israel’s use of the quote strongly indicates that Leibniz meant Spinozists in the sense of
those in “Spinoza’s circle.” In his 2008 The Best of All Possible Worlds: A Story of Philosophers, God and
Evil, Stephen Nadler translates it as: “I went a little too far in another time and I began to lean to the
side of the Spinozists, who grant nothing but an infinite power of God” (p. 227, he footnotes the text
from Leibniz’s Samtliche Schriften und Briefe, VI.6.73). Nadler seems to take the position that more
than only Spinoza grants nothing but an infinite power of God. On the very important question of
“Spinozists” and “Spinozism” see Verbeek’s works. He raises several very important points about the
problem with citing “Spinozists.” They certainly were not a monolithic group. Many held differing
political and religious views from Spinoza. In one place in his Spinoza’s Theologico-political Treatise:
Exploring the Will of God, Verbeek questions whether many of his followers could actually have
understood the intricacies of Spinoza’s Ethics. Leibniz’s use of the term, whether it means only
Spinoza or the Spinoza “circle” or “school”, makes clear what he understood and feared about “the
Spinozist view”: and that was not only that this view “allows God infinite power only, not granting
him either perfection or wisdom”, but also the fact that it “dismisses the search for final causes and
explains everything through brute necessity.” And of course Leibniz would have no truck with that.
584 However, it should be noted that there is some disagreement on exactly who Leibniz thought
more audacious and intolerable between Spinoza and Hobbes. Some passages in Leibniz’s writings
lean toward Spinoza; some toward Hobbes. The following is a powerful example of the early Leibniz.
Writing to his former teacher Jakob Thomasius in 1670 (the year in which the TTP was published)
about his recent vehement denunciations of the TTP and its author, Leibniz congratulates him saying:
“You have dealt with the intolerably licentious book on the liberty to philosophize in the way it
deserved. It seems that the author follows closely not only the politics, but also the religion of
Hobbes… For there is nothing in the astounding critique of Sacred Scripture put into effect by this
audacious man, the seeds of which have not been sowed by Hobbes in an entire chapter of Leviathan”
(quoted by Steven Nadler in his upcoming “A Book Forged in Hell”: Spinoza’s Scandalous Treatise, 316,
my emphasis). So much for Leibniz as a radical enlightener. Yet, as Professor Ariew’s work on
Leibniz has demonstrated, there are great difficulties in knowing exactly what Leibniz’s purported
“views” were – for Leibniz was forever modifying, changing, improving, and adding to his views
throughout his career. As an example of this, Professor Ariew told me in a personal communication,
that a year after Leibniz wrote this indictment against Hobbes, he “writes a fan letter to Hobbes and
two treatises that are Hobbsian in character.”
Note the two key terms which I italicized from Leibniz’s letter above (“intolerably” and
“audacious”). Both are watchwords of Enlightenment thought, yet Leibniz, in this letter, uses
language that utterly repudiates the Enlightenment’s call for humankind to be audacious in their
581
582
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Spinoza "had transcended Hobbes and all other intellectual malefactors in

undermining belief in the divine authorship of Scripture." 585 And again, "Where Hobbes

[according to one writer] is merely 'triflling' with Scripture and 'wresting some particular

places to his odd opinions', Spinoza begins at the very root and foundation by taking away

all divine authority from prophecy, miracles or inspiration, and making all sacred pen-men,
to be no other than either mad-men or imposters." 586

Regarding Spinoza’s TTP, Hobbes himself admitted that he "durst not speak so

boldly", which suggests that his work did not completely sever itself from all theological

beliefs 587, whereas Spinoza's new view on scriptural exegesis "is hence not just a revolution

in Bible hermeneutics but simultaneously a revolution in theology." 588 These arguments
comprise further evidence of Spinoza's primacy in the Radical Enlightenment. As one

contemporary put it, Spinoza might have been "following the 'Hobbesian path' but [he]

went much further." 589 And Hobbes probably did not have as much influence as Spinoza

also because the interpretation of Hobbes's writings were various and unsettled (for more
on this, see A.P. Martinich's Thomas Hobbes, 128).

thinking and to tolerate all thought. Leibniz, though, was not nearly as intolerant as his more
conservative brethren. Note too how at this date Leibniz believed that Hobbes was the complete
source for Spinoza’s blasphemies. But he shows that he has not read either Hobbes’s Leviathan or
Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise carefully because he states that “there is nothing in the
astounding critique of Sacred Scripture put into effect by this audacious man, the seeds of which have
not been sowed by Hobbes in an entire chapter of Leviathan” (Ibid.). No doubt Leibniz is engaging in
some hyperbole here, not to mention he does not say that Spinoza got “everything” from Hobbes but
only “the seeds” that Hobbes planted. Nevertheless, though Hobbes’s critique of scripture is in
several respects groundbreaking, it is not as detailed and thorough and destructive as Spinoza’s
work.
585 Ibid. 600.
586 Ibid. 608.
587 Ibid. 449.
588 Ibid. 449.
589 Ibid. 503.
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Not only are these things true, but there are some influential Hobbes' scholars who

aver that Hobbes was a Christian (though of an unorthodox variety). 590 A.P. Matinich, for

instance, offers an extensive argument for the position that Hobbes was a Christian (despite
the fact that many considered him an atheist in his time). 591 Still this does not jibe with

Hobbes's extremely unconventional scriptural exegesis on many central teachings such as
the nature of God. For Hobbes, God was not an incorporeal substance but body, which,

needless to say, caused uproar from the theologians. (Hobbes was, after all, a materialist.)

His approach to scriptural exegesis, like Spinoza’s, is also rationalistic. But, unlike Spinoza,
Hobbes still countenances scripture as a rule for human life and nations – even if only the

sovereign should have the authority to say what scripture means. 592 Still, his exegesis of

“Spirit” and angels and prophets and dozens of other intrinsically significant doctrines of
scripture and theology show genius, uniqueness, imagination, courage, and many great
insights that could not fail to stimulate open-minded, thoughtful readers.

The overall effect of reading Hobbes on the scriptures for most was that it led

readers to question and to doubt the Bible, which is the source and foundation of the three
world’s great religions. Edwin Curley explains in his Introduction to Hobbes's Leviathan

that "Hobbes' analysis of scripture concludes that the books of the Bible, as we now have

them, were characteristically written by unknown authors, long after the events they claim
to record" (xliii). This leads to skepticism as to what "God's Word" is in the scriptures.

Hobbes denied natural immortality and eternal hell (xlvii), and he attacked not only the
Nadler’s upcoming book (which will be published in the Spring of 2011) “A Book Forged in Hell”:
Spinoza’s Scandalous Treatise mentions in passing that an early biographer of Spinoza thought him a
Protestant. Nadler, however, quickly and easily puts this question to rest, even if one were to allow
for a very liberal Protestantism.
591 See especially pages 69-85 in his Thomas Hobbes and pages 176-8 and 234-5 in his Hobbes).
592 As opposed to most readings of Spinoza as only a pure Radical Enlightenment atheist totally
against scripture, Verbeek points out in his Spinoza’s Theologico-political Treatise (Ashgate, 2003)
that there are good grounds in the TTP itself for arguing that for Spinoza the scriptures offered at
least some moral value for the masses since they don’t have the luxury to philosophize and in many
cases, even the ability to reason correctly.
590
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Catholic Church, scholasticism and its priests (xliv), but Protestants, too, such as the

Presbyterians (xlv). Because of such things, Martinich himself concedes that

the interpretation of Hobbes's treatment of religion "was one of the milestones on the road"

from theism to deisim to atheism (Hobbes 206). Yet, even though he disagrees with this

interpretation of Hobbes's writing, he nevertheless confesses that Hobbes "clearly failed" in
trying to reconcile Christianity and modern science (Ibid).

Reviewing all these apparently anti-religious or anti-Christian positions of Hobbes,

one might be tempted to think the opposite of what Martinich argues for: that not only was

Hobbes not a Christian, he might have even been an atheist (again, see defenses of this view
in Edwin Curley's "I Durst Not Write So Boldly” and Douglas Jesseph's "Hobbes’s Atheism").
Whatever the truth is on this subject though, it is accurate that "Hobbes is one of the

founders of the higher criticism" (Curley's Intro to Leviathan, xliii). Yet in the final analysis,

we simply don't know for sure if Hobbes was a genuine atheist, anti-Christian, or extreme
liberal Protestant: as Patricia Springborg says in her essay "Hobbes on religion" in the

Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, ”Hobbes's religious beliefs ultimately remain a mystery"

(369). Not so with Spinoza's religious beliefs. 593 At any rate, however various early modern

scholars may argue this issue, which admittedly is something of an intellectual parlor game
(though with heuristic value), Israel argues the position that Spinoza’s overall philosophy
and influence was the most powerful of the early Radical Enlighteners. 594

Verbeek however says that “There is little unanimity as to whether … the book is against all
religion or only against specific aspects of a specific religion” (op. cited 1). In my opinion, one can
only argue in this way in the context of Spinoza’s realization that in the real world it is very unlikely
that all “religion – that is, the relics of man’s ancient bondage” (TTP, Shirley, 3) will die.
Understanding this, Spinoza offered his ideas on a politics that could make some accommodation to
religion. In the final analysis, though, this is not ultimately what Spinoza wished for. To my lights
when one adds-up all the anti-biblical, anti-theological arguments that Spinoza makes both in his TTP
and Ethics, one can’t but help to conclude that Spinoza was certainly an enemy of religion (that is, as
religion was traditionally understood).
594 No matter what the case may be here between Hobbes and Spinoza, one thing is clear, which all
sides agree on, and that is that both contributed a great deal to the Radical Enlightenment, which
593
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Summary of Israel’s account of Spinoza’s biblical hermeneutics and his place in the Radical
Enlightenment
This study will be taking up Spinoza’s treatment of various specific scriptures in greater

detail in a later section on the TTP, but it will help the reader at this point to give a bird’s

eye view of Spinoza’s hermeneutics here for perspective. Then, in later sections, when we
will look more closely at how he interprets various specific scriptures, we will hopefully
remember this broader or more general viewpoint. Some repetition will therefore be
unavoidable.

In several places in his books, Israel plots the affects that Spinoza’s works had on the

consciousness of Europe. We learn from these portions just how influential Spinoza’s
critique of scripture and theology was, and how much this contributed to the Radical

Enlightenment. In his chapters on “Publishing a Banned Philosophy” and “The Spread of a
Forbidden Movement”, Israel delineates the extent to which Spinoza’s epoch-making and

faith-destroying book of biblical criticism, the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, was attacked

and yet still spread throughout Europe. “Spinoza begins by dismissing the entire corpus of
previous Bible interpretation, whether Christian or Jewish.” 595 and then argues that “the

chief concern of theologians on the whole has been to extort from Holy Scripture their own
authority from invented ideas, for which they claim divine authority.” 596

What is needed then to correctly understand the Bible? Spinoza says we first need

to “free our minds from the prejudices of the theologians” and instead interpret Scripture
“no different from the method of interpreting Nature.” 597 All sound Bible interpretation

then must be primarily historical and critical. The end result of new, higher, destructive

“marks the most dramatic step towards secularization and rationalization in Europe’s history” (Rad.
Enl. vi).
595 Ibid. 447.
596 Spinoza, TTP, trans. Shirley, 140.
597 Rad. Enl. 448.
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critical method was (as Richard Popkin’s put it): “a devastating critique of revealed
knowledge claims, which has had an amazing effect over the last three centuries in

secularizing modern man”, and in “the liberation of the human spirit from the bonds of fear
and superstition.” 598

Summarizing Spinoza's view on scriptural exegesis: Spinoza's method of scriptural

exegesis "approaches Scripture as a collection of historical narratives devoid of any special
status or miraculous content." 599 In a word, the scriptures are viewed "as a purely human

document and entirely secularized." 600 The way to truly understand the Bible then is not by

the Holy Spirit's help and guidance, or by the Pope or some Church council's interpretation
or by some charismatic Reformer’s book. The way to accurately interpret scripture is

through a thorough study of its history and language. Once one applies this method to the

66 (or 73 for the Roman Catholics) books of the Bible, the many changes in both content and
style become patently evident. Following Spinoza's method, as opposed to the traditional

method followed by Christianity for over 1700 years, one is no longer led by a religious
commitment that "All scripture is inspired by God" (2 Tim. 3:16) and therefore cannot
contain contradictions since "God is the God of all truth.” On the contrary, the biblical

exegete following Spinoza's method finds that several portions of the Bible are "incoherent
and truncated, and frequently marred by discrepancies and contradictions." 601

Spinoza’s treatment of the relations between reason and revelation is radical

(though he says in several places that the two are of separate domains and therefore don’t

conflict) and in-depth. Israel’s (Nadler’s, Curley’s, et. al.) account that Spinoza’s analysis of

revelation, theology, scripture, prophecy, Moses, the prophets, the Roman Catholic Church,

the apostles, faith, imagination, and so on – are advanced in textual criticism and philosophy
Popkin, op. cited, 229, 237.
Rad. Enl. 448, my emphasis.
600 Ibid.
601 Rad. Enl. 449.
598
599
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cannot be denied. 602 He is direct. He is courageous. He vigorously took on that great

leviathan of orthodox biblical religion that has stood in the way of free philosophizing since
the Lord commanded Moses to stone to death anyone who tries “to turn you away from the

Spinoza scholar Steven Nadler says that “Without a doubt, the Theological-Political Treatise is one
of the most important and influential books in the history of philosophy, in religious and political
thought, and even in Bible studies. More than any other work, it laid the foundation for modern
critical and historical approaches to the Bible” (upcoming “A Book forged in Hell”, op. cited, 326. This
is a strong position to take. It’s certainly not true that Spinoza was the only one who did biblical
criticism in a critical and historical way. Strauss, Popkin, Curley, and others (including Nadler) show
this. Theo Verbeek is even stronger about this matter. For instance, after acknowledging respects in
which Spinoza’s work is distinct despite influences such as from Hobbes, he says: ”A more accurate
comparison between the Theologico-political treatise and Leviathan would be necessary, on the other
hand, to assess Spinoza’s dependence on Hobbes’s theological argument and to dispel once and for all
the myth of Spinoza being a pioneer in Biblical scholarship” (Verbeek’s 2003 Spinoza’s Theologicopolitical Treatise, 182, my emphasis. Verbeek (if I read him rightly) also might take issue with Nadler
(and others) on the question of the extent of the “neglect” of the TTP). Even stronger than Nadler’s
argument that “More than any other work, it laid the foundation for modern critical and historical
approaches to the Bible”, Nadler says that Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise is “Arguably the
most important – and certainly the most scandalous and vilified – work of philosophy of the
seventeenth century” (even though it was later neglected) (Nadler op. cited, 3, my emphasis). Some
might think that Nadler is engaging in hyperbole here as one may think that Arnauld used hyperbole
when he singled out Spinoza as “the most impious and most dangerous man of the century.” But in a
personal communication to me, Nadler takes both claims literally. Of Arnauld’s quote he says, “I
would not say that Arnauld is engaging in hyperbole here -- I would think that he truly means it (as
many of Spinoza's other critics also meant it).” And of the quote that the TTP is “Arguably the most
important work of philosophy of the seventeenth century” he says, “Arguably, yes. The only other
possible candidates are Spinoza's Ethics, Descartes' Principia or Newton's Principia.”
Regarding Nadler’s claim that the TTP was “certainly the most scandalous and vilified - work
of philosophy of the seventeenth century”, many other early modern and Spinoza scholars concur:
“For more than a century, Spinozism was widely held to be the most dangerous philosophical worldview that had ever been concocted.” See for instance, Disguised and Overt Spinozism Around 1700:
Papers Presented at the International Colloquium held at Rotterdam, 5-8 October 1994, edited by Wiep
van Bunge and Wim Klever (New York: E.J. Brill, 1996), vii). As to the important question of whether
this view was an accurate interpretation of Spinoza, Bunge and Klever take issue with some Spinoza
scholars (including Verbeek?) who aver that the first generation of critics of Spinoza misunderstood
him and that he was not totally against religion or God: “The well-worn cliché that the Dutch
philosopher was essentially misunderstood by his early critics no longer seems adequate. Rather, it
would seem, Spinoza was so violently attacked precisely because his early readers clearly saw what
his philosophy amounted to. Indeed, they saw themselves confronted with a way of looking at the
world that at the time was truly revolutionary” (ibid.). For one of the best thorough treatments of the
early reception of Spinoza, see Wiep van Bunge’s “On the Early Dutch Reception of the Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus.”
In a new work hot off the presses (Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise: A Critical Guide,
edited by Melamed, Yitzhak and Rosenthal, Michael (Cambridge University Press, 2010)), Jonathan
Israel adds to the monumental research he has done on Spinoza reception and even more forcibly
concludes that no other work in early modernity “matches the TTP or the Ethics as a candidate for the
honor of being the most analyzed, refuted, and – what counts most – obsessively pored over,
wrestled with, and scrutinized text of the era 1670-1820” (73). The date range he gives for this
might make it easier for some to accept compared to Nadler’s “Arguably the most important work of
philosophy of the seventeenth century.”
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Lord your God” (Deut. 13:10), or when St. Paul wrote that “there are many rebellious

people, mere talkers and deceivers …They must be silenced, because they are ruining [the
faith of] whole households by teaching things they ought not to teach” (Titus 1:11, my

emphasis), or when he told Timothy to “fight the good fight of faith, holding on to faith and a
good conscience. Some have rejected these and so have shipwrecked their faith. Among

them are Hymenaeus and Alexander, whom I have handed over to Satan to be taught not to

blaspheme” (1 Tim. 1:18-20, my emphasis), or when Augustine misinterpreted the scripture
“Compel them to come in”, or when Constantine shut down the pagan schools of philosophy

and declared Christianity the religion of the empire, or when … - the instances of religious
stifling of freedom are too numerous to cite.

It is true of course that this is not an entirely fair judgment because each of the

philosophers that we have studied had different strategic aims, professions, loyalties, and so
forth. We grant this. Our only point is to say that as far as explicit writings about religion go,
one can see the makings of secular and anti-(traditional)-religious modernity far more in

Spinoza than in Descartes, Pascal, Locke, Newton, and Leibniz put together. No other major
philosopher in the history of biblical European culture gets even near Spinoza as the

philosopher against Judaism and Christianity – as the philosopher who directly and fully

undermines the very foundations of biblical religion. 603 But how was he able to accomplish
this mammoth task? How was he able to “drink up this sea? Who gave him the sponge to
wipe away the entire horizon? What did he do when he unchained this earth from its

Yovel illuminates this discussion by pointing out that Spinoza’s philosophy not only distanced
himself from traditional religion, but also “from the accepted philosophical tradition; he was a heretic
not only from the point of view of established religions, but also from the point of view of the free
thinkers and from the several varieties of philosophic deism they were espousing at the time. Deism
rejects religion in the name of an external and remote philosophic deity that does not intervene in
the affairs of this world and does not possess the attributes of particular providence, punishment and
reward, commandment, or ritual. But the deistic heretics at least acknowledged the existence of a
transcendent deity elevated above the world, whereas Spinoza dismissed this idea and identified God
with the whole universe” (Spinoza and Other Heretics, 5).
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sun?” 604 That will be one of the subjects dealt with in the next section as we highlight some
of the most important biographical details of his life. But we can introduce a couple salient

points here.

Spinoza knew whereof he spoke. This is not certain, but there is strong evidence to

believe that Spinoza’s early life was more influenced by the biblical religious spirit than

either Descartes or Leibniz, for he was almost certainly more devout. He therefore knew

the religious mindset well. He therefore understood the difference between the religious

and the rationalist mindsets having lived and experienced both worlds in his own life. He

was a native to both worlds, therefore he is particularly suited to compare, contrast, and

judge both. Many deeply religious people of the 17th century didn’t have a clue as to what a
life of reason or philosophy could be. And, while many people and philosophers of the

period (especially those who were religious in ideology and formal commitment) did have
some understanding of what a deeply devout and experiential faith might be like,

nevertheless the difference in attitude and life between a deeply religious person and a

nominally religious person is almost as great as the difference between a religious person
and an unbeliever. Spinoza however was versed in the best and the worst of all these
possible worlds.

Friedrich Nietzsche. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin
Books, 14).
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Chapter Twelve
On the Making of an “Antichrist”: Biographical context
“the apostate Jew working together with the devil” 605

Biographical context
We are come now to “the antichrist”, “the beast”, “the devil incarnate”, “the apostate Jew

working together with the devil.” These epithets strike most educated secular people today
as entertaining rather than with the horror 606 that was experienced by many in Spinoza’s

See Nadler’s “A Book Forged in Hell” for the details on the source of this quote on pages 315 and
317. Stephen Nadler’s biography of Spinoza notes that when his TTP came out, some “accused him of
being an agent of Satan, perhaps even the antichrist himself” (295). Nadler is not the only one to cite
many such allegations made against Spinoza. Perhaps more than any work on earth, Jonathan
Israel’s Radical Enlightenment plots these charges made against Spinoza from almost every country
in Europe and from almost every walk of life – government officials, Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists,
Mennoites, theologians, philosophers, scientists, the masses. Edwin Curley and Mogens Laerke’s
work on the reception of the TTP by Leibniz and others also cite how prevalent such charges were.
These charges were not meant as metaphors. They were not meant allegorically or rhetorically; nor
are they exaggerations or hyperbole. They were meant literally, and, as such, many completely
believed that Spinoza was as grave a threat and as fearful a person as these words belie. This has to
be pointed out emphatically because readers of such charges today are so far removed from such a
mentality that they too often don’t really take in how serious and fearful these beliefs about Spinoza
were. See also Wiep van Bunge’s “On the Early Dutch Reception of the Tractatus TheologicoPoliticus”, as well (Studia Spinozana 5, 1989, pp. 225-251. The value of this work is that it gives
several quotes and a relatively lot of space to the arguments of the orthodox who opposed Spinoza,
instead of just summing up their positions in three words or one quick sound bite).
606 See for instance some of the first responses of horror to Spinoza’s works in Colerus’s biography of
Spinoza [64-69] on the Ethics. Colerus himself carefully studied Spinoza’s works and lays out his own
critique of Spinoza’s ”abominable” TTP and some on his Ethics. He concludes his thorough study of
Spinoza’s works warning his Christian readers: “I don’t design to examine here all the impious and
absur’d Doctrines of Spinoza; I have mentioned some of the most important, only to inspire the
605
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world. 607 Most educated people in the west today don’t hurl such accusations as freely, nor
take them as seriously as they used to be taken. Most well-educated people today, for

instance, are not in dread of evil spirits, nor do they believe that if a society does not stop an
atheist’s writings from spreading that God will punish the whole society (as many did in

Spinoza’s Amsterdam concerning his books). 608 Most well-informed people today - even

many theology professors - wouldn’t be caught dead throwing an ink well at the devil as

Martin Luther did. As far as I know, Jewish synagogues are no longer practicing the kind of
biblical excommunication that Spinoza’s synagogue practiced against him. To the modern
mind then, these theological denunciations seem literary, colorful, and rhetorical, as the
study of Greek literature and religion (which Christians called “myths”) seemed to

Renaissance Christian humanists. But it must be made emphatically clear here that this is a
misreading of these texts. For the ancient Greeks, as well as for the orthodox Jews and
Christians of the seventeenth century, these texts were certainly not “literature” or

Christian Reader with the aversion and horror he ought to have for such pernicious Opinions” [p. 68,
my emphasis, see also [74]. The 17th century treatment of Spinoza’s works is instructively different
from the 20st century’s treatment of Spinoza’s works. Once again, for a brilliant example of how later
generations interpret and indeed distort a great philosopher’s work, see “The Cogito in the
Seventeenth Century” in Roger Ariew’s forthcoming edition of his Descartes and the Last Scholastics.
Here the theological components of the 17th century philosopher’s work on the cogito are not seen
and instead made “modern.”
607 I say “most educated secular people today”, but of course this is not meant to deny the fact that
hundreds of millions of people in the world today still do believe such things – as many in the United
States do, for instance. But things are far worse in countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and
others which still follow many of the practices of the Koran and Torah such as the issuing of fatwa’s
by supreme leaders against anyone in the world who seems to have insulted Islam or the prophet
Mohammad; or from Islamicists who consider all who do not follow the one God Allah infidels and of
Satan; or who stone adulterous women (but usually not men) to death; or of the Orthdox Jews in
Israel who are fighting to gain control of all the land that God promised them in the Torah; or of
Pentecostals and charismatics throughout the world who cast out demons, prophecy, speak in
tongues, and believe that this generation will see the return of the Son of God and the end of the
world.
608 Following biblical teachings, the provincial synods and classis of Amsterdam complained that
Spinoza’s work (and others) were spreading atheism “against which the almighty God will issue his
anger from heaven; and already the appearance of his anger pours upon our dear fatherland” (which
I take to be a reference to events of 1672 such as the invasion by the French of the Netherlands and
the assassination of De Witt). Stephen Nadler. “A Book Forged in Hell”: Spinoza’s Scandalous Treatise,
op. cited, 310-311). Those who believe in the Bible today are still arguing in such fashion. In
America, Evangelical preachers and many other religious teachers assert that hurricanes, 9/11, and
so on are the result of God’s anger at America’s ever growing slouch towards Sodom and Gomorrah.
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“rhetoric.” They were taken to be “the very words of God” (Rom. 3:2) and “It is a dreadful

thing to fall into the hands of the living God” (Heb. 10:31; Isa. 33:14: Ps. 50:22, 76:7,
90:11). 609

I’m sorry to have to belabor this issue, but it seems necessary because many modern

readers just don’t understand or feel the believed-reality and horror of these things as the

very religious people of the seventeenth century did. We have to remember that we were
not brought up in their world, a time in which most people were not educated, in which

most people didn’t really understand what Galileo, Descartes, Harvey, Gilbert or Newton
were up to. Their minds were “pre-scientific”, pre-Enlightenment, pre-Darwinian, pre-

Nietzschean, pre-Marxian, pre-Freudian, pre-Einsteinian, etc. Many in this seventeenth

century world, especially outside the great cities, had beliefs not far from those delineated

by Sir Walter Frazier in his famous and important anthropological study The Golden Bough.

Something like this is the world in which Spinoza was brought up into. 610 The vast majority
of the masses then are very superstitious, so much so that even some Christian theologians
lamented the excessive credulity of the people. 611

Outside the flats of Descartes and Spinoza and the ivory tower universities are the

masses. This is the world of tanners, shop keepers, candle stick makers, smiths, and so on.

In Lucas’ record of the inquisition-like trial of Spinoza ( days before his excommunication) in front
of the judges of the synagogue, he tells us that Spinoza’s famous teacher Moteira asked Spinoza “if he
was not afraid of falling into the hands of the living God?” See The Oldest Biography of Spinoza, ed. by
A. Wolf, 49-50.
610 For further background and context, see Keith Thomas’s Religion and the Decline of Magic (New
York, 1997) and Stuart Clark’s Thinking with Demons. The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe
(Oxford, 1997).
611 I’m reminded of Charles Dickens’s famous lines from his account of the later Enlightenment
French Revolution: "It was the best of times, it was the worst of times; it was the age of wisdom, it
was the age of foolishness; it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity; it was the season
of Light, it was the season of Darkness; it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair; we had
everything before us, we had nothing before us.” This is indeed the full context of the Enlightenment.
Compare this with Lucas’s testimony to what he most admired about his friend Spinoza: “But what I
esteem most in him is that, although he was born and bred in the midst of a gross people who are a
source of superstition, he had imbibed no bitterness whatever, and that he purged his soul of those
false maxims with which so many are infatuated. He was entirely cured of those silly and ridiculous
opinions which the Jews have of God” (Lucas, op. cited, 69).
609
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The masses of these people are not learned Thomists or Scotists or Baconites or Cartesians
or Hobbsians or Spinozists. On the contrary, these are the people that Spinoza so often
refers to as the “common people”, the “masses”, “the ignorant”, “the credulous”, the

“superstitious”, and so on. It is with the beliefs of many of these people that several early
modern philosophers and theologians often speak of with contempt. 612

Yet many of these same philosophers and theologians retained many of the

superstitions of the masses. It has often seemed to me when reading some early modern
philosophy scholars that they tend to forget that these scientists and philosophers

themselves still maintained many of the most egregious superstitious beliefs of the people,
even if in a far more educated and moderate way. Mersenne still felt it was justified that

Noel Fournet had his tongue gouged out and then body burnt to a stake for arguing that the
God of the Bible who predetermined the masses to an eternal torment was more immoral
than the gods of the Greeks and Romans. 613 Hobbes was believed to have a “fear of

For more on religious background of the seventeenth century in relation to its philosophy, see
works such as Richard Popkin’s “The Religious Background of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy” in
The Cambridge Companion History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, Volume I, edited by Daniel
Garber and Michael Ayers with assistance from Roger Ariew and Alan Gabbey (UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 393-422. Popkin makes clear that the world of our early modern
philosophers is not the world of our philosophers. He talks about undercurrents of “religious ideas
and developments which may now look strange and distant from philosophy but were familiar to,
and were taken seriously by, all the major philosophers of the period. These philosophers lived in
societies dominated by religious institutions and lived through tremendous upheavals that were
fundamentally generated by religious concerns – the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, the
Thirty Years’ War, the Puritan Revolution, the pogroms in Poland, the revocation of the Edict of
Nantes. The point is not simply that religious ideas and events had an important influence on the
philosophical thought of the period. Rather, these religious issues were deeply intertwined with
philosophical conceptions of knowledge, revelation …” and so on (393). “All of the heroes of modern
philosophy were involved in, or influenced by” these issues. “Perhaps, if we recognized that our
philosophical heroes … lived in historical time and space, in some part religious time and religious
space, we could better understand why they wrote on various topics” (416). In an earlier essay,
Popkin tracks what he calls “The third-force philosophy” (p. 61) with “some of the strange
combinations of new science and theology that develop during the century” (p. 35) in his “The Third
Force in 17th Century Philosophy: Scepticism, Science and Biblical Prophecy” from Nouvelles de la
Republique des Lettres, 1983, 35-63.
613 An anecdote reported by Mersenne: “saying [of a certain Noel, executed at Metz] that he would
rather have preferred to adore a Saturn who eats his children, an adulterous Jupiter, a drunkard
Bacchus, a deceiving Mercury, or believe that there is no God at all, than to believe Him to be the
author of the ruin of humankind, and of the perdition of reprobates, who surmount the number of the
612
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phantoms and demons” 614; Locke and Bishop Berkeley left “ample scope for credence in

Satan, demons, magic, and witchcraft to persist”; “Boyle, Henry More, Ralph Cudworth, and
Joseph Glanvill battled to stabilize belief in the existence and operations of apparitions and
spirits as part of a wider drive to uphold religion, authority, and tradition.” 615 Pascal and

Arnauld still believed in the miraculous healing powers of relics such as the sacred thorn. 616

Leibniz, as we saw, still evidently believed many central doctrines of Christian theology

including prophecy and eternal torment. Newton spent more time trying to work out the
chronology of end time Bible prophecy than he did on math and physics. The point I’m

trying to make here is that these things are, if not in the foreground, at least powerfully in
the background, of even many (or most) of the early modern philosophers and scientists.
“For while the Scientific Revolution, the rise of the mechanical world-view, and Lockean

empiricism all helped erode the foundations on which older notions about magic, wonderworking, and the supernatural rested, neither Cartesianism with its dichotomy of
substances, nor Locke’s epistemology, nor any mainstream trend of the Early

elect by so very much” (Jean-Luc Marion. On the Ego and on God: Further Cartesian Questions. Trans.
Christina M. Gschwandtner (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 110 and endnote #31 on p.
231.
614 As we mentioned above, regarding the rule of giving priority to the central principles of a
philosophers’ philosophy, the accuracy of this claim is in serious question. If Hobbes was truly an
atheist, as some argue, than by entailment, he could not have believed in the demons. The full
passage of the quote above from Israel’s Radical Enlightenment reads as follows: “During the last
third of the seventeenth century, the scene was set for a vast triangular contest in Europe between
intellectual conservatives, moderates, and radicals over the status of the supernatural in human life
and the reality of the Devil, demons, spirits, and magic. The intellectual battles was heralded by
Naude and Hobbes, the latter, despite being celebrated for his personal timorousness and ‘fear of
phantoms and demons’ – as Bayle and, later, d’Holbach delighted in informing readers – nevertheless
injecting a measure of skepticism about diabolical power and the reality of spirits” (Rad. Enl. 375).
Israel cites several passages from Hobbes’s Leviathan (q.v. 210-19, 331-2, and 349-63) plus
arguments in Martinich’s Two Gods (250-4, 252-5) and Clark’s Thinking with Demons (303 and 310).
615 Israel, Rad. Enl., 375-6. See rest of chapter 21 “The Death of the Devil”
616 See for instance Angelique Arnauld abbess of Port Royal by Francis Martin (New York: Macmillan,
1873). For an epistemological study of this, see Peter Dear’s essay “Miracles, Experiments, and the
Ordinary Course of Nature” (Isis 81, 1990, 663-683.
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Enlightenment provided a rationale for total repudiation of belief in spirits and magic.” 617

Spinoza’s philosophy, however, is more radical. He dispenses with all of it. As Yovel puts it:
After all, Spinoza was not just a reformer of revealed religion but its adamant
enemy; his philosophy of immanence (of so-called pantheism) did not merely
oppose the established religions but all other philosophies of reason that affirmed
the transcendent status of God and the duality between God and his world. Spinoza
was in this respect a loner even among the daring heterodox minority. 618

The Question: How?
We introduced our chapter on the Greeks as precursors to the Radical Enlightenment with
the following words:

The question I explore in this dissertation and chapter is similar to the question
historian Will Durant poses in the Preface to his The Age of Voltaire: A History of
Civilization in Western Europe from 1715 to 1756, With Special Emphasis on the
Conflict Between Religion and Philosophy. He asks: ‘How did it come about that a
major part of the educated classes in Europe and America has lost faith in the
theology that for fifteen centuries gave supernatural sanctions and supports to the
precarious and uncongenial moral code upon which Western civilization has been
based?’619

And:

One can ask this same question with respect to the history of the ancient Greeks.
How did it come about that a culture that believed what the divinely inspired poets
sung of (such as that the Milky Way was the breast milk of the goddess Hera, Zeus’s
divine wife, etc.) eventually produced philosophers who denied the literal truth of
such claims? How did the Greeks get from Hesiod to Plato or Epicurus, from
theological accounts of things to a more naturalistic account of things?
The question I wish to ask in this section is similar to the one I investigated with

respect to the Greeks. The question I want to ask in this section however has to do with

Ibid. 376.
Yovel, op. cited, 143.
619 This question, in keeping with the language that we have been using, is the same as: “How did the
European Radical Enlightenment come about?”
617
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only one individual and not a whole culture. The question I want to ask is this: ”How did it
come about that a young, innocent, devout Jew, brought up in an orthodox believing

household and community, came to lose the precious and holy faith in the religion of his

Fathers that for approximately twenty centuries gave meaning, nurture, and sustenance?”
To speak in the language of the orthodox defenders of revelation who came to condemn

him: How did Spinoza go from being a kind of “son of the morning” (Isa.14:12; Ezek. 28)

whom the elders look upon as the “future light of their community and their faith” 620 to “the

apostate Jew working together with the devil”? How did he go from being like a Jesus in the
Temple asking questions, learning, and amazing his teachers at 12-years-old 621, to the

greatest of Jewish apostates and an antichrist? What happened to him to account for how

he used to believe in a God who literally inscribed the Ten Commandments on stone tablets
at the top of Mt. Sinai and handed them over to Moses, to calling such accounts crass,

common, imaginary, frenzied, childish, and superstitious? How did he go from believing

that he and his people were the Chosen Ones specially selected by God from all the nations
to someone who taught that such notions are arrogant and bigoted? How did he go from

devout observer of the Law to a preacher who taught that the Lawgiver Himself is merely
the anthropomorphic projection of our desperate human imaginative hopes and fears? 622

This will be the subject of our next section.

Will Durant. The Story of Philosophy (New York: Washington Square Press, 1952), 149
Nadler reports that “Spinoza must have been an intellectually gift youth, and he would have made
a strong impression on his teachers as he progressed through the levels at the community’s school on
the Houtgracht. He probably studied at one time or another with all of the leading rabbis of Talmud
Torah, including Menasseh ben Israel … who was perhaps the most famous Jew in Europe, and who
was teaching in the elementary grades when Spinoza attended the school; the mystically inclined
Isaac Aboab da Fonseca; and Saul Levi Mortera, the chief rabbi of the congregation whose tastes ran
more to rational philosophy and who often clashed with Rabbi Aboab over the relevance of the
kabbalah” (Stephen Nadler. Spinoza’s Ethics: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006), 3.
622 In the Preface to his Theological-Political Treatise, the Appendix of Part I of his Ethics, and in many
of his letters, Spinoza not only delineates his philosophy of religion toward Judaism and Christianity,
but actually formulates a full blown general theory of the origin and development of religion.
Spinoza argues that “Numerous examples of [his theory that fear and hope are the springs of all
620
621
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From Baruch to Benedict 623 Spinoza 624
Unto us a child is born 625: The orthodox education of Baruch 626

religion] can be cited, illustrating quite clearly the fact that only while fear persists do men fall prey
to superstition, that all the objects of spurious reverence have been no more than phantoms, the
delusions springing from despondency and timidity…. This being the origin of superstition … like all
other instances of hallucination and frenzy, is bound to assume very varied and unstable forms, and
that, finally, it is sustained only by hope, hatred, anger, and deceit. For it arises not from reason but
from emotion …” (TTP, Shirley, 1-2).
623 His given Hebrew name, “Baruch”, ironically enough, means “blessed one.” “Baruch” is the name
his parents gave him and “as he would have been called in the classroom and in the synagogue”
(Nadler, Spinoza’s Heresy, 2001, 1). “Bento” (also understood as “blessed”) is the Portuguese name
he was called as a boy. During his “backsliding” period, when his views and his life got further and
further away from the Jewish community, he took on the Latinized version of his name “Bendedict”
or “Benedictus.” On the first page of Colerus’s biography of Spinoza, he states: “His Parents, a little
while after his Birth, named him Baruch. But having afterward forsaken Judaism, he changed his
name, and called himself Benedict in his Writings, and in the Letters” (if this account is true, this
would be tantamount to a kind of reverse name-change compared to the famous name changes of
Petra (pebble) to Peter (rock), or of Saul to Paul; that is, instead of marking a religious new step in
life, Benedict marks his repudiation of the old religious life). R.H.M. Elwes’ puts it this way: “His
separation from Judaism was marked by his substituting for his name Baruch the Latin equivalent
Benedictus” (http://users.telenet.be/rwmeijer/spinoza/bio.htm). Nadler hypothesizes that he may
have made this name change in “association with university life – where all instruction and learned
discourse was in Latin” (See Nadler’s biography of Spinoza on his name on p. 42 and 163).
624 Regarding the name of Spinoza, Matthew Stewart states the following: “To the delight of the
philosopher’s future detractors, the family name, Spinoza … derives from the Spanish for ‘thorny’”
(Matthew Stewart. The Courtier and the Heretic: Leibniz, Spinoza, and the Fate of God in the Modern
World (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006), 19). For these detractors, Jewish and Christian,
Spinoza was considered “a thorn in their sides.” And, because they knew what God taught in His
Word, they sought to rid the land of his presence and teachings. Scripture passages like the following
explain how it is that they could treat “infidels” like Spinoza the way they did. These scriptures, to
them, also command and justify how they must treat such “atheists.” This is an extremely important
historical point, which is usually overlooked or misinterpreted in the light of the more liberal
interpretations given to such scripture passages today. Many commentators today explain away the
true reason why various synagogues and churches treated their opponents as they did. This
revisionist account claims that their forefathers acted unbiblically, that they were misled by cultural
factors, or that such egregious acts were perpetuated only by fanatics. This does not appear to be the
case, however. On the contrary, they actually practiced scripture more conscientiously in this area
than their future more liberal believers. The fundamental point here is that they didn’t just say that
the scriptures guided them; in many respects such as this one, they actually practiced what it taught.
The following passage is only one of hundreds used to explain and justify their actions: “And the Lord
spake unto Moses, ... saying, Speak unto the children of Israel, and say unto them, When ye are passed
over Jordan into the land of Canaan; Then ye shall drive out all the inhabitants of the land from
before you, and destroy all their pictures, and destroy all their molten images, and quite pluck down
all their high places: ... But if ye will not drive out the inhabitants of the land from before you; then it
shall come to pass, that those which ye let remain of them shall be pricks in your eyes, and thorns in your
sides, and shall vex you in the land wherein ye dwell” (Numbers 33: 50–52, 55, my emphasis (KJV)).
625 You’ll forgive me for using biblical themes like this (e.g. referring to Spinoza’s birth and life using a
passage of scripture that both Jewish and Christian biblical scholars interpret as referring to the
Messiah-Saviour (“Unto us a child is born”, Isa. 9). I do so advisedly because one of the major aims of
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There was every reason to believe that Baruch de Espinoza would grow up to become a
great rabbi in the synagogue or an important religious leader in the Jewish community.

Stephen Nadler reports that “As a boy—known to his fellow Portuguese as Bento—he had

undoubtedly been one of the star pupils in the congregation's Talmud Torah school. He was
intellectually gifted, and this could not have gone unremarked by the congregation's rabbis.
It is possible that Spinoza, as he made progress through his studies, was being groomed for
a career as a rabbi.” 627

He was born into a Portuguese Jewish family in the Jewish quarter of Amsterdam in

1632. His father, Michael de Espinoza, was a prominent merchant and supporter of the
Jewish community, and so Baruch (or Bento) was lodged in a highly regarded school of

this chapter is to make real the major issues at stake in Spinoza’s life and philosophy according to his
enemies and his time and place. And this “making real” can only be done by accentuating the
theological issues involved because the theological issues involved were considered to be by far the
most central issues of his life and times. To use the prophetic passage “Unto us a child is born” to
Spinoza, of course, is blasphemous from the biblical-believer’s perspective. But from the unbeliever’s
perspective, Spinoza’s work brings light and deliverance from the darkness and bondage of
superstitious ancient religion. One finds this tone of respect, for instance, in Lucas’s (?) The Oldest
Biography (ed. A Wolf. New York: Kennikat Press, 1927. Originally published in 1677 or 1688, or, at
the latest 1688, p. 19). From their perspective, Spinoza represents the thing most needed for the age:
a radical enlightenment. Indeed, “enlightenment” is the very term Lucas uses to describe Spinoza (p.
41). For these thinkers, religion not only propagated a false philosophy, but it was also an ideology
that was used to control, oppress, and brainwash the people from childhood.
626 The focus of these biographical vignettes is mostly to give some account of Spinoza’s
overwhelmingly religious education and then, next, to note what forces and ideas led to Spinoza’s
religious and Jewish philosophical apostasy. It is outside the purview of this dissertation to look into
all the scholarly issues involved here exhaustively. For the latest, most comprehensive, and, I think,
by far the best biography in English to date, see Stephen Nadler’s Spinoza: A Life. Nadler somehow
manages to weave 17th century history, geography, art, culture, economics, politics, Judaism, the
various church confessions and theologies, and philosophy all together in one magnum opus – a
brilliant tour de force. See also W. N. A. Klever’s “Spinoza’s life and works” in The Cambridge
Companion to Spinoza (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996) and Yirmiyahu Yovel’s Spinoza and
Other Heretics: The Marrano of Reason (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
627 Nadler, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/. If this is so (and I think that it is so) then a
further element needs to be pointed out. And that is that their lives as rabbis, though consumed in
biblical and rabbinic studies as part of their religious exercises, were also given to prayer and
worship. In other words, intellectual ability and accomplishments are not the only requisites for
becoming a rabbi or religious teacher and leader. If he was seen as a possible future rabbi or leader,
his devoutness would also be part of the analysis. The Nadler quote focuses on only his intellectual
qualifications for the rabbinate. But there are spiritual or religious qualifications as well. If he was
seen as a promising light for the religious community, as most of his biographers and the evidence
shows, than it couldn’t have been only because he was smart. He had to be devout too.
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Jewish learning, the Talmud Torah School. Spinoza, it seemed, had a bright future in the

Jewish community before him. It is important to note here that Spinoza was “educated as a
Jew”, and an orthodox Jew to boot. 628 Despite the many agreements in theology with

Christianity (creation, the Fall, Noah, Abraham, the Promised Land, etc.), his upbringing and
education was emphatically different from the upbringing and education of a Roman

Catholic, a Lutheran, an Anglican, a Calvinist, a Quaker, a Soccinian, or a humanist. 629 In

1639, at the age of seven, Spinoza begins his education at the Talmud Torah School where

he learns some Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch, “But the education, of course, was primarily

an introduction to Hebrew, the language of the Holy Scriptures, and the study of the law and
the Talmud” 630. He thus received no education in Latin (the language of European learning)

from his school.

His school was praised by many Jews of the time because the children learned

Hebrew, “the entire Bible”, and “the essentials of Judaism.” 631 His school taught the boys, as

one observer put it: “until they are well versed in the Five Books of Moses down to the last

verse.” 632 They even chanted the Hebrew text, and one of the exercises that each of the boys
had to do was to recite a verse “at the top of his voice in Hebrew and explain it in Spanish.”

And there were further personal-devotional religious exercises: “All students under the age

W. N. A. Klever. “Spinoza’s life and works” in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza (UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3. I should say here that, like Nadler, Klever warns his readers
that his biography of Spinoza is “a reconstruction of Spinoza’s life story” (Klever 14) and is therefore
speculative in parts. As I have learned from personal correspondence with Nadler, there is some
question as to what “orthodox” means in the Jewish quarter in 17th century Amsterdam. So far as we
can tell, it is not like the “orthodox” of the “ultra-orthodox” that may be found in Israel and Brooklyn
New York today. So there are, as usual, important parsing and nuances to make in the use of such
key terms as “orthodox” that we should keep in mind.
629 I think this difference in upbringing and education is important because I suspect that Spinoza did
not know Christianity near as well as he did Judaism, even though he read the New Testament and
had Christian friends from various denominations. This, I think, becomes important when we try to
answer questions later such as “How could Spinoza have used the passage of 1 John as the epigraph
to his TTP if he really knew his audience?”
630 Klever, op. cited, 14.
631 Nadler’s biography 61-62.
632 Nalder biography 62.
628
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of sixteen were also expected to be present every day in the synagogue for evening prayers

and to sing psalms. 633 Beyond these more personal and emotional biblical exercises 634, they
also learned the prophets and translated parts of the Torah into Spanish. 635 One Spinoza

commentator summarized his education in this way: Spinoza’s “education was as deep as it
was narrow”, for the “program consisted principally of memorizing the Bible, studying the
Hebrew language, and learning Jewish customs” and, presumably, hardly any liberal

education. 636 The school’s educational curriculum was described by a visiting rabbi in the

following words (which again shows the centrality of the Bible in his early years): “I saw

that the small children learned the Pentateuch from the first to the last words, after this the
other twenty four Books of the Bible and then the whole Mishna.” 637

It is true that Spinoza had great teachers, but it must be underscored that they were

orthodox 638 through and through. Take Rabbi Mortera, for instance. Yovel points out that
Rabbi Morteira’s dictum was that “he who philosophizes is evil.” 639 Though Nadler points

out that he was far more read in Jewish and non-Jewish writings than many have thought,

Ibid. 63.
A further point regarding what kind of orthodoxy Spinoza’s synagogue practiced. In a recent
(Sept. 2010) personal communication to this author, Nadler expresses his lack of certainty about the
kind of devoutness Spinoza may have lived out: “The Portuguese Jews of Amsterdam were definitely
not hasidic-like in fervor; I would say [they were] probably more like modern orthodox. But
remember that it was a very oddly constituted community, since many of its members, especially in
the early years, had been converses raised in Catholic environments. So the kind of ‘orthodox’
Judaism found among the Sephardim was unusual in Europe at the time.” And again: “I don’t see any
overwrought Hasidic type of davening going on here. The modern orthodox, while certainly feeling
their faith personally and deeply, do not adopt the ostentatious emotional displays that tends to
accompany Hasidic prayer. Nadler goes on to say that “his ‘inner life’ is completely hidden from us,
and I would resist any kind of psychological speculating (such as Gullan-Wuhr does in her
biography).”
635 Nadler, op. cited, 62-3, my emphasis.
636 Stewart, op. cited, 24.
637 Nadler, op. cited, 14-15.
638 It should be pointed out that by “orthodox” here is meant that they took the Bible literally and that
it was the center of their beliefs and life. However, due to the history of their community, especially
from Portugal and Spain, there were confusions and disagreements regarding several doctrinal
issues. For details on these see Yirmiyahu Yovel’s Spinoza and Other Heretics (especially chapters 1
to 3), Nadler’s biography of Spinoza (chapters 1 to 4 and 6) and Nadler’s Spinoza’s Heresy (chapter 1,
especially pages 4-5).
639 Yirmiyahu Yovel. Spinoza and Other Heretics:The Marrano of Reason, 84.
633
634
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nevertheless, he still believed and wrote to persuade others that the Law of Moses is truly
and literally from God. Thus he “was no liberal when it came to proper understanding of
Jewish law.” Jews who continue to profess Christianity (even against their desire), who

attend mass, and deny their Jewishness are “guilty before God.” Worse, he believed that

Jews who don’t get circumcised “risk eternal punishment” and that “anyone who failed to
follow the laws of the Torah, and who openly denied the principles of the faith, is no
righteous person and will be eternally punished for his transgressions.” 640

Nadler also makes it clear that “the Jewish leaders … no doubt frowned upon

members of the congregation turning to the non-Jewish world to further their education

(unless it was for purposes of professional training, such as in medicine or the law) …. one

probably risked censure by steeping too far into the contemporary domain of Gentile letters
and sciences.” That way lies “rabbinical opprobrium.” 641

In his youth therefore Spinoza almost certainly believed everything in the Torah and

the prophets as he had been taught to. He believed in the Creation of the world by Yahweh;
he accepted Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden and the talking serpent as literal history;

he held to the story of Noah’s ark and of God killing everyone in the world by rain except for
Noah’s family; he accepted, on its face, all the stupendous miracles God did in behalf of the
Israelites so that they could escape Egypt and expropriate God’s gift of the Promised Land
after exterminating its inhabitants. He believed in the Temple worship and its animal

sacrifice, the Levitical priesthood, and of course, the all-important coming of Messiah and
his kingdom - that “He will judge between the nations and will settle disputes for many

640 Ibid. 52-3; see also 92 ff. We should remember that the doctrine of eternal punishment is not
unique with Christianity; forms of Judaism and Islam also preach it. Christianity though receives most
of the criticism for it. It must also be pointed out that while Klever thinks that Morteira was among
Spinoza’s schoolmasters (Klever 15), Nadler says he’s not sure if Spinoza was one of Moretera’s
students. We know that he was a teacher at his school, but we don’t know for sure if he studied
under him. Nadler does say, however, that Spinoza probably studied under Morteira once a week in
the Keter Torah yeshiva sometime after Spinoza left daily school at Talmud Torah.
641 Nadler biography 100.
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peoples. They will beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks.

Nation will not take up sword against nation, nor will they train for war anymore” (Isa. 2:4).
Bento most probably also looked forward to the visionary millennium and future time in

which “The wolf and the lamb will feed together, and the lion will eat straw like the ox, but

dust will be the serpent’s food. They will neither harm nor destroy in all my holy mountain,’
says the Lord” (Isa. 65:25).

The foregoing facts and more lead us to infer that the young Spinoza was probably

devout. 642 In 1645 at 13 he underwent his bar mitzvah, with the religious ceremony of

publically reading and explaining a passage of Torah. According to Jewish law, at 13 boys
are considered morally responsible for their lives and actions. Not too long after this

Spinoza decides to leave his school despite his father’s wishes. His life then takes a new

track whose trajectory will take him far from everything he has held dear. In fact, the rest of
his life looks like a reaction to the faith of his upbringing, for just about every book he wrote
takes this heritage to task – if not explicitly, at least implicitly.

Nader: “to all appearances, [he lived] a perfectly normal orthodox life and remarkable perhaps
only for his intelligence.” However, Stephen Nadler’s extensive biography of Spinoza is at first
cautious on this subject. To him there is no absolutely certain documentary proof that Spinoza was a
devoted Jew. He argues that this period “is, unfortunately, hidden from us, possibly forever”, and that
“There is so little surviving material, so little that is known for certain about the details of Spinoza’s
life, particularly before 1661 (when his extant correspondence begins), that we can only speculate on
his emotional and intellectual development … But what a rich field for speculation it is.” And again,
later: “But nothing is known about Bento’s activities during these years, aside from whatever
ordinary assumptions one can legitimately make about the life of a young man in an orthodox Jewish
community in Amsterdam” (Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, op. cited, xi, 79). Yet none of the biographies I’ve
read on Spinoza, including his earliest ones, say anything that would make us think otherwise.
Moreover, there’s a lot that one can know by inference from things he has written in his future books
and correspondence. Indeed, as Nadler’s biography proceeds, he tells us more and more about the
early life of Spinoza that makes one feel convinced that he most probably was devout. In a personal
communication on this issue, I asked Nadler about this and he answered my query: “We do not have
any documentary evidence one way or another on this. But there is every reason to believe that, as a
boy growing up in a family that was part of an observant Jewish life” [Note the “there is every reason
to believe that.” All these reasons may not be “documentary evidence”, but they are nevertheless
evidence.] Nadler goes on to say something which I take to be very important in understanding why
Spinoza devoted so much of his labor, time, and life to assessing and criticizing biblical and
theological claims: “I’m certain that his loss of faith and commitment – which seems not to have
occurred until the early 1650’s – was a major even in his life” (5/24/10). I agree.
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Spinoza biographers W.N.A. Klever and Nadler believe that Spinoza “did not finish

the higher education which prepares for the rabbinate” 643. They argue that Spinoza “must

have attended the school until he was a young man of about fourteen years old” and then

went on to work for his father. 644 This means that Spinoza’s formal schooling went only up
to the 4th grade. Still, after this he may have, or probably did, further schooling at Keter

Torah once a week. Spinoza then never did get to study Talmud, Mishna, Gemara, “and

other classical texts” while at Talmud Torah. These he had to study on his own, though it

may be the case that he studied these texts under rabbi Mortera at Keter Torah, as well. 645
Nadler and Klever believe that his father was against his son’s decision to leave

school. 646 If this is so, then why would he go against his father’s wishes and leave Talmud

Torah, especially because he could have had a bright future there if he stayed? So many

questions; so few definitive and certain answers. There are some things that are definitive
and certain, however: the Spinoza of 1646 at 14 and the Spinoza of 1656 at 24 are as

different from each other as the Counter-Enlightenment is from the Radical Enlightenment.
He had not only lost his faith, but he was to become one of the world’s most deadly
philosophical enemies of traditional religion. How did this happen?

Before answering this question in some detail, let us first give a quick overview of

Spinoza’s life to give the reader a clear and simple representation of the timeline of Baruch
to Benedict, from believing Jew to apostate to one of the 17th century’s greatest

philosophers. Then we’ll be at a better vantage point to assimilate more of the scholarly
details.

Klever, op. cited, 15.
Ibid.
645 Nadler’s biography, 64-65.
646 Ibid. 59.
643
644
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Brief chronology of an apostate and antichrist

[The following is a rough chronology of Spinoza’s life from his birth in 1632 to his

excommunication in 1656. It is my synthesis based on all the major Spinoza biographies,
especially Klever’s and Nadler’s. 647]
I.

1632 to 1646 (0 to 15)

1632: Born to Portuguese-Jewish parents in Amsterdam.
1639: At seven begins orthodox Talmud Torah School.
1645: At 13, Spinoza has bar mitzvah.

1646: At 14, he probably leaves Talmud Torah and begins work with his father.

1647: At around 15 Spinoza raises questions which his rabbis do not answer sufficiently.
II.

1646 to 1650 (14 to 18) (?)

Spinoza the business man by day and student by night enters the larger world of European
culture, of the Gentiles, of Christians – Lutherans, Roman Catholics, Calvinists, Collegiants,
free thinkers, materialists, and so on.
Probably reads the great Jewish theologians, Bible commentators, and philosophers.
Probably also read some non-Jewish biblical critical works.

Probably has a circle of contacts and friends, including free spirits, which encourage his
learning further.
III.

Early 1650s to 1656 (18 to 24)

His father dies in 1654 (when Spinoza is 22).

Leaves Jewish community and begins to study Latin, the classics, science, and philosophy at
the Van den Enden household. It is highly probable that he learns Bacon and Descartes.

As was pointed out above, not all Spinoza biographers are agreed on the dating of, or even the
actuality of, some occurrences in Spinoza’s life. In my chronology above, I’ve done my best to avoid
the most debatable points. The least substantiated by certain documentary evidence in my account
above is in II. 1646 to 1650. The subdivisions in this timeline are what I take to be the most
important periods of Spinoza’s life in relation to the question of what Klever called his “process of
secularization.” Others may differ.
647
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Spinoza is summoned to give an account of his beliefs and behavior before the judges of the
community.

On July 27, 1656 the Jewish community pronounces the most stringent cherem in its history
against Spinoza’s apostasy.
IV.

1656 to 1663

Writes his Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect along with the Short Treatise on God,
Man and His Well-being.

1663: Publishes The Principles of Cartesian Philosophy.
V.

1663 to 1677

1670: Publishes the Theological Political Treatise which is an unrelenting assault on both
Judaism and Christianity.

1677: Spinoza dies. Most of his works, including the Ethics and correspondence, are
published. Though less direct, the Ethics also is at bottom a sustained attack on the
theologies and philosophies generated by Jewish and Christian ideas.

With this quick and simple outline before us, we can now look more closely at Spinoza’s life
to gain greater insight into the far-reaching transformation he underwent in his thinking.
We begin in 1646 when he is 14-years-old and has decided to leave school.
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Baruch to Benedict: questions to doubts to loss of faith to apostasy to antichrist
“the ever-entrancing question: how did Spinoza come to be Spinoza? i.e., how did this young man, raised
in the Portuguese Jewish community in Amsterdam, come to rebel against the religious tradition in
which he was raised, and become the symbol in Western thought of the rational reconstruction of
religion” – Edwin Curley 648

[In the ten year period from 1646 to the 1656 excommunication, from ages 14 to 24,
Spinoza leaves school, goes into his father’s business, meets all sorts of people, including
free thinkers, his faith dissipates, studies a great deal, his father dies, he leaves the Jewish
quarter, he comes to reject the religion of his father, he meets, lives with, and studies Latin,
the classics, the sciences, philosophy, Bacon and Descartes, under Franciscus van Enden,
and then begins his writings. 649]
Questions to doubts

At the end of our section on Baruch’s orthodox education, we mentioned that in

1646 at 14 he decides to leave school. We asked the question then, “Why would he go

against his father’s wishes and leave Talmud Torah, especially because he would have had a

bright future there if he stayed?” Why did he leave Talmud Torah when he could have gone
on to the rabbinate or greater leadership, with all the accruements that such a life would
have brought? Something or some things evidently happened.

Edwin Curley, “Spinoza and the Science of Hermeneutics,” 4. I’m not entirely sure all that Curley
may mean by the expression “rational reconstruction of religion”, but as he himself points out, there
are two schools of thought with respect to the question of Spinoza and God or religion: one that
argues that Spinoza and his philosophy are atheistic through and through; and another, “atheistic”
with respect only to traditional and all anthropomorphic religious conceptions, but that might
nevertheless hold out some kind of heterodox view of God.
649 I wish to point out, once again, that the following account should be thought of as hypothetical
(e.g. my current best guess) and not certain. Most of the top contemporary Spinoza scholars make
this caveat, and therefore so should this account which is mostly based on theirs. But even if much in
the following account were somehow false, the biographical, educational, religious, social, and
historical details provided to give some account of Spinoza’s journey from faith to unbelief can’t help
but to enrich our knowledge of Spinoza, his life, and times. And for nothing else, such enrichment
makes the study valuable. This is attested to by Spinoza biographers and scholars, as well. Take
Nadler’s exhaustive account, for instance: though he sometimes makes the most skeptical of
comments about many of the details in on Spinoza, he nevertheless devotes whole books to
discussing these details.
648
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At 14 or 15 we learn in the earliest biography we have of Spinoza (which was

probably written by his friend Lucas which may have been reported by Spinoza) 650 that he

started to have some questions and doubts at this time. This biographer records that

Spinoza’s narrow education’s “study of Hebrew Literature” “was not capable of satisfying

completely a brilliant mind like his.” 651 He had raised questions to some of the rabbis, but

they were not able to sufficiently answer or resolve his questions or doubts. Baruch knew

enough not to ask further questions so as not to embarrass the rabbis. So he kept his doubts

and questions to himself, and worked on these on his own.

He was not yet fifteen years old when he raised difficulties which the most learned
among the Jews found it hard to solve. And though such extreme youth is hardly the
age of understanding, still he had enough of it to perceive that his doubts
embarrassed his teacher. Being afraid to irritate him, he pretended to be very
satisfied with his answers, contenting himself with writing them down in order to
make use of them at the proper time and place. 652
So there we have it. Spinoza’s earliest biographer tells us one of the first causes of

Spinoza’s eventual loss of faith. Klever and Nadler seem to agree with this account. For
them, Spinoza used the decision to leave Torah Talmud to get free from the intellectual
constraints, pressure, and narrow-mindedness of Talmud Torah. Klever interprets

Spinoza’s decision to leave in this way:

He had refused to continue his studies in the higher courses in Jewish theology,
although his father, a faithful and perhaps also conservative member of the
community recommended them forcefully… [But Spinoza’s] critique of the Jewish
system … deepened. He could only free himself from their pressure by a commercial
participation in public life in his father’s business; this seemed to him a promising way
out.” 653

Lucas notes that because “it was not safe to write about Spinoza in a friendly or respectful
manner” and that it was in fact better to go “out of their way to throw mud at Spinoza in order to
divert attention from themselves”, “our reliable information about the life of Spinoza is rather
meager” (The Oldest Biography of Spinoza, ed. A. Wolf, 18-19). More evidence for this is the fact that
the oldest biography was written anonymously.
651 Ibid. 42.
652 Ibid.
653 Klever, op. cited, 17, my emphasis. Like Klever, Nadler is also in general agreement with the Lucas
account. See his Spinoza: A Life, 100.
650
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His thinking evidently started to change. Somehow or other he began to think

independently. Somehow or other he began to think differently. He began to believe his own
thought in spite of the conspiracy of his society to be a conformist. He began to entertain

and then to take seriously doubts – doubts about the beliefs, interpretations, and practices

of the ole’ time religion of his faith-community. He probably heard some things and read
some things, and these, along with his reasoning, fueled further doubts. He was a smart,

dedicated, studious kid, so he almost certainly read a great deal. There are several factors

that one can cite as (at least) influences in his thinking which led to further doubts and then,
eventually, to the total loss of faith in Judaism and in all traditional religion. Some of these
probably had a more profound effect on Spinoza’s thinking then others.

More questions, more doubts, more knowledge: 1646 to 1650 from age 14 to 18 (?)
From Jewish sources 654
Introduction

So Spinoza leaves school and begins to work for his father’s import-export firm. This takes
him away from the pressures to conform at school and into the larger world of European

culture, of the Gentiles, of Christians – Lutherans, Roman Catholics, Calvinists, Collegiants,
free thinkers, materialists, and more. Sometime during this period, it is believed that he

gained a wider circle of contacts and friends, and may even have eventually been going to

meetings in which some members were unbelievers. None of Spinoza’s biographers doubt
that all these contacts and influences went into the cauldron of the thinking, comparing,

Because most works which discuss Spinoza’s intellectual influences emphasize non-Jewish
philosophical sources, I wish to focus on the major Jewish influences (as Yovel and Nadler have done)
especially with respect to their biblical theological underpinnings.
654
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contrasting, and testing that were going on in this young man’s mind about his religion and
all religion.

We can’t give a month by month or even a year by year chronology of what he read,

what influenced him, who he met, who he talked to, what Jewish thinkers most influenced

him, what non-Jewish meetings he may have went to, etc. But we do know that from 1646

to 1650 he amassed a great deal of knowledge. During this period, some think that he read
some of the great Jewish theologians, Bible commentators, and philosophers. His weekly

Keter Torah classes under rabbi Mortera may have helped in this. Nadler says that he kept
up his studies even after he went to work for his father. 655 Nadler also believes that it is

almost certain that Spinoza began to closely study the great Jewish philosophers during his
businessman period while attending weekly yeshiva classes. But he makes it clear that

Spinoza probably did not study the Talmud or the Mishnah or Gemara much, though he no

doubt heard many quotes and thoughts on them from his teachers. Even though “Mortera’s
Keter Torah group was devoted to studying primarily ‘The Law’ … He may also have

provided his more enterprising and capable students – among whom no doubt, he counted
Spinoza – with readings in medieval Jewish Bible commentary (particularly Rashi and Ibn
Ezra) and classical Jewish philosophy… Mortera would [probably] have introduced his
students to the works of Maimonides, Saadya Gaon, and Gersonides, among others.” 656

Like Nadler, Yovel also takes up the question of what Jews and Jewish theological

and philosophical influences may have assisted Spinoza in his eventual rejection of religion.
Yovel credits Harry A. Wolfson with showing that

655
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the young Spinoza’s reading the works of Jewish medieval philosophers may well
have provided him with ample food for heterodox thought…In other words, the
tradition of Jewish philosophy itself – from Maimonides and Gersonides, Ibn Ezra
and Crescas to Yehuda Abrabanel (Leone Ebreo) – provided Spinoza with ideas and
clues that … could well inspire bold and dangerous thinking. In this sense, there is

Nadler’s biography 89.
Ibid. 93.
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some justice in Rabbi Morteira’s dictum, that ‘he who philosophizes is evil’….Yet in
order to plunge into philosophy, a young man like Spinoza must have already
possessed an inquisitive disposition and a restless mind; and this he could have
drawn through a thousand arteries from the mental and educational background of
his youth… The combination of his specific cultural [Marrano] and personal
background with the body of ideas and arguments in Jewish philosophy could well
have sparked in Spinoza a critical and inquisitive flame – nourished mainly, if not
exclusively, from Jewish life itself – long before he came into contact with outside
influences and before he met other heterodox figures within the community and
entered into a mutual relationship with them. 657

Like Nadler’s account of Spinoza’s thought, this contextual assessment adds to the standard
contemporary philosophical and scientific story that is usually emphasized in accounts of

the influences that led Spinoza to reject religion. The only thing that I would disagree with

in Yovel’s/Wolfson’s account as given above is that he fails to realize or note that the major

Jewish philosophers that he cites obtained much or most of their philosophical ideas not

from specifically Jewish sources, such as preeminently in the Bible. On the contrary, much
or most of their sources ultimately stem from the pagan rationalist Greek philosophers.
Menasseh ben Israel
Another probable significant influence in Spinoza’s thinking, which serves as

another example to demonstrate that doubts and challenges to the faith were in the air in

17th century Europe (even in strongly devout areas such as the Amsterdam Jewish quarter),
we may take the case of rabbi Menasseh ben Israel. Menasseh ben Israel is important for

our study because some scholars believe that Spinoza was greatly influenced by Menasseh

ben Israel, who was “perhaps the most worldly … rabbi of the seventeenth century.” 658 Not

only was he more worldly than the other rabbis, but “He was, without question, the most
famous Jewish apologist of his time.” 659
Yovel, op. cited, 84.
Nadler biography 93-4.
659 Ibid. 96.
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In his essay “Maimonides, Spinoza, and the Book of Job” Edwin Curley reports that

Manasseh ben Israel’s book The Conciliator attempts to explain all the apparently

contradictory passage in Scripture. His premise was that since the Bible is “in the highest

degree true, it cannot contain any text really contradictory of another.” 660 Here we must note

two very important details. First, it shows once again that the Spinoza’s teachers believed the
literal truth of the scriptures very much as the Protestants like the Reformed did, that is, as
the word of God. Secondly, because Ben Israel takes the Bible to be literally true, based on
this premise, he assumes a methodology in biblical interpretation that the Bible cannot
contradict itself.

Curley reports that Ben Israel’s methodology in reconciling scriptures that

contradict one another is not very convincing. So, for instance, in “Whatever difficulties
Spinoza may have had with Maimonides' [more liberal] treatment of Job, I suspect he

recognized it to be superior to Manasseh’s. 661 But he also had a great deal of disagreement

with Maimonides’ philosophy and treatment of scripture. Sounding very much like Hobbes

against the scholastics, Spinoza complains that the religious thinkers in his time don’t teach
anything but

Aristotelian and Platonic speculations. Not to seem to constantly follow pagans, they
have accommodated Scripture to these speculations. It was not enough for them to be
insane with the Greeks, they wanted the prophets to rave with them. This clearly
shows that they do not see the divinity of Scripture even through a dream. 662
We can tell from such background information then that Spinoza would have come

face to face with some of the major intellectual defenses for (and therefore by entailment,

some of the major arguments against) Judaism in his time. Ben Israel wrote another work

published in 1651 in which “he tried to reconcile the apparent inconsistencies in Scripture
“Maimonides, Spinoza and the Book of Job” from Jewish Themes in Spinoza’s Philosophy, ed. by
Heidi Ravven and Lenn Goodman (New York: SUNY Press, 2002), 30/42.
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Ibid. 34/42.
Ibid. 35/42.
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with the help of ancient and modern commentaries.” He wrote this also “so that the

marranos, above all, could see that the central text of Judaism is not full of

contradictions.” 663 Now why would a rabbi be writing such books unless at that time and
place there was a lot of talk, rumors, and books that taught that the Scriptures had

inconsistencies and was ‘full of contradictions’? And if this was the case, then anyone who
was paying attention to such debates, would no doubt be influenced by it. 664 Eventually,

Spinoza will write his TTP, which will highlight many of the inconsistencies and

contradictions in biblical and traditional teachings. But, again, Spinoza’s anti-apologetics

was not unique for his time. This challenge to God’s Word was out and about, in the air, and
in people’s minds.

It should not be thought, however, that Menasseh was a rationalist or only

interested in rationally inclined apologetics. On the contrary, as in most things religious,

there is usually a mixture of the reasonable and the beyond-reasonable. In 1650 Menasseh
wrote Hope of Israel arguing that the Messiah was close at hand: “Menasseh could not say
for sure when redemption was to arrive – 1648 was a date bandied about by certain

kabbalists – but he believed it to be close at hand, ‘for we see many prophecies fulfilled’.” 665

Spinoza owned a copy of a kabbalist work and Menasseh’s Hope of Israel and “was familiar

with Menasseh’s own writings…All of this…suggest – but by no means establishes – that

Menasseh played some kind of formative role in the broadening of Spinoza’s intellectual
horizons.” 666

Ibid.
It is a well known phenomenon in the field of Religion that students who study at seminaries that
deal with apologetics often end up imbibing a lot of reasons to disbelieve, which then often leads to
the ending of their faith.
665 Nadler biography 96-7.
666 Ibid. 99-100. By the way, Ben Israel’s works, such as The Conciliator and The Hope of Israel, offer a
gold mine of information about many of the beliefs and practices of the Jews of the day. In his
dedication to The Hope of Israel, for instance, we learn that the prayer life of the Jews was more than
merely formal reading of prayers. Ben Israel states, “But I entreat you to be certain that I pour out
continual prayers to God for your happiness” (A3). I don’t know the extent to which Spinoza
663
664
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About the influence that Menasseh probably had in Spinoza’s life, Nadler states

It is possible that this enterprising, cosmopolitan, and well-connected rabbi with
messianic interests was, at some point, Spinoza’s teacher… Menasseh was familiar
with the writings of Issac La Peyrere, a French Calvinist who held that Moses was
not the author of the Pentateuch, that there were many people in existence before
Adam and Eve… and the arrival of the Messiah expected by the Jews was imminent.
Menasseh, who wrote a refutation of the ‘pre-Adamite’ theory in 1656, may have
been responsible for introducing the ‘young rebels’ in the Jewish community to La
Peyrere’s ideas. Spinoza could certainly have been among his circle. He owned a
copy of the Prae-Adamitae and used material from it in his own Bible criticism, and
his familiarity with La Peyrere’s theses may stem from the time when he was still in
the Jewish community. 667

Somewhere along the line then Spinoza also heard or read some of the heretical

works of Uriel da Costa, Juan Prado, and biblical critics such as Isaac La Peyere. Yovel and

Nadler believe that this period of Jewish reading increased his critical questions and doubts
about Judaism. It is plausible to believe also that these doubts extended to most biblical
theology and to a great deal of the philosophy and science based on them.

Of the many Jewish sources that Spinoza read that no doubt nourished further

questions and doubts, we may take Uriel da Costa as a kind of model example to show the

reader how Enlightenment skeptical ideas even among the Jews were much in the air in 17th

century Europe. 668

The case of Uriel da Costa as skeptical influence on Spinoza.
In the order of his book, Nadler suggests the case of Uriel Da Costa as possibly one of the

first influences in Spinoza’s life that may have caused him some doubts because of the “dark

shadow of heterodoxy” over the Talmud Torah congregation that came from him. However,
there’s no certainty when Spinoza read Da Costa. We refer to this case here because,

biographers and scholars such as Nadler have studied these works, but I can say that anyone who
wants to get a better understanding of the Jewish mindset, theology, and devotional life at the time of
Spinoza should study these works.
667 Ibid. 99.
668 See also Yovel, op. cited, on the influence other Jewish thinkers (including Da Costa) had on
Spinoza - such as Juan Prado, Isaac La Peyrere, and others, pp. 42-84. A
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according to Nadler and other contemporary Spinoza biographers, Da Costa’s views

“without question had an impact on Spinoza’s intellectual development” regarding doubts
about the faith. 669 Nadler suggests that Spinoza may very well have been influenced by

Uriel da Costa’s heretical thinking. There were even probably some kinship ties between

the Da Costa and the Espinoza families: “Either way, there is no doubt that Spinoza himself,

like any member of the community at the time, was familiar with Da Costa’s heretical ideas;
he probably meditated long and hard over them.” 670

In the early to mid-1600s, Uriel da Costa (whose family was prominent in the Jewish

community in Amsterdam) wrote books that were deemed blasphemous and heretical by

the rabbis, teachers, and community. His father was a Christian and his mother a Judaizer.
In his autobiography he tells us that he was brought up as a Christian in Portugal, and, like

all good Christians, “he feared eternal damnation and confessed his sins regularly.” 671 But
then doubts started to annoy him. And then they got worse. This threw him into great
turmoil. In his autobiography, he writes:

Since I found it difficult to abandon a religion to which I had been accustomed ever
since the cradle and which, thanks to faith, had established deep roots in me, I
uttered these doubts (when I was around twenty-two years old): Could what is said
about another life be a fiction? Does the faith given to such sayings agree with
reason? For reason directly repeats for me a number of things and ceaselessly
whispers things altogether contrary [to faith]. 672

Note his mention that because his faith was inbred in him since the cradle, it established
deep roots in him. This explains the extremely difficult, painful, and lengthy time it took

him to finally accept the whispers of his reason against the prejudices of his upbringing. We
think there is good reason to think this same slow and painful process occurred in the

adolescent-to-young-adulthood years of Baruch. Note, too, Uriel’s use of the word “reason”
Nadler, op. cited, 72-3.
Nadler, op. cited, 66.
671 Ibid.
672 Ibid. 67.
669
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here, and how he juxtaposes it with faith. Spinoza will use this same language not many
years hence from his bar mitzvah.

Uriel’s autobiography shows that there are other Christians and Jews of the time 673

that were suffering from attacks of Enlightenment rationalist works against their biblical

theological beliefs even before Hobbes’s Leviathan or Spinoza and his TTP. At any rate, Da
Costa worries: “Could what is said about another life be a fiction?” Talmud Torah Rabbi

Mortera, of course, didn’t think so. He preached that Jews who violate the covenant and

who reject the doctrines of the immortality of the soul and of the afterlife will suffer eternal
torment. Da Costa’s case may be instructive to us in our attempts to understand the

mentality of the young Spinoza. Some Spinoza biographies imply that Spinoza probably
didn’t suffer much over the loss of his faith. But this seems hard to believe for several

reasons, one of which may be learned from the case of Da Costa. Since thinkers such as

Uriel feared eternal damnation because he was brought up to believe in such doctrines, why
should it not be the case that Spinoza, his contemporary, would not equally fear eternal
damnation, since he too was brought up to believe in it?

Wishing to resolve these doubts, Uriel tries his mother’s religion and converts to

Judaism. He gets circumcised and then leaves Portugal to live in the Amsterdam Jewish

community with his mother. But reason whispers things altogether contrary to this faith,

This “time” has been called the “Enlightenment” by historians. Jonathan Israel uses historian Paul
Hazard’s expression “Crisis of the European Mind” to “denote the unprecedented intellectual turmoil
which commenced in the mid-seventeenth century, with the rise of Cartesianism and the subsequent
spread of ‘mechanical philosophy’ or the ‘mechanistic world-view’, an upheaval which heralded the
onset of the Enlightenment proper in the closing years of the century. Admittedly, new philosophical
and scientific ideas such as Cartesianism cannot claim all the credit for engineering the resulting
revolutionary transformation in European culture. New kinds of theological controversy often
contributed both to the weakening the internal cohesion of the main confessional blocs [including
within the Jewish community] and, as has been shown in the case of the decline of belief in Hell and
eternal torment for the damned, to driving some of the most characteristic changes in attitude
regarding traditional beliefs during this most decisive of all periods of cultural change” (Israel,
Radical Enlightenment, 14). We see this at work in the theological controversies caused by Uriel da
Costa and others (ex. Juan de Prado) within the Jewish community. To get a better understanding of
the affects of the Enlightenment on Judaism, see Joseph Blau’s Modern Varieties of Judaism (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1966), especially chapters one and two.
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too. At first he criticizes what he takes to be an excessive amount of “Pharisaism” in the

rabbinic traditions of the Oral Law, which is the Talmud. At around this time he becomes

bothered also by doubts about the immortality of the soul and of the hereafter or eternal
life. 674 Eventually he “rejected the rite of circumcision and mocked the usage of various
articles of Jewish ritual, including tefillin (phylacteries), tallitot (prayer shawls), and
mezuzot.” 675

Da Costa’s studies eventually lead him to argue that

the human soul is mortal and does not survive the death of the body… It is not
created by God separately and then placed in the body…Thus, it is necessarily as
mortal and perishable as the human (or any) body. It follows that there is no
afterlife, and no eternal reward or punishment.” 676 As a result of these heresies, he
is placed under a ban by the Hamburg and then the Amsterdam Jewish communities.
He was also arrested and put in jail, and his book was burned. 677
Da Costa came to doubt the central claim of Judaism: “I came to the conclusion that

the Law did not come from Moses, but is only a human invention, just like many other such

inventions in the world… God, the author of the law of nature, could not contradict himself,

which he must have done if he ordered man to fulfill commandments which are contrary to

Nadler biography 68.
Nadler, op. cited, 69. Note: this gives us some documented visuals to add to our understanding of
the orthodoxy of the Judaism of the time. Rembrandt’s “The Jews in the Synagogue” (1648) and the
two drawings of the external and internal appearance of the Amsterdam Portuguese Synagogue (see
Nadler’s biography of Spinoza plates 3, 4, and 5) don’t do justice to the far more biblical character
that they possessed. If an artist depicted the goings-on in the temple during worship, a far more
religious scene would be shown. The ark is the focal point of all Jewish worship. In it lay the Law of
God. They used these physical, visible religious items in obedience to God’s commands to do so in the
Torah in order to make sure that His people never forget Him, leave Him, or take Him for granted.
For the meaning of “mezuzot” see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mezuzah. The biblical sources for
some of these religious practices are Exodus 13:9, Deuteronomy 6:-4-9; 11:13-21; Numbers 15:38
and Deuteronomy 22:12 – “You shall put these words of mine on your heart and on your soul; and
you shall tie them for a sign upon your arm, and they shall be as totafot between your eyes”
(Deuteronomy 11:18). Note also, once again, how seriously and literally the Jews took the Scriptures.
For the centrality of the ark (and the Law in it) in Jewish worship, see Ex. 25:10-16, 22; Lam. 2:1;
Numbers 4: 5-6; 10:33-36, 35:5; Josh. 4:5, 6:4-20; 1 Sam. 3:3; 2 Chron.6:41.
676 Ibid. 69.
677 Ibid. 70.
674
675
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a nature of which we know the author.” 678 Da Costa’s argument here is two-fold: the first is

theoretical and the second is moral.

A cherem was pronounced against him, but (for whatever reasons) he consented to

atone for his wickedness “by submitting to flagellation” of thirty-nine stripes in a horrible
public scene in the Amsterdam synagogue (see his horrific description of this in Nadler’s

Spinoza: A Life, pp. 71-2). This humiliation was more than he could bear. A few days later
he committed suicide.

Though Spinoza was only eight years old when Da Costa killed himself,

Nonetheless, Da Costa’s views on the immortality of the soul, the status of the Torah
– whether it had been written by Moses communicating the word of God or was
simply an ‘invention’ by a number of people at some later time – and the
superstitious nature of organized religion were widely discussed and long
remembered within the community, and without question had an impact on
Spinoza’s intellectual development. 679
To end this section on the Jewish influences which probably assisted Spinoza’s loss

of faith, I wish to underscore a point implied by Yirmiyahu Yovel. Yovel implies that
Spinoza would never have come to the philosophical positions he came to (in ethics,

metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and more) had he not first achieved his in-depth analysis

of biblical religion. In this sense, some central aspects of his philosophy stem from his

experience of and searching critique of religion even before learning the new sciences, the

new philosophy, and Descartes. 680 If the accounts are true that Spinoza’s early education at
Ibid. 71.
Nadler biography 72-73. Nadler seems confident in his account in many places in his biography;
but then, at the same time, he cautions us that much of his account may not ultimately be true
because we simply don’t have enough proof or certainty from the documented evidence available.
Six pages after he writes the above, he says: “But nothing is known about Bento’s activities during
these years (the early 40s), aside from whatever ordinary assumptions one can legitimately make
about the life of a young man in an orthodox Jewish community in Amsterdam” (79). Still, a lot of
credible assumptions and inferences can legitimately be made about the ordinary life of a young man
in an orthodox Jewish community in Amsterdam, even if, at the same time, they cannot be perfectly
proven.
680 While I accept this claim in one sense, I’m afraid I don’t in the expanded sense in which Yovel
means it. For Yovel, as for Nadler, the Jewish community was more enlightened than has usually
been depicted. But for Yovel, he thinks that it was so cultured and enlightened that Spinoza derived
678
679
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Talmud Torah was almost exclusively religious, and that he had questions and doubts about
religion as early as 14 or 15, then it is indeed the case that Spinoza was questioning,
doubting, and testing religion even before he learned much about the new sciences,
philosophies, and Descartes.

Doubts to unbelief to “mental crisis”: his non-Jewish studies in the classics,
philosophy, and the sciences, early to mid-1650s.

At this point, we’re getting a better idea of the many forces at work against Spinoza’s faith.

After years of mostly Jewish and biblical studies, Spinoza begins to tire of his entire Jewish
education. Nadler says:

Within just a few years, Spinoza must have been feeling a sufficient lack of
contentment with the education he had acquired, and having some rather serious
doubts about Judaism, both its dogma and its practices, was ready to seek
enlightenment elsewhere. By the time Baruch was twenty-two, he may in fact have
been undergoing a kind of spiritual and intellectual crisis similar to that experienced
by Uriel da Costa over thirty-five years earlier. 681

R. H. M. Elwes makes a stronger claim that Spinoza may have suffered a “mental crisis”
somewhere in this period:

Meanwhile the brilliant Jewish student was overtaken by that mental crisis, which
has come over so many lesser men before and since. The creed of his fathers was
found unequal to the strain of his own wider knowledge and changed spiritual
needs. The Hebrew faith with its immemorial antiquity, its unbroken traditions, its
myriads of martyrs, could appeal to an authority which no other religion has

all of his religious critique from his religious community and not from outside it: “He developed his
reflections and criticisms of religion solely from within the world of contemporary Judaism.” He
claims that Spinoza was able to accomplish this before having read any philosophy or science (Yovel,
5-6). At this point in my research on this matter, I take it that Nadler has the more up to date
information on the level of culture of the Jewish community and of the dating of when and where
Spinoza obtained the bulk of his secular learning in the classics, philosophy, and science – that is, that
he derived these mostly from outside the Jewish community.
681 Ibid. 101, my emphasis. I checked with Nadler on this claim of “a kind of spiritual and intellectual
crisis”, and, once again, he adds a strong skeptical caveat to his account of Spinoza’s loss of faith. In a
personal communication to me he wrote: “the chronology of his loss of faith and how he felt about his
herem – my best guess is found in my description of his gradual loss of faith in my biography. Sure,
I’m certain he found it painful, but we have nothing to go on whatsoever about his actual feelings, so
it’s all speculative.”
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equalled, and Spinoza, as we know from a passage in one of his letters, felt the claim
to the full. We may be sure that the gentle and reserved youth was in no haste to
obtrude his altered views, but the time arrived when they could no longer be with
honesty concealed. 682
Nadler hypothesizes that Spinoza may have found “the ancient learning to which he

had devoted so much time too narrow to satisfy his natural curiosity for ideas.” 683 His dad’s
death during this period, along with his continued intellectual exchanges with all sorts of

other gentile and Christian groups – all this probably exacerbated his straying from Moses,

the Law, Judaism, the Scriptures, and faith. 684 Regarding the learning of new theological and
moral principles: he may have been influenced by Collegiants and disaffected Remonstrants,
Quakers, and Mennonites that true piety consists entirely in love of God and neighbor 685

During these years (ages 15-22), Spinoza would have been exposed to a variety of

liberal theological opinions and have come across much talk of new developments in

philosophy and science, such as Descartes’ recent innovations in physics and mathematics.
Spinoza may even at this time have begun attending meetings of one or another of the
groups of freethinkers that proliferated in seventeenth-century Amsterdam and
participating in their discussions of religion, philosophy, and politics. 686

Nadler says that it becomes clear that “by 1654 or 1655 he was devoting his spare

time to studies of an entirely different and secular nature” 687:

around this time he decided to learn Latin, and almost all biographers date this
before the excommunication, Spinoza may not have been having much to do with
the Jewish community beyond what was required for his commercial activities and
what was minimally expected of a member-in-good-standing of the congregation. It
is likely that he was no longer attending Mortera’s Keter Torah by this point. 688

Benedictus de Spinoza. A Theologico-Political Treatise and a Political Treatise, translated and
introduced by R. H. M. Elwes (New York: Cosimo Inc., 2005), xii.
683 Nadler, op. cited, 101.
684 Nadler op. cited, 101.
685 Ibid. 107.
686 Ibid.
687 Nadler, footnote 29 on page 363.
688 Ibid. 102.
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Lucas states that at around this time “he had so little intercourse with the Jews for some

time that he was obliged to associate with Christians, and he formed ties of friendship with
intellectual people.” These friends urged him to study Latin to pursue his studies, but

Spinoza had the problem of finding a way of how to learn Latin. At around this time, he

meets, and then studies, and then lives with Franciscus van den Enden, a former Jesuit, and
now free thinker and “atheist.” Lutheran pastor and Spinoza biographer John Colerus

blames Van den Enden for “sowing the first seeds and foundations of atheism in his young

students.” 689 This may have been true for others, but these seeds were evidently in the soil

of the mind of Spinoza before he knew Van den Enden, – though Van den Enden probably
was a powerful influence in watering these seeds.

Nadler says that it is uncertain when Spinoza began studying in the Van den Enden

household. But based on

what can reasonably be surmised about his increasing dissatisfaction with his
Jewish religious studies and his growing desire to learn more about philosophy and
science (particularly contemporary developments in those fields), processes that
almost certainly peaked while he was still a merchant and thus in his early twenties,
it is plausible that Spinoza turned to the ex-Jesuit for instruction sometime around
1654 or 1655 – that is, before his excommunication from the Jewish community. 690

Klever agrees with Lucas’s account that Spinoza’s departure from the Jewish community
and entry into Van den Enden’s world occurred before 1656. Based on the testimony of
reformed theologian Salomon van Til, Lucas, Colerus, Bayle, and the text of the

excommunication, Klever argues that Spinoza left the Synagogue because of his reading and
learning in the sciences, including Descartes. 691 In his view, Spinoza probably met Van den

Enden before his excommunication – maybe sometime in 1652. Here he learned not only
Latin, the new science, and philosophy, but “atheism”, too. 692
Ibid. 104.
Ibid. 106.
691 Klever 18-21.
692 Klever 17.
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It was during this period that Spinoza learned more about liberal politics and

theology, as well. There seems to be no doubt then that his time at the Van den Enden’s

was of crucial importance to his intellectual and personal development…He must, by
that point, have been articulating, at least in his own mind and perhaps also to
others (which may have led to his excommunication), his dismissive views of
religion. He may also have begun formulating, if only in a rudimentary form, the
radical political, ethical, and metaphysical principles to which he would eventually
give written systematic expression. 693

During his time studying at the Van den Enden’s he probably picked up further learning of
the great classics 694 along with further knowledge of the arts and sciences; for if Spinoza
studied under Van den Enden, then he would have read “the ancient classics of poetry,

drama, and philosophy – the literary legacy of Greece and Rome 695 – as well as neoclassical

works of the Renaissance.” 696 Moreover, Van den Enden’s students would have at least been
introduced “to Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic philosophy; to Seneca, Cicero, and Ovid; and
perhaps even to the principles of ancient skepticism. They would also have read the great
epics, tragedies, comedies, and histories of antiquity.” 697 He even had his students act out

Nadler biography of Spinoza, 107.
Ibid. 108. I think Nietzsche’s estimation of the value of the study of the Greeks, though overstated
in part, is generally accurate: “Every prerequisite for an erudite culture, all the scientific methods
were already there … the prerequisite for a cultural tradition, for a uniform science; natural science,
in concert with mathematics and mechanics, was on the best possible road – the sense for facts, the
last-developed and most valuable of all the senses, had its schools and its tradition already centuries
old! Is this understood? Everything essential for setting to work had been devised – methods, one
must repeat ten times, are the essential, as well as being the most difficult, as well as being that which
has habit and laziness against it the longest. What we have won back for ourselves today with an
unspeakable amount of self-constraint – for we all still have bad instincts, the Christian instincts,
somewhere within us – the free view of reality, the cautious hand, patience and seriousness in the
smallest things, the whole integrity of knowledge – was already there! Already more than two
millennia ago! … (Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist, trans. Walter Kaufmann, 182-3). As we saw in
our earlier chapter on the Greeks, it was this Greek rational culture that was a threat to not only
Greek religion, but also to the Hebrew and then the Christian religion, as well. And this is why all
three religions set their teeth against this culture. The point I’m trying to make here is that one
should not think that Spinoza’s study of the great Jewish philosophers and of 17th century philosophy
and science were the only major influences that assisted in extricating Spinoza from the in-bred
prejudices and “the main false assumptions that prevail regarding religion” (Spinoza, TTP, trans.
Shirley, 3). As Nietzsche implies, the Greeks alone could have accomplished this.
695 The study of the classics alone, according to many thinkers such as Nietzsche, is sufficient to teach
the love of truth and the passion for carefulness of methodology in attaining it.
696 Nadler: Spinoza: A Life, 109.
697 Ibid. 109.
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and give monologues of dramatic speeches, such as those of Terence. 698 Nadler tells us

further about the education he probably received there:

In addition to the education they received in classical literature and philosophy, Van
den Enden’s students were almost certainly introduced to … recent developments in
natural science. It seems likely that Spinoza’s familiarity with sixteenth- and
seventeenth-century thinkers began under Van den Enden’s tutelage. His teacher
could have given him lessons in the ‘new science’ and had him read Bacon, Galileo,
and … Bruno. He may also have directed him to humanists such as Erasmus and
Montaigne… and told him to read Machiavelli, Hobbes, Grotius, Calvin, and Thomas
More. 699

Lucus says that after Spinoza took up with Van den Enden, he came to devote himself to
Descartes’ works above all others. During this time (1654-5) Spinoza probably began

reading “Descartes’s work in physics, physiology, geometry, meteorology, cosmology, and,
of course, metaphysics.” 700

We know that his friends “were devotees of Cartesian thought.” At the Van den

Enden’s he may very well have been led or inspired to read Descartes’ Discourse on Method,

The Meditations, and the Principles of Philosophy. 701 Though his knowledge of Cartesianism
would deepen in the late 1650s, his early biographers are agreed that he was very

influenced by Descartes before the cherem. 702 (Because of the central importance of

Descartes’ influence on Spinoza’s life and philosophy, we devote a whole section to it
below.)

Ibid. 109-110.
Ibidl 111.
700 Ibid. 112.
701 Ibid.
702 Ibid. 113.
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Existential elements which contributed to Spinoza’s loss of faith and new philosophy
Nadler adds another essential element to the story of Spinoza’s loss of faith - an existential

one. He argues that the forces which led Spinoza away from faith were not only due to lack
of satisfaction with the intellectual resources and apologetics of Judaism, but that

He also began to experience what historically must be one of the prime motivations
behind anyone’s choice of a philosophical vocation: a deep sense of the vanitas of
ordinary pursuits, particularly the materialistic pursuits of an Amsterdam merchant,
and a desire for ‘truth’ – not just empirical truths about nature but, more important,
an understanding of the ‘proper goods’ of a human life. 703

Spinoza evidently did not like his life as a business man. Even while in business, he “was
already distracted from these worldly matters and was devoting more and more of his

energies to intellectual interests.” 704 Nadler makes it clear that during this time in which he

is being distracted from his business responsibilities, he “undoubtedly [began] experiencing
a serious weakening of his Jewish faith as he delved ever more deeply into the world of

pagan and gentile letters.” 705 Thus, “By the early to mid 1650s, Spinoza had decided that his
future lay in philosophy.” 706 Nadler argues that the probable proof of this claim can be

found in his autobiographical statement in his later Treatise on the Emendation of the
Intellect:

after experience had taught me that all the things which regularly occur in ordinary
life are empty and futile, and I saw that all the things which were the cause or object
of my fear had nothing of good or bad in themselves, except insofar as [my] mind
was moved by them, I resolved at least to try to find out whether there was anything
which would be the true good, capable of communicating itself, and which alone
would affect the mind, all others being rejected – whether there was something
which, once found and acquired, would continuously give me the greatest joy, to
eternity. 707

Ibid. 101.
Nadler’s Spinoza’s Ethics, 3.
705 Nadler’s Spinoza’s Ethics, 4.
706 Ibid.
707 Ibid. 101-2.
703
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Klever describes Spinoza’s autobiographical confession here as “an account of his

conversion to philosophy” (by “conversion to philosophy”, I take Klever to mean away from
religious thinking):

The first pages of the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect can only be
explained as being very close to Spinoza’s personal experiences and the beginning of
… his new point of view… They are, as it were, notations drawn from his private
journal, from the time of his transition to a new ‘system’. 708
There were other existential, painful, emotional, or traumatic experiences that

occurred during this period as well, which most Spinoza biographers almost totally ignore.
We must not neglect to mention, therefore, that there were a lot of serious problems going

on in Spinoza’s life at this time, including family deaths: “This must have been a depressing
period for Bento. He lost his father, his stepmother, and his sister all in the space of three
years. By 1654, at the age of twenty-one, Spinoza was without parents … and the family

business was growing in debt.” 709 It may also be at this time that someone tried to kill him.
Bayle’s account of Spinoza’s life says that it was around the time that Spinoza distanced

himself more and more from the synagogue that a Jewish assassin tried to kill him. 710 If this

is true, it may be that at this time there was “a climate of deep hostility in the Jewish

community regarding apostasy, of which Spinoza was around this time showing early but
unmistakable signs.” 711 Taking all these events together, most human beings would be

Klever, op. cited, 21.
Ibid. 86.
710 The cherem against Spinoza was not only that “no one should communicate with him, neither in
writing, nor accord him any favor nor stay with him under the same roof nor come within four cubits
in his vicinity” (even his own family), it was also: “nor shall he read any treatise composed or written
by him.” What the rabbis and leaders of Talmud Torah heard from witnesses and from Spinoza was
anathema to them; but if they were allowed to read his future TTP, “The Book Forged in Hell”, they,
or their Christian cousins, might have wanted to go further than the cherem – as one tried to do to
him by knife. One is reminded of the assassination of Dutch film director Theo van Gogh in the same
city of Amsterdam - over three hundred years later this sort of madness is still taking place. He was
shot eight times and then stabbed in the chest and left with a note pinned to him about his heresy.
One is also reminded of the fatwa death sentence pronounced on Salmon Rushdie for merely writing
a book that criticized Mohammed. And thus it goes.
711 Ibid. 110.
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immensely affected. Many people are brought nearer to their religion during such times;
others are led further away.

Apostasy

Why would someone try to kill Spinoza? He must have been a lone crazed individual, right?
Most people today, I think, assume this; but this may not be the truth. We have to

remember that In order to better understand the intense emotion and severity with which
Spinoza’s backsliding causes in the Jewish and Christian communities, we need a better

understanding of how apostasy was thought of in Spinoza’s time. 712 The term “apostate”,
like the term “antichrist”, has particular and clearly drawn out theological lines of

thought. 713 The people who will be charging Spinoza using these loaded terms will not be
using them carelessly or lightly. According to the dictionary, for instance, an apostate is

simply someone who leaves or forsakes his religion. But according to “God’s Word” and

those who believe and follow it, this term is charged with far more sinister consequence.

We cannot spend the day in explicating all the weighty theological issues involved, but we

can at least suggest some so that we are clear on how his 17th century accusers, both Jew and

Christian, thought about these expressions. In early Judaism, apostasy is the gravest of

crimes. Nothing less than stoning to death is the punishment for it. The Torah emphatically
states:

And not only in Spinoza’s time, of course: for example, a colleague of mine in the history of early
modern philosophy not only reported to me that the church he attends practices the scriptural
command of excommunicating members of their congregation who “continue to live in sin”, but
supports this practice as well. Why? “Because that’s what the Scriptures demand.”
713 As professor Ariew puts it in his Descartes and the Last Scholastics (about Descartes’s
terminology): “We need to understand the meaning those terms had in that particular culture.” One
of the ways (albeit sometimes an indirect way) of learning the meaning of special terms an author
uses is by investigating “its immediate reception.” This sometimes can tell us how the work “was
originally intended” (2).
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If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy
bosom, or thy friend, which is as thine own soul, entice thee secretly, saying, Let us
go and serve other gods, which thou hast not known, thou, nor thy fathers, of the
gods of the people which are round about you, nigh unto thee, or far off from thee,
from the one end of the earth even unto the other end of the earth; Thou shalt not
consent unto him, nor hearken unto him; neither shall thine eye pity him, neither
shalt thou spare, neither shalt thou conceal him: But thou shalt surely kill him; thine
hand shall be first upon him to put him to death, and afterwards the hand of all the
people. And thou shalt stone him with stones, that he die; because he hath sought to
thrust thee away from the LORD thy God, which brought thee out of the land of Egypt,
from the house of bondage” (Deuteronomy 13:6–10, my emphasis).

And there are many, many other passages which make clear the biblical God’s feelings about
apostates. And all of them are none too pretty. 714 In later Judaism after the dispersion,

rabbis continued to excoriate apostasy based on Holy Scripture. According to the Jewish
Encyclopedia, the apostate is "one who has separated from the ways of the Jewish

community.” Once he has separated his ways from the Jewish community, "No sacrifice is

accepted from the apostate", "nor have they any respite from eternal doom in Gehenna" 715
With its warp and woof in Judaism, Christianity continues and exacerbates this theology
(we must remember that Spinoza’s Theological Political Treatise was not only directed

against Moses and Judaism, but against the doctrines of the divinity, salvation, and eternal
life in Christ, too).

Let us hold unswervingly to the hope we profess …Let us not give up meeting
together, as some are in the habit of doing … If we deliberately keep on sinning after
we have received the knowledge of the truth, no sacrifice for sins is left, but only a
fearful expectation of judgment and of raging fire that will consume the enemies of
God. Anyone who rejected the law of Moses died without mercy on the testimony of
two or three witnesses. How much more severely do you think a man deserves to
be punished who has trampled the Son of God under foot, who has treated as an
unholy thing the blood of the covenant that sanctified him, and who has insulted the
Spirit of grace? … It is a dreadful thing to fall into the hands of the living God
(Hebrews 10).

See other examples of these such as Isa. 1:2-4; Jer. 2:19; Ezek. 16 and 17.
From Seder 'Olam R. iii.; R. H. 17a; Tosef., Sanh. xiii. 5, then Sifra, l.c.; Lev. R. ii.; Ḥul. 5a; er. Sheḳ. i.
1[46b]; then R. H. 17a; see especially Sifre, Bemidbar 112 to Num. xv. 31. See
http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/view.jsp?artid=1654&letter=A&search=apostate#ixzz10AxAM
HFH.

714
715

320

And again: “See to it that no one misses the grace of God and that no bitter root grows up to
cause trouble and defile many….for our God is a consuming fire” (Hebrews 12:15 and 29).
During the course of his diligent research into the manner of Spinoza’s

excommunication and the subject of the cherem, Colerus refers to the work of the “learned

Dr. Lightfoot on the first Epistle to the Corinthians, Chap.5. v. 5.” 716 This verse from St. Paul
reads as follows: “hand this man over to Satan, so that his sinful nature may be destroyed

and his spirit saved on the day of the Lord.” The context of this passage delineates an

ecclesiology and church discipline that are rarely heard about from today’s 21st century

churches, but was attended to far more by the 17th century churches. Many today excuse

the Church’s more aggressive past explaining that the Church got caught up with the world’s
manner of justice. But this is not accurate insofar as the Church’s behavior has been guided
by and given justification from the scriptures themselves. In this same epistle Paul says
things like: “For the kingdom of God is not a matter of talk but of power. What do you

prefer? Shall I come to you with punishment, or in love and with a gentle spirit?” (1 Cor.

4:20-1). And: “Get rid of the old yeast that you may be a new batch without yeast”; “Are you
not to judge those inside [the church]?... ‘Expel the wicked man from your number’” (1 Cor.
5:12-13; Deut. 17:7; 19:19; 22:21,24; 24:7). And again: “But if we judged ourselves, we

would not come under judgment. When we are judged by the Lord, we are being disciplined
so that we will not be condemned with the world” (1 Cor. 11:31-32). Thus he orders
Timothy to “fight the good fight of faith … Some have rejected these and so have

shipwrecked their faith. Among them are Hymenaeus and Alexander, whom I have handed
over to Satan to be taught not to blaspheme” (1 Tim. 1:19-20).

There are many other scriptures and theologians that might be referred to here. St.

Paul goes so far as to say, “If anyone does not love the Lord – a curse on him. Come, O Lord!”
716
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(1 Cor. 16: 22). In discussing the nature of Spinoza’s excommunication, Colerus says that

“Many are of opinion that this is the same excommunication with that mentioned in the first
Epistle of Corinthians, Chap. 16. v. 22 where the Apostle calls it maranatha. These are the
words: If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be Anathema Maharam Motha, or,

Maranatha; that is, let him be made Anathema, or let him be excommunicated for ever, or, as
others explain it, the Lord is a coming, viz, to judge and punish that excommunicated

person.” 717 Needless to say then: Spinoza would not have fared well under Moses or St.

Paul.

One of the major justifications used for the inquisition and expulsion of the Jews

from Portugal and Spain the generation or two before Spinoza’s (which is what caused the
Jews to immigrate to the Netherlands in the first place), was to prevent more Christians

from being Judaized from the influence of the Jews and from intermarrying. The expulsion
order signed by Ferdinand and Isabella was “to prevent the Jews from influencing

conversos and to purify the Christian faith.” 718 We should also remember that Christianity
from its inception saw the Jews as apostates and “blasphemers against Christ.” 719

Moreover, even before 1651, Christian groups such as the Calvinists were struggling

for a theologically regimented state, if not a confessionally homogenous one. They
were concerned about the rise of Catholicism and the increase in the number of non-

John Colerus. The Life of Benedict de Spinoza, 16.
Nadler goes on to cite the literal expulsion order. See the primarily theological concern behind
this expulsion in Nadler’s biography 3. It was certainly not for economic reasons that they were
expelled.
719 This is an extremely important point, and one which most Christians don’t know. Any thorough
study of the New Testament, however, will disabuse the honest student about the New Testament
Christian attitude toward “the Jews.” The reason why future generations of Christians persecuted
Jews was not because these Christians were not really Christians, as is sometimes explained. It is
true, that one can justifiably argue that the political and judicial persecution of the Jews using the
power of the state may not be the true teaching of the New Testament, but one cannot argue that the
New Testament does not say many vicious things against the Jews which future generations of
Christians and Muslims could easily – even if mistakenly - use to justify their oppression. Indeed,
though it may seem an overly harsh judgment to many Christians, many responsible Jewish and nonJewish historians and thinkers attribute some of the causes of the holocaust to this historic Christian
bigotry. For a cursory, but by no means thorough, look at this issue, see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antisemitism_in_the_New_Testament.
717
718

322

Reformed or dissenting Reformed Protestant congregations (especially Lutherans,
Mennonites, and Remonstrants). But they saved their ire for the Jews. These
‘blasphemers against Christ,’ it was argued, should not be allowed to practice their
religion publically anywhere in the republic. 720
It was for reasons such as these that the Jewish community had to be very careful

how they treated apostates and heretics in their own midst; for Jewish heretics are likely to
be heretics to Christianity, too. They therefore did not want any of their own troubling the
non-Jewish, Christian communities outside the Jewish quarter. Not wanting to cause any
problems with their Christian neighbors when the Amsterdam Jewish community

excommunicated Spinoza, they petitioned the municipal government in Amsterdam to expel
him as well. 721

Some readers may wonder why so much ink is being spilt on Spinoza’s Jewish and

Christian world. Shouldn’t we be “doing philosophy”? I answer using the words of Stephen
Nadler to justify his focus on Spinoza’s Jewish and theological background:

I aim only to place Spinoza’s thought on one particular issue within a different
philosophical and religious tradition. It is a tradition that is too often neglected in
philosophical scholarship on Spinoza; rare is the book written on him by a
philosopher that considers with any depth his relationship to and standing within
Jewish [and, I would add, Christian] philosophy. And yet, if one does not pay
attention to this context, much of what he has to say cannot make any sense. 722

Having located the mental-spiritual environment for Spinoza’s apostasy, we should now

have an enhanced sensitivity of what is at stake and therefore a more informed vantage
point to continue our inquiry.

Nadler biography 85, my emphasis.
For the details on the relations between Jews and the Christians in this period, see Nadler’s
extremely important discussion of it on pages 148 to 154.
722 Stephen Nadler. Spinoza’s Heresy: Immortality and the Jewish Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2001), viii-ix.
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Spinoza’s loss of faith, apostasy, and excommunication: 1655-1656

His loss of faith and apostasy

Lucas tells us that “friends” of his from the synagogue tricked Spinoza into revealing his true
thoughts and beliefs about God, Judaism, and the soul. Spinoza’s answers confirm to his
“friends” that Spinoza does indeed hold to horrible heresies. 723 We know from these

answers then that by 1655 or 1656 at 23 or 24 years of age he has come to reject Judaism.

We know that at this time he rejects the immortality of the soul, the God of Moses, and any

and all anthropomorphic representations of God. This implies that by as early as 1656 (but
probably earlier) he rejects all anthropomorphic representations of God, which is what his
later TTP and Ethics will argue at length for. His zealous “friends” spread the word about

Spinoza as an apostate: “the people deceived themselves in believing that this young man
might become one of the pillars of the synagogue” because “it seemed more likely that he

would be its destroyer, as he had nothing but hatred and contempt for the Law of Moses.” 724
First, then, Spinoza is accused of having nothing but hatred and contempt for the

Law of Moses, that is, the Holy Scriptures. (Note: no mention is made here of the Talmud or
any rabbinical or “pharisaical” work, such as a Da Costa might argue against.) His “friends”
spread this news to the Jewish community. Before the judges of the congregation, they

testify that Spinoza “scoffed at the Jews as ‘superstitious people born and bred in ignorance,
who do not know what God is, and who nevertheless have the audacity to speak of

themselves as His People, to the disparagement of other nations.” 725 Again, their criticism

has to do with Spinoza’s attack against the faith, against their God, and against the teachings
of Scriptures, specifically in this instance, the teachings of revelation that claim that Israel is
special of God. We know that these claims are in no way out of character for Spinoza. We
Nadler biography 134-5.
Nadler, Spinoza’s Ethics, 8.
725 Ibid. 8-9.
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find them said in the Ethics, and we find them fully and ferociously expressed in the
Theological Political Treatise.

Spinoza is then summoned to give an account of his beliefs and behavior before the

judges of the community (which included his teacher, rabbi Mortera). He evidently answers

their inquiries honestly and resolutely. They try hard to change his mind. They fail to do so.
And then they issue the cherem against him. 726
The cherem and excommunication
“They will put you out of the synagogue; in fact, a time is coming when anyone who kills you will think
he is offering a service to God. They will do such things because they have not known …” (Jn. 16:2-3)

On July 27, 1656 the Jewish community in Amsterdam pronounces the harshest

cherem in its history against Spinoza. 727 The following declaration was “read in Hebrew

from in front of the ark 728 of the synagogue.” This verdict epitomizes the warfare between
orthodoxy and liberalism, revelation and rationalism, Scripture and philosophy, the

Counter-Enlightenment and the Radical Enlightenment, the privileging of a primitive and

ancient epistemology of visions, prophecies, and revelations over the new more critical,

See also The Oldest Biography of Spinoza, 44-50.
Let us look a little more closely at this cherem and excommunication. We know, reports Nadler,
that Spinoza “was still, in mid-1655, an at least nominally active – if not necessarily enthusiastic –
member of the congregation, keeping up appearances and willing to do his part in satisfying the basic
obligations that were expected of every yehudi. During that year Spinoza may also have been
attending synagogue on a fairly regular basis, at the very least to say kaddish for his father, which
requires a minyan or quorum of Jewish males.” We know that he offered pledges even up to March
29 of 1656, but which was never paid. “While Spinoza’s faith must indeed have suffered a serious
decline by the end of 1655”, it is not clear why the pledge monies declined. It may be because his
business finances were declining. Nadler biography 118. A word about Spinoza saying kaddish for
his father: if Spinoza did indeed pray this prayer, he did so without believing it, because by this time
his God is no longer the anthropomorphic God of Judaism but a “philosophical God.”
728 The most important thing about the ark, which made it the absolute center of Israelite culture,
was that it contained the very words that God gave to Moses, the Ten Commandments and the Law.
For those not familiar with “the ark” of the covenant and its central place in Jewish biblical theology,
see, for instance: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ark_of_the_Covenant. Be sure to check the scripture
references. The point I wish to emphasize here, once again, is the fundamental commitment of faith
and practice to their Bible that this synagogue in this time and place held.
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more scientific, more careful, more cautious, more patient, more rationalistic, and more
scientific epistemology:

The Lords [Senhores] of the ma'amad [the congregation’s lay governing board],
having long known of the evil opinions and acts of Baruch de Spinoza, they have
endeavored by various means and promises, to turn him from his evil ways. But
having failed to make him mend his wicked ways, and, on the contrary, daily
receiving more and more serious information about the abominable heresies which
he practiced and taught and about his monstrous deeds, and having for this
numerous trust worthy witnesses who have deposed and born witness to this effect
in the presence of the said Espinoza, they became convinced of the truth of this
matter; and after all of this has been investigated in the presence of the honorable
chachamim [‘wise men’, or rabbis], they have decided, with their consent, that the
said Espinoza should be excommunicated and expelled from the people of Israel. By
decree of the angels and by the command of the holy men, we excommunicate,
expel, curse and damn Baruch de Espinoza, with the consent of God, Blessed be He,
and with the consent of the entire holy congregation, and in front of these holy scrolls
with the 613 precepts which are written therein; cursing him with the
excommunication with which Joshua banned Jericho and with the curse which Elisha
cursed the boys and with all the castigations which are written in the Book of the Law.
Cursed be he by day and cursed be he by night; cursed be he when he lies down and
cursed be he when he rises up. Cursed be he when he goes out and cursed be he
when he comes in. The Lord will not spare him, but the anger of the Lord and his
jealousy shall smoke against that man, and all the curses that are written in this book
shall lie upon him, and the Lord shall blot out his name from under heaven. And the
Lord shall separate him unto evil out of all the tribes of Israel, according to all the
curses of the covenant that are written in this book of the law. But you that cleave
unto the Lord your God are alive every one of you this day 729

From these many dire biblical 730 curses, the decree becomes more painfully specific and

concretely directed to the 23-year-old’s real world: “no one should communicate with him,
neither in writing, nor accord him any favor nor stay with him under the same roof nor

Nadler biography 120, my emphases to make absolutely clear and distinct the Jewish community
of Amsterdam treated Spinoza according to revelation. See also Spinoza’s Heresy 2. When one takes
the trouble to look up and to read all the curses referred to in the cherem above (the passages on
Joshua’s curse on Jericho, Elisha’s against the boys, and “all the castigations which are written in the
Book of the Law” (Deuteronomy 27 and 28), one can’t help but to feel the seriousness (and even
practical value) of this study of the warfare between revelation and independent reason –especially
because this warfare continues to this day.
730 One reason why I emphasize the biblical here at the expense of the political is because there is a
school of thought which “argues that the reasons [for the excommunication] were political and
stemmed from the community’s relations with the outside world … [see rest].” Yovel doesn’t buy this
theory, but in this section of his book at least, he does not accentuate the theological factors (which
my study emphasizes) (Yovel 10-13).
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come within four cubits in his vicinity; nor shall he read any treatise composed or written
by him.” 731

The first thing that must be emphatically pointed out here is that God commands the

excommunication. Excommunication is emphatically laid out in the Holy Scriptures. 732 I
point this out to make it clear that despite some ignorance and confusion among the

leadership of the relatively new 40-year-old Jewish community in Amsterdam about the

correct or orthodox teachings on such things, they nevertheless at least knew that the Torah
taught that it was supposed to be done. 733

The curses in this cherem then are not excrescences or additions that were derived

from the “Pharisees” or rabbis in much later centuries. No, they come right out of the Torah,
many of whose commandments are in the ark in front of which they spoke to all the people
almost word for word - “in front of these holy scrolls with the 613 precepts which are

written therein.”

All talk about the rationalism of Montera or of the enlightened thinking of other

rabbis that Nadler mentions in his biography goes out the door here. A good hard look at

this certain documentary proof of the mind-set of the Jewish leadership, and the source that

actuates their excommunication and behavior, are all here in full view. No wonder the

words and tone in many passages of his TTP (and pre-TTP Apology?) seems tinctured with
anger and fury. This cherem was no minor or petty or meaningless event.

Nadler biography 120-1.
The result of Colerus’s well-researched investigation into the matter of Spinoza’s cherem
understood that the “banishment from the synagogue attended with the dreadful curses” was “taken
most of ‘em out of Deuteronomy, chap. 28.” And again, “The curses inserted into the
[excommunication] were taken from the Law of Moses” (The Life of Benedict de Spinoza, 14).
733 Out of all the works I’ve read on this cherem, Nadler’s discussion of it in his biography on page
121, best demonstrates the biblical sources. It is a brief summary of some of what these many
scriptures mean, but it does the job of at least making clear that these condemnations are derived
from the purported revelations of the Torah. The fullest treatment on this subject is given by Nadler
in his Spinoza’s Heresy. Yovel’s Spinoza and Other Heretics is also must reading for insights into the
mind-set behind the excommunication.
731
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There’s a lot that we can learn from this document. It shows us that Spinoza’s “evil

opinions” were “long known.” Some of the claims that we have surmised up to now about
Spinoza’s loss of faith were unclear and unproved. Here we have proof. But what were
these “abominable heresies” the document refers to which led to the most severe

excommunication ever executed by the Talmud Torah congregation – even worse than Uriel
da Costa’s excommunication? As far as we know, he had not even published anything.

They tried to dissuade him from his anti-biblical beliefs. Some of the “they” here

were some of his former teachers – older, august, friends of his father and family, now all
against him and using all their vaunted scholarly knowledge to turn him from his wicked

ways. And what are they condemning? What are the beliefs Spinoza held that caused them
to pronounce “all the curses that are written in this book … according to all the curses of the

covenant that are written in this book of the law”? Nadler researches this question carefully.
Some things seem clear:

Turning away from his Jewish studies – and perhaps the Keter Torah yeshiva – to
seek a philosophical and scientific education elsewhere might have incited his
“teachers” within the Jewish community, particularly Mortera. And the rabbis
would surely not have been happy with his attending lessons at Van den
Enden’s…. 734

But others “sinned” in such ways and they were not punished so severely. Plus, according

to Nadler, the rabbi’s weren’t that vehement against secular learning. 735 So the severity of

the cherem couldn’t have been only because he was seeking a secular education.

In the “Spinoza’s life and works” chapter of his work on Spinoza’s ethics written

seven years after his biography of Spinoza, Nadler writes that none of these explanations of
the severity of Spinoza’s cherem are sufficient. So then, what explains its severity? Nadler
answers:
734
735

Nadler biography 129.
Ibid. 130.
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Instead, what seems really to have been the offense behind the vicious cherem
earned by Spinoza are not actions, either religious or legal, but rather, as the
proclamation reads, mas opinioins and horrendas heregias: ‘evil opinions’ and
‘abominable heresies’ – that is, ideas. 736

In a word, Spinoza was condemned because he said that there was no God except in

“a philosophical sense”, that Moses and the Law was not true, and that the soul was not

immortal. Nadler makes the case for this argument by citing what his research determines
to be “Three relatively reliable sources for the period.” He spells out much of their

testimonies and then synthesizes them loudly and clearly. The cherem was pronounced
against Spinoza because he held to three heretical positions:”’God exists only
philosophically,’ ‘The Law is not true,’ and ‘The soul is not immortal’” 737

We do not know for certain what Spinoza's “monstrous deeds” and “abominable

heresies” were alleged to have been, but an educated guess comes quite easily. No doubt he
was giving utterance to just those ideas that would soon appear in his philosophical

treatises. In those works, Spinoza denies the immortality of the soul, strongly rejects the

notion of a providential God—the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob; and claims that the Law
was neither literally given by God nor any longer binding on Jews. For Spinoza scholars,

these things explain why Spinoza was so severely condemned. Thus there is no mystery as
to why one of history's boldest and most radical thinkers was sanctioned by an orthodox
Jewish community. 738

Before ending this section, we should observe that the theological charges against

Spinoza imputed against him by the Jewish community make him an apostate to Judaism,

but they also expose him to be an “antichrist” to the Christian community: for to reject the

Spinoza’s Ethics 7.
Ibid. 10.
738 Nadler’s article on Spinoza from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
736
737
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God of Judaism is to also reject the God of Christianity. 739 Nadler understood this well:

“Moreover, when the parnassim issued their cherem against Spinoza, they were banning

someone whose views would be considered heretical not just by Jews but by any
mainstream Christians as well.” 740

To say that there is no God except in “a philosophical sense” for Spinoza is to reject

all the anthropomorphic claims of the New Testament about Jesus (that he is the Son of God;
that He created and sustains the universe; that he is the Christ prophesied from Genesis to

Malachi; that his death on the cross as the sacrificial Lamb of God taketh away the sins of
the world, and so on, can’t be true). To say that Moses and the Law ares not true, is to

reject the theological foundations of Christianity in the Jewish scriptures and the messianic

prophecies included in them. And to say that the soul is not immortal entails saying that the
scriptural, messianic, and eschatological claims of the New Testament and Christianity are

also false. And if all these are false, then one may argue with St. Paul that, “If the dead be not
raised then we are to be pitied more than all men” (1 Cor. 15:19).

This ends the principally biographical part of our study. We will still refer to

biographical elements as we discuss his works, of course, but our focus will turn now to the

development of his philosophy and to his writings.

This is probably a good place to insert the fact that Spinoza’s Jewish community were not content
to curse and excommunicate him from their midst alone. They also sought to have him expelled from
Amsterdam as well. Four years after his excommunication, in 1660, “the Jewish authorities
petitioned the Amsterdam municipal government to expel him from the city, giving as their reason
that he was a menace to ‘all piety and morals’” (Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins. Readings in Modern
Philosophy: Volume I Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Associate Texts (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 2000), 126). I’m reminded of the famous passage of Scripture: “Then the whole assembly
rose and led him off to Pilate. And they began to accuse him, saying, ‘We have found this man
subverting our nation” (Lk. 23:1-2). According to Lucas’s account, the rabbis told the Amsterdam
magistrates that they had excommunicated Spinoza “for execrable blasphemies against Moses and
against God.” But the magistrates, like Pilate, “could find nothing ‘impious in the way in which the
accused had conducted himself’” (see Nadler’s Spinoza: A Life, pp. 156-158 on the pros and cons
whether Lucas’s account actually took place).
740 Nadler’s Spinoza: A Life, 150.
739
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Chapter Thirteen
The Development of an Apostate Antichrist Philosophy

“Conversion to philosophy” 741

1656 to 1661: the Apology, the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, The Short Treatise
on God, Man, and His Well-Being and his Correspondence
As opposed to some biographical accounts of Spinoza, he did not attend the horrid

excommunication ceremony. In fact, Spinoza had left the Jewish quarter at least a year or
two before his excommunication. Nadler and Yovel show that though he still visited the
Synagogue here and there, he was not much of an active member any more. After his

cherem, however, he is expelled from the Jewish community and can never come back. 742

His whole faith community, family, friends, and work associates included, are banned from
helping him, seeing him, or even reading anything written by him.

In his biography of Spinoza for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Nadler says:

“To all appearances, Spinoza was content finally to have an excuse for departing

[completely] from the community and leaving Judaism behind; his faith and religious

commitment were, by this point, gone.” 743 Klever adds to this account by mentioning the
role that philosophy played in his departure: “According to the evidence of [many]
documents, the [final] departure from the Synagogue was more the end point of an
Klever, op. cited, 21.
Nadler, however, cites some probable exceptions to this rule.
743 (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza/).
741
742
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introduction into natural science than its starting point, as is usually supposed. The new

physics of Descartes [for example] must have played an important role in Spinoza’s process
of enlightenment.” 744 Thus the development of Spinoza’s philosophy was at work years

before his expulsion.

The thesis or the focus of this part of our study on Spinoza is to show some respects

in the development of his philosophical thinking from around his excommunication in 1656
to 1661 in which he diverges from “the way he should go.” 745 The focus is on the Radical
Enlightenment elements in this development; that is, on those respects in which his

thinking opposes the thinking of traditional or orthodox biblical theology (both Jewish and
Christian). From the perspective of both believing Jews and Christians, this philosophical

development is the development of an apostate and antichrist philosophy (hence the title of
this part as “The development of an apostate antichrist philosophy”). It is thought that the

development of his philosophy is a development primarily in response to and in reaction to

the theological vestiges of his upbringing. But there are, of course, many other respects in

which the development of his philosophy is not in response or in reaction to the religion of
his upbringing and time.

Apologia and The Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect: And On the Way in which it May
Be Directed Towards a True Knowledge of Things
Recapping then to situate Spinoza at this point in our study: By 1656, he’s well-educated, he
knows Latin pretty well, and he’s read various histories and the great Greek and Roman

Klever 20.
“Train up a child in the way he should go, and even when he is old, he will not depart from it”
(Proverbs 22:6). “Train up a child in the way he should go, and even when he is old, he will not
depart from it” (Proverbs 22:6).
Spinoza somehow was able to break the hold of the ingrained prejudices inculcated in him since
birth. This, to my mind, is one of the most impressive philosophical achievements of Spinoza. As
most people know from talking to believers of various faiths, they believe as they do, even unto old
age, simply because they were brought up that way. It is much too difficult for the average human to
go against his or her deep psychological conditioning from childhood.
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classics. He has imbibed and studied the new philosophy and the sciences, and has come

down on the side of the new philosophical and scientific methods for gaining knowledge as
opposed to the claims of epistemological authority in divine revelation, illumination,

inspiration, visions, etc. of the Bible believers. By 1656 at the age of 24, it is all but certain
that Spinoza’s loss of faith is complete. He has not only repudiated Judaism, he also has

derision for it. He thinks that it is out-and-out crude superstition. He feels contemptuous

toward Moses and the Law. And he thinks and feels this way because he has already

developed some foundational philosophical positions. We mentioned some of these above:

that if God exists, he does so only philosophically; that God or reality can’t be as Moses and
the Jews and Christians say; and, last but not least, that the immortal soul does not exist.

Klever believes that one can extrapolate from Jarig Jelles’s “very reliable survey of

Spinoza’s life, works, and philosophy” that Spinoza composed an “Apologia” “to render an

account of his conversion to philosophy.” 746 Spinoza commentators say that he probably

wrote this defense of his views in response to the cherem from his old teachers. 747 Part of

this defense will find its way as part of the TTP, which along with his earlier Treatise on the
Emendation of the Intellect, Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being, and then his

Ethics are his life’s apologia for reason over faith. Klever and Nadler believe that his
Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect is also “an account of his conversion to
philosophy.” I agree. Klever elaborates on this:

The first pages of the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect can only be
explained as being very close to Spinoza’s personal experiences and the beginning of
… his new point of view… They are, as it were, notations drawn from his private
journal, from the time of his transition to a new ‘system’. 748

Klever 21, my emphasis.
However, in a brand new work just out, Piet Steenbakkers argues that this is an error, that there
was no Apology of Spinoza, but rather that the sources for this claim mixed it up from another author
and work. See Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise: A Critical Guide, edited by Melamed, Yitzhak
and Rosenthal, Michael (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 31-33.
748 Ibid.
746
747
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In the first volume of his The Collected Works of Spinoza, Edwin Curley starts off with

Spinoza’s Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. Though it was published after his

death in 1677 in his Opera posthuma, Curley and others such as Stephen Nadler believe that
it is highly probable that a draft of it was written even before September of 1661 (5 or 6

years after his excommunication). This would mean that he worked on this before the Short

Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being (KV), and two years before the publication of his

The Principles of Cartesian Philosophy (PP) in 1663. We can assume then that the Treatise

was written if not earlier, at least around the same time as the KV. 749

There is reason to believe that Spinoza conceived of the Treatise early on as an

introduction to another work that would deal with philosophical theology, philosophy of

mind, epistemology, and ethics (the KV or the Ethics? – the KV is more likely). Whatever the
case may be on these issues, he never finished the work, though his first editors (of the

Opera Posthuma) say he wanted to: “He always intended to finish it, but, distracted by his
other occupations and taken from us by death, he did not succeed in bringing it to the

desired conclusion.” 750 There is reason to believe that more than this was at work here. If

his April 1662 letter to Oldenburg citing “a whole short work” devoted to the matter of the

first cause and also to a work “on the emendation of the intellect” refer to The Short Treatise
on God, Man, and His Well-Being and to the Treatise on the Intellect (which they certainly

seem to be), then his explanation for why he has not finished them should be mentioned. If
I read this passage in the letter rightly, he appears to be saying that he has not finished it,
and his motivation and work on it was inhibited, because of fear of being attacked by

theologians. I imagine Spinoza may have meant something like the following: “Why should
I be knocking myself out on this work if in the final analysis I can’t publish it anyway

749 Spinoza. The Collected Works of Spinoza, Volume 1, edited and translated by Edwin Curley (New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985), 3-4. See also Nadler’s Spinoza: A Life, 175.
750 Spinoza, The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, Selected Letters, Translated by
Samuel Shirley, edited by Seymour Feldman (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992), 232.
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because the theologians will make my life a living hell because of it. Therefore, I don’t know
what to do with this work – and it’s probably wiser (caute!) not to publish it. But if I’m not

going to publish it, then why work further on it?” Here are the exact words he wrote. Let
the reader decide if my paraphrase translation is accurate.

I am engaged in transcribing and emending it, but sometimes I put it to one side
because I do not yet have any definite plan regarding its publication. I fear, of
course, that the theologians of our time may be offended and with their usual hatred
attack me, who absolutely dread quarrels. 751

At any rate, the editors decided to publish the unfinished work after Spinoza’s death

in 1677 because they recognized its philosophic and theological importance. In addition to
the intrinsic value of the work, the Treatise is important to us because it gives us insights

into Spinoza’s thought during this early period. 752 It expresses personal things (which are

not found in later works) that we take to be important, especially with respect to the
interests of this study.

Nadler states that the Treatise is in part

an autobiographical sketch of Spinoza’s own intellectual itinerary and partly an
appeal to the reader … to follow the same road and be converted to the philosophical
life.
What is required for such a conversion even to begin to be contemplated is a
feeling of dissatisfaction, perhaps not fully articulated, with the life one is leading.
One must question the values one has adopted and that have guided one’s actions
and ask after the ‘true good’ for a human being, ‘the eternal source of the greatest
joy’. 753

Reading the early sections of the Treatise one is struck by how much they sound like the

early sections of the Book of Ecclesiastes. Both are written by a skeptical author who says
Collected Works, op. cited, 188. I make an issue of this here to support the argument I’m making
that some of the most important aspects in both works, and certainly the aspects that many of his
time were most interested in, were theological.
One can imagine from confessions like this just how many other works in the 17th century (and
most of the centuries preceding it) never saw the light of day to benefit humankind because of fear
“that the theologians of our time may be offended and with their usual hatred attack me.” In respects
like this, the focus of evil in the early modern world, it could be argued, was not atheism; it was
theology.
752 Ibid.
753 Nadler biography of Spinoza, p. 176.
751
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things that nothing in the Torah or the prophets or Spinoza’s old rabbis could support.

Seeking the ‘true good’? And this ‘true good’ is not the God of Israel or His Law? One needs
to be converted? His old rabbis would not be proud of this.

What is this ‘true good’? Is it anything that Torah or the Psalms (such as Psalm 119)

would agree with? Definitely not. Spinoza says that the true good is “the knowledge of the
union that the mind has with the whole of Nature.” 754 The whole of what? The knowledge

of what? Nature? One can imagine how the rabbis of Talmud Torah would respond to this
anti-creationist account. One can imagine them “arguing” against this position by quoting
scripture texts - of Job, for instance: “Who is this that darkens my counsel with words

without knowledge? Brace yourself like a man; I will question you, and you shall answer

me. ‘Where were you when I laid the earth’s foundation? Tell me, if you understand: …Will
the one who contends with the Almighty correct him? (Job 39-40:1). Or of Isaiah: “To

whom will you compare me? Or who is my equal?’ says the Holy One. Lift up your eyes and
look to the heavens: Who created all these?... Do you not know? Have you not heard? The

Lord is the everlasting God, the Creator of the ends of the earth” (Isa. 40). “This is what the
Lord says - … I am the Lord, who has made all things, who alone stretched out the heavens,

who spread out the earth by myself… Woe to him who quarrels with his Maker … Does your
work say, ‘He has not hands’?” (Isa.44-45).

This is how Spinoza’s rabbis and the Christian preachers of Amsterdam and

everywhere else would respond to Spinoza’s disregard of the centrality of the Creator. For
them, the true good lies in knowing the Creator, not in knowing nature. In fact, since the

writing of the second commandment, there has always been a strong censure towards any
overly attentive or affectionate attitude toward nature:

754

You shall not make for yourself an idol in the form of anything in heaven above or on
the earth beneath or in the waters below. You shall not bow down to them or

Ibid. 177.
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worship them; for I, the Lord your God, am a jealous God, punishing the children for
the sin of the fathers to the third and fourth generation of those who hate me, but
showing love to thousands who love me and keep my commandments (Ex. 20).
For Jewish theology, this issue is of the most serious kind because the God of their
Bible warns

them over and over again about making sure that they don’t forget or forsake what was told
them from Mount Horeb:

Only be careful, and watch yourselves closely so that you do not forget … You saw no
form of any kind in the day that the Lord spoke to you at Horeb … Therefore watch
yourselves carefully, so that you do not become corrupt and make for yourselves an
idol, an image of any shape, whether formed like a man or a woman, or like an
animal on earth or any bird that flies in the air, or like any creature that moves along
the ground or any fish in the water below. And when you look up to the sky and see
the sun, the moon and the stars – all the heavenly array- do not be enticed into
bowing down to them and worshipping things the Lord your God has apportioned to
all the nations under heaven (Deut. 4).
Christian preachers would quote New Testament passages:

The wrath of God is being revealed from heaven against all the godlessness and
wickedness of men who suppress the truth by their wickedness … For although they
knew God, they neither glorified him as God nor gave thanks to him, but their
thinking became futile and their foolish hearts were darkened. Although they
claimed to be wise, they became fools and exchanged the glory of the immortal God
for images to look like moral man and birds and animals and reptiles.
Therefore God gave them over to the sinful desires of their hearts … They
exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshipped and served created things
rather than the Creator – who is forever praised. Amen…
Furthermore, since they did not think it worthwhile to retain the knowledge
of God, He gave them over to a depraved mind (Rom. 1).

Such passages of scripture are typical examples of the “proof texts” that the orthodox would
preach against Spinoza’s apostate claim that the true good is “the knowledge of the union
that the mind has with the whole of Nature.”

For Scripture, there is only one who is good, and He alone is the true good. But for

the renegade Spinoza the true good is now become something very different. For the

believing Jew, in order to know and live the true good, one must know and obey God’s

commandments. As “Solomon” concludes his Ecclesiastes: “Be warned, my son, of anything
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in addition to them. Of making many books there is no end, and much study wearies the

body. Now all has been heard; here is the conclusion of the matter: Fear God and keep his
commandments, for this is the whole duty of man” (Eccl.12:12-13).

But, for the Jew Spinoza, who lived an observant life for many years, he has come to

make not only an addition to this religion, he has come to reject and replace it. “In order for
the true good to be realized”, Nadler says to summarize Spinoza’s new way:

the true good requires a thorough knowledge both of Nature itself and of human
nature, a clear and exhaustive understanding of the metaphysics of matter and of
mind, the physics of bodies, the logic of our thoughts, and the causes of our
passions…. [and] The intellect must be purified and prepared for the task of
inquiring into Nature. 755

Quite a change of view! “Oh, how the mighty have fallen,” his former teachers would have
thought if they read Spinoza’s Treatise. Instead of the God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and
Moses, he now talks of a God of philosophy. The differences between this new God of

Spinoza’s, this “idol”, this philosopher’s God, compared with the God of his fathers are so
startlingly different as to require eye rubbing. For Spinoza, Nature is God and therefore

eternal and infinite and perfect and blessed. For Jews and Christians, Nature is not only
created by God and contingent on God, but it is also “fallen” and “under a curse” and

destined to be consumed and destroyed by fire for a new heaven and earth to be created. 756
How do we explain this radical new God of Spinoza’s? Several Spinoza scholars

think that in the early years in which he was losing his faith that Spinoza looked for

something better, something more true, something more noble, a “true good.” The Treatise

on the Emendation of the Intellect and on the Way in which it may be Directed Towards a True
Knowledge of Things appears to be the answer to what Spinoza took to be the better way.

We get a strong hint of this in the title and subtitle itself: It is with the intellect or the

Nadler biography 177.
For a list of some of the amazingly different positions resident in Spinoza’s true good in knowing
Nature, see Nadler’s biography pp. 178.
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understanding that he is most concerned with now because he believes that in it alone (and
not in revelation or in a transcendent God) can one come to “a true knowledge of things.”

Spinoza begins the Treatise sounding like the Solomon in the early chapters of the

book of Ecclesiastes. Compare the expressions of Ecclesiastics with Spinoza. Ecclesiastes:

I, the Teacher, was king over Israel in Jerusalem. I devoted myself to study and to
explore by wisdom all that is done under heaven… I have seen all the things that are
done under the sun; all of them are meaningless, a chasing after the wind… I thought
in my heart, ‘Come now, I will test you with pleasure to find out what is good’. But
that also proved to be meaningless… And what does pleasure accomplish? I tried
cheering myself with wine, and embracing folly – my mind still guiding me with
wisdom. I wanted to see what was worthwhile for men to do under heaven during the
few days of their lives. I undertook great projects: I built houses for myself and
planted vineyards…. I amassed silver and gold for myself, and the treasure of kings
and provinces. I acquired men and women singers, and a harem as well – the
delights of the heart of men… I denied myself nothing my eyes desired; I refused my
heart no pleasure… Yet when I surveyed all that my hands had done and what I had
toiled to achieve, everything was meaningless, a chasing after the wind; nothing was
gained under the sun (Eccl. 1-2, my emphases). 757

Compare this Faustian striving with Spinoza’s:

After experience had taught me that all things which frequently take place in
ordinary life are vain and futile…I determined at last to inquire whether there might
be anything which might be truly good …I determined, I say, to inquire whether I
might discover and acquire the faculty of enjoying throughout eternity continual
supreme happiness. 758

The texts quoted above from Ecclesiastes have been traditionally interpreted by both

Jewish and Christian commentators as the classic example of the mind of the backslider or
person in the world without God. “Solomon” wrote this book during his period of

backsliding and rebellion against God. Thus, as in the passage cited earlier, because he “did
not think it worthwhile to retain the knowledge of God, He gave [him] over to a depraved

The English term “meaningless” in the NIV translation I quote from above is identical with
“vanity” or “vain” and “futile”, the English terms Shirley translates from Spinoza. Most other
translations of these passages from Ecclesiastes use the latter terms.
It should also be noted that the author of Ecclesiastes also “applied myself to the understanding of
wisdom” (1:17). But, he, unlike Spinoza, concludes that the search for knowledge and wisdom is
“also madness and folly.” Moreover, contra Spinoza’s conclusion that understanding brings
blessedness and contentment, the skeptical author of Ecclesiastes concludes: “For with much wisdom
comes much sorrow; the more knowledge, the more grief” (1:18).
758 Spinoza’s Ethics and On the Correction of the Understanding, translated by Andrew Boyle, New
York: Everyman’s Library, 1970, p. 227.
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mind.” Thus his “thinking became futile and [his] foolish heart was darkened. Although
[he] claimed to be wise, [he] became a fool” (Rom. 1).

As a result of his “foolishness” Spinoza, like the backsliding Solomon, seek what is

truly good outside of God. Indeed, as can be seen in Spinoza autobiographical account of his
search, he at first doesn’t know what is truly good. He has to inquire about it and how he
may enjoy it. A Jew does not inquire about such things. A good Jew knows the answer to

these things: they lie in obedience to God and his commands. End of story. If you will recall
our earlier chapter on the Greeks and Judaism, this kind of thinking was labeled “pagan” by
the orthodox Jews. We see then, at this early stage in Spinoza’s philosophical life that the

rationalistic trumps the traditionally religious, the Greek over the Jewish, the philosophical
over the theological, the intellect over Torah, and reason over blind obedience.

Spinoza continues. He says that he is on a “new quest”, that he is searching “for

something new”, that he is “seeking for a fixed good.” 759 Note how he is going about this
new quest. He is seeking this new thing, this true good or supreme happiness just as

Solomon did: by his own intellectual effort and not by simple, childlike obedience to the
higher authority and wisdom of the Creator as revealed in Torah. We note, too, that the

tone of some of his expressions in this book smacks far more of religion than his later books
(though the religious terms continue even up to the last book of the Ethics): “For I saw

myself in the midst of a very great peril.” 760 This sounds like the typical experience of a
Ibid. 228.
Compare Spinoza’s autobiographical account with Descartes’ in the beginning of his Discourse on
Method. There are many commonalities between the two. Indeed, so much so, that some have
thought that this work might have been influenced by Descartes. Whatever the case may be on this
point, one thing seems noticeably different: though Descartes clearly gives proceeds with faith and
praise in reason, Spinoza does so with greater religious overtones. Observe, too, that Descartes is
mostly seeking truth, whereas Spinoza seems to be mostly seeking salvation. I personally interpret
Spinoza’s added interest to be due to the loss of his faith and the usually consequent need to find a
substitute for this. This is speculation (because we don’t know enough for certain of their early
lives), but my impression from their biographies is that Descartes’ religious experience as a child and
youngster was not nearly as pervasive and existential as Spinoza’s. Plus, Descartes’ Jesuit education
did not eschew “pagan” and Gentile education, or slight the intellect, as Spinoza’s education did. This
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person in crisis before being resolved by a religious conversion. One thinks of Augustine’s

8th book of his Confessions or of Bunyan’s in Grace Abounding, and so on. So he has “to seek

a remedy, however uncertain, with all my energy: like a sick man seized with a deadly

disease, who sees death straight before him if he does not find some remedy, is forced to

seek it, however uncertain, with all his remaining strength, for in that is all his hope placed.”
We see here, even at this early period in his philosophical life, that Spinoza already

had the key planks of his philosophical platform in place. He already cites the greatest good
as being “the knowledge of the union which the mind has with the whole of nature.” He

already knows that he wants to devote his life to not only sharing this gospel, but also in
hope of forming a new society in which such ends are followed. 761 But in order to be

successful in this, he rightly understands that “attention must be paid to Moral Philosophy

and the Theory of the Education of Children.” 762 I speculatively interpret this to be Spinoza’s
round-about way of saying that society needs not only a new and better and truer

philosophy (than the religious one it has adhered to for ages) to follow, but that this can
only be established by teaching such a morality in our education system at an early age.

This must be done “at the beginning, that it may with the greatest success understand things
correctly.” 763

The top priority for all thinking is that “a method must be thought out of healing the

understanding and purifying it.” 764 And what is this method or way to attain this? Through

“the Spirit of wisdom and revelation” so that “the eyes of your heart may be enlightened so
that you may know”? (Eph. 1:17). No. For starters, Spinoza says, we need to “give all our
too may go a long way in accounting for the differences between the two apparently sincere
autobiographical accounts.
761 Ibid. 230-1.
762 Ibid. 231.
763 Ibid.
764 Ibid.
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attention in order to be able to direct our intellect in the right way it is necessary to live.” 765

The intellect, that is, the natural intellect, is given pride of place, not Jehovah, not the Holy
Spirit’s enlightening actions on our intellects.

And how should the Spinozists get this message out? Spinoza counsels his reader

who is in the know to follow three rules, the first of which seems to strongly verify at least
some of Leo Strauss’s teaching on how to interpret Spinoza:

To speak in a manner comprehensible to the vulgar, and to do for them all things
that do not prevent us from attaining our end. For from the multitude we may reap
no little advantage, if we make as many concessions as possible to their
understanding. Add to this that we shall thus prepare friendly ears to give us a good
hearing when we wish to tell them what is the truth. 766

And what, pray tell, is this truth that he’s talking about? He already told us: the greatest

good for man to attain to is “the knowledge of the union which the mind has with the whole
of nature.” And what is the way to this union? Spinoza says that we attain “the summit of

wisdom” through working on and improving our intellects and intellectual instruments just
as artificial instruments have been improved from labor and perfecting. 767

Spinoza wants to know the truth. So he has to find out the best way to know the

truth. And that means he has to examine those various domains of supposed knowledge to
see how much truth and certainty they offer. He mentions knowledge “by hearsay” – such

knowledge as the date of his birthday. The Bible’s claims must also be understood to fall

under the category of hearsay - claims such as: God revealing things to Moses, of choosing
the Jews, or of doing miracles, or of giving the Ten Commandments, and of God’s great

commission for His people to possess the Promised Land. He concludes that compared with

Ibid.
Ibid.
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scientific knowledge “we can obviously conclude that all certainty which we have from
hearsay is far removed from scientific knowledge.” 768

Spinoza also examines the status of many empirical experiences, which he labels

“vague experience.” He knows the usual problems in relying on such experiences as the sun
looks smaller than it actually is. He also mentions deductive knowledge such as that gained
from mathematics, and concludes: “But the things which I have been able to know by this
knowledge so far have been very few.” 769

Spinoza wants to know the best mode of perception, the best mode of

understanding, the best ways to both improve the power of the intellect and to correct any
of the poor sources that would mislead the understanding into adopting false ideas. And

because the understanding has so many false ideas, these must corrected for – what Spinoza

expresses over and over again: “the attainment of our end.” To attain our end, we need to
rely on the best mode of perception and the right method of knowing only adequate and

true ideas. We therefore need to know the difference between true and false or fictitious
ideas. 770

Notice now how the Jewish boy from the Amsterdam synagogue is now interested

and living according to things that are not discussed in the Torah: things such as how to

distinguish between true and fictitious ideas. The only thing that I recall from all the Jewish
Bible having to do with any kind of distinguishing is that between the true God and other

gods and between the true prophet from the false prophet. But none of this has anything
epistemological about it, but rather they are primarily theological. The wise man for the

Jew is one who knows what’s right and wrong, true and false, according to Torah. The wise

man for the developing Spinoza has to do with cultivating and strengthening and educating
Ibid. 235.
Ibid. 233.
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the intellect and rational powers, and of following rational and tested methods of reasoning.
Then and then only can the mind distinguish between true and fictitious ideas. And of these
fictitious ideas, most of what he believed in his early days as a believer falls.
The Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being
Introduction
Like the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect: and on the way by which it is best

directed to the true knowledge of things, Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-

Being (abbreviated as “KV”) was also never completed or meant for publication, and thus

not published during the author’s lifetime. How the Short Treatise on God, Man and His

Well-Being (abbreviated as “KV”) got into the Spinoza corpus, Curley states, “is a scholar’s

delight.” 771 Others would call it more like a scholar’s nightmare. 772 Not only are there a lot
of unsettled questions about the text, but, amazingly, some scholars have even wondered
whether there is much value to studying the KV at all! 773 Happily, we can ignore most of

these concerns, except in so far as they have relevance for our focus; for the fact of the

matter is that for our purposes, the importance of the KV, like that of the Treatise, is the

early theological-philosophical concerns that we find in it that are not found anywhere else
in all of Spinoza’s writings. For instance, the KV devotes a short chapter (Chapter XXV in
Curley) to the question of whether the Devil exists. 774 Further, the KV can “help us to

understand better Spinoza’s position in relation to Christianity, which in turn is useful for

the proper understanding of the Theological-Political Treatise.” 775 One Spinoza scholar even
Curley op. cited, 46.
Ibid. 46-52.
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argues that “though it contains many propositions incompatible with Christian dogma, the
Short Treatise is nevertheless more open to a Christian reading than is the Ethics” which

shows “that at a certain stage of his life certain Christian ideas and sentiments ‘penetrated
his soul’.” 776 We see hints of these, I think, in some of the language used in Chapter VI “Of

God’s Predestination”, in Chapter XXI “Of True Knowledge, Rebirth, Etc.”, in Chapter XXIII
“Of the Immortality of the Soul”, and in “Of the Human Soul” (in Appendix II).

The KV also deals with several of the themes he takes up in more detail in the TTP. I

will cite only one here. In his chapter “Of God’s Love for Man”, he states: “one might rightly
ask how God can make himself known to man, and whether this happens, or could happen,
through spoken words, or immediately.” 777 Here we see one of the central worries of the

TTP, e.g. the question of the epistemological status of purported divine revelation. But
beyond this, let there be no mistake, the bulk of this work is philosophical, as was the

Treatise. True, many of these philosophical themes have been historically generated by

many Jewish, Christian, and Scholastic theological issues, but, for the most part, Spinoza’s

treatment of them is philosophical and not historical-textual as in his TTP treatment. The

KV is also a great place to see pre-Ethics formulations, so it is simply mind-boggling to

wonder about the value of the KV when considering the context, history, and maturation of
Spinoza’s thought in his later works.

Nadler indicates that Spinoza had been working on a systematic treatise in

philosophy around the time he met Oldenburg in 1660. He was probably referring to the

Short Treatise. In this work, he would examine further philosophical and theological issues,
and in more detail than he did in his Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. When

Spinoza first wrote Oldenburg in 1661, the Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being

was still being worked on. It was probably a work that his friends urged him to do. Nadler
776
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notes that “Though Spinoza seems to have thought of eventually publishing the treatise, his
remarks at the end of the work make it clear that it really was mainly a presentation of

philosophy for his friends.” 778 Because he knew the dangerousness of some of the novel

thinking in this work, he asks his friends directly in the last paragraphs “to be very careful

about communicating these things to others” because “of the character of the age in which
we live.” Spinoza knew how novel his ideas were, but also of “the certainty of their
appearing too radical in the eyes of the Dutch Calvinist authorities.” 779

The Short Treatise, like the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, is interested

in human happiness and blessedness which “consists in a knowledge of God and of how all

things in nature depend on him.” 780 This then leads to his conclusion that we ought to love

God as our highest and truest good. But there is a wrench in the works. As Nadler puts it:

the God whose existence is demonstrated is not a God who would have been familiar
to the members of the Reformed Church, or indeed of any religion. It is not God the
benevolent and free creator of whom Spinoza speaks. His God is not a lawgiver and
judge in any traditional sense. He is not a source of comfort or reward or
punishment, nor is he a being to whom one would pray. Spinoza explicitly denies
that God is omniscient, compassionate, and wise. 781

Once again, we meet Spinoza’s philosophical God, only this time treated in far more detail.

Indeed, the Short Treatise is a close precursor to the philosophy of God that he will chart out
more fully in his 1670 TTP and even more in his Ethics. Here too he uses a lot of theological
language. Nadler says that, “Despite Spinoza’s theological language and what looks like

concessions to orthodox sentiment (‘the Love of God is our greatest blessedness’), there is
no mistaking his intentions. His goal is nothing less than the complete desacrilization and

naturalization of religion and its concepts.” 782 Man, the existence and nature of God, divine
Nadler biography 186.
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providence, predestination, salvation, and “God’s love of man” “are all given naturalistic

interpretation in terms of substance, its attributes and modes, and the laws of nature.” 783
Spinoza took this work seriously. He worked on it for at least two years. But he

chose not to publish it “not so much because it was never finished – he seems, in fact, to

have regarded it as a complete work by early 1662 784, even if it needed more polishing – but

because he feared that ‘the theologians of our time may be offended and with their usual
hatred attack me, who absolutely dread quarrels’” (191).

It was not only these theologians that worried Spinoza. He worried about many of

his correspondents, as well – even those who like Oldenburg went out of their way to assure
Spinoza that they could be trusted. Thus, it is clear that as a result of Spinoza’s radically

heterodox positions, “he seems to have been cautious about revealing too much detail” to

Oldenburg. Oldenburg recalls that “we spoke as if through a lattice.” 785 Oldenburg wished

for a copy of the work; Spinoza held it back, even though the former encouraged him against
“the foolish theologians” and that the Dutch give “great freedom for philosophizing.”

Oldenburg at this time probably “failed to grasp the deeper theological implications of

Spinoza’s work.” 786 Spinoza probably showed Oldenburg parts of the Short Treatise, but

was not comfortable enough to speak with complete candor. Even so, it is hard to

understand how Oldenburg could have failed to grasp the deeper theological implications of
Spinoza’s work, especially because Oldenburg himself was trained as a theologian. Most

other readers of Spinoza divined what he was up to very quickly. Oldenburg could not have

Ibid.
He also had much of his book on Descartes done at this time – and even of the Ethics. Nadler says
that “A substantial part of the Ethics was written by this date [1663, the year in which his book on
Descartes came out].” Nadler biography, p. 374, endnote 28. By early 1662, while he was still
revising some things in his Short Treatise, “His ideas on God, nature, and human well-being were, in
essential respects, well formed by then” (Ibid. 199). The appendix attached to the end of the Short
Treatise “may actually have been a part of an early draft of the Ethics, the philosophical magnum opus
in which all the most important doctrines from the Short Treatise, along with a great deal more
material, is given a complete geometrical presentation” (Ibid.).
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been reading or listening very carefully (either that or he was slow in getting the point).

Unfortunately, we don’t know if Oldenburg read what Spinoza says about hell, the devil, and
other theologically sensitive issues 787 in the Short Treatise, but if he did it would be hard to

understand how he could have missed what Spinoza was up to because his treatment of
these doctrines is as heterodox as they come.
Spinoza contra the doctrine of hell

As opposed to the traditional orthodox teaching about hell, Spinoza wants to give us

knowledge that will free “us from sadness, despair, envy, fright, and other evil passions,

which … are the real hell itself.” 788 Like a modern day liberal theologian, Spinoza in essence

psychologizes hell from a real place in which the wicked are punished for eternity to a

universal phenomenon that stems from natural human passions. It is true that in the 17th
century many wrestled with the onerous doctrine of eternal punishment; but Spinoza’s

response to this dogma is among the most radical. For if hell and eternal punishment are

only human passions, then why do the scriptures say so much about it as a place where God
sends sinners and the unbelieving as punishment after they die?

Then I saw a great white throne and him who was seated on it… And I saw the dead,
great and small, standing before the throne, and books were opened. Another book
was opened, which is the book of life. The dead were judged according to what they
had done as recorded in the books… and each person was judged according to what
he had done…The lake of fire is the second death. If anyone’s name was not found
written in the book of life, he was thrown into the lake of fire. 789

The Short Treatise also repudiates the doctrines of sin and salvation. Not only are there “no
devils”, but there is no sin and eternal peace either (Curley 146). And salvation is really a matter “of
seeking our own advantage, something which is very natural in all things… we therefore prefer to be
governed by our intellect” (Curley 147). As opposed to St. Paul’s “If in only this life we have hope in
Christ, we are to be pitied more than all men”, Spinoza says: “So even if the power of knowledge and
divine love did not bring the intellect to an eternal peace …, but only to a temporary one, it is our duty
to seek even this, since it is such that one who enjoys it would not want to exchange it for anything
else in the world” (ibid).
788 Ibid. 128, my emphasis. Curley footnotes this passage: “Freudenthal noted that we do not get the
promised later discussion of the real hell as domination by bad passions, and he cited this as
evidence that our manuscript of the Short Treatise represents an unfinished draft” (Curley p. 128).
789 Revelation 20:11-15.
787

348

Jesus says that this lake of fire is eternal (Mt. 25:41). And it is a place of “torment”(Lk. 6:23),
of “weeping” (Mt.8:12), “wailing” (Mt. 13:42), “gnashing of teeth” (Mt. 13:50), “darkness”

(Mt. 25:30), and so on. New Testament scholars teach that Jesus said more about hell and
all its horrors than any other figure in the Bible. So, if the scriptures about hell are false,
then why should one believe the rest of scripture? Or if the scriptures about hell should

only be taken figuratively as human passions, then what theological doctrine of scripture
can be taken as literal? And if no theological doctrine of scripture can be taken literally,
then what is the meaning of the scriptures?
Spinoza contra the devil
And it is not only against the doctrine of hell (and the authority of the scriptures)

that the Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being takes to task. Spinoza takes on the

devil himself. He actually devotes a whole chapter (albeit a very short chapter) to this

theological subject. Right from the very beginning of Chapter XXV, “Of Devils”, Spinoza

makes clear what he’s after: “We shall now say something briefly about whether or not

there are devils.” 790 After many months of reading and researching the works of all the

major early modern philosophers, to my knowledge not one of them discusses the devil (or
hell) in any direct, philosophical manner. Not Descartes. Not Leibniz (even in texts such as
the Theodicy in which the devil most definitely should have been treated). And not even

Pascal (in any philosophical sense). Only Spinoza to my knowledge ventures to go “where
angels fear to tread.”

In the very second sentence of his chapter on the devil, Spinoza takes on the biblical-

theological claims regarding this being and then makes clear his ultimate philosophical

conclusion (which is completely in accord with his overall philosophy of God): “If the Devil
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is a thing completely contrary to God and has nothing from God, then he agrees precisely
with Nothing.” 791 Spinoza doesn’t think that such a being “could exist even a single

moment.” He offers the following curious 17th century philosophical argument as his reason

for this:

For all the duration of a thing arises from its perfection, and the more essence and
divinity they have in them, the more constant they are… Moreover, constancy or
duration in the mode of the thinking thing only arise through the union which such a
mode has with God, a union produced by love. Since the exact opposite of this is
posited in Devils, they cannot possibly exist. But because there is no necessity to
posit Devils, why should they be posited? For we have no need, as others do, to
posit Devils in order to find causes of hate, envy, and such passions. We have come
to them sufficiently without the aid of such fictions. 792

This is vintage Spinoza. Short, sweet, to the point. Philosophical arguments above all others
carry the day for Spinoza. If Oldenburg read this passage, my guess is that even he would
have gotten the message. It’s no wonder why Spinoza told his friends “to be very careful

about communicating these things to others.” He knew darn well that “the theologians of
our time [would] be offended and with their usual hatred attack me.” 793 Spinoza’s

arguments against hell and the devil here are extremely heretical. And they are written at
least eight years before his most complete foray into biblical subjects, the Theological-

Political Treatise.

The theological (and philosophical, as in Spinoza) issues of the status of hell and the

devil may not seem like a big deal to those unversed in Jewish and Christian theology, but it
certainly was for most believers in the 17th century. The belief in Satan and in all the things

the scriptures teach about him was alive and well in the Netherlands, France, England, and

Ibid.
Ibid. My emphases. For Spinoza, all the passions (and everything else) are completely
accountable by means of Nature alone. No entities beyond this Spinozistic razor need apply. I would
be very curious to know how Leibniz would judge this argument and the conclusion that devils do
not exist.
793 Nadler biography p. 186 and 191. Spinoza, as we know from the biography section of this study,
knew quite well, and from painful experience, what happens when a man crosses a culture’s
theological line.
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Germany. Jonathan Israel’s Radical Enlightenment devotes whole chapters to the

pervasiveness of this belief and the furor of the Churches and theologians against all who
put this doctrine in question. 794 In keeping with one of the major purposes of this

dissertation let us show the radicalness of Spinoza’s position (that the devil does not exist)
by delineating the Counter-Enlightenment forces (the Bible, Churches, theologians,
Christian philosophers) thought about the devil.

The first thing that needs to be recognized is that the doctrine of the devil has

always been central to Christianity. One needs to be clear on this essential dogma in order
to fully appreciate the audacity of Spinoza to take this on and the danger it could have
brought to him. First then: Who is this being according to the Bible and biblical

theologians? He is entitled the “Prince of this world” (Jn.12:31), the “god of this world

[who] has blinded the minds of unbelievers, so that they cannot see the light of the gospel of
the glory of Christ” (2 Cor. 4:4). He is called “the father of lies” (Jn.8:44). He is that

supernatural being who took the Son of God “to a very high mountain and showed him all

the kingdoms of the world and their splendor” and then said to him: “All this I will give you,
if you will bow down and worship me” (Mt. 4:8-9). He is the one who “put into the heart of
Judas Iscariot to betray [Christ]” (Jn. 13:2).

Note the many great powers this being has, especially over human minds and

beliefs. This is not therefore a being that a Christian philosopher can be indifferent about,
or in whom one need fear no evil. On the contrary, the Lord himself demonstrates the

constant vigilance his people need to have toward this being by culminating his teaching on

how to pray (the “Our Father”) with the words: “and deliver us from the evil one” (Lk. 11:4).
See for instance Israel’s chapter “The Death of the Devil”, pages 375 to 405 in his Radical
Enlightenment. Israel commences this chapter with the words: “During the last third of the
seventeenth century, the scene was set for a vast triangular contest in Europe between intellectual
conservatives, moderates, and radicals over the status of the supernatural in human life and the
reality of the Devil, demons, spirits, and magic.”
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Again, who is this being? This is the creature who led Eve and then Adam astray and thus

brought the fall, sin, the curse, death, and condemnation upon all flesh. This is a being who
has literal dominion over all the world’s minds unless some teacher can “open their eyes
and turn them from darkness to light, from the power of Satan to God” (Acts 26:18).

Besides leading most mortals to everlasting damnation, this being also causes untold

suffering in the world and against believers. “Your enemy the devil prowls around like a

roaring lion looking for someone to devour. Resist him, standing firm in the faith, because

you know that your brothers throughout the world are undergoing the same kind of
sufferings.” (1 Pet. 5:8-9).

The only way not to be philosophically deceived and bound in shackles by this god,

is by being “strong in the Lord and in his mighty power” and by taking up the armor of God:
“Put on the full armor of God so that you can take your stand against the devil’s schemes.

For our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but against the rulers, against the authorities,
against the powers of this dark world and against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly
places (Eph. 6:10-17). One needs to “take up the shield of faith, with which you can

extinguish all the flaming arrows of the evil one,” and “Take the helmet of salvation [to

protect one’s beliefs] and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God” (Eph. 6:16-7).

The teachings of the churches and universities of the seventeenth century were by-

and-large not yet overly “tainted” with Enlightenment theological liberalism, so they were

not shy in speaking about the devil. For instance, when the Jesuits went to “New France” to
convert the Indians, they wrote over and over again about the “demonic” influences that
held the Indians bound. We see this attitude also manifested in the correspondence

between the brilliant 795 Albert Burgh and the philosopher Spinoza in the 1670s. Burgh
I say “brilliant” here to counteract what I take to be the overly bad press that Burgh has received.
To my thinking, he is too often depicted as a poor wretch half out of his mind. Even Curley and
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argued that Spinoza’s philosophy stemmed from “deception by the devil.” So we know

these things were in the air. Burgh tried to persuade Spinoza that he should not rely on his

own mind or reason: “You can never be confident about whether the human mind possesses
the ideas of all created things naturally, or whether external objects of the suggestion of
good or evil spirits produce many, if not all, of them.” 796 In essence, Burgh asserts that

Spinoza’s philosophical “proofs are inspired by the Prince of evil spirits.” Spinoza responds
to Burgh’s insinuation not only with some philosophical argument, but also by simply
mocking his insane “dream” of a being who can be an enemy of God, as an abject
absurdity. 797

Just as St. Paul argued that if there is no resurrection from the dead than so is the

faith and the truth claims of scripture, so also with the devil: If the devil doesn’t exist, then
Adam and Eve would not have eaten of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil;

then they would not have been driven out of the Garden of Eden; then nature wouldn’t have
been cursed; then man wouldn’t have fallen; then there wouldn’t have been a need for
salvation or for Christ; then revelation or scripture are lies, which mean that God is a

deceiver or that there is no God. If there is no devil, then all the passages that state that
Christ came to deliver the world from devils and power of darkness are also false.

Therefore the devil is as necessary to the truth of scripture as is salvation and heaven. If the
devil is not true, than neither is Christ.

Nadler fall into this way of treating him. Though Burgh’s excess emotional tirades come off like the
typical fundamentalist madness, he is a lot smarter than this seems. In fact, some of his arguments
against Spinoza’s philosophy are serious; and Spinoza’s response to them weak. Yet, it seems to me
on points like this that some Spinoza scholars tend to depict mostly only a good-guy-bad-guy
analysis. Indeed, this study also is guilty of this. In my opinion, there is the tendency to only praise
Spinoza and mute any serious criticism; and the opposite toward his opponents.
796 Spinoza. The Correspondence of Spinoza (New York: Russell & Russell, 1966), edited by A. Wolf, p.
311.
797 Ibid. 354 and 351-2. I should say here that Burgh’s letter about the devil is not the only reference
to the devil in the Correspondence. There are many such references and, even more, implied
comments. Indeed, how could there not be?
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This is why the dogma of the devil is so central to Christianity and why Spinoza’s

attack against it considered such an outrage. 798

Spinoza’s Correspondence : The first letters of 1661:
In the very first letter (of August of 1661) to Spinoza in the surviving correspondence is
further proof that Spinoza at this date already knew the principles of Cartesian and

Baconian philosophy, issues about infinite Extension and Thought, and about the soul-body
problem. 799 This comes a year before the 1662 dates given for his Treatise on the

Emendation of the Intellect and the Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well Being. So

Spinoza seems to have much of the major doctrines of his philosophical system in order as
early as this date. We can tell from this letter that Spinoza already has a confident and

strong philosophy in place. He doesn’t just refer to Descartes or other philosophers as a
student or as a scholar would do. He writes what he thinks and believes on his own.
In letter 2, “Of the philosophy of Descartes and Bacon,” Spinoza says:

The first and greatest error is that they have wandered so far from knowledge of the
first cause and origin of things. Second, they did not know the true nature of the
human Mind. Third, they never grasped the true cause of error. Only those lacking
any education or desire for knowledge will fail to see how necessary the true
knowledge of these three things is. 800
The first criticism he has against Descartes and Bacon is about God; more

specifically, their notion of God (which is, I take it, in line with the Judaeo-Christian biblical

notion of a Creator). The second criticism, like the first, is also based on metaphysical and

Throughout all his works, Spinoza deals with various biblical and theological issues such as the
devil and hell. We saw this in his Apologia, in his Treatise, and now in his Short Treatise. And we will
see more in the TTP and the Ethics, for much of early modern philosophy revolves around and is
intimately concerned with the cosmic drama of the theological tragic-comedy of the Bible.
799 From Curley’s The Collected Works of Spinoza, Volume 1, 163-4. This letter was sent from
Oldenburg.
800 Ibid. 167. Note how strong his philosophical opinions are at this point. He’s 38-years-old and he
is ripping into the theological-philosophical errors of the 17th century’s greatest philosophers.
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religious grounds: Descartes holds that the true nature of the human mind is in some way
ontologically distinct and even separate from the body. Spinoza rejects this ontological

dualism. This mind-body dualism is in line with Christian theology’s sharp distinction and

separation of the “soul” from the body. St. Paul, for instance, talks about his wish to “depart
the body to be with the Lord”, and the like. The third point of criticism has to do with what
he calls the true cause of error. He connects this issue with the subject of the problem of
free will and what he takes to be the false bifurcation of will from intellect made by
Cartesians and others.

From these letters then, and from all the evidence selectively gleaned from the

Apologia, the Treatise on the Emendation of the Understanding, the Short Treatise on God,

Man, and His Well-Being, and, finally, from his Correspondence, the case has been made that

the development of Spinoza’s “apostate antichrist philosophy” is to all extents and purposes
complete and set in stone even before 1661. True, a lot more is yet to come (TTP, Ethics,

Politics), but, in terms of philosophical foundations, these have already been laid. With this
in mind, we now proceed to his Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, but we do so with a
different interpretation of this book than is usually given.

1661-1663: Spinoza and Descartes – The Principles of Cartesian Philosophy
The conventional understanding of this work is that Spinoza simply aimed to explain some

of the major principles of Cartesian philosophy to his friends in a clear way that would help
them to better understand it. However, as some Spinoza scholars point out, there is more

going on in this book than at first meets the eye. Edwin Curley, for instance, points out that
“there is a good deal of thinly veiled criticism in Spinoza’s exposition of [Descartes’]
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principles” 801. Indeed, there are several places in this text in which Spinoza puts some of

Descartes’ views in question, though the language he uses may not seem to overtly point
this out.

Wiep Van Bunge points out that Lodewijk Meyer’s preface to Spinoza’s Principles of

Cartesian Philosophy made a lot of people worried. He not only warned the reader that

Spinoza “did not share each and every principle of Descartes’ philosophy … [but also] let it

be known that his philosophy was indeed marked by a number of substantial modifications
of Cartesianism.” 802 As Meyer’s says, “The foundations of the sciences brought to light by
Descartes, and the things he built on them, do not suffice to disentangle and solve all the

very difficult problems which occur in metaphysics. Different foundations are required, if
we wish our intellect to rise to that pinnacle of knowledge.” 803

Looking behind the scenes in the “thick context” of Spinoza’s world, Jonathan

Israel’s essay “Spinoza as an Expounder, Critic, and ‘Reformer’, of Descartes” interprets

some of Spinoza’s Principles of Cartesian Philosophy as being purposely, though furtively,

subversive of Cartesianism. Israel argues that there are some crucial philosophical points in
the Principles that can only receive a proper construal by locating the book in its historical
context. Once the background of the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy is thoroughly

investigated, a different view of the book comes out than that of the interpretations of later
generations. Israel points out that “by the later eighteenth century, philosophical debate

had lost touch with the immediate intellectual context.” Moreover, “while modern scholars
concur that Spinoza departs substantially from Descartes’ intentions in his only book to be
published under his name during his life-time, it is hardly ever suggested that his might

Spinoza. Collected Works, vol. 1, ed. Curley, op. cited, p. 221.
Wiep Van Bunge. From Stevin to Spinoza, op. cited, 108.
803 Ibid. 108-9.
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have been a deliberate strategy or subversion of ideas, something designed to advance his
own philosophical priorities covertly.” 804

Though Spinoza says that he is reordering Descartes’ thought in a way to make it

clearer to the reader, there is evidence to doubt that this was Spinoza’s only intention. For
one thing, Spinoza literally told his friends that he rejected some of Descartes’ most

important philosophical positions. For another, as we saw in Spinoza’s letter to Oldenburg
quoted above in the previous section, Spinoza strongly dissented from Descartes’ (and

Bacon’s) views on various basically theological respects. He especially disliked Descartes’
defense of a first cause and along with his defense of the soul as a spiritual thinking thing
ontologically distinct from the body.

Seeing how strongly Spinoza felt about these matters, it should not surprise us if in

his treatment of Descartes’ work he suggests and implies some of the things he dissented
from. When we research the matter, we also find out that others (outside his circle and
correspondents) discerned his anti-Cartesianism merely from reading his Principles of

Cartesian Philosophy. From this alone they argued that Spinoza was up to more than merely
laying out Descartes’ views.

For example, we learn that Nicholas Steno interpreted Spinoza’s work on Descartes

as a work in which he “reformed” Descartes. By this time (1671), Steno “knows that

Spinoza was a materialist whose concern was not just fundamentally to ‘reform’ Descartes’
philosophy but, as Steno saw it, to liquidate spirituality and ‘soul’ in the process.” 805 Steno

Jonathan Israel’s version of this paper delivered in July 2006.
Intellectual History Review. Vol. 17, Issue 1, March 2007, 44-45. I wish to say that I am thus far
uncertain and therefore uncomfortable with accepting all Israel’s thesis as stated in this essay,
especially regarding his interpretation of Descartes letter to his Meyer (Letter XV in A. Wolfe). It
seems to me that if Spinoza was as anti-Cartesian as Israel argues for, this letter to his friend would
have given more indication of it.
804
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strenuously denies Spinoza’s project to get rid of the theological dogma of the immortal
soul.

806

Steno isn’t the only thinker of the period who recognized that Spinoza’s work on

Descartes was subversive. Another critic who saw what Spinoza was really up to in the

Principles of Cartesian Philosophy was Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten, whose lectures in the
mid 1750s stated that

Spinoza had given the appearance of only wanting to rework Descartes’ theories
more accurately and astutely [than Descartes had done], but, [in reality] already laid
the ground for asserting his own fallacies – which specifically consisted of seeing all
things as mere formations and parts of one big essence or one substance, so that
God, as asserted by Spinoza, is the most integrated thing in the whole world, in that
all other things are actual parts of the same.

Other critics, including arch Cartesians such as Cornelius Bontekoe, claimed the

same thing, only in stronger terms. Bontekoe makes clear that Spinoza’s real purpose was

to mix his diabolical concepts among those of Descartes and coax the Cartesians to
accept them the more easily, and they, taking him to be a true Cartesian, often
acknowledged these as being authentic Cartesian ideas when in fact they are not,
being concepts which on the contrary besmirch that philosophy, obscure and
destroy it and often without anyone noticing, overthrow it. One sees all this from
the work’s full preface, and from the Cogitata Metaphysica which he appended to it.
Indeed, in the preface, Spinoza has the effrontery to assert not only that he had had
to deal with things in that book according to Descartes’s opinion, but that he had
gained insight into still higher principia whereby he can provide other and better
explanations of things than does Descartes. 807
True, Spinoza’s manner in talking of Descartes “gives the impression of reverend

adherence and loyal discipleship”, but this is “often deftly undermined by subtle differences
of wording in the way arguments are developed.” 808 In Spinoza’s presentation of some key
planks in Descartes’ philosophical platform, such as on God, he purposely excludes

Descartes’ orthodox qualifications about divine revelation and the Creator. Curley agrees,

Ibid, 44.
See Israel’s case for this on pages 48 to 49, ibid.
808 Ibid.
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for “if we conceive of God’s power as being like that of a king, as Descartes did …, we destroy
the foundations of our physics.” 809

With respect to Spinoza’s treatment of Descartes, I’m reminded of Descartes’ way of

dealing with scholasticism. Instead of explicitly and stridently taking scholastic theories to
task, Descartes instead worked to present his system in such a way that by the time a

person finished reading his work, he would only then realize that scholasticism becomes
superfluous.

These are the things I want people mainly to notice. But I think I included many
other things besides; and I may tell you, between ourselves, that these six
Meditations contain all the foundations of my physics. But please do not tell people,
for that might make it harder for supporters of Aristotle to approve them. I hope
that readers will gradually get used to my principles, and recognize their truth,
before they notice that they destroy the principles of Aristotle. 810

Roger Ariew shows in his “Descartes among the Scholastics” that Descartes often dealt with

the scholastics using their own terms and language in order to win as many as possible with
the least amount of hysteria. If Israel’s thesis on the clandestine manner of Spinoza’s book

on Descartes is true, then, we might surmise, that Spinoza does in that work what Descartes
did in his works. Indeed, Spinoza actually talks like this. In his letter to his friend Meyer, he

asks him to omit from his Preface those passages in which Meyer uses strident language, for
I should like all men to be able easily to persuade themselves that these are
published for the good of all men, and that you, in publishing this little book, are
mastered simply by a desire to spread the truth, and that you are doing all in your
power to make this little work welcome to everyone, and to induce men, in a kindly
and friendly way, to take up the study of true philosophy, and to pursue the good of
all. This everyone will easily believe when he sees that no one is hurt, and that
nothing is put down which can be even slightly offense to anyone. 811

Based on such arguments, Israel feels certain that “Cartesianism, for Spinoza, was a

medium by means of which he could surreptitiously and inconspicuously instill his own

Ibid.
Rene Descartes. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Volume III The Correspondence,
translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991, AT III, p. 298.
811 Spinoza. The Correspondence of Spinoza, translated by A. Wolf, op. cited, p. 135, Letter XV.
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philosophy into the Dutch cultural milieu, a system entirely incompatible with Descartes’s
premises but also with the prevailing cultural norms as well as the Dutch laws of his

time.” 812 Israel argues that evidence such those cited show that Spinoza looked upon his

book on Cartesian philosophy as a planned and integral part of his ambition “to establish his
own philosophy in society.” 813 But he needed to do this in a clandestine manner because of
the seriousness of the times. 814

To sum up then, Spinoza’s Principles of Cartesian Philosophy is more than a simple

exposition of Descartes’ philosophy. It is instead a “carefully judged mix of exposition of
Descartes’s philosophy and partly concealed but fundamental revision of Descartes’s
thought … [whose] evident purpose was simultaneously to build on and yet negate

Descartes” in hopes of “carrying the generality of Cartesians a good part of the distance with
them”… “for the good of all.” 815

The years cited above in our section are not meant to imply that Spinoza’s dealings

with the works of Descartes only began in the years 1661 to 1663. We only cite these years
to continue our time line up to the Ethics and the TTP. Spinoza had read Descartes and had
been immensely influenced by Cartesian thought before 1661. According to most Spinoza
scholars, Descartes had the greatest philosophical influence in Spinoza’s life. Descartes

turned his life around. Descartes was the primary cause of his “philosophical conversion.

Descartes consolidated his rejection of Judaism and the old way of the synagogue and

“Spinoza as an Expounder, Critic, and ‘Reformer’ of Descartes”, op. cited, p. 52.
Ibid. 44.
814 See Israel’s excellent summation (in my view) of the “three factors” that prevented him at times
from speaking his views in a transparent way on pages 46 to 48, ibid. There has been a lot of
discussion (especially since Leo Strauss’s essay “How to Study Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise
in his Persecution and the Art of Writing) on the question of how transparent or guarded Spinoza was
in his works, my thoughts on the matter from reading much of it is that he did indeed often present
his views in a covert manner. We must remember that the only work that he published in his name
during his lifetime was the Principles. The TTP was published during his lifetime, but without his
name, and even given from a false printer. And the Ethics and Correspondence were only published
after his death (and even then a lot of clandestine activity brought this publication into being).
815 Ibid. 53.
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Torah. Descartes represented a new life, honesty, truth, light, and liberation. Without
Descartes, there may have been no Spinoza as we know him.

It is known that Spinoza had studied Descartes probably even before his 1656

expulsion. We have said that some of Spinoza’s works and philosophy are responses to, or
reactions against, his religious education. We have to say the same thing about Spinoza’s
post-Talmud Torah education in Descartes. So much of what Spinoza’s philosophy – his

metaphysics, philosophy of mind, epistemology, philosophy of religion, and even his ethics
can be seen as responses to and development from Descartes. We now turn to what is
widely regarded as Spinoza’s magnum opus, his great Ethics.
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Chapter Fourteen
Spinoza’s Ethics versus “the Word of God”
Reason versus “prejudices”
“Is it not the most pernicious atheism that ever was seen in the world?” 816
“whenever the opportunity arose I have striven to remove [ theological] prejudices … there still remain a
considerable number of[theological] prejudices…I have thought it proper … to bring these [theological]
prejudices before the bar of reason” 817

Introduction
Preliminary remarks on the difficulty of the Ethics
Before pointing out areas in which Spinoza’s Ethics is a Radical Enlightenment document
against biblical theology and Jewish and Christian philosophy, it will be useful to say a

couple words about the difficulty of learning this work. There are several obscure and

difficult passages in Spinoza’s Treatise on the Emendation of the Understanding, the Short

Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being, and his Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy, but none
more so then in his Ethics. The first, second, and third impression that most readers have

when perusing Spinoza’s Ethics is just how utterly foreign it is. Indeed, during the course of
These are the words of one of Spinoza’s first biographies (The Life of Benedictus Spinoza) by
Pastor John Colerus explicitly about the Ethics (67). “Did ever anybody hear any such abominations
among Christians!” (68). Indeed, these are only a couple of the many excoriations spoken against
Spinoza in an otherwise pretty well-researched and scholarly biography. I should also point out here
that Colerus didn’t just research Spinoza’s life; he also studied many of his works. Lest the reader
think that only clerics uttered such violent speech, think again. Bayle’s article on “Spinoza”, the
longest essay in his Dictionary, is replete with the highest of denunciations. Many philosophers, as
great as Arnauld and Leibniz, also had many harsh words.
817 Spinoza. Ethics (trans. Shirley), op. cited, Part I, Appendix, p. 57
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my research on Spinoza, many of my colleagues in philosophy (both advanced students at
the graduate level and some professors) confessed to me their frustration and despair in

understanding Spinoza’s Ethics. They said that they had tried several times to enter into his
thought, but each time had given up the attempt unsuccessful and dispirited. Furthermore,
in almost every book I have read on the Ethics, commentators are forced to discuss the

problem as to why the Ethics is so daunting. It has been translated into English from the
Latin. We read the English words, most of which we understand, yet, after we finish

sentence after sentence, much of it doesn’t really register. We read the words assuming that
we can learn what he’s written because we know how to read, but, after reading a few lines,
we realize that we are not really understanding what he is saying. So we try again.
Puzzlement. Bemusement. What’s going on here? Why is it not registering?

One of the great rewards of studying under Professor Roger Ariew is in learning the

imperative need to read philosophy and philosophers in context. 818 A personal confession
may be apropos here. Since 1972 I have, here and there, opened the Ethics and read in it

hoping to get a better understanding of it. Each time I have come up short. And now,

almost 40 years later, studying under Professor Ariew, the light has finally dawn on yonder
block head – you have to study such books in their historical, biographical, and social context

For an excellent statement and example of this, see Roger Ariew’s Introduction to his Descartes
and the Last Scholastics. See how he backs up this methodology throughout the essays in the work.
Indeed, this methodology and book seems to have always been in the back of my mind in the writing
of this dissertation, and especially in this chapter on Spinoza. I have often went over portions of
Ariew’s work, such as the Introduction to the book just cited, and, to help me to apply its teachings, I
would simply substitute “Spinoza” for “Descartes” and “Orthodox biblical theology” for
“Scholasticism.” I found a great deal of inspiration and insight into Spinoza and his world from
proceeding in this way. I believe that Wiep Van Bunge found similar inspiration from his teacher,
Theo Verbeek, in works such as From Stevin to Spinoza: An Essay on Philosophy in the SeventeenthCentury Dutch Republic. In the Preface to this book, he notes that his work “draws on sources which
historians of early modern philosophy as a rule tend to neglect, although a substantial part of this
book picks up on recent research done by Dutch colleagues”, especially Verbeek. Van Bunge’s work
does not concentrate on only the philosophy as such, “Instead I have studied philosophy as it
appeared in a specific seventeenth-century culture” (ix). I follow Ariew and Van Bunge in this 17th
century contextual approach, only my focus is to make clear and distinct the theological and
scriptural bases of the conflict with philosophy and unassisted natural reason.
818
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before you can understand them. You have to do more than merely read the book, for this is
a book that requires the reading of other books. This is a book that requires some

knowledge of the history of philosophy, especially of Aristotelian, Scholastic, and Cartesian
philosophy. It is also, as we will see, a book that requires knowledge of biblical doctrine.

There’s so much in this book that is assumed and implied, but not explicitly stated.

To take some examples of difficulties that readers inevitably have with the Ethics, take the

fact that it is arranged like Euclid’s geometry textbook. Why doesn’t Spinoza tell us why he
has chosen to write philosophy like a geometer? 819 It’s only by doing research into the

mentality of his time that you can learn anything about that. And that takes you into the

16th and 17th centuries. That takes you into the world and works of Copernicus and Galileo

and the revolution in mathematics at the time – and what this revolution in mathematics

meant – and what this new movement, this “New Philosophy”, was all about. But in order to
appreciate this as “new” you need to learn what came before it. You then realize that you

have to learn about scholastic philosophy and scholastic methodology. Once you get a hold
of this, then you can finally be in a position to understand the impatience and anger that

many in the seventeenth century (Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, etc.) felt about
scholastic philosophy – and then the attraction they felt toward this new way of
mathematics and naturalistic science.

Another difficulty in understanding this book is the employment of terms which no

one uses anymore (for example, the Aristotelian and scholastic term “substance”). 820 One of
This is not exactly right, for he does tell us. One can find his explanation in the Preface to Part III
of his Ethics. He knew that many would “find it surprising” that he should “treat of the faults and
follies of mankind in the geometric manner.” But his argument for doing this is that all of nature,
including human emotions, follows universal laws which have assignable causes or reasons. Because
of this, he believes that he can investigate the nature of God (or Nature), the mind, and the emotions,
“just as if it were an investigation into lines, planes, or bodies” (Ethics, op. cited, Shirley, 102-3). The
point I’m trying to make here is how such a method even arose and why this method came to be used
over traditional and Scholastic methods of doing philosophy.
820 Indeed, one of the major reasons for not doing away with scholasticism and replacing it with
Cartesianism in the universities was because it was understood that it took a great deal of time and
819
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the causes of this is, obviously, because we are a different audience compared to his 17th

century audience. Those in his audience that were philosophers and theologians knew a

great deal more about scholastic philosophy and theology than we do. 821 Hence they were

not utterly perplexed when they came upon terms such as “substance.” They also knew a

great deal more about Cartesian philosophy (at least in some regards), too. Indeed, the late
17th century world was up in arms over Descartes’ works. They put his works on the Index.
People supporting Cartesian ideas lost their jobs. Others were lambasted, ridiculed, and
excoriated from pulpits and from rectors of universities. Why? We no longer feel the

dangers of Cartesian philosophy. Indeed, most people today still haven’t a clue as to what

those dangers were perceived to be. What do we care about Cartesian philosophy? Do we

get violently upset when we read it? No. Why not? If they did when they read it, why don’t
we? If you don’t know, then you have failed to enter into some of the most important

aspects of such works – which is historical and theological. As a rule then, a scholar who

cannot explain the revulsion and horror that the greatest minds of the 17th century felt over

Spinoza’s works, has failed to understand the most important issue about his works to his

17th century contemporaries. And there’s no way to understand the revulsion and horror

they felt toward Spinoza unless one understands the theology that made them feel that way.
The study of biblical theology then, in this case, is unavoidable.

But there are many other examples that may be cited to prove the necessity of

knowing context to accurately understand Spinoza’s Ethics. One final one will be given here.
Many commentators have been puzzled by the use of such language as “salvation” and

labor to master the scholastic way of expressing things. Students then could not afford to be
distracted from their scholastic studies to read novel works.
821 Indeed, as was implied in the preceding footnote, one of the reasons why many opposed the new
philosophy was because “once [students] have begun to rely on this so-called philosophy, they are
unable to understand the technical terms used in their books of traditional authors and in the
lectures and debates of their professors” (Rene Descartes quoting a portion of an edict against his
work in Utrecht. See Rene Descartes: Philosophical Essays and Correspondence, edited with
Introduction by Roger Ariew, xiv).
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“blessedness” because they are Christian expressions. Historically, Judaism has not taught
that “salvation” may be found in Moses. You will never learn the answer to this question
from reading the Ethics, no matter how hard and long you study it. However, if you do

historical work, you will dissolve this puzzlement. Yirmiyahu Yovel did just that. In his

Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Marrano of Reason, Yovel convincingly demonstrates by
plenteous historical documentation that Spinoza and the Jews in the Jewish quarter of

Amsterdam learned these terms by – as it were - existential osmosis from their ancestor’s

experience in Spain and Portugal. Because of the generations in which they were forced to
become Christians, the Jews were cut off from overt ties with Jewish religious Orthodox
communities. As a result of this Christian assimilation, some of the Jewish theology in
Amsterdam still showed signs of Christian influence. 822

So then, let us be clear: You can’t understand or appreciate Spinoza’s Ethics, just as

you can’t understand some difficult work in science, unless you have done a great deal of
additional study. My problem in 1972 and for many years after in trying to fathom the

Ethics was the false presupposition that if you know how to read, and you study a text real
hard for a long time, then you will come to understand and master it. Wrong. Here’s the

only way to truly understand and master such texts: you have to do all the background study

both in the history of that philosophy and in the biography of that philosopher. And here’s
where the rubber hits the road and where many readers will leave off trying. For in

actuality, such a path takes a great deal of time, involves too much effort, and consumes too
much of the life of most readers. Therefore most readers will never come to fully

understand or appreciate the Ethics. But to “the chosen few” scholars who realize the

importance of this text and devote themselves to learning it, they alone have the pleasure in
For the complete story on all this, see Yirmiyahu Yovel’s Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Marrano
of Reason (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). For a quick view on this point, see for
example, pages 36-39 and 18-24.

822

366

understanding the text and its importance. This is one of the few rewards and pleasures we
poor, book worm scholars enjoy over non-bookworm scholars. Reading this work in 1972,
I hadn’t the foggiest idea at all of the controversy and hullabaloo that swirled around this

book in its time – let alone knowing why such hubbub should arise from it. Only after doing
the requisite historical, social, theological, and biographical reading can one really
appreciate and accurately assess this great work.

The Context of the Ethics: Reason versus the “prejudices”

“whenever the opportunity arose I have striven to remove prejudices … there still remain a considerable
number of prejudices … I have thought it proper at this point to bring these prejudices before the bar of
reason” 823

This study has covered a great deal of context (biography, history and theology) already, so

we have a sizeable amount of background information on Spinoza and his world, even if not
enough on the Ethics at this point. We covered Spinoza’s intellectual-spiritual biography

from his youth up to 1656 (24-yrs old) and then said a few words about his early works in
the period from 1656 to 1661 and 1663, the date of the publication of his Principles of

Cartesian Philosophy and of his Metaphysical Thoughts. We’ve seen that at least some of the
doctrines which Spinoza was condemned and excommunicated for in 1656 were central

Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, Appendix, op. cited, p. 57. Note here that Spinoza confesses that throughout
the writing of his Ethics, he has made it a point to deal with biblical theological beliefs (which, in
Spinoza estimation, are predominantly “prejudices”) to “remove” them. I point this out because it
has been rarely pointed out. Most commentators approach the Ethics as so overwhelmingly
philosophical that they do not notice the pervasive biblical theological dogmas that the work takes
issue with over and over again – “whenever the opportunity arose”, for there are “a considerable
number of [these] prejudices” (my emphasis). Note also how Spinoza’s use of words (“prejudices”
instead of the more direct “faith in biblical theology”) avoids too-open or obstreperous a
confrontation. Finally, note how he formulates the conflict. My treatment of these issues has not
simplified or projected a black-and-white, reason-versus-theology bifurcation onto Spinoza. Spinoza
himself makes the bifurcation between reason versus theology (How different from Leibniz’s way of
doing philosophy of religion!). And this he does in the Ethics and not just the TTP, as many
commentators wrongly divide the supposed vastly different purposes between these two works.
823
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teachings that would appear in the Ethics (such as his “philosophical God” and his

repudiation of the soul and immortality). From his 1663 book on Descartes then, we know

that Spinoza went forward to develop his own philosophy. According to Curley and Nadler,
he actually had the bulk of the Ethics by as early as 1665 (though there would be additions,
expansions, and structural changes to come). The gist of the Ethics then, was in place five

years before the publication of the TTP. For this reason, we will examine the Ethics before

the TTP in this chapter. Curley does the same in his Collected Works of Spinoza (Vol. 1). He
justifies this order by arguing that “we know from correspondence that a substantial

manuscript of the Ethics was in existence by the middle of 1665 … [so] it seems best to treat
the Ethics as coming before the Theological-Political Treatise and to see a shift in Spinoza’s

interests in the late 1660s.” 824

Nadler tells us that by the spring of 1662, Spinoza probably began work on the

Ethics. His plan was “to provide a fuller, clearer, and more systematic” treatment of his

Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being. He worked on it consistently until about

1665. At this time, he felt confident enough in what he had thus far written to share it with

his friends. We do not know how much of the Ethics was completed at this date, but Nadler
thinks that “At the time, he probably saw it as mostly complete but in need of polishing.” 825

Spinoza stopped 826 working on the Ethics because something had arisen in his town

(Voorburg at this time) that he recognized would become an even graver danger to future

semi-free philosophizing then had already been in the air: Reformed ministers were making
Collected Works, op. cited xiii. This is an interesting observation because many write as if the
“shift in Spinoza’s interests” went from theological and biblical interests to philosophical. Curley
shows how in this case it’s really the other way around. In reality, the two were always at work in
tandem.
825 Nadler, op. cited, 15.
826 Actually, Spinoza did not literally or completely stop working on his philosophy, or the philosophy
of the Ethics, because, as we will see, much of the TTP is his philosophy. More particularly, much of
the TTP is the product of the philosophy of the Ethics. But even this description is misleading
because it is an error to not regard the TTP as a work of philosophy and an error to regard the Ethics
as only philosophy and not also biblical theological criticism.
824
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political and social inroads in their attempt to dominate the culture. Spinoza saw this

development as so alarming that he felt that he had to do whatever he could to strengthen
the liberal forces of the country. He therefore left off work on the Ethics to write a new

work (though it was one that he had already written some on in his early Apology) that he

hoped would strengthen opposition against the Counter-Enlightenment Reformed religiouspolitical movement. This would become a treatise explicitly on theology and politics, The

Theological-Political Treatise. In this work, Spinoza seeks to undermine the authority of the
Scriptures in order to undermine the authority of those who used the Scriptures to infringe
on the freedoms of all other views. The work also makes several powerful arguments on
the need for tolerance and greater freedom. 827

After publication of the TTP in 1669-1670, he moved from Voorburg to The Hague

and went back to work on his Ethics. The years from 1670 to 1675 then were devoted to

revising and completing this work for publication. During this period he read works such as
Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, which would have some impact on the Ethics. 828 Meanwhile,

things were getting worse in the political arena. His naïve hope that his TTP would help

strengthen the liberal forces in Dutch politics not only failed, but caused a firestorm against
him. Not only did the Orthodox forces attack him, but even some of the more liberal forces,

including the Cartesians. 829 He bravely took steps to publish the Ethics nevertheless, but the
rumors that he was hearing ultimately dissuaded him. He learned from “certain

trustworthy men” that “the theologians were everywhere plotting against me.” 830 So much
827 Ibid. 18-19. He wrote to Oldenburg that he also wrote it to defend himself against those “who
constantly accuse me of atheism” (Ibid. 20). This is very hard to believe considering that the work is
extremely militant against all traditional theological views of God. If we are to believe scholars such
as Nadler that Spinoza was an atheist, then we cannot always judge Spinoza as sincere or honest or
transparent.
828 Ibid. 24.
829 Ibid. 24-7.
830 How strange, ironic, and hypocritical it is that a religion that suffered from plotting and
persecution against them and their freedom (Mk. 14: 1-2; Jn. 11:45-57; Acts 23:12-35, etc.), and that
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so that he realized he was in grave danger. In 1675 Theodore Rijckius wrote to a friend in
the government of The Hague that

there is talk among us that the author of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is about
to issue a book on God and the mind, one even more dangerous than the first. It will
be the responsibility of you and those who, with you, are occupied with governing
the Republic, to make sure that this book is not published. For it is incredible how
much that man, who has striven to overthrow the principles of our most holy faith,
has already harmed the Republic. 831

In this same year, at a gathering of an assembly of Reformed leaders and members of the
consistory in The Hague, the following was recorded of their proceedings:

as this consistory understands that the most blasphemous opinions of Spinoza are
beginning to spread more and more, as much in this town as elsewhere, each of the
members of this body is earnestly asked to see what they can learn about this,
whether there is any other book by him that might happen to be in press, and what
danger further lies here, in order to report back about it to this gathering and then,
after a finding, to do something about it. 832

The handwriting was on the wall. Spinoza was caute 833 enough to transcribe its meaning.

He therefore gave up his plan to publish his great Ethics and eventually left instructions to
publish it after his death. The Ethics would not come out until his death in 1677. 834 And

when it did, it too was violently attacked. In our next sections, we will delineate in specific

detail why it was attacked so viciously. This is our modus operandi because most

contemporary works on this subject simply do not supply the detailed specifics and sources
of exactly what was so horrible about Spinoza’s work. One sometimes doesn’t even learn
the sources and the specifics of the attacks against Spinoza even from the quotes of

Spinoza’s religious contemporaries above. But this is not because they didn’t know the
would proudly preach this story over and over again throughout the world, would nevertheless go on
to plot and persecute its opponents whenever it gained political power.
831 Ibid. 31.
832 Ibid, my emphasis.
833 “Caute” was the motto inscribed in the ring Spinoza wore. It means “be cautious!”
834 The most comprehensive treatment of the history of the Ethics’ text is Piet Steenbakkers’ “The
Textual History of Spinoza’s Ethics” in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza’s Ethics, op. cited, pp. 2641. Nadler’s biography of Spinoza also sheds a great deal of light on the genesis and probable
evolution of the work while at the same time providing far more context rich in many varying
aspects.
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specifics. They did. We know that they did because a reading of all their criticism, and not
just juicy quotes from their work, reveals this. Colerus, for instance, does not only issue

condemnations of the Ethics. He not only quotes from the works of “Several learned men
[who] have already sufficiently discovered the impious doctrines contained” in Spinoza’s
Ethics, but he himself “add[s] some few things to what has been said by them.” 835

He begins his critique of the Ethics saying: “Who would not think at first, considering

so fine a beginning, that he is reading a Christian philosopher?... But when we enquire more

narrowly into his opinions, we find that the God of Spinoza is a meer phantom, an imaginary
God … And therefore the words of the Apostle, Tit. 1:16 concerning impious men, may be

very well applied to that philosopher: ‘They profess that they know God, but in works they

deny him.’” In this fashion, Colerus goes on to treat other central philosophical teachings in
Spinoza’s Ethics which are not in line with the Word of God.

We see this same kind of treatment (implied or overtly) by Oldenburg, Bayle, and

scores of others. Note, for instance, the language used in the two block quotes above. We’re
told that Spinoza was going to publish a book that is “even more dangerous than the first.”

This is the usual way of citing Spinoza’s heterodox views by Spinoza scholars. But in this

study, we wish to make clear exactly what these dangers are. Again, in the passage above,

we’re told that Spinoza’s work spread “the most blasphemous opinions.” We want to make

specifically clear and distinct exactly what Spinoza’s blasphemous opinions were in the eyes
of his contemporaries and from what sources they made this judgment.

We mustn’t overstate our case by exaggerating the degree to which other works

don’t provide enough specifics on the sources for the attacks on Spinoza. They do make
clear that several of Spinoza’s teachings were anathema to most of his contemporaries

because they opposed or contradicted traditional biblical and church teachings. And these
835

Colerus, op. cited, 63, 63-70.
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works also even make clear and distinct what doctrines of Spinoza were considered

heterodox or blasphemous – such as his views of God as Nature, of Nature as eternal, that

there is no ontologically distinct soul, that all is necessitated, and that he relativizes good
and evil. Most readers have a general inkling on how these opinions are not in line with

traditional biblical and church teachings. It is also true that many readers even know some

of the specifics on exactly how some of Spinoza’s views clash with central biblical teachings
(such as the “God or Nature” conflation, and the Nature as eternal, claims). One of the

principal purposes of this section is to add detail to this general understanding. I want to so
zoom in on these issues so that when the reader is finished reading them, he or she will

have a much better understanding of the reasons, arguments, and causes behind the attacks
against Spinoza.

Purpose and plan of this chapter on the Ethics

“I am utterly amazed, utterly enchanted! I have a precursor, and what a precursor! … Not only is his
overall tendency like mine—namely to make all knowledge the most powerful affect—but in five main
points of his doctrine I recognize myself; this most unusual … thinker is closest to me precisely in these
matters: he denies the freedom of the will, teleology, the moral world-order, the unegoistic, and evil.”
– Friedrich Nietzsche, the philosopher most famous for his advocacy of “God is dead” 836

The purpose of the present section of this study on Spinoza is to make clear and distinct

how Spinoza’s philosophical doctrines in the Ethics militate against biblical doctrines which
Curiously, Nietzsche does not explicitly cite in his list that Spinoza denies God (i.e. of tradition). I
take it that he felt that he didn’t need to because the sum of his five denials entails the denial of God
by logical necessity. Nietzsche called Spinoza a “precursor”, but Nietzsche’s knowledge of Spinoza (as
far as I have been able to determine from my own research and from other Nietzsche scholars that
I’ve read and corresponded with) was limited to textbooks and maybe the Ethics. One can see from
the list Nietzsche cites in the epigraph above that he was referring to the Ethics. He most probably
did not read Spinoza’s TTP. If he had, he most assuredly would have praised and loved Spinoza far
more. At any rate, even without the TTP, if he had done the requisite study of Spinoza’s Ethics, then
he still would not have called him only a precursor, for Spinoza’s Ethics cries out the death of God just
as emphatically as Nietzsche’s Gay Science, albeit without the same gifted literary and rhetorical
prose style.
836
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were staunchly defended by the theologians, philosophers, and culture of his day. Spinoza’s
Ethics is primarily philosophy, but it does not only deal with philosophy. In fact, it is

historically impossible for philosophy to be completely abstracted from religion. On the

contrary, as we will show (both from the Ethics itself and from scholars on the Ethics), there
are a great number of doctrines in Spinoza’s Ethics which implicitly and explicitly treat

scriptural and theological themes. Another very important principle that must figure in our
labor to accurately interpret Spinoza’s Ethics is by keeping his other works and

correspondence in mind. As Curley so aptly puts it, “it remains true that the other Spinozistic
texts constitute our most important data for the interpretation of the Ethics.” 837

So then, we must not make the mistake of abstracting Spinoza’s Ethics from his time

and place, or from the history of philosophy, theology, and biblical criticism. And we must

not make the mistake of abstracting Spinoza’s Ethics from the religious world all about him,

his orthodox religious upbringing, his exclusive religious education, and all the sufferings he
endured due to religious causes (such as being rejected and expelled from his community
and family, the incredibly harsh cherem pronounced against him, the attempts to get the

Amsterdam authorities to expel him, the attempted assassination, the insane uproar against

the TTP, and so on). But we must also not make the mistake of abstracting the Ethics from
his earlier works (which we have briefly treated above) or from his correspondence, or
from his TTP (which we will treat in the next chapter). Piet Steenbakkers’ essay “The

Textual History of Spinoza’s Ethics” for The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza’s Ethics states
that “writing the Theological-Political Treatise had its impact on the development of the

philosophical views expounded in the Ethics.” 838 To paraphrase Nadler, in a forthcoming

Collected Works, op. cited, xi-xii.
See page 29 for this. Unfortunately, Steenbakkers’ paper, like Koistinen’s and Viljanen’s
Introduction, says nary a word about the theological issues or context at work.

837
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work on the TTP: Those who don’t know the TTP, don’t know Spinoza. 839 I would add to

this: Those who don’t know his correspondence also don’t know Spinoza (at least as fully
and accurately as he can be known). The correspondence is incredibly important in

knowing Spinoza’s views on his works because he could not speak as forthrightly in his
published works as he could in his private (and as yet) unpublished letters.

The plan of this section then is to furnish some samples to show how much

Spinoza’s Ethics militates against biblical-theological-philosophical positions. We will show

that the juxtaposition of these two antithetical world views is exactly how the theologians,

philosophers, and scholars of his time responded to his work. In fact, this method of study

was the usual focal point in the scholarship of theologians, philosophers, and thinkers of the
time. We see this in Colerus’s works, all the works which he refers to, in Bayle, Steno,
Burgh, Leibniz, and many of Spinoza’s correspondents. Contemporary students and

scholars of philosophy may be surprised or puzzled by the large amount of biblical texts and
theology that will be referred to here by me and by Spinoza’s contemporaries; but this is

necessary to make clear and distinct just how antithetical the two world views are and just
how much it was this antithesis that engaged most of the attention of the scholars of the

time, in contradistinction to the overriding attention of Spinoza scholars today. 840 One look

at the table of contents of one of the premier publishing houses in the world on Spinoza’s
Ethics today appears to demonstrate this point. Not one of the thirteen chapters in The
Cambridge Companion to Spinoza’s Ethics reads anything like the treatment this work

The exact quote is: “But if we do not give the Theological-Political Treatise the attention it
deserves, then we do not really know Spinoza.” From “A Book Forged in Hell”: Spinoza Scandalous
Treatise (Princeton: Princeton University Press, to be published in Spring of 2011), 5.
840 Some contemporary scholars might protest that only the more traditional and orthodox
interpretations of the Bible and biblical theology are being presented here. They can cite many other
religious groups and their theologians, philosophers, and scholars who don’t interpret scripture, or,
as a result, Spinoza, in this way. Socinians, Collegiants, liberal Anglicans and other Christian sects, for
instance, are not being represented here. This is indeed true. My only response to this is what I was
taught as a former high school English teacher. Having to instruct classes with students from the four
levels of academic aptitude (essentials, general, honors, and gifted students), I was taught to “aim for
the middle.”
839
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received from Spinoza’s contemporaries. 841 Compare, for instance, Olli Koistinen and

Valtteri Viljanen’s 25-page Introduction to each of the five parts of the Ethics with my

samples of the five parts and vignettes below and you will find that Koistinen and Viljanen
barely say a word about the Ethics’ opposition to biblical theology. It is almost completely
abstracted from this context. 842 They give an almost purely philosophical rendering of all

five parts without any context of biography, place, 17th century society, and so forth. We are
not criticizing this assessment in itself, nor trying to insinuate that the authors don’t know
the full context of the work. Clearly, their work performs an excellent service for all those

who want to know and focus on the purely philosophical aspects of the work. And this was

no doubt the purpose which the authors decided to focus on. As a result, that is all that one
will learn from their essay. One will learn nothing further about the horror, the fury, etc. in
the reception of this work from his contemporaries.

There’s not enough time or space to go through the whole of Spinoza’s Ethics in this

study, but we don’t need to do this to achieve our goal. Just as, for example, the U. S. Food

and Drug Administration has officials who periodically check the cargo of ships and trucks
by sampling, and from this get a reasonably correct assessment (at least ideally!) of the

state of this cargo, so also will we check the cargo of the Ethics. We will select some pieces

of this work to show wherein Spinoza represents that new thing under the European sun,

that is, the Radical Enlightenment philosophy of a world without the ancient God and all the
many false attendant theological-philosophical offshoots thereof. We’re going to show

wherein God is dead for Spinoza and what consequences Spinoza draws from this death.
For a comparative analysis, see Roger Ariew’s work on Descartes’ famous cogito and how he
shows a similar complete disjunct in how Descartes’ contemporaries read his work from how
contemporary philosophers treat his work. See his “The Cogito in the Seventeenth Century” in his
forthcoming Descartes Among the Scholastics (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, June 2011).
842 I’m reminded of a lecture by Professor Roger Ariew on contemporary philosophical assessments
of Descartes, for instance, by Gilbert Ryle in his The Concept of Mind. Ryle completely misses the
contextual boat upon which the ship of Cartesianism floats.
841
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The Ethics contra God Almighty (samples and examples)

Do we not hear anything yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we
not smell anything yet of God’s decomposition? – gods too decompose. God is dead. 843 God
remains dead. And we have killed him… That which was holiest and mightiest of all that
the world has yet possessed has bled to death under our knives … Must not we ourselves
become gods simply to seem worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed – and
whoever shall be born after us, for the sake of this deed he shall be part of a higher history
than all history hitherto.’ 844

Brief preview in samples from Parts I to V of Spinoza’s God contra the biblical God
In Part I, “Concerning God”, Spinoza goes right to the jugular from the get-go. The

first several propositions he lays out are meant to demonstrate that in all that exists there is
only one substance: “There cannot be two or more substances of the same nature” (IP5). 845

But it’s not immediately apparent that Spinoza has just put the knife to “That which was
holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet possessed” 846 (as the devout would

express it). Further propositions, proofs, scholiums, corollaries, and appendixes are needed
to make the bleeding apparent. Proposition 5 doesn’t do it alone. But when Proposition 6
(“One substance cannot be produced by another substance”), Proposition 7 (“Existence

belongs to the nature of substance”), and Proposition 8 (“Every substance is necessarily

infinite” 847), are cited one after another, most astute Jewish and Christian philosophers and
theologians begin to “smell something of God’s decomposition” and hear something of “the

As the epigraph at the beginning of this section (“I have a precursor!”), and other passages in the
Nietzsche corpus demonstrate, Nietzsche considered Spinoza to be a precursor to the Radical
Enlightenment or the “death of God” – to use Nietzsche’s incredibly intense expression.
844 Friedrich Nietzsche. Translated by Walter Kaufman. The Gay Science (New York: Vintage Books,
1974), 181, section 125.
845 Nadler, op. cited, 59.
846 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Gay Science, op. cited.
847 It must be stated here that propositions such as “Every substance is necessarily infinite” and,
below, “God is the immanent … cause of all things,” suggest to some Spinoza scholars that Spinoza is
here betraying a kind of theism and not an out-and-out atheist that Nadler and others argue for.
843
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noise of the gravedigger who is burying God.” 848 So, by the time Proposition 14 is

pronounced (“There can be, or be conceived, no other substance but God”), the jig is up. The
rest of the propositions are simply more nails in the coffin.

Let us cite one further proposition (#18) from Part I to show what Spinoza has

killed. “God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things.” Put in a nutshell, this

proposition puts the lie to God as creator and transcendent cause of the world. 849 There’s

no need to juxtapose to these propositions the many famous passages from Scripture that
assert that “In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth.” Everyone in the

western and near eastern world knows this. It just needs to be known loud and clear that
according to Spinoza’s Ethics, the biblical claim of “In the beginning, God created the
heavens and the earth” is false.

Moving on to Part II, no conservative theologian or philosopher would ever teach

the following: “By ‘body’ I understand a mode that expresses in a definite and determinate
way God’s essence in so far as he is considered as an extended thing” (II, Def. 1). Bodies

should in no way be thought to be part of God’s essence. God’s essence is Spirit, not body.
God existed before he created bodies, that is, the universe. One of the classic New

Testament statements in scripture against the notion of the corporeality of God comes from
a famous passage in the Gospel of John in which Jesus announces the nature or essence of
God: “God is Spirit” (Jn.4:24), he says. God is Spirit, and not physical or material or

extension. His essence pertains only to his nature; and, because his nature is eternal and

the world was created, nature or body cannot be his essence.

In Part III, Spinoza states that “As long as a man is affected by the image of a thing,

he will regard the thing as present even though it may not exist” (III, Pr.18, Proof). Spinoza
is doing depth psychology here. In this one brief sentence Spinoza enunciates a deep and

848
849

Ibid. in my paraphrase.
Shirley, op. cited, 25.
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powerful psychological force, most of which works at an unconscious level. It reveals

much about how the human mind works, about the psychology of imagination and fantasy,
and the psychology of religion. We see also from this one short statement how this

psychological associationism can hook up with the problem of error, deception, delusion,

or illusion - that is, the problem of imagination versus reason and how easily our ontology

can be tricked into accepting all sorts of non-existent beings. In point of fact, Spinoza

enunciated this insight as early as his Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect: and on the
way by which it is best directed to the true knowledge of things: “the soul can by its unaided
power create sensations or ideas which are not ideas of things” 850 For Spinoza, among the
ideas which are not true ideas of existing things is God Almighty.

We learn in Part IV (Preface) that in God there is no good or evil – never mind that

Jesus answered this question: “’Why do you ask me about what is good’? Jesus replied,

‘There is only one who is good’” (Mt. 19:17). God is good. And by God Jesus doesn’t mean
nature or reality. He means the creator of nature. But, according to this new philosopher
under the sun, “by reality and perfection I mean the same thing”; our ideas of perfection

and imperfection “are in reality only modes of thinking”; “As for the terms ‘good’ and ‘bad’,
they likewise indicate nothing positive in things considered in themselves.” Not so
according to “the Word of God.”

And finally, in Part V, “Of the Power of the Intellect, or of Human Freedom”: one can

probably divine at this point from the title (and from what we’ve learned from works such
as Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect) that for Spinoza the only “God” who gives us

freedom and help over our passions is that of our natural human reason. But Spinoza’s

claim that our natural reason is the fount of moral goodness opposes the scriptural dogma

that “There is no one righteous, not even one; there is no one who understands, no one

Baruch Spinoza. The Ethics, Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, Selected Letters, trans.
Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992), #60 or p. 248.
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who seeks God. All have turned away, they have together become worthless; there is no

one who does good, not even one” (Rom. 3:10-12). 851 For if our reason is as corrupt as the

scriptures teach 852 (at least according to those in the Pauline-Augustinian-Lutheran-Calvin

tradition), then how could we, based on our own natural human reason find freedom, let
alone salvation and blessedness (Vp42)?

Thus in five quick sound bite samples taken from each of the five parts of his Ethics,

we quickly recognize that the Ethics is a work at odds with the God of Abraham, Isaac,

Jacob, Jesus, Paul, Augustine, Aquinas, Pascal, and most of 17th century Europe. Now then,

let us take a closer look at a few more examples and show in what respects the Ethics flies
in the face of “That which was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet
possessed.”

Examples of Spinoza’s Ethics contra God’s Word (and vice versa)
•

Nature is self-caused and eternal, not created by the God of the Bible

From the very first line of his Ethics Spinoza starts the trouble: “By that which is self-caused
I mean that whose essence involves existence; or that whose nature can be conceived only
as existing” (Def. 1,I). His Christian and secret Jewish readers don’t know it yet, but

Paul quotes this passage from several passages in the Old Testament, which indicates that the
doctrine of the corruption of human nature is not unique to Christian ideas, but actually stems from
Judaism.
852 In the history of biblical theology there have been some differences on this issue. Some
theologians (such as Thomas Aquinas) argue that our natural reason does have some goodness
(albeit acknowledging that this goodness stems from God from his image in us), while others (John
Calvin) argue that this image has been so subdued by darkness as to count the whole human race as
dead in their transgressions and sin, lost in darkness, and therefore totally depraved.
851

379

Benedict has just unleashed a damnable heresy (We know how European civilization dealt

with this doctrine as early as the 13th century when it was condemned in 1277). His readers

don’t know it yet, but the writer of these lines, the former Orthodox Jew, born and bred in
Orthodox Judaism, just repudiated one of the most central tenets of Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam – that is, he just repudiated the doctrine that nature or the universe has been
caused or created from a Self-caused, eternal, transcendent Being. 853

This first definition doesn’t tell his readers yet, but he’s not referring to that Being

whom they probably think Spinoza is referring to; for what or whose other existence can’t
be conceived except as existing? To think that all of the universe, everything, or nature is
eternally self-caused just doesn’t register for those brought up in a tradition that (in all

sorts of ways, in all sorts of doctrines, stories, narratives, prophecies, sermons, music, bed-

time stories, Christmas plays, etc.) teaches that the universe, everything, or nature was Godcaused.

How is it that a good Jewish boy, who no doubt revered his Creator and Moses and

the biblical creation account could have went from believing that the universe went from

being God-caused to self-caused? We might be allowed some educated speculation here. It
seems likely that for Spinoza this conclusion was the only logical inference his thinking
could come to; for if the God of his Bible, of his people, and the products of the natural

imagination does not exist, then that means that God did not create everything. And, if God
didn’t create everything, then how is it that there is anything? How is it that Nature exists?

About the opening lines and pages of the Ethics, Colerus writes, “Who would not think at first,
considering so fine a beginning, that he is reading a Christian Philosopher? All those definitions are
fine … But when we inquire more narrowly into his opinions, we find that the God of Spinoza is a
mere phantom, an imaginary God” (Colerus, op. cited, 64). Spinoza slowly comes to write more
openly about all that he means here only as the pages of the Ethics progress. But we find greater
forthrightness in his correspondence. We see a greater openness or courage in his 1675 letter 73 to
Oldenburg, in which he says: “But in order to open to you my mind … I say, in the first place, that I
hold an opinion about God and Nature very different from that which Modern Christians are wont to
defend. For I maintain that God is, as they say, the immanent cause of all things, but not the
transeunt cause.”

853

380

If all that is does not have God as their originator or cause, then how does everything exist?

Well, if everything is not God-caused, and there is no such transcendent Being, then the only
thing left to conclude (after this process of divine elimination) is that everything, nature, or
the universe itself, has always been here. And, if the universe has always “been here”, then
that means that the universe is eternal. And, if the universe or nature is eternal, than that

means that it was never created (or caused), nor does (did) it need a creator (since it always
is by its own nature). Therefore it itself (that is, the universe or nature) exists of itself, of its
own power, by its own force (Not by God’s might, nor by God’s power, nor by His Spirit,
saith Benedict de Espinosa [cf. Zech.4:8]). And it continues and persists in its existence
through its own force. The universe or nature than is “God”, for the universe is the

originator and the sustainer of all things. The universe is the cause of my existence.

Therefore, “From Him [nature] and through Him [the universe] and to Him are all things.
To Him [nature] be the glory forever! Amen.” (Rom. 11:36). Therefore also, “For in Him
[nature] we live and move and have our being” (Acts 17:28). Or, as Spinoza puts it to

Oldenburg, “All things, I say, are in God and move in God, and this I affirm together with
Paul.” 854 Thus, in a nutshell, is Spinoza’s paean to his new “God,” Nature.

Spinoza Correspondence, Letter 73, Shirley translation from his Spinoza’s Complete Works. I think
that a couple scholarly points are in order here about Spinoza’s reference to St. Paul, especially
because out of all the literature on Spinoza that I have read, not one scholar has mentioned these
points, even though the literature quotes Spinoza’s quote of “St. Paul” extensively. First, Spinoza
talks as if his immanent ontology were in line with St. Paul’s theology. Spinoza’s reference to Paul
here appears to be from the book of Acts (17: 28). Spinoza neither quotes it verbatim (and therefore
it does not appear in scare quotes), nor does he refer the reader to where in the Bible he affirms this
with Paul. And for good reason because that would make it too easy for his readers to find out that
he is twisting this scripture way out of context. But for anyone who took the trouble to look up the
passage and its context, he would easily and immediately find out the opposite of Spinoza’s seemingly
pious claim! For, right above the scripture that Spinoza alludes to, this same Paul says, “The God who
made the world and everything in it is the Lord of heaven and earth … he gives all men life and breath
and everything else. From one man he made every nation of men that they should inhabit the whole
earth; and he determined the times set for them and the exact places where they should live. God did
this so that men would seek him and perhaps reach out for him and find him, though he is not far
from each of us.” Only after saying all this does Paul then say, “’For in him we live and move and have
our being’. As some of your own poets have said, ‘We are his children’… In the past God overlooked
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Spinoza’s reasoning starting from being persuaded that the God of the Bible (and all

the world’s anthropomorphic imaginative religions) is false to countenancing that the world
then is probably “self-caused” and eternal is understandable and logical. Indeed, it might
have been the case that these were some of the logical steps that Spinoza took which led

him to the conclusion that the world had to be self-caused, and then therefore might also
have to be eternal. The logical trajectory that led him from belief in God to nature then

might have gone like this: First, he has some early doubts about his religion and the Bible.
These doubts grow through his own studies in divinity and then from his growing

knowledge of the great world outside the synagogue (the world of Greek philosophy, of

Bacon, of Descartes, of the great humanist literary classics, and of the sciences). If this is

correct, then Spinoza came to realize that the Bible was false before his thinking could see
the inevitability of the doctrine of the eternity of the world. He had to be convinced that
God was dead before he could believe that the universe was eternally existent. His

anthropomorphic religion had to die before his philosophical ontology could live. If it

wasn’t for the Bible, and learning that its claims are false, Spinoza may not have come to the
belief that the world is eternal and therefore “self-caused.” It is ironic then that it may have
been his study of “the Word of God” and “divinity” that led him to the philosophy that the
world is self-caused and of atheism.

In the same way –as an aside - maybe we too can recognize this reasoning as

possible evidence that the universe did not have a start in the Big Bang, as many, such as
such ignorance, but now he commands all people everywhere to repent. For he has set a day when
he will judge the world with justice by the man he has appointed ....”
Not only does Spinoza take this scripture passage out of context, but he also fails to note that
it wasn’t Paul who said it! In truth, the passage is a quote from a poet which his Athenian audience no
doubt was familiar with. Paul quotes this not because he supports this view, but only to get a better
hearing from his pagan audience (very much like what Spinoza is doing toward his Christian
audience) so that he many “win as many as possible” (1 Cor. 9:19-23). I don’t know what Paul’s
Athenian audience thought of this use of their poet, but I can tell you what Spinoza’s Christian
audience who checked on this passage would think.
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Harvard astronomer Robert Jastrow has argued. 855 The empirical scientific evidence of

course is the overriding consideration in factoring to this conclusion, but – as Spinoza knew
so well – “removing prejudices” is also an essential part of the philosophical process in

being able to accept new truth. In this case, new truths can only be learned after we learn

that the truths we had hitherto believed are false.
•

All follows from natural cause and effect, not God

In our brief samples above we cited several Propositions from Part I. Let us cite another
clear, knock-down show of anti-biblical thinking: “Every individual thing, i.e. anything

whatever which is finite and has a determinate existence, cannot exist or be determined to act
unless it be determined to exist and to act by another cause which is also finite and has a
determinate existence, and this cause again cannot exist or be determined to act unless it be
determined to exist and to act by another cause which is also finite and has a determinate
existence, and so ad infinitum” (Prop. 28, I). 856 How would this proposition translate with
respect to say, us? Well, humans are individual things. And they are finite with a

determinate existence which cannot exist or act except by other individual, finite causes,
and so on ad infinitum. Therefore we humans and our nature stem completely and

ultimately from finite causes. All follows from natural cause and effect. Nothing follows

from any final or transcendent causes – because there simply are no such final or

transcendent causes. Therefore, there are also no special creations or special supernatural
providence. Therefore humans are the product of natural and not supernatural or divine
forces.

See his God and the Astronomers on this point.
My citation and comments on this proposition is presents only one aspect here. In actuality, this
proposition is complex and therefore meets its fullest explanation within the context of Spinoza’s
overall ontology.
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•

Mathematics makes sense of the world, not revelation from God

“truth might have evaded mankind forever had not Mathematics, which is concerned not with ends but
only with the essences and properties of figures, revealed to men a different standard of truth”
(Appendix I).

Just as Thomas Hobbes found the demonstrations and chain of reasoning in Euclid’s

geometry to be a method or model for human beings to emulate in the formulation of what

should be considered valid, or true, ideas, so did Spinoza. In the “scriptures” of his Ethics he

makes this abundantly clear. After laying out 36 Propositions in Part I along with their

proofs and corollaries, Spinoza inserts an Appendix evidently to speak more plainly to the

reader so that they may be clear as to what he’s up to. After strenuously arguing against the
methodology of the theology of anthropomorphism, providence, and final purposes, he

states: “truth might have evaded mankind forever had not Mathematics, which is concerned
not with ends but only with the essences and properties of figures, revealed to men a
different standard of truth” (App. I).

Generally speaking, mathematics here represents dependence on natural reason,

epistemic carefulness, exactitude, method, proof, and science. This is not the place to
elaborate the many intricacies involved in Spinoza’s conception of mathematics and

geometry and their relation to his philosophy. There is a vast literature on this subject
which the reader may refer to with profit. The only point that I wish to make about

Spinoza’s claim here is that he refers to this new standard of truth as something which

should supersede the old standard of truth to which people followed. The old standard of
truth led to absurd results including beliefs that “disasters, such as storms, earthquakes,
diseases and so forth … occurred because the gods [read biblical God] were angry at the

wrongs done to them by men … And although daily experience cried out against this and
showed by any number of examples that blessings and disasters befall the godly and the

ungodly alike without discrimination, they did not on that account abandon their ingrained
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prejudice.” It is not unto revelation that men ought to seek for the standard of truth, but to
mathematics or science.
•

The Ethics versus supernatural miracles

As men believe that “disasters, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases and so forth …

occurred because the gods [read biblical God] were angry at the wrongs done to them by
men”, so also do men believe that supernatural miracles occur in someone’s behalf when

the gods are pleased. Men believe such things because they are “ignorant of the causes of
things.” For Spinoza the very concept of supernatural miracles stems from the

anthropomorphizing accounts of the ancients to describe things for which they had no

explanation. But once one learns that all things are of Nature and its causes and effects, no

phenomena can any longer be explained as a miracle. God is nature or substance. Nothing
therefore transcends or violates this eternal and infinite substance. All miracles therefore

are ruled out. This means that every single claim made by the Bible that violates the canon

of the laws of nature is false. Hence the story that Eve was created out of the side of Adam is
false. Hence the story that the earth was cursed because of Adam and Eve’s disobedience is
false. Hence the Noah’s ark story that two of every species of bird, animal, and so on

entered the ark and were saved by a universal flood is false. Hence the story of the burning
bush before Moses whose fire would not burn out is false. Hence all the miracles that God

did through Moses are false. Hence all the miracles that God was said to have done for the
Israelites are false. Hence there are no true prophecies. Hence there is no true messiah.

Hence there was no virgin birth. Hence there was no walking on the water, resurrection
from the dead, ascension into heaven, and so on and so forth.
•

On the antinomy of ethics between Spinoza and God
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Part and parcel of Spinoza’s radical enlightenment philosophy versus the old God’s system

is Spinoza’s notion of ethics. One of the primary goals of the Holy Scriptures is to teach man

how to live. “And now, O Israel, what does the Lord your God ask of you but to fear the Lord
your God, to walk in all his ways, to love him, to serve the Lord your God with all your heart
and with all your soul” (Deut. 10:12). In the same way, writes Olli Koistinen and Valtteri

Viljanen in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza’s Ethics, “The primary goal of [Spinoza’s
Ethics] … is, as it was of the Ancients, to teach how we should live.” 857 For the Holy

Scriptures the chief good is to “do what is right” (Gen. 4:7), but “right” means obeying God’s
commandments, while for Spinoza “the only thing good in itself is understanding” and the
only bad is “that which hinders us from understanding.” 858 For Spinoza “beings endowed
with a human mind should devote themselves, as much as they can, to a contemplative

life” 859 of Nature; but for Jews and Christians, beings “created in the image and likeness of

God,” should contemplate only His law (Ps. 119) and Christ who “is the radiance of God’s

glory and the exact representative of his being, sustaining all things by his powerful word”
(Heb. 1:3; Phil.3:7-15; Col. 3:1-2; Cor. 2:18, 4:16).

This is a tale of two cities. On the one hand there is God’s way (as given by

supernatural revelation set forth in the scriptures and interpreted by theologians); on the
other hand, there is Spinoza’s way (as set forth by his natural reasoning and

philosophizing). The two clash at just about every point, as our samples and vignettes of
juxtaposing passages from Spinoza with passages from the Bible demonstrate.
•

Spinoza’s freedom or salvation from bondage from bad emotions and passions
versus Stoic, Cartesian, and biblical claims

857 The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza’s Ethics, ed. by Olli Koistinen and Valtteri Viljanen (UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1.
858 Ibid.
859 Ibid.
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My first readings of the Ethics gave me the impression that Spinoza’s exaltation of the
power of reason was Pollyannaish. Indeed, one might conclude this way if one

concentrates one’s interpretation of Spinoza only on the fifth part of the Ethics, “Of the

Power of the Intellect, or of Human Freedom.” But there are four other parts, and these

other parts make it clear that Spinoza is not Pollyannaish about reason or about reason’s

power over the passions. He is quite aware and knowledgeable about conflicting emotions
and the pain that these cause us. He is also quite aware that we humans are to a large
degree hapless creatures contingent upon Nature and that – using the words of

Wordsworth - “the world is too much with us.” As Spinoza wonderfully puts it: “The force
whereby a man persists in existing is limited, and infinitely surpassed by the power of

external causes” (Pr.3, IV). In this his view is more realistic than the Stoics’ and Cartesian
formulation of the power of the intellect over our passions. In the Preface to Part V,

Spinoza criticizes the Stoics’ unrealistic view that “the emotions depend absolutely on our
will, and that we can have absolute command over them.” The proof against the Stoics’

view on this issue has “experience crying out against them.” 860 Similarly, in the Preface of
Part III, Spinoza criticizes Descartes because “he too believed that the mind has absolute
power over its actions” 861.

Spinoza takes the theological view of human nature and conduct to task in many

ways in the Ethics. In the Preface to Part III for example, he implicitly criticizes what I take
I take it that Spinoza’s criticism of Stoicism on this point is an important qualification to make to
remind those who aver that Spinozism is Stoicism. For the details on the differences between the
two, see, for example, Jon Miller’s excellent “Spinoza and the Stoics on Substance Monism” in The
Cambridge Companion to Spinoza’s Ethics.
861 Shirley, op. cited, 152. It is not certain to me, however, that this is the most accurate way to
conclude Descartes’ view on this matter. For one thing, Spinoza does not mention that Descartes
qualifies his claim with the words: “if sufficient industry is applied in training and guiding them”
(Rene Descartes. Philosophical Essays and Correspondence, ed. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 2000), 315. But see also Roger Ariew’s essay on Descartes’ ethics in “Ethics in
Descartes and Seventeenth Century Cartesian Textbooks.” The Rationalists: Between Tradition and
Revolution. Montreal History of Philosophy, ed. C. Fraenkel, D. Perinetti, J. E. H. Smith, The New
Synthese Historical Library, Springer.
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to be at bottom the theological view of “dealing not with natural phenomena that follow

from the common laws of Nature but with phenomena outside Nature.” He goes on also to

criticize those who hold such views because “they assign the cause of human weakness and
frailty … to some defect in nature [sin?], which they therefore bemoan, ridicule, despise, or,
as is most frequently the case, abuse.” 862

Note, Spinoza doesn’t explicitly state here that he has clerics, theologians or

religious people in mind. But he does. I think I have found strong evidence for my claim

hidden in Part IV in the Scholium for Proposition 63. The language he uses here is almost

exactly the same language he uses in the Preface to Part III, only here he gives us a further
clue: “The superstitious, who know how to censure vice rather than to teach virtue, and

who are eager to guide men by reason but to restrain them by fear so that they may shun
evil rather than love virtue, have no other object than to make others as wretched as

themselves.” Now then, who could these “superstitious” people be? The uneducated

masses? No, not in this passage, for look and see: the “superstitious” in this passage are

people who “censure,” “teach,” and “guide men.” Okay, so they are leaders and teachers.
“But,” the skeptic may continue to worry, “How do we know what teachers?” Well, the

answer to that question is in the answer to this question: “What ‘teachers’ in Spinoza’s time
and place censured vice and tried to inculcate virtue by fear?” Everybody knows the

answer to this: it’s the guys who preach “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God” sermons.

I should point out here that Spinoza does not explicitly refer to theology or any theologians in the
Preface to Part III from which I am quoting. It might very well be that he doesn’t have Christian
theology consciously in mind here, but only Cartesian and maybe Platonic dualism. Nevertheless, it
seems to me that some of the language used here may indicate that the theological view of human
nature is at work at least in the background. But, even if this guess is wrong, this argument can still
be used to refer to the theological view. Though Nadler doesn’t explicitly cite the theological
background, he does so implicitly because in his explication of the Preface to Part III he notes that the
view Spinoza is criticizing is that of the mind as “supernatural – implanted (by God) in a body”
(Nadler, Spinoza’s Ethics: An Introduction, 191). I take it that this stems from special and not natural
theology.
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Last question for the skeptic to answer: “What ‘fear’ did these teachers hold up as

threats to get the masses to ‘shun evil’?” I think this dissertation has noted this fear

enough times even for the greatest of skeptical scholars to acknowledge. Note again, how

Spinoza doesn’t spell out what he has in mind, but only suggests it. The reader has to put 2
and 2 together. Spinoza won’t spell it all out. Indeed, we have been discussing a scholium.
A scholium is a note or comment to add further explanation or light on a proposition. And

what is the proposition of this scholium? “He who is guided by fear, and does good so as to
avoid evil, is not guided by reason.” Now do we have a better idea of what Spinoza means?
Once again, we see that to understand many of the propositions, proofs, etc. of the Ethics,
background and “code-breaking” is required. And we see once again that propositions

(etc.) that on first readings don’t at all seem to refer to biblical theological issues, on more
careful contextual analysis yields up this very truth.

If you’re still not convinced that by “superstitious” Spinoza means all traditional

religion, than you will find that proof in the Preface to the TTP. Careful reading of the TTP
reveals that the “superstitious” is synonymous with any and every belief in an

anthropomorphic God, revelation, inspiration, the Holy Spirit, the scriptures as the Word of
God, prophecy, omens, and the rest of it (e.g. Judaism and Christianity). When we fit all the
clues together like pieces in a jigsaw puzzle 863, Spinoza is shown to be completely
antagonistic to biblical ideologies.

Spinoza won’t rant and rave against vice like the clerics do. Nor does he hold up

eternal threats to get the herd to shun evil. Instead, he brings “logical reasoning to bear on
what they proclaim to be opposed to reason, and is vain, absurd and horrifying.” Spinoza

It is due to evidence such as this that I think Spinoza did talk in code or obscurely at times. He
purposely often does not name names or books. Though it is true that he was dangerously explicit at
times (such as in the Appendix in Part I), I think there is good evidence to believe that he purposely
muted and crafted his language so that they would not be as provocative and then bring down on his
head (or the executors, editors, and printers of his work) the wrath of the superstitious.
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counters their view of the “defectiveness” of Nature by the following argument. “But my

argument is this: in Nature nothing happens which can be attributed to its defectiveness,

for Nature is always the same; and its force and power of acting is everywhere one and the
same [that is, not one way in an animal or in the body and a different way in the soul or

spirit]… So our approach to the understanding of the nature of things of every kind should

likewise be one and the same…Therefore the emotions [or sins] of hatred, anger, envy, etc.,
considered in themselves, follow from the same necessity and force of Nature as all other
particular things” [e.g. there is no bifurcation in existence between nature’s forces and

spiritual forces (such as the devil and original sin)]. All human emotions and actions “are
assignable to definite causes through which they can be understood, and have definite
properties.”

Spinoza’s Ethics versus God’s New Testament on death, freedom, and the good life
“Do not fear the afterworld’s men, my brothers!” 864

Proposition 67, IV: “A free man thinks of death least of all things, and his wisdom is a mediation of life,
not of death.” Proof: A free man, that is, he who lives solely according to the dictates of reason, is not
guided by fear of death (Pr.63, IV), but directly desires the good (Cor.Pr.63 IV); that is (Pr.24,IV) to act,
to live, to preserve his own being in accordance with the principle of seeking his own advantage. So he
thinks of death least of all things, and his wisdom is a meditation upon life.”

Introduction

When I first decided to say a couple words on this passage as another example to

demonstrate how much the Ethics has biblical theology in its cross hairs, I didn’t think it

The quote is an oft repeated expression from Nietzsche’s mouthpiece or protagonist Zarathustra
in Thus Spake Zarathustra. Zarathustra often declared such things because he knew that he had to
allay the imaginative fears of his followers in whom the shadow of God still resonated. As Nietzsche
puts it elsewhere: “After Buddha was dead, his shadow was still shown for centuries in a cave - a
tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves for
thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown. - And we - we still have to vanquish his
shadow, too” (The Gay Science, s.108). Spinoza’s ministry does the same work.
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would be a big deal. I thought I’d be able to dip into it quickly and write the gist of the

difference between the two with relative ease. But, as is so often the case in the work of

research and writing, what seems to be a task of relative simplicity, often turns out to be

more involved and more difficult than one originally imagined as one works on it. Hence
the added prolixity of pages on this example.

The task of comprehending all that Spinoza means by freedom and death is, as with

most of the propositions in the geometric structure of the Ethics, logically connected to

several other doctrines in the Spinozistic world view. Not only is the task of understanding
Spinoza’s teachings on freedom and death demanding, but the task of understanding the

New Testament’s teachings on freedom and death are equally demanding – not to mention

the subsequent theological interpretations thereof. What I thought would take two or three
days of labor, led to many days of labor. Like the Spinozistic literature, the biblical and

theological literature on freedom and death (and their logically or theologically connected
teachings) is a complicated undertaking. Much more is involved on these subjects than
immediately meets the eye. The history of Christian theology and philosophy on these
subjects is proof of that. Some of the most significant works in the history of western

literature falls under this rubric. Think for instance of the place and importance the subject
of freedom or free will has had in Europe! One thinks of Augustine’s works, and of

Erasmus’s and Luther’s violent diatribes, and the list of important works on this subject
goes on and on.

What to do to limit this immensity? Answer: with regard to Spinoza’s views, we will

focus on only the proposition at hand and not tell the story of its logical interconnections

with other aspects of his philosophy. With regard to the biblical and theological immensity,
we will strain out the camel of scholarly secondary literature to justify our citations of
various scripture passages, and we will strain out the camel of the history of Christian
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theological and philosophical differences of opinion on these subjects. We will do all this in
order to swallow only the “gnat” of biblical teachings on this subject. But it should not be

thought that the presentation of the biblical passages and their attendant theology are laid
out without the knowledge of the “camels” we’re straining.

Once again, as in most of this study, my presentation of the biblical and theological

teachings is purposely and strictly in line with how most theologians in the 17th century

understood these teachings and not as contemporary trained theologians and biblical

scholars view them now. Contemporary biblical scholarship and theology has become

immeasurably more informed, sophisticated, and philosophical since the beginnings of

serious biblical criticism spearheaded by pioneers such as Spinoza. This study however

does not need to bring this scholarship into consideration beyond mentioning to the reader
that it is there.

Before commencing our exposition I should say that trying to understand the

biblical teachings and the theologies that stem from them is sometimes just as time-

consuming, difficult, and arduous as trying to understand difficult philosophical teachings.
One should not imagine that learning and explicating the teachings of a 17th century

philosopher is harder than learning and explicating the teachings of several 1st century

enthusiastic theologians (as revealed in the twenty-seven books of the New Testament) and
their 17th century descendants. To accurately comprehend and do justice to the 66 or 73
books of the Bible, which were written from many time periods and places in the ancient
world, is also a mammoth undertaking. In this respect the present dissertation is not
limited to the learning and accurate explication of philosophy. This work has also

demanded proficiency in an entirely different field and world – that is, of the biblical

religions (Judaism and Christianity along with their changes and evolution in different
times, places, and languages over the last 2500 years). One may think that since this
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dissertation is primarily a history of philosophy that I did not therefore need to pay as close
attention or to take as seriously the non-philosophical issues involved. This is a mistake. It
is true that one could probably do a slipshod job of the scriptural and theological matters
and get away with it without many outside these fields knowing any better, but this

wouldn’t be right or just. The biblical expositor must not only be conversant with the

scholarly literature on biblical interpretation, but also of the history of the theological use of
them, especially in our case, in the late 17th century. All in all, it is a huge undertaking.

Spinoza versus God on death, freedom, and life (example: Proposition 67, IV and its Proof)

Part IV, Proposition 67: “A free man thinks of death least of all things, and his wisdom is a mediation of
life, not of death.” Proof: A free man, that is, he who lives solely according to the dictates of reason, is
not guided by fear of death (Pr.63, IV 865), but directly desires the good (Cor.Pr.63, IV 866); that is
(Pr.24,IV 867) to act, to live, to preserve his own being in accordance with the principle of seeking his own
advantage. So he thinks of death least of all things, and his wisdom is a meditation upon life.”

Pr.63, IV: “He who is guided by fear, and does good so as to avoid evil, is not guided by reason.”
From Genesis to Revelation, the great bulk of the moral teachings of the Bible come with threats of
the most severe punishment. From “You are free to eat from any tree in the garden; but you must not
eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat of it you will surely die”
(Gen.2:15) to “I warn everyone who hears the words of the prophecy of this book: If anyone adds
anything to them, God will add to him the plagues described in this book. And if anyone takes words
away from this book of prophecy, God will take away from him his share in the tree of life and in the
holy city, which are described in this book” (Rev. 22: 18-19). One is even ordered to honor and obey
one’s parents “so that it may go well with you” (Eph.6:1-3; Deut. 5:16). I have to keep presenting
passages of scripture to prove my claims and because it’s often hard to believe or remember just how
cruel and brutal the scriptural world view is. Part of what Radical Enlightenment philosophers
sought to do in their attacks against scripture was this very thing: to put an end to the ancientprimitive mindset of cruelty, insensitivity, master-slave attitudes, and the justification of this
brutality by invoking God’s commands. Hence, once again, the absolute imperative to undermine,
refute, shame, and criticize blind obedient faith in the “word of God.”
866 Cor.Pr.63,VI: “Through the desire that arises from reason we pursue good directly and shun evil
indirectly.” This is yet another of Spinoza’s repeated criticisms against the Jewish and Christian
ethical system based on punishment – that is, the scriptures and the preachers who get people to do
good out of fear and threat of divine punishment and not due to pure reason. To take only one
example out of thousands, one is commanded to live by faith: “’He who is coming will come and will
not be late. But my righteous one will live by faith. And if he shrinks back, I will not be pleased with
him.’ But we are not of those who shrink back and are destroyed, but of those who believe and are
saved’” (Heb.10:37-39). And again: “See to it that you do not refuse him who speaks. If they did not
escape when they refused him who warned them on earth [at Mt. Sinai, Ex. 19:12-13], how much less
will we, if we turn away from him who warns us from heaven? … for our God is a consuming fire”
(Heb. 12:25, 29).
867 Pr.24,IV: “To act in absolute conformity with virtue is nothing in us but to act, to live, to preserve
one’s own being (these three mean the same) under the guidance of reason, on the basis of seeking
one’s own advantage.” Compare or contrast this notion of virtue with that of the New Testament,
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A great deal can be said about this proposition and its proof. We will mention only

some of them for the purpose, once again, of making the antithesis between all things

Spinoza versus all things biblical more clear and distinct to the reader - and, by doing so,
thereby providing the explanation as to why the conservative religious forces were so
hostile to him.

At a first glance, the above proposition seems innocuous enough. On its face it

doesn’t immediately look like an anti-Christian sentiment, let alone an egregious

counterpoint to it. But, upon a closer look, we learn differently. 868 As I have had to learn
again and again in this study, scripture is far more radical and other-worldly than is

generally known; and Spinoza’s Ethics is far more this-worldly and anti-biblical than is

generally known. But to know this, a great deal of comparing and contrasting and detective
work is needed, as we hope this study has given some glimpse of. 869

particularly the epistles of Paul. For the apostle Paul, to act in absolute conformity with virtue is the
exact opposite of Spinoza’s. To act in absolute conformity to virtue is to no longer live, but to have
Christ live through us. “I have been crucified with Christ and I no longer live, but Christ lives in me”
(Gal. 2:20). It is to no longer act or to live or to preserve one’s own being on the basis of seeking
one’s own advantage, but rather to act, to live, and to preserve God’s way in us. We are to do all for
the glory and advantage of God and His Kingdom, not our own glory and advantage.
868 Spinoza refers to Pr. 63, IV in our Proposition above. See the section immediately preceding this
one on “Spinoza’s freedom or salvation from bondage from bad emotions and passions versus Stoic,
Cartesian, and biblical claims” for our detective analysis that led us to the proof that this Proposition
had clericical and biblical theology in mind.
869 I should point out that we know from Yirmiyahu Yovel’s Spinoza and Other Heretics: The Marrano
of Reason that the marranos, the rabbis at Talmud Torah, and the Amsterdam congregation in which
Spinoza was raised, all believed the afterlife and in heaven and in hell. The ancestors of the Jewish
congregation assimilated these beliefs during their time in Spain and Portugal when they were forced
to become Christians. Spinoza, then, was brought up under such teachings as surely as the James
Joyce of A Portrait of an Artist was (Joyce highlights the fear and sufferings he underwent because he
was brought up being taught by Catholic priests and nuns to believe in the doctrine of hell). So when
the older Spinoza teaches that the free man shouldn’t think or fear death or the afterlife or anything
beyond this life, he is directly contradicting what rabbi Mortera taught, who had asked him at his trial
whether he feared falling in to the hands of the living god. We know that one of the things he was
condemned by the judges of the congregation was his rejection of the doctrine of the immortality of
the soul. See Nadler’s book on this: Spinoza’s Heresy: Immortality and the Jewish Mind.

394

The fear of death: Spinoza versus Christ
Spinoza writes on subjects such as death in a completely opposite way of those

knowledgeable about Christian teaching. Spinoza says that you should think about death or

the afterlife least of all. Yet the gospel is all about the problem of death and the afterlife, and
not only about eternal life and heaven. The scriptures teach that you should think and

meditate on death and the afterlife. 870 How could the scriptures not mention death and the

afterlife since this is where (according to the revelations that they believed they received

from God) all humankind will be spending an eternity - either in heaven or in the fiery

torments of hell. As the devout inform us, only the devil doesn’t want us to think about
death and the afterlife. Even as far back as the Garden of Eden and the first man and

woman, the devil has been saying, “Ye shall surely not die” (Gen. 3); for the devil wants to

get your mind off death so that you will not fear God. Because if you don’t fear God then you
will be much more prone to not take His pronouncement seriously - “the day that ye shall
eat thereof, ye shall die.” 871

Throughout the scriptures, God and his prophets alert men to the fact that they are

but a breath; here one day and gone the next. God wishes man to devote their lives to what
most counts, e.g. God’s will and not their own will. Compare God’s will to Spinoza’s will as

represented by his proposition and proof above paying close attention to his doctrine of the
Thomas a Kempis’s Imitation of Christ chapter XXI “The Meditation of Death”: “O the hardness and
insensibility of the human heart, that thinks only on present concerns, and disregards the prospects
of futurity! In every thought, and every action, thou shouldst govern and possess thy spirit as if thou
was to die to-day…If thou art not prepared for that awful event to-day, how wilt thou be prepared tomorrow?”
871 For those who think that the Ethics is only about philosophy and hardly, if ever, deals with
scripture, think again. Only a few sentences after Proposition 67 and its Proof, in the Scholium to
Proposition 68, Spinoza refers the reader to the Garden of Eden and to “Moses’s” “history of the first
man.” This is not the place for an exposition of this purposely misleading passage. I wish only to
point out here that the Ethics is replete with such examples. The only translation of the Ethics that I
know of that calls attention to this significant fact is Curley’s Collected Works (op. cited). He even
provides an “Index of Biblical and Talmudic References.” But it is by no means an exhaustive index,
for the Ethics refers to many more explicit and especially implicit passages of scripture than his index
refers to.
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good (that is, the principle of seeking one’s own advantage): Spinoza: “A free man … directly
desires the good (Cor.Pr.63 IV); that is (Pr.24 IV) to act, to live, to preserve his own being in
accordance with the principle of seeking his own advantage.” Christ:

If anyone would come after me, he must deny himself and take up his cross and
follow me. For whoever wants to save his live will lose it, but whoever loses his life
for me and for the gospel will save it. What good is it for a man to gain the whole
world, yet forfeit his soul? Or what can a man give in exchange for his soul? (Mk.
8:34-36). 872
Spinoza says that “A free man thinks of death least of all things, and his wisdom is a

mediation of life, not of death”, but the follower of Christ says, “If only for this life we have

hope in Christ, we are to be pitied more than all men” (1 Cor. 15:19). And again: “For to me,

to live is Christ and to die is gain” (Phil. 1:21). As the hymn goes: “Tis only one life, twill
soon be past, only what’s done for Christ will last.”

Contrary to Spinoza’s proposition and proof, St. Paul says, “Join with others in

following my example, brothers ...For … many live as enemies of the cross of Christ… Their
mind is on earthly things. But our citizenship is in heaven. And we eagerly await a Savior

from there, the Lord Jesus Christ, who, by the power that enables him to bring everything

under his control, will transform our lowly bodies so that they will be like his glorious body”
(Phil. 3:18-21). “So we fix our eyes not on what is seen, but on what is unseen. For what is
seen is temporary, but what is unseen is eternal” (2 Cor. 4:17-18). “Since, then, you have

been raised with Christ, set your hearts on things above, where Christ is seated at the right
hand of God. Set your minds on things above, not on earthly things” (Col. 3:1-2).

Compare how different Christ’s view of the life of the body and the afterlife is with

Spinoza’s: “I tell you, my friends, do not be afraid of those who kill the body and after that

872 The stronger version of Jesus’s oft-repeated demand is found in Luke (14:25-33): “Large crowds
were traveling with Jesus, and turning to them he said: ‘If anyone come to me and does not hate his
father and mother, his wife and children, his brothers and sisters – yes, even his own life – he cannot
be my disciple. And anyone who does not carry his cross and follow me cannot be my disciple… any
of you who does not give up everything he has cannot be my disciple.”
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can do no more. But I will show you whom you should fear: Fear him who, after the killing
of the body, has power to throw you into hell. Yes, I tell you, fear him” (Lk. 12:4-5).

Now death in the Bible is not a natural but a theological or spiritual event. Death

according to the scriptures is a spiritual power. The Bible teaches that the devil had the

power of death: “Since then the children share in flesh and blood, He Himself likewise also
partook of the same, so that through death He might render powerless him who had the

power of death, that is, the devil; and might deliver those who through fear of death were

subject to slavery all their lives” (Hebrews 2:14-15, my emphasis). The Christian answer to
the fear of death depends upon the panoply of purported revelations about sin, blood

sacrifice, the need of a scapegoat, expiation, etc. to turn away the holy and righteous wrath
of God.

As opposed to Spinoza’s this-worldly, naturalistic standpoint, behold the theological

view: “Therefore, just as sin entered the world through one man, and death through sin, and
in this way death came to all men, because all sinned … Consequently, just as the result of
one trespass was condemnation for all men, so also the result of one act of righteousness
was justification that brings life for all men” (Rom. 5: 12-13, 18). Since he “conquered

death” by his resurrection, Christ now holds the keys of death: “I am the Living One; I was

dead, and behold I am alive for ever and ever! And I hold the keys of death and Hades” (Rev.
1:18). Nevertheless, death is considered an “enemy” until “all things will be restored.” “The

last enemy to be destroyed is death” (1 Cor. 15:26). At this end-time event, “Then death and
Hades were thrown into the lake of fire. The lake of fire is the second death. If anyone’s

name was not found written in the book of life, he was thrown into the lake of fire” (Rev.
20:14-15).

I hope the reader is able to assimilate just how incredibly different and other-

worldly the ancient biblical view of life and death is compared to Spinoza’s exactly opposite
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view. “A free man thinks of death least of all things, and his wisdom is a mediation of life,
not of death” – especially because there is no reason to think of continued existence after

death. For Spinoza, when the body dies, the “soul” dies. 873 If you know that when you die,

you die, then there’s no reason to worry about what things will be like for you after you die.
For there is no continued existence of the soul; no spiritual body; no resurrection or

ascension; nothing beyond nature; no God beyond nature; no Creator or Judge or Punisher

or Rewarder. Death, then, is simply the end of your life. It therefore behooves you to think

of life and all that you can do and get from it. There is then now no condemnation for those
who are in Benedict de Espinosa. The wrath of God will never be revealed from heaven

against mankind (cf.Rom.1). There is no need to fear God because God does not exist. You
should therefore not take seriously him who taught that all who do not obey him will

“forfeit” and “lose” their souls to be cast into outer darkness where there will be screaming
and gnashing of teeth.

One of the central teachings of Spinoza’s message may be paraphrased thusly: “Fear

not. For God is dead.” Spinoza’s message is like Zarathustra’s message to the tight-rope

walker. The tight-rope walker (humankind struggling to make progress) falls to the ground
and is dying. He cries out to Zarathustra, “I’ve known for a long time that the Devil would

trip me up. Now he’s dragging me to Hell.” Zarathustra (Nietzsche) responds to him with

feeling: “On my honor, friend … all you have spoken of does not exist: there is no Devil and

no Hell. Your soul will be dead even before your body: therefore fear nothing any more!” In
essence, Spinoza’s message for humankind is to reject all the insane theological views of an

Actually, this is an over-simplification. Spinoza uses language such as “that our mind is eternal”
(Pr. 41, V) that are quite involved. There is therefore some controversy on this issue among some
Spinoza scholars. Two essays can be recommended which will introduce the reader to the intricacies
on this issue quite well. Besides Nadler’s Spinoza’s Ethics: An Introduction (chapter 9 on Eternity and
Blessedness), see also Don Garrett’s “Spinoza on the Essence of the Human Body and the Part of the
Mind That is Eternal” in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza’s Ethics.
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afterlife and a human-like wrathful punisher and to accept only the view that nature is all in

all. Thus his hymn, as opposed to the Christian hymn, might go something (awkwardly) like
this: ‘Tis only one life, ‘twill soon be past, only what’s rationally done for the good of this
world will last.’

On freedom and the free man: Spinoza versus Christ
Part IV, Proposition 67: “A free man thinks of death least of all things, and his wisdom is a mediation of
life, not of death.” Proof: A free man, that is, he who lives solely according to the dictates of reason, is
not guided by fear of death (Pr.63, IV), but directly desires the good (Cor.Pr.63, IV); that is (Pr.24,IV) to
act, to live, to preserve his own being in accordance with the principle of seeking his own advantage. So
he thinks of death least of all things, and his wisdom is a meditation upon life.”

The concept and hope of freedom in the Christian scriptures is very very different from the
concept of hope and freedom in Spinoza’s Ethics. Like the concept of death, a study of the

Christian theology of freedom depicts a completely non-naturalistic, non-rational, and non-

worldly view of things. We will not take the space to explicate the Christian theology of

freedom here, as we did to some degree the Christian theology of death above. Our purpose
here is to point out a couple further observations of the proposition above to make its
meaning clearer and more distinct.

Who is the “free man”? And what does Spinoza mean by “free” in this context? Well,

he tell us – explicitly: (1) “A free man … is he who lives solely according to the dictates of

reason (2) “is not guided by fear of death“ (3) “but directly desires the good (Cor.Pr.63 IV);

that is (Pr.24, IV) to act, to live, to preserve his own being in accordance with the principles

of seeking his own advantage” (4) “So he thinks of death least of all things, and his wisdom
is a meditation upon life.”

(1) So then, now we know. The “free man” is a rationalist, not a religious enthusiast

or someone given to accepting claims that can’t be substantiated by naturalistic

explanations exclusively in terms of empirical causes. Spinoza often states that the world
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mixes everything up when they believe things which have no foundations in the natural

chain of causes that produced them. The key term that gives Spinoza away as a “rationalist”
(in the sense of someone who rejects all non-rational or super-rational claims) is his use of

“solely.” The free man, the wise man, the best man, the good man is one who lives solely

according to the dictates of reason. This ”solely” is important. It separates the men from the
boys, the radical enlighteners from the moderate enlighteners, the atheists from the theists.
Leibniz praises reason and a life in accordance with reason, but he did not subscribe to

Spinoza’s notion of “solely” as necessitating the preclusion and exclusion of the divine. For
Leibniz reason and his theistic God were in harmony. Not so for Benedict. The free man
who lives solely according to the dictates of reason does not live according to any other

dictate or authority: not tradition, not enthusiasm, not imagination, and not religion, but

only reason. And for Spinoza reason stems only from nature and is not “the candle of the
Lord” or made “in the image and likeness of God.”

(2) Because the free man rejects all superstition about the afterworld and divine

punishment, he “is not guided by fear of death.” For him, death is the way of nature.

Nothing happens after death, that is, there is complete personal extinction. Since this is so,

the wise man naturally concentrates and focuses all his attention and love on this world. He
is completely this-worldly. His only meditation is upon this life. Therefore he thinks of

death least of all things. For his citizenship is on earth, not in heaven (cf. Phil. 3:20). I’m

reminded of Karl Marx’s many powerful criticisms against the other-worldliness of religion:
“The struggle against religion is … the fight against the other world.” 874 Indeed, to a large

degree, Spinoza’s philosophical labors were exactly in line with the famous Marxian maxim

that “The criticism of religion is the premise of all criticism” - long before Marx was born. 875
874
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Karl Marx. Tucker, Robert C., ed. 1978. The Marx-Engels Reader, second ed. New York: Norton.
Marx scholars tell us that he was immensely influenced by Spinoza’s writings.
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(3) Because the free man is free from the fear of hell and the afterlife and from the

dictates of God’s commandments to serve God, the free man is then free “to act, to live, [and]
to preserve his own being in accordance with the principles of seeking his own advantage.

Because there is no God to take care of him or to look to for help, the man freed from all the

illusions of spiritual help (through prayer, faith, sacrifice, etc.) must rely on his own powers

to survive, to advance, and to enjoy this life. No longer is the good to deny oneself and carry
the cross and follow Christ and obey God’s commandments. No, now man will follow

himself and the commands and guidance he receives from the light of his own natural

reason. Instead of following the slave’s “Not my will, but thy will be done”, he lives “in

accordance with the principles of seeking his own advantage.”

(4) The slave or the man in bondage believes that his wisdom is in fearing and obeying

God: “The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.” But for the man who is free from all
the illusions, errors, and superstitions of Judaism and Christianity, he meditates, acts, and

lives with his mind set not “on things above where Christ is seated at the right hand of God”,

but on the only world that exists, the world of nature, that is, this life.
•

Spinoza contra the Word of God on pleasure

In many passages of the Ethics Spinoza opposes the devoutly religious and the Bible on the
subjects of fun, merriment, theater, sports, or, in general, “worldly pleasure.” For instance,

he says right out: “Pleasure is not in itself bad, but good. On the other hand, pain is itself

bad” (Pr. 41, IV). And again: “Cheerfulness (hilaritas) cannot be excessive; it is always good.
On the other hand, melancholy is always bad” (Pr. 42, IV). Such statements go against the

grain of the tenor of scriptures that turn a worldly understanding of such behavior upside

down. Poverty, weeping, insults, and hunger are often treated as goods by Scripture. And
wealth, laughter, and comfort are sometimes derided. The scriptures demand strict

sobriety, an ever vigilant seriousness, the embrace of and even the love of suffering. There’s
401

not enough time or space to cite the hundreds or thousands of passages of scripture to back
this claim up. We will therefore only pick a couple willy-nilly from the New Testament
alone. Jesus exclaims,

Blessed are you who are poor, for yours is the kingdom of God. Blessed are you who
hunger now, for you will be satisfied. Blessed are you who weep now, for you will
laugh. Blessed are you when men hate you, when they exclude you and insult you
and reject your name as evil, because of the Son of Man. Rejoice in that day and leap
for joy, because great is your reward in heaven… But woe to you who are rich, for
you have already received your comfort. Woe to you who are well fed now, for you
will go hungry. Woe to you who laugh now, for you will mourn and weep (Luke
6:20-25). 876
Or take the attitude of St. Paul, for instance. He looked on weaknesses and

sufferings as a wonderful thing. He taught that sufferings are sent from God in order to test
or to purify us. In one famous passage in which he has just finished telling about all the
many visions and revelations from God that he received when he “was caught up to

Paradise”, he says “there was given me a thorn in my flesh, a messenger of Satan, to torment
me.” His theological explanation for this torment was “To keep me from becoming

conceited because of these surpassingly great revelations.” He begged God to take the
torment away, but God told him, “My grace is sufficient for you, for my power is made

perfect in weakness.” Like Leibniz’s theodicy, Paul sees everything that happens to him as
the best of all possible worlds, no matter how great the suffering. For he has a theological
justification for everything: “for Christ’s sake, I delight in weaknesses, in insults, in

hardships, in persecutions, in difficulties. For when I am weak, then I am strong” (1 Cor.

12:1-10). Or again: “we rejoice in our sufferings because we know that suffering produces
For expository purposes I am of course presenting only one interpretation of this famous passage.
There are others. I wish you to note though how poverty, hunger, weeping, laughing, and wealth are
explained. They are not treated as things that naturally happen in this world, as Spinoza explains
them. They are all treated as part and parcel of a huge, dramatic, supernatual tragic-comedy. But
Spinoza says that the “doctrine of Final Causes turns Nature completely upside down” for “Nature has
no fixed goal and all final causes are but figments of the human imagination.” Spinoza rails against
those who “display their [theological] talent in assigning purpose to things” (Ethics, Appendix, Part I).
See this Appendix also for another very telling example on how theology interprets even such things
as a stone falling from a roof on someone’s head.
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perseverance; perseverance, character; and character, hope” (Rom. 5:3). And: “My son, do

not make light of the Lord’s discipline, and do not lose heart when he rebukes you, because
the Lord disciplines those whom he loves, and he punishes everyone he accepts as a son”

(Heb. 12: 5).

Despite the strenuous arguments of believers in recent times that the depiction of

Judaism and Christianity as morose and fun-killing is a gross caricature, there is no doubt

whatsoever that in most of the New Testament, nary anything is said to promote or

encourage or to bless what the devout call “worldly pleasure.” By and large, the scriptures
are clear: God wants his people to have joy, but in Him and not separate from Him. As a

result, all the divine guidelines for how one should live are directed with a view to religious
activity. The general principle followed throughout is: “So whether you eat or drink or
whatever you do, do it all for the glory of God” (1 Cor. 10:31). Hence, there are no

instructions about playing, no encouragements for sports, joking, dressing up, secular music
or entertainment, or how to have fun. But there are many many passages against dressing
up, frivolity, seeking beauty, and so on. The pleasure that the devout are called to enjoy is
joy in the Lord and His ways and not in the enjoyments of worldly or “fleshly” living.

Biblical Judaism and Christianity are by and large ascetic religions. Spinoza opposes these

restrictions on pleasure as unnatural. In a long passage in the Ethics (Pr. 45, Schol. IV), one

can almost feel Spinoza’s personal experience on this subject. We’ll give Benedict the last
word on this subject.

For laughter, and likewise merriment, are pure pleasure, and so, provided that they
are not excessive, they are good in themselves (Pr.41,IV). Certainly nothing but
grim and gloomy superstition forbids enjoyment. Why is it less fitting to drive away
melancholy than to dispel hunger and thirst? The principle that guides me and
shapes my attitude to life is this: no deity, nor anyone else but the envious, takes
pleasure in my weakness and my misfortune, nor does he take to be a virtue our
tears, sobs, fearfulness and other such things that are a mark of a weak spirit. On
the contrary, the more we are affected with pleasure, the more we pass to a state of
greater perfection; that is, the more we necessarily participate in the divine nature.
Therefore it is the part of a wise man to make use of things and to take pleasure in
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•

them as far as he can (but not to the point of satiety, for that is not taking pleasure).
It is, I repeat, the part of a wise man to refresh and invigorate himself in moderation
with good food and drink, as also with perfumes, with the beauty of blossoming
plants, with dress, music, sporting activities, theatres and the like, in which every
man can indulge without harm to another. For the human body is composed of
many parts of various kinds which are continually in need of fresh and varied
nourishment so that the entire body may be equally capable of all the functions that
follow from its own nature, and consequently that the mind may be equally capable
of simultaneously understanding many things. So this manner of life is in closest
agreement both with our principles and with common practice. Therefore, of all
ways of life, this is the best and is to be commended on all accounts. There is no
need for me to deal more clearly or at greater length with this subject (Pr.45.Schol).

Spinoza’s God versus the emotional God of the Bible

“God is without passive emotions, and he is not affected with any emotion of pleasure or
pain” (Pr. 17, V). While some (or much) of Spinoza’s philosophical argumentation

throughout the Ethics (especially in places such as the Appendix at the end of Part I) that

God cannot be an emotional being may have struck the pious reader as having some weight

– after all, it certainly does seem (at least prima facie) that a being who is absolutely perfect,
shouldn’t be affected by emotional issues. Still, it doesn’t matter. The scriptures are clear,
God is an emotional being. He loves some, hates others, gets angry at some, calls some

friends, calls others his enemies, and so on. As early as the correspondence between
Blyenbergh and Spinoza shows, those who follow the two rules of both reason and

revelation will not allow the greater (revelation, “God’s Word”) to capitulate to the lesser
(man’s word, natural reason, philosophy or science). Consequently, even if Spinoza’s

philosophical argumentation of the nature and perfection of God seems to repudiate the

biblical representation of the nature of God, it does not matter. God’s Word trumps man’s

word. Therefore, Christian philosophers did not give up their cherished belief that God is a
being who does indeed actually have something of which we may legitimately identify as
“emotions.” “For God so loved the world that He gave ...”, etc.
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Spinoza had grasped this proposition and principle years before he wrote the Ethics.

He even sought to persuade his auditors through biblical argumentation (which he does not
do here) that God cannot possibly have or experience or act out of emotions. In his

Metaphysical Thoughts, appended to his Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, Spinoza says, ”It

is improper to say that God hates some things and loves other things.” And then he goes on
to refer to Scripture to buttress his argument for his readers: “But from Scripture itself it
can be sufficiently inferred that God is not angry with anyone, and that he does not love

things in the way that is commonly believed.” He then goes on to quote from Isaiah and
Romans to make his case. 877 I refer the interested reader to these passages.
•

Spinoza’s wise and ignorant man contra God’s wise and ignorant man

One of the chief aims of Spinoza’s Ethics is to show “how much to be preferred is the life of

the wise man to the life of the ignorant man” (Preface, V). Spinoza’s notion of the wise man
and the ignorant man is not the biblical notion of the wise man and ignorant man. The

scriptures almost always judge wisdom and ignorance according to how much a man is

“wise” or “ignorant” of God - that is, the God of the Bible. The wise man according to the

Bible is the one whose “delight is in the law of the Lord, and on his law he meditates day and
night. He is like a tree planted by streams of water, which yields its fruit in due season and
whose leaf does not wither. Whatever he does prospers. Not so the wicked!” (Ps. 1:2-4).
Not so with Herr de Espinosa. For Spinoza, the wise man’s delight and meditation is on

reality, the real world, reason, and truth, and not in the false imaginations or revelations of
an Other Greater World. His wise man is a man of the world, that is, this world, that is, the

only world. His wise man is one who seeks his own advantage. His wise man even in some
degree conflates himself with God: “He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and
877
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his emotions loves God, and the more so the more he understands himself and his
emotions” (Prop. 15).
•

To the very final proposition, proof, and scholium, Spinoza’s Ethics goes down
swinging against biblical theology

We come now to the very last Proposition of his Ethics and we see that he’s still at it (Pr. 42,

V). He’s still working on attacking and replacing the biblical world view. Biblical theology
teaches that blessedness is the reward of virtue; but Spinoza says point blank that

“Blessedness is not the reward of virtue.” In the proof for this last Proposition he says that

the only power man has over his lusts lay “solely in the intellect” – e.g. not in praying and

believing God through Christ and the Holy Spirit to give one the victory over the flesh. And
then, finally, the scholium, the last passage of this great anti-Christ work: here he preaches
something that unless readers are versed in his historical and social milieu they will

completely fail to appreciate just how radical his sermon is. For, if you look closely at this
scholium, he is preaching a gospel of salvation through works and not of faith through

grace. This may not mean much to us in the year 2011 in the United States of America. But
for his time and place the cataclysmic Protestant Revolution against the Roman Catholic

Church over salvation by works was still a live issue. So to say that salvation cometh only

through works (and that through the work of naturalistic reason) is tantamount to insuring
the wrath of his Protestant countrymen. It makes Spinoza sound like a Roman Catholic –
albeit an atheistic one.

Here he reminds us, once again, of the power of each and every person’s mind (and

not of some transcendent God or Holy Spirit or prayer or faith) over bad emotions. It is this
which constitutes the “wise man” for Spinoza, as opposed to the scriptures’ claim that the

wise man is the one who obeys the commandments of the God of the Bible. For Spinoza, the
road that he has pointed out that leads to salvation and enlightenment is “very difficult, yet
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it can be found … For if salvation were ready to hand and could be discovered without great
toil, how could it be that it is almost universally neglected? All things are as difficult as they
are rare.” Spinoza’s gospel then is a gospel of works, of effort, of intellectual application, of
self-reliance, of radical enlightenment rejection of all authority over reason, and of whole
hearted active rational labor for constant spiritual-rational growth. Anyone with any

experience of the Lutheran tradition, or indeed, most of the Protestant traditions, will know

that this gospel flies in the face of the very foundations of Pauline soteriological teaching. In
plain words, St. Paul to Luther to Calvin and to the Lutherans and Calvinists in Spinoza’s

world (and still in our world today) all say the opposite of what Spinoza just said. They all
argue strenuously that salvation is a free gift through grace alone. That it comes not

through adult, rational, intellectual, active labor, but again, from the opposite: from humble,
un-self-dependent, child-like, wise-less, reason-less, faith. They preach that salvation can
only be had by faith through grace and not by works.

Much of the New Testament, especially the epistles of St. Paul, is devoted to this

doctrine of salvation. Much of the books of Romans, Galatians, Ephesians, Colossians, and

Hebrews strenuously argue at length for this doctrine. Paul repeats it over and over again
to make it clear that he means it to be “the gospel.” Indeed, he must because his greatest

enemy is the Judaism of the time which preached salvation by works. Most people are at

least partially familiar with the story of Luther and what led to his conversion experience.
Every European historian must deal with this central biographical fact that changed the
course of the world. Most people, especially in the 17th century, learned about Luther’s

enthusiastic experience of realizing that all that is needed for salvation is simple, child-like
faith and that this is what led to the great Protestant Revolution. Europe was abuzz with
debate and warfare over this central issue of salvation. To imagine that these passages
don’t have any reference to the world outside Spinoza’s study, and yet to use the same
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theological language as the world outside his study, is to read Spinoza with analytic blinders
on.

Spinoza preaches a gospel of salvation by works in largely Lutheran, Calvinist,

Protestant lands. Writing on such things, and concluding one’s book on such a note, is not
likely to win much applause when one’s audience is so situated. Let us quote it again:

salvation, according to Spinoza, is “very difficult, yet it can be found… For if salvation were
ready to hand and could be discovered without great toil, how could it be that it is almost
universally neglected? All things are as difficult as they are rare.”

But the revelation that St. Paul believes that God gave him says, “I tell you, now is

the time of God’s favor, now is the day of salvation” (2 Cor. 6:2), and “For it is by grace you
have been saved, through faith – and this not from yourselves, it is the gift of God – not by
works, so that no one can boast” (Eph.2:8-9).

I think the overwhelming weight of the historical, social, and biographical context

strongly argues that passages such as these, which are sprinkled throughout the Ethics, have
biblical texts and the Jewish and Christian teachers and authorities that flow from them, as
their foil. The foil for all of the Ethics then is not pure philosophy devoid of central biblical
theological teachings, but to a degree far more than any commentator I have read on this

matter, biblical theological – against the Lutherans, Calvinists, preachers, enthusiasts, etc.

I know of no better interpretation. If the aim of the study of the Ethics is to obtain its

full and accurate meaning, the mindless, un-contextual, 20th century, analytic, readings of
this text, is simply deficient. Some may think that I am perhaps forcing these biblical

interpretations on the texts, however. Could it be that Spinoza wrote these passages with

no knowledge of these contentious Europe-rending theological issues in mind, but with only
some pure philosophers in mind? I don’t think so. I think that passages such as these, once
again, prove the necessity of knowing historical and social context in order to accurately
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understand and interpret the author one studies. And what is it that one finds when one

studies the context of Spinoza’s life – his biography, his time, his place? Well, look and see!
If you want to know if this interpretation is correct, then see how the vast majority of

Spinoza’s contemporaries read him. See also Spinoza’s correspondence. For all those who
have read these passages of Spinoza many times before, but without the contextual

knowledge that we have adumbrated, I hope that this study has enriched and improved
their understanding of the Ethics. 878

The Ethics as Spinoza’s philosophical-religious replacement or substitute of the biblical God
“Choose you this day whom you will serve” (Josh. 24:15)

Spinoza’s Ethics doesn’t only criticize biblical theological dogmas and philosophies, it also

provides a replacement! Moses is replaced. The Law is replaced. The Ten Commandments
are replaced. The prophets replaced. The New Testament is replaced. Christ, the Way, the
Truth, and the Life, is replaced. A new God is in town. And he’s very different from the old
God. Very different indeed.

Despite the in-depth analysis he gives to ontology and philosophy of mind

throughout his book, the ultimate goal of the Ethics was to show the way to “salvation”,

“blessedness”, and happiness. In a word, “Spinoza’s ultimate goal in the Ethics is to

I suspect that some of my language above might be overdone, that is, with respect to how
pervasive these biblical themes are at work in and as the foil for the Ethics. I say this because I
shouldn’t leave the wrong impression about this. For much of Parts I, II, III, IV, and V do not deal with
biblical themes – certainly not in an explicit way in which one could tell that Spinoza has some such
themes in mind. On the other hand, Spinoza’s whole non-religious, non-biblical, philosophical,
naturalistic, rationalistic way of doing everything – each and every one of his propositions, etc. can be
taken to task from that perspective.
In this study, I have found it necessary over and over again to make clear exactly what the
scriptures teach. I have thought it necessary because I believe that many readers (even those who
know the scriptures well) simply forget how radically different it is from any and all ordinary ways. I
have felt that unless I explicitly point out exactly what the Scriptures teach, my reader won’t
remember and then know just how radical Spinoza’s works were viewed.
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demonstrate the way to human happiness in a deterministic world filled with obstacles to

our well-being, obstacles to which we are naturally prone to react in not entirely beneficial
ways.” 879

Of course, Judaism and Christianity have argued that they have the way and the light

and the truth for humankind’s salvation, blessedness, and happiness, but instead of urging

man to reason his way to greater enlightenment against all the natural obstacles that come
our way in life, they argue that the way to salvation, blessedness, and happiness is by

overcoming “sin”, “the devil”, and “the world”, all theological notions that Spinoza utterly

rejects. For Spinoza the world or reality is perfect; for Christians the world is fallen, cursed,
under the control of the evil one, and that the only way to happiness is by utterly rejecting
the devil and the world.

Do not love the world or anything in the world. If anyone loves the world, the love
of the Father is not in him. For everything in the world – the cravings of sinful man,
the lust of his eyes and his pride in possessions – comes not from the Father but
from the world. The world and its desires pass away, but the man who does the will
of God lives forever (1 Jn. 2:15-17).
For Bible believers the world was created, cursed, and will eventually be destroyed

by fire and a new heaven and earth created. For Spinoza the world is God! It was never

created, it is not “fallen” or “corrupt” or temporal or finite. And there is nothing that is

“outside” it. The world is everything that is the case. There are no purposes in nature or the
world or God. No plans. No reason for it or its laws or its future.

In Spinoza’s “replacement religion” there is no condemnation, no Judgment Day, no

punishment for our sins, no eternal lake of fire for unbelievers, no devil infested world, no
divine mandate to preach the gospel to all nations and then the end will come. In the

religion of Spinoza, Christ is not all in all, nor should He be worshipped. Christ is not the
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Son of God, is not the Lamb of God, is not the Way, the Truth and the Life. One should not

think or live like St. Paul who confessed:

But whatever was to my profit I now consider loss for the sake of Christ. What is
more, I consider everything a loss compared to the surpassing greatness of knowing
Christ Jesus my Lord, for whose sake I have lost all things. I consider them rubbish,
that I may gain Christ and be found in him, not having a righteousness of my own
that comes from the law, but that which is through faith in Christ – the
righteousness that comes from God and is by faith. I want to know Christ and the
power of his resurrection and the fellowship of sharing in his sufferings, becoming
like him in his death, and so, to attain to the resurrection from the dead… All of us
who are mature should take such a view of things… Join with others in following my
example, brothers…For as I have often told you before and now say again with tears,
many live as enemies of the cross of Christ. Their destiny is destruction, their god is
their stomach, and their glory is in their shame. Their mind is on earthly things.
But our citizenship is in heaven. And we eagerly await a Savior from there, the Lord
Jesus Christ, who by the power that enables him to bring everything under his
control, will transform our lowly bodies so that they will be like his glorious body.
Therefore, my brother, you whom I love and long for, my joy and crown, that is how
you should stand firm in the Lord, dear friends (Phil. 3: 7-4:1).

It is necessary to quote passages from the Bible in order to prove and to make clear

and distinct just how radically other worldly the Bible’s world view is compared to

Spinoza’s. Once this is made plain, then one can better understand why the very religious
17th century western world was up in arms against him.

The longer I work on this subject the more I realize that the Bible is not really

known or taken seriously even by the vast majority of believers. There’s no way to fully

appreciate my juxtaposition of Spinoza with Christ unless one truly grasps the way of Christ.
“Since then you have been raised with Christ, set your hearts on things above, where Christ
is seated at the right hand of God. Set your minds on things above, not on earthly things”
(Col. 2:1-2). St. Paul says that we are to “fix out eyes not on what is seen, but on what is
unseen. For what is seen is temporary, but what is unseen is eternal” (2 Cor. 4:18).
For Spinoza, things are the opposite. We are to fix our eyes not on things

purportedly “outside” the world, but on the world itself. Blessedness, for the religion of

Spinoza, consists in this very thing: to know and love the world and the world only. All else
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is but fantasy, false images, false concepts, false beliefs. Contrary to Jesus’s disciples’ claims
of the highest form of knowledge and life, the highest form of knowledge and life in the
“religion of Spinoza” according to Spinoza’s disciples is to know and get clearer on the

teachings of the Ethics, so that “under your guidance we may be able to defend the truth
against those who are superstitiously religious and Christian, and to stand against the

attacks of the whole.” 880 And this truth, which is contrary to the superstitious religious and

Christian,

is a thorough understanding of Nature and its ways and an intellectual intuition of
how the essence of anything follows from Nature’s most universal elements – or,
since God and Nature are one and the same, how the essence of anything relates to
God… Spinoza takes on the issue of immortality, and demonstrates how the true
rewards of virtue lie not in some otherworldly recompense but in the happiness,
well-being, and blessedness that understanding confers upon us in this life. 881
The Ethics’ (unethical) reception - a couple examples 882

“Blessed are you when men hate you, when they exclude you and insult you
and reject your name as evil” (Lk.6:22)
“By their fruits ye shall know them” (Mt. 7:16)

After the Ethics had been published in Spinoza’s posthumous works, Spinoza’s biographer,

Pastor Colerus, writes the following conclusion about Spinoza’s work: “Several learned men
have already sufficiently discovered the impious doctrines contained in those posthumous
works [especially the Ethics], and have given notice to everybody to beware of them.” 883

Note how Colerus and many of the learned men of the 17th century went about their study

Nadler, op. cited, 12.
Nadler, op. cited, x.
882 Some may wonder what the reception of a work of philosophy has to do with doing philosophy.
Van Bunge replies: “nowadays an increasing number of experts prefer to regard research into the
history of philosophy as an autonomous exercise, which needs no philosophical justification” – that
is, research into the history of philosophy is also doing philosophy (Van Bunge, op. cited, x).
883 John Colerus. The Life of Benedict De Spinoza (London, 1706), 63.
880
881
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of books. 884 They’re like inquisitors; they go through all things, books, theater, art, etc. with

an eye to make sure that they are in line with holy writ and orthodox teaching. But in our
day, scholars don’t do this. They have different interests.

My interest in this section, however, is to read Spinoza’s works with the eyes of

most or many of his contemporaries, that is, with the eyes of suspicion to guard the flock.

To take one specific example of this, let us take Colerus’s reading of the Ethics. He starts out

by noting that Spinoza’s Ethics begins with definitions and descriptions of God that appear

to be fine and sound: “Who would not think at first, considering so fine a beginning, that he

is reading a Christian Philosopher?” Colerus goes on: “But when we enquire more narrowly
into his opinions,” we find something quite different. Then he cites a scripture verse, Titus
1:16. 885

When someone quotes a passage of “God’s Word” after making an allegation, then

you know that things are getting serious. But, like so many in his time, Colerus only cites

the scripture verse but does not write out the full passage (though later he does quote from
some of the verse). Most readers today, I fear, read the cited book name and number of the
verse and then go on. But this is a mistake. If you want to know the subject of your study,

and how he thinks, then you have to track down the passages and the books that he cites as
an authority for his claims. Here’s the text: “They claim to know God, but by their actions

they deny him. They are detestable, disobedient and unfit for doing anything good.” Note
the incredibly strong language.

Now we’re getting a better insight into how many interpreted Spinoza’s works and

of him as a person. This is not only strong language; it’s strong language because of the

strong theological implications in it. For the New Testament world view is one in which

As a result of this, Edwin Curley mentions that it was “not until he had been taken up by leading
figures of the German Enlightenment – by Lessing, Goethe, and Herder among others – did his work
receive much sympathetic attention” (Spinoza, Collected Works, ed. Curley, op. cited, 401).
885 Ibid. 64.
884
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things are theologically black or white. Long before President Bush announced “You’re

either for us or against us”, the Jesus of the New Testament emphatically stated: “He who is
not with me is against me, and he who does not gather with me, scatters” (Lk. 11:23). By

citing this verse, Colerus is, in essence, theologically type-casting Spinoza into the role of the
most horrid human being there can be: one who opposes God. He is thus “detestable,

disobedient, and unfit for doing anything good.”

We can go further than this. Indeed, we should go further than this to make sure we

fully get what is going on here; for, merely looking up one scripture verse that is within a

whole book, doesn’t do justice to the context of that sentence or the context of the book in

which it is embedded. So we should look further into this. It would be a good idea here to
elaborate on this quote and why Colerus cites it in order to better understand his mindset

and of all those like him (e.g. the Counter-Enlightenment). The best way of doing this is for
the reader to read the whole letter to Titus, to note its teachings, its context, and its

commands. For these teachings and commands, according to the faithful, are not only for

Titus but to all of God’s people, especially those in leadership capacities like Pastor Colerus
and the many theologians.

A few lines above the one Colerus quotes are claims about “the knowledge of the

truth” that was entrusted by “God, who does not lie” “to me by the command of God our
Savior” (that is, St. Paul here is claiming that he received this knowledge of the truth by

revelation from God). Because of this, God’s people “must hold firmly to the trustworthy
message as it has been taught” and “refute those who oppose it.” This is indeed exactly

what Colerus and the theological and philosophical works he refers to are doing. Indeed,

they must. They look to the scriptures to guide and inform everything in their lives – their

language, how they should think, talk, and write about others, what they should care about,
what is true and false, right and wrong, wonderful and horrible. They don’t think for
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themselves. They put on the mind of Christ. They want only to die to self in order to let
Christ live. And Christ’s ways are not our ways.

Now listen to how this revelation, the context of the verse Colerus cited, judges

those who reject their view: “For there are many rebellious people, mere talkers and

deceivers …They must be silenced, because they are ruining whole households by teaching

things they ought not to teach … Therefore rebuke them sharply, so that they will be sound

in the faith and will pay no attention to … those who reject the truth” (that is, what Paul says
is the truth and what everyone else says is the truth who believe Paul). Of these people who
reject Christian revelation, Paul says, “In fact, both their minds and consciences are

corrupted.” Colerus makes it plain that he means to refer the letter to Titus to Spinoza:

“And therefore the words of the Apostle, Tit. 1:16 concerning impious men, may be very

well applied to that philosopher: They profess that they know God, but in works they deny
him.”

He then quotes another scripture (for one quotes scripture as literal proofs because

they believe that these scriptures are literally from God): The fool says in his heart, ‘There is
no God’ (Ps.14:1). But how can Colerus say this of Spinoza’s Ethics which talks about and

praises God and His ways throughout its pages? Answer: Because Colerus is able to discern

what Spinoza is really up to, which is not the propagation of the faith, he can say, “This is the
true opinion of Spinoza, whatever he might say.” Colerus had Spinoza exactly right: “He

takes the liberty to use the word God, and to take it in a sense unknown to all Christians.” 886
Notice again how Colerus does his Spinoza scholarship. He doesn’t just argue his

point against Spinoza’s God from his Ethics, he also finds proof to support his claim against
Spinoza by citing from Spinoza’s correspondence. Colerus has read these letters. Thus he
quotes Spinoza from the 21st letter to Oldenburg: “I acknowledge, says he, that I have a
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notion of God and Nature, very different from that of the modern Christians. I believe that
God is immanent, and not the transient cause of all things.” Colerus goes on to mock, by

implication, Spinoza’s use of scripture passages to back up his impious doctrine. 887 Colerus
sees through Spinoza’s protestations that he does not deny God. He sees right through him
and recognizes the true God of Spinoza: “The God of Spinoza is therefore nothing else but
Nature … corporeal and material.” 888

While Colerus was highly educated and did a passable job of critiquing the Ethics

(even if only from an orthodox theological perspective), the critique the Ethics offered by
some other theologians and philosophers, such as Oldenburg and Bayle show greater

philosophical acumen. 889 Yet, despite their philosophical professionalism, their central

controlling concern was biblical theological orthodoxy.

Let us briefly take another couple examples of how the religious concern overrides

or constrains philosophical critique. Henry Oldenburg writes Spinoza in December of 1675
to tell him what in Spinoza’s writings cause “the most distress” in his readers (Letter

LXXIV). Oldenburg then tells Spinoza what it is. He doesn’t refer to Spinoza’s views about
the Holy Spirit, or about Christ, or about revelation, prophecy, the Scriptures, Moses,

contradictions in the Scripture, and the like. No, instead he complains about Spinoza’s

philosophical conclusions about necessity. But then note how his complaint about Spinoza’s
philosophy is due to his biblical theological concerns. 890

Ibid. 64-65.
Ibid. 65.
889 Still, it is true that the reactions against Spinoza (and Descartes for that matter) were by amateurs.
Van Bunge notes that “Descartes and Spinoza became the subject of hundreds of books and
pamphlets…”, but “It should be added that the overwhelming majority of the participants of these
debates were complete amateurs. Only a handful of the protagonists of this study were professional
philosophers” (ix). Part of the value of Bunge’s work is that he does not restrict his “context” to only
professional philosophers, but also pulls back the curtain so that we may see the wider context of the
culture at large as well.
890 I say “biblical theological concerns” because the language in this passage stems from biblical
theological teachings. The subjects of “rewards and punishments” and of things being “inexcusable in
the sight of God” stem from biblical passages and thus most probably stem from Oldenburg’s
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You seem to assert the fatalistic necessity of all things and actions: and they say that
if this is admitted and affirmed, then the nerves of all laws, of all virtue and religion,
are cut through, and all rewards and punishments are empty. They think that
whatever compels, or involves necessity, also excuses; and so, they think, no one
would be inexcusable in the sight of God. For if we are driven by fate, and all things,
turned by a strong hand, follow a definite and inevitable course, then they cannot
see what place there is for blame or punishments. 891
You see, on the one hand, the concern looks to be primarily philosophical.

Oldenburg is concerned about Spinoza’s philosophical position on necessity or free will.

But, when we look more closely, we find out what about Spinoza’s philosophical position

bothers Oldenburg. He worries that if people start believing in this stuff, then people will
lose their faith in, and fear of, the Christian theological teachings about the receiving of
rewards of punishments by God at the Last Judgment.

We see this same kind of thing in Bayle. Bayle’s article on Spinoza in his Historical

and Critical Dictionary offers many excellent (and terribly weak) philosophical assessments
of Spinoza’s philosophy. But as we read on, we notice how over and over again Bayle
situates the philosophical issues to orthodox theological concerns. 892

Our next and last chapter on Spinoza is on his TTP. What do the TTP and the Ethics

have in common? Answer: both are philosophy and both attack biblical theology. What

Ethics’ stuff is in the TTP and what TTP stuff is in the Ethics? Answer: Surprisingly, there’s a
mix of the two. What philosophical arguments are in the TTP? Answer: Some of the central
philosophical positions of the Ethics.

Christian theological education. He had been trained and educated, after all, as a Christian
theologian. If this is not enough evidence, then a reading of the rest of the letter will prove the case
because Oldenburg goes on to ask Spinoza more question about angels, the Son of God, and so on.
891 The Correspondence of Spinoza, Wolf, op. cited, 345.
892 Pierre Bayle. Historical and Critical Dictionary: Selections, translated and edited by Richard H.
Popkin (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991), 288-338. Bayle’s Spinoza entry is the
largest entry in his entire Dictionary. Another point I’d like to make on this entry. If one restricted
one’s judgment on the question as to whether Bayle was a genuine Christian (at least around-theball-park orthodox in theological thinking) to this article, one might very well conclude that he
certainly sounds like a devout and orthodox Christian.
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Chapter Fifteen
The Antichrist’s Book
“my most urgent task [in the Theological-Political Treatise] has been to indicate the main
false assumptions that prevail regarding religion, that is, the relics of man’s ancient
bondage” – Spinoza 893
“The chief aim of the Treatise is to refute the claims which had been raised on behalf of
revelation throughout the ages” – Leo Strauss 894
“If [the TTP’s arguments against the scriptures are] true, Good Lord? What respect could
we have for the Scripture! How could we maintain that it is divinely inspired? That it is a
sure and firm prophecy; that the holy men who are the authors of it, spoke and wrote by
God’s order, and by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit that the same Scripture is most
certainly true, and that it gives a testimony most certainly true” 895 – Colerus
“One may very well doubt, whether, amongst the many men the Devil has hired to
overthrow humane and divine right, any of them has been more busy about it, than that
imposture, who was born to the great mischief of Church and State” 896
“that abominable treatise” 897
“the Treatise [the TTP] ought to be buried forever in an eternal oblivion” 898
“the learning and inquiries whereof must needs have been fetched from hell” 899
“The Lord confound thee, Satan, and stop they mouth” 900

Spinoza, TTP, 3, Seymour Feldman in Shirley.
Leo Stauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing, op. cited, 142.
895 John Colerus. The Life of Benedict De Spinoza (London: D. L., 1706), 59.
896 Ibid. 74.
897 Ibid. 46.
898 Ibid. 59.
899 Ibid. 60.
900 Ibid. 59.
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First approaches to understanding the TTP
The TTP is a work of the antichrist inspired by Satan

We are now finally come to the antichrist’s most diabolical production, Satan’s magnum

opus, the Theological Political Treatise of Benedict de Espinosa. Not since the serpent told

Eve that God’s Word was false (his “Ye shall surely not die” to His “The day that you eat

thereof, ye shall die” (Gen. xxx) has the devil so inspired a creature to speak his dark word.

As Spinoza’s early biographer put it: “One may very well doubt, whether, amongst the many
men the Devil has hired to overthrow humane and divine right, any of them has been more
busy about it, than that imposture, who was born to the great mischief of Church and
State.” 901

As a pastor of the Lord’s flock, Colerus cannot help himself. Along with his careful,

even scholarly rendition of the facts of Spinoza’s life that he gathered through industrious
labor, Colerus can’t help but to sprinkle throughout his book theological denunciations of
Spinoza and his TTP: “the Learning and Inquiries whereof must needs have been fetched
from hell”; 902 “that abominable treatise”; 903 “that wicked book”; 904 “the Treatise [TTP]

ought to be buried for ever in an eternal oblivion”; 905 “The most impious atheist that ever

lived upon the face of the earth”; 906 “The Lord confound thee, Satan, and stop thy mouth!” 907

The reader may ask, “Why are we discussing the antichrist? Isn’t that only crack-pot

theology which only a very small minority or fringe believe in? What does that have to do

with Spinoza and philosophy?” 17th century historian Christopher Hill answers these sorts

John Colerus. The Life of Benedict De Spinoza (London: D. L., 1706), 74.
Ibid. 60.
903 Ibid. 56.
904 Ibid. 60.
905 Ibid. 59.
906 Ibid. 59-60.
907 Ibid. 59.
901
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of questions in his Antichrist in Seventeenth-Century England. The reason why Hill wrote a

whole book on this apparently outlandish subject from the Bible is because “historians have

tended to ignore” the fact that many of the greatest thinkers of the seventeenth century took
this subject very seriously. The historian of philosophy’s task must not “cover up

irrationalities.” Hill criticizes the attitude of historians who call all those who took such

claims (the antichrist, the beast, the end of the world, etc.) seriously as “lunatics” at their

peril because they tend to forget or ignore that the great luminaries of the period (examples
include Henry More, John Milton, Oliver Cromwell, Henry Oldenburg, Isaac Newton, etc.) all

shared this belief – and that with the appearance of the Antichrist, the end of the world was
presaged. 908

In fact, for many reputable seventeenth century teachers, it was imperative to be

knowledgeable about the Antichrist not only because the scriptures teach that one should

be on the lookout for him so as not to be deceived by him, but also because his appearance
was said to be the key sign that the end of the world is at hand. And to know when the

world will end is naturally of great importance. At any rate, it occupied many of the greatest
minds of Europe, including its philosophers and scientists. Their time is not our time; the
large majority of philosophers and academics today do not believe these things. But the

large majority of philosophers and academics in Spinoza’s world did. So we have to deal
with them as they were and not as we are.

When this many great thinkers are “interested in Antichrist, it is clear that there is

something important here,” says Hill. “The historian ignores at his peril a body of ideas

which at one time aroused passion and controversy.” 909 What seems unworthy of our
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attention today was “full of life and significance” for them. It had to be because, once again,
they took the Bible to be literally God’s word.

As I said at some length earlier, the modern reader must not take the theological

denunciations against Spinoza lightly. Colerus and most of his Christian brethren really

meant them. Again, one has to try to live inside their minds to get a better understanding of
what is afoot here between counter-enlightenment and radical enlightenment forces. If

you’re a devout Bible believer in Amsterdam in 1670 (when the TTP was first published)

and you happened to pick up a book entitled Theological-Political Treatise, you would have

been aghast upon reading it. One can then understand how Pierre-Francois Moreau can say

in his “Spinoza’s reception and influence” for the Cambridge Companion to Spinoza that “The
publication of the Theological-Political Treatise in 1670 had the effect of a lightning bolt.” 910
As opposed to Spinoza’s other philosophical works, the TTP’s arguments against

revelation, inspiration, prophecy, miracles, dreams, omens, Moses, the prophets, Jesus, the
apostles, etc. are direct. You can’t miss them. One can understand then why the TTP had

more effect and influence on Europe in his generation than his other works: It was easier to
read; there was a greater audience for the subject matter than for arcane pure philosophy,

and it was more dramatic and sensational. With the TTP, king, queen, prince, Rabbi, Roman
Catholic priest, Lutheran minister, Calvinist pastor, and literate laymen, Christian and Jew,
could take up and read and very quickly be brought to fathom what it is promulgating.
It was largely because of the TTP’s importance in undermining the age-old

theological foundations of European culture that Stephen Nadler argued that, “Without a

doubt, the Theological-Political Treatise is one of the most important and influential books
in the history of philosophy, in religious and political thought, and even in Bible studies.
More than any other work, it laid the foundation for modern critical and historical
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approaches to the Bible.” 911 Moreover, Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise is “Arguably

the most important – and certainly the most scandalous and vilified – work of philosophy of

the seventeenth century” (even though it was later neglected). 912

Difficulties in interpretation

Spinoza’s Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being, his Principles of Cartesian

Philosophy and his Ethics: Proved in Geometrical Order are for most readers, difficult works
to get through. In several respects on the other hand, the Theological-Political Treatise

(TTP) is easier reading, clearer, more direct, more emphatic, and more dramatic. And yet

most Spinoza scholars make it a point to ask and explore the question of why the TTP is so

difficult to interpret. Commentators such as Leo Strauss, Theo Verbeek, and Steven Nadler,
to name only some, have taken up this question. In the first sentence of the Introduction to
his Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise: Exploring ‘the Will of God’, Theo Verbeek states,
Every reader of Spinoza’s Theologico-political treatise (1670) will know that it is a
difficult book but will also realize that its difficulties are not like those of say, the
Critique of Pure Reason or the Phenomenology of the Mind. Its vocabulary is not
technical at all; nor is its reasoning complicated or its logic extraordinary. If it is
difficult it is not because of particular phrases, paragraphs, concepts, but because
one fails to see how things combine; how particular arguments fit into the
comprehensive argument … indeed, it is not clear most of the time what it is all
about even if every now and then one stumbles across something familiar and
recognizable. 913
This may be how Verbeek and contemporary scholars feel about the TTP feel, but

(as best as I have been able to gather from the early reception of this work) it was not how
Upcoming “A Book forged in Hell”, op. cited, 326.
Ibid. 3.
913 Theo Verbeek. Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise: Exploring ‘the Will of God’ (Great Britain:
Ashgate, 2003), 1. See also his summary of the several motivations in Spinoza’s writing of the TTP,
some of which explains its ambiguities. Because of the serious danger he was in as a Dutch citizen
(10-11).
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Spinoza’s contemporaries thought. They were clear as to what it meant and what its purpose
was. The early critical reviews on the TTP do not complain about “how particular

arguments fit into the comprehensive argument” or that “it is not clear most of the time

what it is all about even if every now and then one stumbles across something familiar and

recognizable.” They knew what it was all about. The more they read and considered it, the

more they recognized it as the work of the counterfeit angel of light (2 Cor. 11:14). Indeed,

a comparison of the critical treatment of the TTP then with the critical treatment of the TTP

today is really quite revealing – and radically different.

Verbeek goes on to explain that many of the ambiguities can be accounted for

because of the grave danger this book put him in. I agree, but it should be pointed out that
his contemporaries interpreted many of these “ambiguities” as cover-ups; for they knew

very well that the evil atheists and libertines of the age could not speak transparently

without seriously endangering themselves. Hence, they did not puzzle too much over these
so-called ambiguities as contemporary scholars do.

After being immersed in the works of Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, Newton, Arnauld,

etc. for a long period of time, one gets used to the carefulness most philosophers of the 17th
century speak on biblical and theological issues. In fact, there is something like a cottage
book industry trying to figure out the sincerity and authenticity of many of these

philosophers with respect to their theological beliefs. The best contemporary scholars in

the world, for instance, still squabble over the sincerity of Descartes, Hobbes, and Leibniz.
However, on the other hand, when one comes to the TTP, the attitude, the language, the

things being said, are so different, so unorthodox, and so radical, that you can’t miss it. It’s

as if the age-old internal censoring monitor has suddenly been torn off and now for the first
time in centuries we are made privy to the very bowels of the monster of unbelief. No man
spake like this.
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Still, in other respects, the TTP lacks perspicuity. He seems to contradict himself at

times, and he certainly does contradict himself at other times. I think it is correct to argue
that Spinoza purposely uses unclear language and arguments to cover up (at least

sometimes) the extent of his radicalness. But he does not engage in this purposeful lack of
clarity all the time. On the contrary. Anyone who knows scripture well and who knows

how to read can easily understand with absolute clarity just how incredibly radical the TTP
is! In fact, to not see how clearly radical it is demands an explanation. In this sense then,
some of the problems of ambiguity as to what he’s up to are somewhat restricted to

different contemporary scholarly interests; for again, Spinoza’s contemporaries did not

have difficulty in understanding what the TTP was all about. They knew that it was a work
which purposely sought to undermine revelation or Holy Scripture. And that was almost

the only thing they were most concerned about in this work.

Readers of the TTP today who are not devout, who don’t know scriptures well and

who don’t know the long and common history of the usual (or traditional) interpretations

given the Jewish and Christians scriptures, may find much that is unclear. Because of this,
they also cannot be privy to the radicalness or the horror that the TTP elicited.

Interestingly, some even in the 17th century, like Oldenburg (a Christian correspondent with
Spinoza) had trouble coming to grips with just how radical the TTP is because (I suspect) he

couldn’t take it in that anyone could seriously write a treatise wholly devoted to destroying

the holy Christian religion. A final reason that we can give here for why some have difficulty
understanding the TTP is because some of the arguments are so novel and so contrary to
their conventional understanding that portions of it seem obviously wrong (we may cite

some of his philosophical points about God as identical with nature and his refutations of all
scriptural anthropomorphic depictions of God).
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For our focus in this section though, there is a key, a “code breaker,” if you will, that

can make the TTP more perspicuous. Generally speaking, the key to understanding this
work is to try to discover how much of what he wrote ultimately undermines biblical

theological claims. The Counter-Enlightenment forces of Judaism and Christianity of the

time thought the same thing. They thought they could discern this clearly because when

they compared what he said with the Word of God and with biblical theology, they found
that much of what he said militated against these. And for anyone like them with such a
fervent faith in scriptures, it was easy to identify Spinoza as the antichrist. Indeed,
according to the criteria given in scripture, their identification of the antichrist is

exegetically sound. It may seem at first questionable to say so, but a good heuristic in

understanding the TTP is to try to go native and see Spinoza as the defenders of God’s Word
saw him. For Spinoza’s part, this focus was not only that some of the 17th century’s biblicaltheological problems were the most pressing intellectual problems of the day, but also

because Spinoza’s own life was to a large degree shaped by the biblical tradition; so much so
that it seems that much of what he wrote was in reaction to this religious upbringing.

In order to be a convincing antichrist, one has to at least appear as an angel of light;

one has to talk the talk; one has to quote scripture and do a lot of pious talk. Once this is

established, one can then systematically go to work in undermining the major foundations

of the enemy; as Leo Strauss puts it: “To exaggerate for purposes of clarification, we may say

that each chapter of the Treatise serves the function of refuting one particular orthodox
dogma while leaving untouched all other orthodox dogmas.” 914
Strauss on interpreting the difficulties in the TTP

Leo Strauss. Persecution and the Art of Writing (Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1952),
184.
914
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Long before Curley, Nadler, and Steenbakkers’ work on the TTP, Leo Strauss knew the

centrality of this work for 17th century Europe and afterwards. His works Persecution and

the Art of Writing 915 and Spinoza’s Critique of Religion 916 are to this day excellent

introductions to the TTP. Strauss gets to the heart of the most serious issues at work in the
TTP. Unfortunately, Strauss’s works are neglected today. Over and over in the current

literature on Spinoza, Strauss’s work is maligned. These Spinoza scholars refer almost only
to the controversial aspects of Strauss’s hermeneutic in interpreting philosophers. This

leaves readers with the impression that Strauss is not a reliable interpreter of Spinoza and
therefore, because time is limited, is not someone to take seriously. This is a big mistake.
Strauss’s interpretations of Spinoza and his TTP are in some respects superior to the new

works on the TTP.

It might be that Strauss’s works on Spinoza’s TTP are so insightful because he

himself (like Spinoza) was brought up in a “conservative, even Orthodox Jewish home” 917;

so he had, as it were, an inside on the key issues at stake. Strauss understood that the TTP is
a “historical subject.” Indeed, he inquires why we should care today to read this book that
was published in 1670, for he knows that “The study of the Treatise can be of real

importance only if the issue discussed in it is still alive.” 918 He criticizes contemporary

scholarship on Spinoza on the grounds that they do usually enter into the spirit and the age

of the text. Because of this deficit, “the most fundamental issue – the issue raised by the
conflicting claims of philosophy and revelation – is discussed in our time (1952) on a
decidedly lower level than was almost customary in former ages.” 919

See especially chapter 5, “How to Study Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise.
In Strauss’s Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, see especially chapter V, ”The Critique of Orthodoxy”
and VII, “The Critique of Calvin.”
917 See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leo_Strauss. These are Strauss’s words. Strauss’s conservative
or orthodox upbringing, however, may have been with more stress on ceremony than theology.
918 Persecution and the Art of Writing, op. cited. 142.
919 Ibid. 142-143.
915
916
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In the Introduction to his Persecution and the Art of Writing, Leo Strauss reviews the

history of the relations between the revelatory religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam)
and philosophy and finds the religious responses all wanting. He argues that of the three
religions, Judaism is by far the most antithetical to philosophy. Next is Islam. And least is

Christianity, that is, the Christianity that much later “officially recognized” philosophy (this

status of course was to be decried throughout its history). Of the essentially antiphilosophical spirit and history of Judaism, Strauss rightly states that:

It is difficult not to see the connection between the depreciation of the primary
object of philosophy – the heavens and the heavenly bodies – in the first chapter of
Genesis, the prohibition against eating of the tree of knowledge of good and evil in
the second chapter, the divine name ‘I shall be what I shall be,’ the admonition that
the Law is not in heaven nor beyond the sea, the saying of the prophet Micah about
what the Lord requires of man, and such Talmudic utterances as these: ‘for him who
reflects about four things – about what is above, what is below, what is before, what
is behind – it would be better not to have come into the world,’ and ‘God owns
nothing in His World except the four cubits of the Halakhah. 920

There is a lot here. In a nutshell, Strauss indicts just about every pivotal era of

Judaism up to the Common Era. The style here seems almost glib; but it’s not. This is a

carefully planned passage which compresses the origins and early development of Judaism
and shows that Judaism is, in essence, antithetical to philosophy. And this anti-rationalist

attitude continues throughout its history:

Jews of the philosophical competence of Halevi and Maimonides took it for granted
that being a Jew and being a philosopher are mutually exclusive … Spinoza bluntly
said that the Jews despise philosophy. As late as 1765, Moses Mendelssohn felt it
necessary to apologize for recommending the study of logic, and to show why the
prohibition against the reading of extraneous or profane books does not apply to
works on logic. The issue of traditional Judaism versus philosophy is identical with
the issue of Jerusalem versus Athens. 921

Despite the fact that most of the scriptures that Spinoza deals with are in the Jewish

Bible, Strauss argues that, “Taken as a whole, the Theologico-political Tractate is aimed
920
921

Strauss, op. cited. 20-21.
Ibid.
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much more directly at Christian than at Jewish orthodoxy.” 922 I think that there can be little

doubt of this since Spinoza himself said as much. In October of 1665, Benedict writes
Oldenburg:

I am now writing a Treatise about my interpretation of Scripture. This I am driven
to do by the following reasons: I. The Prejudices of the Theologians; for I know that
these are among the chief obstacles which prevent men from directing their mind to
philosophy; and therefore I do all I can to expose them, and to remove them from
the minds of the more prudent … 3. The freedom of philosophizing, and of saying
what we think; this I desire to vindicate in every way, for here it is always
suppressed through the excessive authority and impudence of the preachers. 923

The preachers and theologians that Spinoza mostly has in mind then are Christians.

But it is important to bear in mind what kind of Christians. Strauss (and all the

commentators I’ve read) states that “The Christian orthodoxy, which Spinoza primarily
attacks is in particular Calvinism.” 924

Strauss got the essence of Spinoza’s TTP right: “The chief aim of the Treatise is to

refute the claims which had been raised on behalf of revelation throughout the ages. 925” All
the claims of theology – prophecy, visions, miracles, Christ, the creation and end of the
world – stem from this one putative source.

Spinoza’s Critique of Religion 109.
Wolf, op. cited, Letter XXX, Oct. 1665, Voorburg, p. 206.
924 Spinoza’s Critique of Religion 109.
925 Leo Strauss. Persecution and the Art of Writing (Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1952),
142. The reader should not construe my praise and support of Strauss’s interpretation on this point
as praise and support of all his interpretations, however. In fact, ironically enough, Strauss’s overall
interpretation of such Radical Enlightenment philosophers as Spinoza and Hobbes is in some
respects the stuff of the “counter-enlightenment”; for while Strauss understood “the fundamental
issue that divides ancient and modern thinkers is the relative importance of reason and revelation in
human life”, he was nevertheless very critical of the exclusivist reliance on reason. So much so, that
“In Strauss’ view, the modern faith in reason is at the heart of the ‘crisis of the West’.” More than that,
according to Shadia Drury, Strauss thought that “what is needed is belief in a transcendent God who
punishes the wicked and rewards the righteous.” While “Strauss was committed to philosophy and
had no intention of denouncing it out of hand”, he nevertheless argued “that philosophy must be kept
hidden or secret, not simply to permit philosophers to avoid persecution, but for the sake of the
people and for the well-being of the city.” With this, of course, we do not support. See Drury’s article
on Strauss in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online:
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/S092?ssid=&authstatuscode=202. There are differing
interpretations of whether Strauss himself was a believer of some kind or an atheist (See:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leo_Strauss).
922
923
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Not only that, but as we mentioned above, Strauss understood that his

contemporaries could not enter into the vital significance of the work because for most

scholars today, the issues that the TTP takes up are no longer vital or live options. There

aren’t many contemporary scholars who believe that the Bible is revelation from God. Thus
they feel absolutely no umbrage of even anything of personal or religious relevance when

they read this work. Some of the difficulty of fully appreciating this work then has to do

with finding a way to make the issues of the book (such as the problem of revelation) alive.
As we’ve already quoted: “The study of the Treatise can be of real importance only if the

issue discussed in it is still alive.” 926 That is exactly right. Because of this lack, Strauss states
that

we cannot help noticing that the most fundamental issue – the issue raised by the
conflicting claims of philosophy and revelation – is discussed in our time on a
decidedly lower level than was almost customary in former ages. It is with a view to
these circumstances that we open the Treatise again … For if we fail to do so, we are
likely to substitute our folly for his wisdom. 927
A good example, perhaps, of this “lower level” of existential understanding of the

TTP’s outrageous antichristian nature is the fact that not one contemporary scholarly work
(to my knowledge) has pointed out (or comprehended) the questionable-ness if not

outrageousness of the epigraph which Spinoza affixes to his whole work. On the very front
page of the book under the title is written: “The First Epistle of John, Chapter 4, Verse 13.
“Through this means we recognize that we remain in God, and God remains in us – that He
gave to us from His own Spirit.” Anyone who knows the scriptures well would know

immediately that Spinoza takes this important scriptural passage wildly out of context. The

Calvinist theologians and preachers in Amsterdam certainly would have caught this. 928 But,

to my knowledge, not one contemporary work on Spinoza’s TTP points this fact out. There
Persecution 142-143.
Ibid.
928 In a personal communication on this point, I asked Spinoza scholar Theo Verbeek if my
interpretation of this matter was correct. He agreed and wrote that it was.
926
927
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are many contemporary works on the TTP that give commentary and analysis on most of

the book. How strange it is then that not one of these excellent works recognized the

problematic nature of Spinoza’s quotation of the 1 John passage as the epigraph for his

whole book. Is it possible that no one researched it? For there is no way that one could
recognize that a serious issue is being raised in the epigraph unless one knows or

researches the context of the quote. And once one knows that, then one recognizes that from
the very epigraph of the TTP that Spinoza is up to no good – in relation to Christianity, that

is.

In some important respects, the primary audience of the TTP was Spinoza’s own

countrymen. In fact, the circumstances that led Spinoza to break off work on his Ethics to

write a work directly on the scriptures and biblical theology was occasioned by a religious
controversy in his town. He feared that the Calvinists were gaining too much political

power in his town and country, so he wrote the TTP in large part with hopes of undermining
their biblical theological foundations. Most of the religious groups in the 17th century knew
the scriptures very well. Indeed, for many of them, the scriptures and theology was their

only education. So whatever they heard or read, they would judge it according to “the word
of truth” (2 Tim. 2:15).

The 1 John 4:13 passage that Spinoza uses as the epigraph of this book sounds pious

enough. “Through this means we recognize that we remain in God, and God remains in us –
that He gave to us from His own Spirit.” Anyone reading this for the first time and not

knowing the contents of the rest of the book might easily think that the author is a Christian.
But once the devout reader goes through the book, he learns that the author must be a

trickster and heretic. But what kind of heretic? Well, the best way to find out, according to

the New Testament, is to find out what the author thinks about Jesus Christ. Once he learns
this, then he will know how to categorize the author.
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Of all the figures in the Bible, Spinoza’s TTP seems to treat Jesus with the most

respect. Yet, though Spinoza talks about him in laudatory tones, there is something about
his choice of words that would tip off the devout reader that something is not quite right.

Spinoza says many glowing things about Jesus. 929 He even sees Jesus as greater than Moses

(which by entailment is a condemnation of Judaism in that Judaism rejects the Christian’s
Christ). In fact, Spinoza even says some things that suggest that God truly and specially

revealed His Will to him. But when one reads further and more carefully, one realizes that

more is afoot. For instance, Spinoza never says the magic words: he never says that “Jesus is
Lord” or that he is God’s Son come in the flesh.

Moreover, if it is true that Jesus received special revelation, according to Spinoza he

nevertheless “adapts” this language to the coarse level of the people. And this “coarse”

adapted language is not in the final analysis the truth of God at all – which undermines the
scriptural teaching that all scripture is inspired by God and therefore “the word of truth”
(Eph. 1:13; Col. 1:5). But Spinoza says that Christ is forced to teach these things

“undoubtedly in concession to the frailty of the flesh … [and to adapt] his words to the
character of the … carnal man.” 930 The devout won’t buy this. Not for a second.

For readers with the wherewithal to put together all that Spinoza wrote about

revelation, prophecy, imagination, the common herd, etc. from the TTP, these readers would
know that while Spinoza said nice things about Christ, in the final analysis, he did not really

believe in Him. And that would be enough for them to pronounce their solemn judgment on
Spinoza; for they were taught how to identify the antichrist and, upon once identifying him,
to eschew him with all one’s being.

TTP, Shirley, 54.
Spinoza. Theological-Political Treatise, trans. Shirley, op. cited, 55.

929929
930

Dear children, this is the last hour; and as you have heard that the antichrist is
coming, even now many antichrists have come. This is how we know it is the last
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hour … But you have an anointing from the Holy One, and all of you know the truth
… Who is the liar? It is the man who denies that Jesus is the Christ. Such a man is
the antichrist – he denies the Father and the Son. No one who denies the Son has
the Father; whoever acknowledges the Son has the Father also. See that what you
have heard from the beginning remains in you. If it does, you also will remain in the
Son and in the Father. And this is what he promised us – even eternal life. I am
writing these things to you about those who are trying to lead you astray (1 John 2).

again:

Spinoza, to the devout mind, was definitely trying to lead the flock astray. And

Dear friends, do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits to see whether they are
from God, because many false prophets have gone out into the world. This is how
you can recognize the Spirit of God: Every spirit that acknowledges that Jesus Christ
has come in the flesh is from God, but every spirit that does not acknowledge Jesus
is not from God. This is the spirit of the antichrist, which you have heard is coming
and even now is in the world. You, dear children, are from God and have overcome
them, because the one who is in you is greater than the one who is in the world.
They are from the world and therefore speak from the viewpoint of the world, and
the world listens to them. We are from God, and whoever knows God listens to us;
but whoever is not from God does not listen to us. This is how we recognize the
Spirit of truth and the spirit of falsehood … We know that we live in him and he in
us, because he has given us of his Spirit.

This last sentence is the verse that Spinoza has the chutzpah to use as the epitaph to

his TTP! The correct reading of this verse is to read it in context in accord with the

sentences before and after it - which was the hermeneutics that Spinoza preached but often

did not practice! 931 And once one does this, one finds out that the point of the passage was
to know how to identify the antichrist and false teachers. Spinoza fits that bill in spades!
There are many other such passages of scripture that Spinoza twists to either

project what he wishes it to mean or purposely gives a false reading in hopes of deflecting
the rage of the devout fanatics against him. From the orthodox perspective, this correct

reading of the 1 John passage shows Spinoza to be an antichrist! Any reader who knew or

However, there are other ways to interpret why Spinoza used this verse as the motto for his book
– though I think my criticism of his use of this verse should stand. He might have used this verse as
the epigraph of his book as his way of saying that what makes someone “in God” is not so much what
his or her particular denomination’s confession might be, but as he or she lives according to God’s
Spirit (which for Spinoza means as a loving person. In his Spinoza’s Theologico-political Treatise:
Exploring ‘the Will of God’ (which, I am told, is the only in-depth commentary of the TTP in English)
Theo Verbeek also takes this position (Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003], 5).

931
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looked up this verse for memory’s sake would not only identify Spinoza as an antichrist
because he doesn’t believe the claims of Christ, but also because of the obvious

mendaciousness of using such a verse as the epigraph to his whole book! Spinoza for obvious

reasons does not mention the very next verse after the one he uses: “And we have seen and
testify that the Father has sent his Son to be the Savior of the world. If anyone

acknowledges that Jesus is the Son of God, God lives in him and he in God” (1 John 4).

Spinoza definitely did not acknowledge that Jesus was the Son of God come in the flesh.
The Radicalness of the TTP
The question of radicalness
As we mentioned earlier in this study, the use of the term “radical” in reference to Spinoza
or to the “Radical Enlightenment” is meant in respect to Christianity and the history of

Christendom up that point. Many of course would argue that the true “radicals” are not

those like the Spinozists, but rather the orthodox and traditionalists in religion. At any rate,
for Spinoza’s time, the TTP was considered not only “radical” but “vile and blasphemous.”

Stephen Nadler notes that “The Theological-Political Treatise is an astoundingly bold and

radical work” that was considered “as vile and blasphemous a book as the world has ever
seen.” Even the radical Hobbes was astounded by the TTP’s audaciousness. Hobbes is

reported to have said that the TTP “cut through him a bar’s length, for he durst not write so

boldly.” 932

Stephen Nadler. Spinoza’s Ethics: An Introduction, op. cited, 20. Nadler concludes that Hobbes
plays it safe, and that he does not, like Spinoza, come out: “He does not adopt – or, at least, does not
express – the thoroughgoing, dogmatic and more radical naturalism of Spinoza’s Treatise; after all, he
‘durst not write so boldly” (Nadler’s forthcoming “A Book Forged in Hell”, op. cited, 130-131). In
terms of philosophy (at least in principle) Douglas Jesseph’s “Hobbes’ Atheism” would disagree with
the former claim (that is, that he does not express thoroughgoing, radical naturalism), but not the

932

433

After Spinoza’s radical arguments and claims begin to finally sink in, one comes to

the realization that he is rejecting just about every sacred biblical theological and traditional
teaching of the Church. One wonders how he could have had the ability, the courage, the

insight, and wherewithal to come to totally reject his Jewish and Christian Europe’s most

sacred paradigm. We must remember that Spinoza wrote at a time long before Diderot,

Voltaire, Holbrach, Darwin, Nietzsche, Marx, higher biblical criticism, Freud, and so on. I am
reminded of Richard Dawkins’ amazement (in his The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence
of Evolution Reveals a Universe without Design) that someone before Darwin could even

question the teleological proof of the existence of God. Dawkins says that he feels even

more wonder over the apparent design of the biological world than Bishop William Paley
did. In this respect, he writes:

I feel more in common with the Reverend William Paley than I do with the
distinguished modern philosopher, a well-known atheist, with whom I once
discussed the matter at dinner. I said that I could not imagine being an atheist at
any time before 1859, when Darwin’s Origin of Species was published. ‘What about
Hume?’, replied the philosopher. ‘How did Hume explain the organized complexity
of the living world?, I asked. ‘He didn’t’, said the philosopher. ‘Why does it need a
special explanation?’ Paley knew that it needed a special explanation; Darwin knew
it, and I suspect that in his heart of hearts my philosopher companion knew it too.

Dawkins goes on to say that

what Hume did was criticize the logic of using apparent design in nature as positive
evidence for the existence of God. He did not offer any alternative explanation for
apparent design, but left the question open. An atheist before Darwin could have
said, following Hume: ‘I have no explanation for complex biological design. All I
know is that God isn’t a good explanation, so we must wait and hope that somebody
comes up with a better one.’ I can’t help feeling that such a position, though logically
sound, would have left one feeling pretty unsatisfied, and that although atheism
might have been logically tenable before Darwin, Darwin made it possible to be an
intellectually fulfilled atheist. I like to think that Hume would agree … The boy
naturalist Charles Darwin could have shown him a thing or two about that. 933

latter (that he durst not write as transparently or as boldly). There are many statements in Hobbes’
Leviathan, for instance, in which it does not appear at all that he is “playing it safe.” On the contrary,
if one adds up the meaning of all such bold statements, then one is led to the conclusion that Jesseph
comes to: that Hobbes expresses an atheism and thoroughgoing radical naturalism.
933 Richard Dawkins. The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe
without Design (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), 5-6.
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While we agree with Dawkins’ obvious claim that Darwin demonstrated a positive

scientific non-teleological way of explaining the apparent design in the world, we don’t

think that he knew Spinoza’s arguments against the anthropomorphism of nature and God
and therefore the arguments against the plausibility of teleology. At any rate, not to argue

this issue here, Dawkins’ point does at least give us pause to admire Spinoza’s philosophical
insights, courage, and independent thought many decades before Hume, and 189 years
before Darwin.

Still, though Spinoza was definitely more advanced in his thoroughgoing non-

teleological naturalism, he was not the only atheist or radical. There were others, Jews and
Christians, who Spinoza most probably knew, who also rejected and criticized the religion
of their fathers, and who were also publically humiliated and excommunicated or even

burnt to the stake. Spinoza was not the only dissenter. And he was not the only one who

wrote works replete with many excellent arguments against the status quo version of God,
nature, and the Bible. Nevertheless, as scholars such as Popkins, Preus, Yovel, Nadler and

others have shown, Spinoza’s TTP definitely counts as a major step forward in the history of
naturalism, philosophy of religion, and biblical criticism. 934 Spinoza could have shown

Hume and Darwin a thing or two had they read his TTP. 935

Beyond his radical non-teleological naturalism in respect to science, Spinoza went

further in his arguments against Judaeo-Christian biblical theology. We will pick out only a

couple of these arguments here (the repudiation of revelation on philosophical and moral
grounds).

J. Samuel Preus’s Spinoza and the Irrelevance of Biblical Authority (Cambridge University Press,
2001) is the most thorough or comprehensive work on this subject in regard to its specifically
biblical critical aspects that I have found during my research on this subject. He learns from Popkins’
work: from Erasmus to Spinoza, especially about Isaac La Peyrere, but he goes beyond that. Preus’s
second chapter on Ludwig Meyer is particularly helpful in filling out gaps in our understanding of
Spinoza’s influences in hermeneutics.
935 As far as I have been able to determine thus far, Hume and Darwin did not study the TTP.
934
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Spinoza’s repudiation of revelation based on biblical critical, philosophical, and moral
grounds

Strauss argues that “The chief aim of that Treatise is to refute the claims which had been

raised on behalf of revelation throughout the ages.” This is most certainly one of the TTP’s
principal points of attack. The chief aim of this section then will be to present some of

Spinoza’s biblical critical, philosophical, and moral arguments to refute “the claims which
have been made on behalf of revelation throughout the ages.”

Spinoza starts the first chapter of the Theological-Political Treatise innocently

enough with the words: “Prophecy, or revelation, is the sure knowledge of some matter

revealed by God to man.” 936 So far so good. These words seem innocent and conventional.

But then he goes on to say, “A prophet is one who interprets God’s revelation to those who

cannot attain to certain knowledge of the matters revealed, and can therefore be convinced
of them only by simple faith.” 937

First he says that revelation or prophecy is “revealed by God to men.” Then he says

in effect: “But before one can get from God to man, the prophets have to interpret God’s

revelation.” So, God’s messages are not relayed to man directly or immediately, or exactly

or clearly. But this added or qualified theory of prophecy and revelation seems different
from the way most have learned about this subject.

Most believers are taught that God reveals x to prophet P and then prophet P simply

relays that exact message to the people. Throughout the Bible, outside of a few small

exceptions, we never read passages such as: “And I, Moses, was not sure of what Yahweh

said, but, well, it seemed to be something like x, so I wrote that down.” No, from the book of
936
937

TTP, op. cited, 9.
Ibid. my emphasis.
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Genesis to the book of Revelation, the testimonies and the commandments and the

prophecies are almost always communicated with the utmost clarity and distinction that x
is exactly what God told P to say or write down. Leaf through Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers,
Deuteronomy and find out if this is not so. And the same goes for all the prophets from

Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, and so on to Malachi. Over and
over in all these books the only expressions written about God are those such as: “This is
what you are to say to the house of Jacob and what you are to tell the people of Israel …”

(Ex.19:3); “The Lord called to Moses and spoke to him from the Tent of Meeting. He said,
‘Speak to the Israelites and say to them: …” (Lev. 1:1); “The word of the Lord came to me

saying, ‘Before I formed you in the womb I knew you, before you were born I set you apart; I
appointed you as a prophet to the nations … You must go to everyone I send you to and say
whatever I command you … Now, I have put my words in your mouth” (Jeremiah 1:4-9);

“Thus saith the Lord;” – thousands of such expressions are used like these throughout the
Bible.

It is the same with the New Testament. According to Luke, God sent the angel

Gabriel to talk to Zechariah and Mary. Luke tells us that Gabriel told Zechariah God’s plan

for John the Baptist. Then “God sent the angel Gabriel to Nazareth” to the virgin Mary. “The

angel went to her and said, “You will be with child and give birth to a son, and you are to call
his name Jesus“ (Lk.1:31). Peter testifies that he heard God say, “This is my Son.” Peter

says, “We ourselves heard this voice that came from heaven when we were with him on the
sacred mountain” (2 Pet.17). The apostle Paul writes in many places how the gospel he

preaches “is not something that man made up. I did not receive it from any man, nor was I
taught it; rather, I received it by revelation from Jesus Christ” (Gal.1:12). John says that an

angel told him the following words: “Write on a scroll what you see and send it to the seven

churches” (Rev.1:10); “Then the angel said to me, ‘Write: ‘Blessed are those who are invited
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to the wedding supper of the Lamb!’” (Rev.19:9); “I warn everyone who hears the words of

the prophecy of this book: if anyone adds anything to them, God will add to him the plagues
described in this book. And if anyone takes words away from this book of prophecy, god

will take away from him his share in the tree of life and in the holy city, which are described
in this book” (Rev.22:18).

These are all examples of the typical ways in which the authors of the Bible testify to

the revelations they received. If all these are only interpretations given according to the
contingencies of the author’s language, culture, history, etc., if these are only

“interpretations of God’s revelation to those who cannot attain to certain knowledge of the

matters revealed, and can therefore be convinced of them only by simple faith”, then all of

these interpretations are not only open to other possible interpretations, but are also open
to doubt, as well. And this is exactly what Spinoza is up to.

The believer could reply to Spinoza that if the prophet or the person to whom

something is revealed didn’t know for sure what God meant, if God didn’t reveal the matter

clearly, then one would think that there would be more indication of this fact in the wording
used. To Spinoza’s credit, he does cite many passages and instances in scripture that back
up his claim. And these offer valuable insights into our understanding of why religious

people make such claims. Nevertheless, for the believer, it is not a sufficient explanation of
why no mention is usually made of this interpretive medium between God and man.

Spinoza is aware of this objection, but he doesn’t mention it immediately. And when

he does, he explains it away in this fashion: he acknowledges that “the Jews never make
mention of intermediate or particular causes nor pay heed to them.” Why don’t they?

Spinoza answers that “they attribute everything to God to serve religion and piety or, as it is
commonly called, devoutness.” 938 So then by the time we get to the sixth sentence (of the
938

Ibid. 10.
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first chapter when he says: “From the definition given above, it follows that natural

knowledge can be called prophecy”), the jig is up. We realize that something very different

is afoot. “Natural knowledge can be called prophecy” or revelation! But, says Spinoza, “this
natural knowledge … is not so highly prized by the multitude” because they “are ever eager
for what is strange and foreign to their own nature … Therefore prophetic knowledge is
usually taken to exclude natural knowledge.” 939 From the beginning then, according to

Spinoza, the multitude has misinterpreted what the prophets interpreted: “prophetic
knowledge is usually taken to exclude natural knowledge.” 940

Spinoza takes issue with this error of the crass herd because he thinks that natural

knowledge “has as much right as any other kind of knowledge to be called divine, since it is

dictated to us, as it were, by God’s nature insofar as we participate therein.” 941 Interpreting

Spinoza is tricky at times (as many Spinoza scholars attest to), but the “crass herd” was

right in interpreting Spinoza as reducing the Word of God to the corrupt word of man. And
this, of course, is anathema to the traditional religious mind.

So then, Spinoza contends that all revelation is really not revelation from God but

the product of human, all-too-human imagination. With this argument alone the whole

house of cards (of religion) collapses. On this point, as we have said above, Leo Strauss is

exactly right when he states in his 1952 essay “How to Study Spinoza’s Theologico-Political

Treatise that “The chief aim of the Treatise is to refute the claims which had been raised on

behalf of revelation throughout the ages.” 942 Spinoza spells out what this entails. If the
scriptures are not really revealed from God Almighty, then Adam, Moses, the Promised

Land, the Messiah, Christ, salvation or atonement through propitiary sacrifice, miracles,
Ibid. 9.
Ibid.
941 Ibid.
942 Leo Strauss. Persecution and the Art of Writing (Conn.: Greenwood Press, Publ., 1952), 142.
939
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prophecy, and so on and so forth – are all debunked, demythologized, undermined,
ridiculed, lambasted, lampooned, criticized, and condemned.

Spinoza argues that Moses didn’t perceive that his ideas were not the best of ways –

or, to use Leibnizian language: Moses’ teachings and leadership were far from being the best
of all possible worlds. Moses “imagined” that God is a ruler, lawgiver, king, merciful, just,

and so on. But, for Spinoza, God is really not like this at all. Far from it. Moses’ depictions of
Yahweh are “merely attributes of human nature, and not at all applicable to the divine
nature.” 943

The Pentateuch teaches that God appeared to Moses in a burning bush (that would

not be consumed) and gave him various orders. Later, on the top of Mount Sinai in the

Negev desert, we’re told that God literally writes the Ten Commandments on stone tablets
for Moses, and then reveals to him a huge corpus of laws. Most people who might be

skeptical of such claims would say things like: “Why should we believe that these ancient
books accurately recorded these things?” And they would be right to ask this question.
Spinoza himself cites such questions.

Yet what Spinoza seems to be more adamant about against the claims of the

Pentateuch is based on his rationalist-moral argument that God simply could not be that

way; for any deep reflection on this subject should convince anyone that God must surpass
such obviously childish, anthropomorphic depictions. Spinoza therefore opposes the

Pentateuch’s accounts of such claims as the Promised Land also on moral grounds. 944 This

depiction of God can’t be true because this would make God out to be a monster. If there is
a God, He couldn’t be like this. Therefore these books are false and the world should be

Spinoza. TTP (Shirley translation), op. cited, 53, my emphasis.
In the Preface to the English translation of his Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, Leo Strauss argues
that “the antagonism between Spinoza and Judaism, between unbelief and belief, is ultimately not
theoretical but moral” (29).
943
944
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taught to know this. The world should be taught that these stories of God stem from the

imaginations of vulgar or common minds and are in no wise true descriptions of the divine.
Like Socrates and Plato of old who argued against the gods of their people on moral

grounds, so also does Spinoza. Spinoza opposes Judaism and the Jewish scriptures because
they are beneath the dignity of a true and ethical understanding of what God might be like.
Needless to say, from the perspective of Jews and Christians, such arguments were galling.

To say that the God in whom you worship as the perfection of moral goodness is in actuality
barbarous, vulgar, and immoral – well, this should give readers some idea of how outraged
so many readers of the TTP were.
Spinoza versus St. Paul

Spinoza shows his Enlightenment independence of thought in the TTP in many ways. It’s as
if he turns Jesus’ and Paul’s teachings on their head. Jesus often said to the Jews about their
scriptures, “You have heard that it was said …, but I say …” (ex. Mt.5:27-28). The canonical

gospels say that Jesus’ claims stemmed from revelation from God (“I do nothing on my own
but speak just what the Father has taught me” (Jn.8:28). And St. Paul often claimed the

truth and authority of his teachings also based on revelation (“I want you to know, brothers,
that the gospel I preached is not something that man made up. I did not receive it from any

man, nor was I taught it; rather, I received it by revelation from Jesus Christ” (Gal.1:11). But
Spinoza turns them both upside down by arguing that truth cometh not by purported

special revelation from a human-like God in heaven, but rather by true reasoning based only
on an ontology of naturalism.

If we were to compare and contrast these two conflicting visions, we might envisage

such an interplay as follows. We will pick St. Paul here because, according to many
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contemporary scholars of the New Testament, St. Paul is thought to have been the chief
expositor of Christianity. I ask the reader to be patient with my aesthetically clumsy

rendering of the TTP’s anti-Pauline message. Though my rendering of Spinoza in the

following passages is very awkward, I nevertheless think that it aptly counter-poses the
essence of St. Paul’s message.

Writing to the Corinthians, St. Paul says that he’s got a message of wisdom for them,

but that only the spiritually enlightened and mature among them will be able to take it in.
He’s going to tell them some things that “No eye has seen, no ear has heard, no mind has
conceived” about “what God has prepared for those who love him.” He’s able to do this

because “God has revealed it to us by his Spirit” (1 Cor. 2: 6-10). No doubt many who read

the TTP felt this - No eye ever saw, nor ear heard, nor mind conceived up until then just how

many arguments there were against the scriptures and the Christian view of life. And the
more one reads it, the more one realizes just how completely anti-revelation, anti-

inspiration, anti-scriptural, anti-Christian, anti-Jewish, anti-traditional, anti-theological, and
anti-spiritual it is. Spinoza’s work in essence turns St. Paul’s Corinthian arguments upside
down.

Here is the essence of Paul’s message. He says that Christ sent me

to preach the gospel – not with words of human wisdom, lest the cross of Christ be
emptied of its power. For the message of the cross is foolishness to those who are
perishing, but to us who are being saved it is the power of God. For it is written: ‘I
will destroy the wisdom of the wise; The intelligence of the intelligent I will
frustrate.’
Where is the wise man? Where is the scholar? Where is the philosopher of
this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For since in the
wisdom of God the world through its wisdom did not know him, God was pleased
through the foolishness of what was preached to save those who believe. Jews
demand miraculous signs and Greeks look for wisdom, but we preach Christ
crucified: a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles, but to those whom
God has called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of
God. For the foolishness of God is wiser than man’s wisdom (1 Cor. 1: 17-25)
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And now here is our rendition of the TTP’s anti-Christian message (albeit in

awkward form):

The message of the cross is foolishness to us who are being saved by liberating
natural reason. The word of reason says: ‘I will destroy the ‘revelations’ of the
vulgar imagination; the prophecies of the prophets I will prove false’. Where then is
the prophet? Where is the saint? Where is the theologian of this age? Has not
natural human reason made foolish the ’wisdom’ of the Jewish prophets and the
Apostles? For since in the wisdom of science and accurate biblical interpretation,
the world of prophets and apostles have not come to know the truth, intellectual
integrity is pleased through its insights to save those who attend to reason and
study these things honestly and courageously. Jews demand miraculous signs and
Christians demand faith, but to those who use the eyes in their heads, to those who
listen and follow their intelligence, these learn that reason (and not revelation) is
the most powerful force for human beings to follow. For even though human reason
is admittedly tempted by our needs, passions and imaginations, it is the only sure
and tested light we have to go on.
Right after St. Paul says that God revealed to him His “secret wisdom” through the

Spirit what no other eye has seen or ear heard or mind conceived, he says:

The Spirit searches all things, even the deep things of God. For who among men
knows the thoughts of a man except the man’s spirit within him? In the same way
no one knows the thoughts of God except the Spirit of God. We have not received the
spirit of the world but the Spirit who is from God, that we may understand what God
has freely given us. This is what we speak, not in words taught us by human wisdom
but in words taught by the Spirit, expressing spiritual truths in spiritual words. The
man without the Spirit does not accept the things that come from the Spirit of God,
for they are foolishness to him, and he cannot understand them, because they are
spiritually discerned. The spiritual man makes judgments about all things, but he
himself is not subject to any man’s judgment: ‘For who has known the mind of the
Lord that he may instruct him?’ But we have the mind of Christ (1 Cor. 2:10-16).

The TTP’s radical enlightenment counter-version of St. Paul’s spiritualist vision

might run something as follows:

Human intelligence searches out all sorts of things, even claims about God. Those
who rely on one’s own thought will not slavishly submit to claims of revelation or
prophecy given by all sorts of people. We should submit only to what reason and
science puts forth with evidence as true. This is what we speak, not in words taught
us by ‘the Spirit’ or prophecy or vision or dreams or oracles or drawing lots or
trances or tongues or word of knowledge or gifts of the Spirit, but only in words and
arguments and evidence that can persuade our intelligence. The man who does not
follow natural reason does not accept the things of intelligence, but accepts ‘the
things that come from the Spirit of God’; for the things of reason are foolishness to
him because they have to be rationally discerned. The rational and learned man
makes judgments about all things based on his critical intelligence, so he will not
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surrender his reason to any prophets or messiahs or gods’ judgments. ‘For who
knows the truth except the man who independently studies and tests it?’
St. Paul tells us that many or most of the believers he had to deal with were

spiritually immature, so they could not take in the “message of wisdom” that he had
received from God.

Brothers, I could not address you as spiritual but as worldly – mere infants in Christ.
I gave you milk, not solid food, for you were not yet ready for it. Indeed, you are still
not ready. You are still worldly…. Do not deceive yourselves. If any one of you
thinks he is wise by the standards of this age, he should become a ‘fool’ so that he
may become wise. For the wisdom of the world is foolishness in God’s sight. As it is
written: ‘He catches the wise in their craftiness’; and again, ‘The Lord knows that the
thoughts of the wise are futile’…. So then, men ought to regard us as servants of
Christ and as those entrusted with the secrets of God (1 Cor. 3:1-3; 18-20 and 4:1).

In contrast to St. Paul’s claims about the wisdom of spiritual enlightenment versus

‘worldly’ wisdom, here’s how one may conjecture Spinoza’s message of wisdom:

Brothers, I could not address you as rational but as believers. I gave you milk, not
solid food, for you were not ready for it. I could not speak with total clarity and
frankness to you because then you’d do all that you could to kill me, and you’re too
prejudiced and stupid to use your reason and intelligence and to study enough to
see if the things I have written are so. You are still believers. You still deceive
yourselves. If any of you thinks he is spiritually enlightened by the standards of the
Jewish or Christian Bible, you should become spiritually ignorant so that you may
become rationally wise. For the ‘wisdom of God’ that you speak about is really
foolishness. It really is. An adult knows that children’s thinking is often foolish.
And the philosopher knows that the thoughts of the unthinking, unreflecting,
uncritical, unlearning herd are futile ... So then, men ought to regard us truly honest
philosophers as servants of truth 945 and those who have come to learn the truth that
faith in the ‘word of God’ is an immense blunder.
According to revelation, the Son of God alone sets us free; but according to Spinoza

reason sets us free. For Christians, Jesus is the only way, truth, and life, but according to

Spinoza, reason is the way, the truth, and the life. Jesus says, “If anyone would come after

me, he must deny himself and take up his cross daily and follow me. For whoever wants to
save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life will save it” (Lk. 9:23-25). Spinoza says

My apologies to postmodern thinkers such as Nietzsche and Rorty, who have shown many of the
problems and weaknesses of such an exaggerated fundamentalist rendering of reason.

945
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that if anyone would be wise, let him follow his reason which will teach how best to
preserve his life and to live in accord with his own advantage.

St. Paul says, “When I was a child, I talked like a child, I reasoned like a child. When I

became a man, I put childish ways behind me” (1 Cor. 13). And yet, in the context of this
claim we read of his beliefs in the most other-worldly things – the languages of angels,

miraculous powers, gifts of healing, the supernatural ability to speak in other tongues and

to interpret other tongues. When Spinoza was a child, he used to believe in all the many

supernatural and miraculous stories from Torah. He used to follow Scripture. He used to
obey the Law. But, when he became a young man, he put away these childish things and
followed natural reason as best as he could instead. As a youth, he was most probably

devoted to Yahweh; but, as he became an adult, he gave his life to reason and philosophy. 946
The Jewish scriptures that teach “Lean not unto thine own understanding, but trust in the

Lord with all thine heart” is anathema to Spinoza’s philosophy of reason. His TTP and Ethics

preach the very opposite. They teach that one ought to lean unto thine own reason and not
trust any revelation or prophecy or omen or dream or vision – and certainly not “with all

one’s heart”!

My anti-Paul Spinoza version of course is somewhat ungainly. Worse, for those who

know Spinoza well, this rendition makes Spinoza look too simplistic and too much like a

narrow-minded logical positivist. Taking Spinoza’s teachings about reason all in all, he did
not always apotheosize reason. There are passages in his works which show that he was

As mentioned earlier, in a personal communication with Spinoza scholar Stephen Nadler, I asked
him if my hunch that Spinoza was devout as a youth was true. He emailed me that: “We do not have
any documentary evidence one way or another on this. But there is every reason to believe that, as a
boy growing up in a family that was a part of an observant Jewish community, Spinoza took part in
active Jewish life. I'm certain that his loss of faith and commitment -- which seems not to have
occurred until the early 1650s -- was a major event in his life” (May 24, 2010).
946
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keenly aware “that the road, which reason herself points out, is very steep.” 947 Spinoza was

quite aware that truly rational behavior is extremely difficult, and that few succeed at

following all its dictates. Yet, as Spinoza puts it, “But all things excellent are as difficult as
they are rare.” 948

But to those millions who know and cherish the famous passages of St. Paul cited

above, my juxtaposed rendition of Spinoza may strike home. To the devout, Spinoza’s voice
in the TTP probably strikes them like the old serpent’s voice to Eve in the Garden of Eden:
“Hath God really said …?” (Gen. 3:1). It is the voice (to them) of the anti-Christ: For

whatever God hath said, this man says the opposite. Like Jesus who overturned or

superseded Moses used to say, “You have heard it said …. But I tell you …” (to take only one
example, Mt. 5:27-28). In the same way, Spinoza in the TTP can be understood to say: “You
have heard from Moses or Jesus or Isaiah or St. Paul that …; but I tell you ….”

Like Moses, Jesus and St. Paul, Spinoza presents a new way. But his new way is built

on entirely different foundations. His new way, his enlightenment, his gospel is not built on
purported divine revelation or prophecy or visions or centuries-old uncritical tradition, but

on critical human reason and a materialist science.

Spinoza’s final work: Political Treatise, translated by Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 2000), 289.
948 This comes from the very last sentence of the Ethics. It should also be said in fairness to St. Paul
and Christians (which Spinoza and this author too often fail at), one should recall that the New
Testament’s writings about living by the Spirit understands the difficulty of doing so. Spinoza often
accuses and condemns believers of Scripture of not following what they believe. But, like “living in
accordance with reason” is most difficult, so also is it to live in the Spirit. On the other hand, the New
Testament also annunciates what theologians call a doctrine of sanctification; that is, not only are
believers said to be saved from damnation, they are also said to have the power of the Spirit at their
prayerful disposal so that they may overcome the world, the flesh, and the devil and thus be
overcomers. For, as they often point out, “Greater is he who is in you, then he [the devil] who is in
the world” and “thanks be to God through Christ Jesus who gives us the victory.” From this point of
view, then, Spinoza’s criticism is legitimate because Christians claim to have Christ in them and that
they are the light of the world, etc., and yet, despite all these claims, the history of the church’s
behavior shows much that is far from saintliness. And this appears as evidence or proof against the
truth value of their claims.
947
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Spinoza on the Holy Spirit
In the block quotes above, we juxtaposed New Testament passages with what we

hypothesized to be the message of Spinoza. We juxtaposed St. Paul’s “Spirit” with Spinoza’s

“reason”, for instance, but there are passages in the TTP in which Spinoza conflates the two.
Indeed, “the main purpose” of chapter one of the TTP is to show readers “that in Hebrew

‘Spirit’ means both the mind and the mind’s thoughts.” 949 In these passages Spinoza appears

to be trying to get his rationalist vision of things more acceptable to his scripturally and

spiritually devoted audience. If this interpretation is correct, then what he’s doing is trying
to pull the wool over the eyes of his readers. Or, if he does actually believe that the New

Testament’s theology of the “Spirit” falls in line with any kind of rationalism, then he either

has not studied the New Testament carefully or thoroughly on this matter or he’s deceiving
himself. I say this because many of his biblically learned readers would have certainly

interpreted his forced conflation (e.g. misinterpretation) of the two as being purposely and
therefore mendaciously done.

Before I continue on this subject, it seems important to state once again that a large

portion of his readers - and this not just theologians and philosophers - knew the New

Testament like Spinoza knew the “Old” Testament. In the seventeenth century there were
many pastors, preachers, and lay evangelists who had no higher education, who never

studied theology or philosophy or medicine or law in any university, but yet who not only
knew the scriptures inside and out, but also actually changed their world far more than

most theologians and philosophers (not unlike the early apostles, Act 4:13). One thinks of
George Fox and John Bunyan, for example. The religious background of the seventeenth

century that pervaded the mental life of early modern Europe and America was replete with
949

Spinoza’s TTP, trans. Shirley, op. cited, 19.
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religious groups, sects, movements, evangelists, missionaries, outdoor revival meetings,
prophecies of the end of the world, and much more.

In his “The Religious Background of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy” for the first

volume of The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, Richard Popkin

cautions his philosophical colleagues to not imagine that the Enlightenment period was one

of secularism or merely formal religiousness. “The philosophy of the seventeenth century
has often been seen as connected with a gradual march from religious orthodoxy and

oppression toward pre-Enlightenment deism, agnosticism, atheism, and toleration. In

reality, though, the world of seventeenth-century religious thought is much more

complicated that this simple schema would suggest.” 950 For at the same time the Scientific
Revolution and biblical critical revolutions are taking place, there is a revival of all sorts of
enthusiastic, revivalist, end-of-the-world religious movements.

Popkin goes on to cite how many of these religious movements and their theological

thinking influenced or dominated much in the public square, in government, and the

seminaries and universities. Popkin points out that these “widespread religious movements
… which may now look strange and distant from philosophy … were familiar to, and were
taken seriously by, all the philosophers of the period.” 951 This is an important study; one

which is needed to understand and appreciate the first readers’ reactions to Spinoza’s TTP,
but let us resume the thread of our argument about Spinoza’s utilization of the Spirit with
his reason. 952

It must be granted that Spinoza’s selective exegesis of many passages of scripture

that refer to the Spirit as showing a cognitive or mental or even rational component is

Richard Popkin’s “The Religious Background of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy” for the first
volume of The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, op. cited, 393.
951 Ibid.
952 For more on this, see works on 17th century enthusiasm. Spinoza dealt specifically with
enthusiastic attitudes in his TTP. Hobbes, Locke, and Leibniz also deal with this movement. Each of
these philosophers focused on the errors and problems enthusiasm presents to the society at hand.
950

448

correct. There are passages in which the two terms have similar meanings. And Spinoza

has done well to point this out not only as a contribution to biblical scholarship, but even

more because he shows how often psychological experiences were described in the purely
theological language of the ancient world. “In this same sense, whatever the Jews did not

understand, being at the time ignorant of its natural causes, was referred to God … So those

passages of Scripture that make mention of the Spirit of God can now be readily understood
and explained.” 953

But there is a problem. His exegesis about the Holy Spirit is so selective that it

leaves out the many passages that clearly and distinctly demonstrate the Spirit as God
Himself. The Second Council of Constantinople in 381 dealt with this very heresy and

rightly concluded that there were many passages of scripture that portray the Holy Spirit as

God. At any rate, Spinoza’s apparent twisting of the scriptures here was not received well
by his contemporaries. This was particularly aggravating to the devout because Spinoza

claimed to follow a science of scriptural interpretation that would for the first time get the

truth of the meaning of Scripture. One of his chief interpretive principles to this end was

that Scripture verses could not be taken out of context from other Scripture passages. And
yet he himself took many passages out of context!

A completely contextualist reading of the scriptures on the Holy Spirit then shows

that Spinoza’s interpretation of the Holy Spirit is clearly at variance with the Bible’s

depiction of the Holy Spirit. To take only St. Paul’s and St. John’s writings on this subject,
their references to the Spirit show an intricately worked out conception. As opposed to

Spinoza’s mentalistic reductionism of the Spirit, Paul and John show that the Spirit is God
and Jesus, and that He has performs multifarious functions. He leads men to Christ. He

enlightens men so that they may know that Jesus is come in the flesh and is the Son of God.
953

Spinoza’s TTP, trans. Shirley, op. cited, 16-17.
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He does the supernatural healings and miracles, and so on. At any rate, we bring this issue
up here to give some further examples of the outrages many of his contemporaries felt in
reaction to Spinoza Theological-Political Treatise.

Spinoza versus the New Testament on morality and reason
How then should a man live? How do we know what is right and what is wrong? What is
moral and virtuous and what isn’t? How do we live ethically? According to the Bible, the

answer to these questions is by obedience to God’s revealed laws. In general, Spinoza rails
against all such supposed morality and virtue based on revelation throughout the TTP. He

rails against Moses’s “right way of life, or true living” as “bondage”, especially in that Moses
“further made terrifying threats if they should transgress these commandments.” 954 But

according to Spinoza’s TTP, moral behavior is that which follows one’s natural reason and

not revelation. His Ethics argues the same: “To act absolutely according to virtue is nothing
else in us than to act under the guidance of reason” (Ethics Book IV, Prop. XXIV).

According to orthodox versions of Jesus, “No one is good except God alone”

(Lk.18:19). Only if you are in Him as branches are in a tree can one bear true moral fruit (Jn.
15). Only by being filled with His Spirit are the fruits of the Spirit possible (Rom. 8; Gal. 5).
Moral living then, according to the New Testament, is not a matter of living according to

natural reason. On the contrary, “men are by nature objects of wrath” (Eph. 2:3). Without
the Spirit’s work of regeneration in man, even his reason is darkened and made depraved;

so much so that such people degrade themselves in homosexuality (Rom. 1). Morality is not
a matter of thinking or reasoning hard, but a matter of praying and trusting Christ to give
the victory of the sinful flesh.
954
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This subject has been of immense importance because it has powerful implications

for society and government. For instance, if one believes that reason and not the Spirit of
Christ ought to be the foundation of beliefs and action, then one will urge all people to

follow reason. Reason then has social and political implications. This is the “Politicus” part

of Spinoza’s Theologico-Politicus Tractate. 955 Indeed, “The TTP was a founding document of
liberal democratic theory.” 956 If reason is foundational to morality and is common to all

humans and can be improved, then it is not only for the divinely elected few (with the

majority predestined to irrationality. Nature gives us the ability to reason, so we can all
reason. If we can all reason, then we can all be reasoned with (so long as one doesn’t
believe in a Better and more Imperative Source for knowledge and behavior).

If the basis of our moral, social, and political lives is in reason, teaches Spinoza, and

not some particular revelation or Church confession, then we have hope for a universal
harmony and brotherhood (thus speaks the Enlightenment of Spinoza, Kant, and many

others). With the Bible only the few are enlightened and know the truth. Everyone else is
consigned to darkness, foolishness, lostness, and the devil. In Spinoza, all can be

enlightened, not by confessing one’s sins, not by praying and fasting in dust and ashes, and
not by losing one’s life.

For Spinoza, we can all be brothers not by and in the Body of Christ by the Spirit, but

by nature and reason. Reason is the hope we all have in common. Reason is the hope we

have that may lead to more agreement, more understanding, and more cooperation. In his
I disagree, however, with the view espoused by some Spinoza scholars such as Steven B. Smith in
his Spinoza’s Book of Life: Freedom and Redemption in the Ethics (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2004) in which he seeks to make the “case for the primacy of political philosophy or the ‘theologicopolitical problem’ in Spinoza around which all of his later philosophical reflections tended to
gravitate” (xii-xiii). The TTP, as I think I have pointed out elsewhere in this chapter, is comprised of
what looks like two parts: the first part being biblical criticism. This is by far the bulk of the treatise.
It is 15 chapters or 172 pages compared with the “second part” of 5 chapters and only 57 pages.
There are very little arguments made in the first part that suggests that the work aims at persuading
readers to a political view. It is independent or autonomous enough to stand alone.
956 Ibid.
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essay “The Power of Reason in Spinoza”, Martin Lin delineates Spinoza’s concept of reason
in contradistinction to the emotions or affects. Reason is, as Martin Lin interprets Spinoza
as teaching, is “the moral foundation of society and political alliance.” 957

One of Spinoza’s arguments against the moral claims of the Bible made by believers

is that they don’t live out what they claim. Spinoza points out that if believers actually do

possess the “Light of the world” and Christ is in them, than how is it that the world doesn’t
observe this Light by their behavior? 958 Anyone who knows the history of the Church, or

who has read the works of Luther, Calvin, and the major theologians of the Roman Catholic
Counter-Reformation knows that no greater denunciations, hatred, and viciousness of

language is possible. And not language alone – but by the sword, war, religious persecution,

censorship, and so on. Many contemporary Christian apologists acknowledge this shameful
vista, but then piously proclaim that the true Church has always been a spiritual minority
and that this language and these actions in nowise stem from the New Testament. But

Spinoza’s analysis of the various moral teachings and behavior of believers shows that this
is not correct either. In fact, the very language used by the Reformers and Counter-

Reformers is literally taken from the Bible and the language of Jesus and the apostles. I am

reminded of a rejoinder that Spinoza wrote in response to a vicious letter by Albert Burgh, a
former friend who converted to the Roman Catholic Church. Burgh sought to save Spinoza

from his sinful, arrogant philosophical ways. Spinoza writes that he has learned that Burgh

not only has become Catholic, “but that you are a very keen champion of it and have already
learned to curse and rage petulantly against your opponents.” 959

Before we end this particular discussion, it should be noted that not all Christian

theologians and philosophers interpret the New Testament’s teaching on ethics in this
The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza’s Ethics, op. cited, 258.
Spinoza, TTP, op. cited, 4.
959 Spinoza, Correspondence, Wolf, op. cited. 350.
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Pauline, Augustinian, Lutheran, Calvinistic, or Reformed way. Roman Catholic thinking,

especially as stemming from the scholastics, which were strongly influenced by Aristotle,
argued for a little more optimistic view of nature, human nature, and human reason.

According to this theology, there are two kinds of virtues or moralities: a natural kind and a

supernaturally infused kind. Ultimately, God alone is good, but God’s image in man enables
man in his free will to live a naturally virtuous life. Christian theologian philosophers such
as St. Thomas Aquinas sought a middle way, as it were, between a totally naturalistic and

rationalistic approach (which has come to be called “integral Aristotelianism”) and a totally

theological view (called “rejectionism”). For him grace and nature were not two completely
different domains: “grace does not destroy nature, but brings it to fulfillment.”

Interestingly, as we saw earlier in this study, this change caused quite a ruckus in the

thirteenth century. So much so that it led to the famous condemnations of 1277 by the

Bishop of Paris. I mention this here because the struggle between the integral Aristotelians
(read “radical enlightenment”) and the rejectionists (read “counter-enlightenment”) looks

very much like the struggle between Spinoza and his religious detractors. Spinoza being of
the “integral Aristotelian” camp and many of his religious detractors being in the

“rejectionist” camp and Aquinas’s middle way camp (“moderate enlightenment”).

Note how similar some of the propositions condemned in 1277 are to Spinoza’s

philosophy:

That there is no more excellent way of life than the philosophical way.
That the highest good of which the human being is capable consists in the
intellectual virtues.
That the philosophers alone are the wise men of the world. 960

We can know, however, that many with which Spinoza had to do, both from the

Rabbis in his youth and from the many Christians he came to know later (both Protestants
See Thomas Williams’ excellent Introduction on this subject in Thomas Aquinas: Disputed
Questions on the Virtues from the Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy series (Cambridge
University Press, 2005), especially from xxii to xxiv.
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and Catholics) 961, did not appear to be moderate enlighteners such as various scholastics,

Thomists, Cartesians, or Leibniz. We know this both from the biographers of Spinoza and

by his own works such as the TTP. Over and over again in the TTP, his criticism is directed
against the conservatives. Take only his remarks on this subject from the Preface:

Reason they call blind, because it cannot reveal a sure way to the vanities that they
covet, and human wisdom they call vain, while the delusions of the imagination,
dreams and other childish absurdities are taken to be the oracles of God. 962

They hold even discussion of religion to be sinful, and with their mass of dogma they
gain such a thorough hold on the individual’s judgment that they leave no room in
the mind for the exercise of reason, or even the capacity to doubt. 963

faith has become identical with credulity and biased dogma. But what dogma! –
degrading rational man to beast, completely inhibiting man’s free judgment and his
capacity to distinguish true from false, and apparently devised with the set purpose
of utterly extinguishing the light of reason. Piety and religion – O everlasting God –
take the form of ridiculous mysteries, and men who utterly despise reason, who
reject and turn away from the intellect as naturally corrupt – these are the men (and
this is of all things the most iniquitous) who are believed to possess the divine
light! 964

the more enthusiastic their admiration for the understanding of these mysteries, the
more clearly they reveal that their attitude to Scripture is one of abject servility….
And this is further evident from the fact that most of them assume as a basic
principle for the understanding of Scripture and for extracting its true meaning that
it is throughout truthful and divine – a conclusion which ought to be the end result
of study and strict examination…. When I pondered over these facts, that the light of
reason is not only despised but is condemned by many as a source of impiety, … that
credulity is looked upon as faith … I deliberately resolved to examine Scripture
afresh, conscientiously and freely. 965

Some think that the anti-rationalism in Christianity comes mostly from Luther or from the
Reformed. But this is not so. We see the same extreme anti-rationalism amongst Roman Catholics
and Anglicans as well. See Spinoza’s correspondence for many examples of this. For Roman
Catholics, see for instance, Albert Burgh’s letters to Spinoza. Both the great Arnauld and Steno
praised Burgh.
962 TTP, op. cited, 1.
963 Ibid. 3.
964 Ibid. 4.
965 Ibid. 5.
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Finally, he also decries all those, even philosophers, who would subject reason to the

authority of Scripture or theology. He hopes that these will not read his book because he
knows that they will only make trouble. 966

For without advantage to themselves they would stand in the way of others for
whom a more liberal approach to philosophical questions is prevented by this one
obstacle, that they believe that reason must be the handmaiden of theology (TTP 8).
Some may charge this interpretation of Spinoza that the scriptures inhibit and

contradict reason to be incorrect. For example, in the same Preface that I was quoting from
above, Spinoza says, “Now I found nothing expressly taught in Scripture that was not in

agreement with the intellect or that contradicted it.” 967 And more: “So I was completely

convinced that Scripture does not in any way inhibit reason.” 968 I take it that Spinoza is not

being completely honest here. I base this primarily on the fact that he contradicts these two
sentences in most other places in his work – often implicitly, but in many places, explicitly
as well.

Now “reason” for Spinoza in the TTP is the rejection of all the “superstitions” and

imaginary beliefs of revelations, prophecies, visions, and so on. In the final analysis,

Spinoza’s reason rejects the incarnation, the Eucharist, the devil, the need for an atoning

blood sacrifice, etcetera. In sum then, for Spinoza (and St. Paul) the gospel is foolishness.
For Spinoza, man needs to live according to reason (which judges all the theology of the

Bible to be absurd); for St. Paul, man needs to live according to the Spirit so that one may

see that what is absurd to reason is truth in God.

Edwin Curley hypothesizes that Spinoza might have stopped work on the Ethics to write the TTP
as a kind of John the Baptist to prepare the way for the TTP. This might be so for some fellow
philosophers, but it certainly can’t be true for most people. Spinoza was keenly aware, even while
writing the TTP, that “others”, the “masses”, the “common people” and all strongly religious people
even if they be philosophers, would in no way learn from or approve of his book (TTP 7-8).
967 Ibid. 6.
968 Ibid.
966
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Theologians and Christian philosophers through the centuries since the Church

Fathers have added theological-philosophical arguments to amplify the biblical notion of

reason. They interpret the Genesis narrative of man being created in the image and likeness
of God as referring to human reason, that is, that which they believe distinguishes man from
beast. Reason is then made to take on some God-like attributes, which is then further used

to justify the use of philosophy as a handmaiden to theology. But note the premises: one

has to first accept that man is made in the image and likeness of God, that man has a soul,

and an immortal soul to boot. Though these thinkers sometimes talked as if they subjected
all their premises to rational criticism, in reality they preserved them and then built on

them. Consistent with his radical enlightenment philosophy though, Spinoza, following

natural reason alone, finds all such theological explanations wanting by virtue of the fact
that they stem from and rely on purported revelation.

Indeed, Spinoza’s TTP in some regards seems like a new version of the Bible. But

instead of its division of believers and unbelievers, of sheep and goats, wheat and weeds,

light and darkness, good and evil, God and devil, spiritually enlightened and carnal slaves,
Spinoza (like Charles Murray’s Bell Curve which divides the world up between those with

high IQ’s and those with low IQ’s) tends to divide up his cosmos between the rational and
the irrational, the wise and the ignorant, the good who put reason above all things versus
the fools, the deluded, the common people, the herd, and the unlearned who only follow
desire and emotion.

One can and should wonder how much Spinoza’s philosophy of reason and ethics

helped him to live morally. Since he is so critical of the failure of those whose calling is to

“live according to the Spirit”, how consistent was he in “living in accordance with reason”?
It is one thing to think fine thoughts or to enjoy contemplation of the love of God in one’s
study as a philosopher, and quite another in the marketplace, at home with family, or at
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work among one’s equals and superiors. Yet, on this question, it is almost universally

attested to by all Spinoza’s biographers, including ones that saw him as the enemy, that his
behavior was admirable and above reproach.

Still, one can be puzzled by many passages in Spinoza’s writings and in his letters in

which he does not seem equanimous at all; on the contrary, he seems elitist, is often

polemical, and is downright mean-spirited at times. The TTP, for instance, has numerous
(in my opinion) blatant distortions and is one-sidedness in his analysis of theologians,
common people, the prophets, and much more. They are simply not fair or balanced

analyses of his subject. Spinoza is on a mission. He too often evinces only a one-tracked
mind in his conclusions of his enemies. Too often his praises of the prophets or various

believers seem half-hearted, insincere, or smacks of irony. Spinoza can dish it out too. His

response letter to Albert Burgh lays out his true feelings about the Roman Catholic Church,
the Eucharist, and other points of doctrine; but his tone is far from the tone one would

expect judging from the many paeans offered about his character or from the author of the
oracular Ethics.

He sees nothing of good in “the relics of man’s ancient bondage.” 969 He’s not looking

for it. Of course, he’s no cultural anthropologist with a functionalist’s outlook for the value
and the function of various “barbarous” practices. Nor of course is he a postmodern
sociologist of knowledge or Kuhnian in the historiography of ideas.

Yet it’s not as if he is being dishonest either; for he does state in the Preface of the

TTP that the purpose of his work and “most urgent task has been to indicate the main false
assumptions that prevail regarding religion.” 970 In this sense, his one-tracked negative

969
970

TTP, op. cited, 3.
Ibid.
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analysis of religion is justified. After all, a scholar cannot cover everything. Each work calls
for a different thesis. 971

It seems to me that some of the most fundamental features of Spinoza’s philosophy

are motivated for very much the same reasons as the religious fools he so often despises.

Spinoza wants pleasure, happiness, blessedness, and “true satisfaction of the mind” as much
as the “common people” who “follow desire more than reason” and who are largely

unconscious of their true selves. 972 Some or much of the knowledge that Spinoza seeks is

“infinitely” higher than what the common people strive for – chasing after pleasure in love,
sex, entertainment, and the like. His attitude, it seems to me, sometimes smacks of a “my
way is better than all others” spirit, like the religious people he decries. The best life for
Spinoza is, well, his life.

Spinoza, like his “evil” religious counterparts, is a salvation seeker. He wants peace,

tranquility and contentment intensely. He abandoned a career in business for it. His

treatment of reason gives the impression at times that it is like unto Jehovah Himself. One
certainly gets this feeling upon reading his early work Treatise on the Correction of the

Understanding. Nothing seems to matter to him, not in comparison that is, with Reason.

Indeed, as Yovel and other commentators have remarked, reason and rationalism for

Spinoza seems like his God and Judaism substitute. Yet other Spinoza scholars deny that
Spinoza’s philosophy (either in the TTP or in the Ethics) constitutes a narrow-minded,

At this point, it might be a good idea to reiterate what I mentioned in the introduction to this
work, that my treatment of religion is similarly one-tracked minded, and, accordingly in the final
analysis, an incomplete depiction of Greek religion, Judaism, and Christianity. There are many
positive things about the scriptures and Christianity, for instance. Many. But the primary purpose of
this study is to present the struggle between philosophy and theology, especially with respect to
delineating the claims and arguments of the precursors of the Radical Enlightenment.
972 TTP, op. cited, 1.
971
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inhumane rationalism in the strong, scientistic secular humanism version which tends to
slight the humanities. 973

Like the author of Ecclesiastes, Spinoza says that experience in life has “taught me

that all things which frequently take place in ordinary life are vain and futile.” So he

“determined at last to inquire whether there might be anything which might be truly good
and able to communicate its goodness, and by which the mind might be affected to the
exclusion of all other things.” 974 And why does he do this? What is he out for? “I

determined, I say, to inquire whether I might discover and acquire the faculty of enjoying

throughout eternity continual supreme happiness”! 975 That’s a tall order. Like the saints of

old, at times he seemed to be “looking forward to the city with foundations, whose architect
and builder is God” (Heb. 11:10). Spinoza goes on: “For I was looking for a fixed good.” 976

More:

For I saw myself in the midst of a very great peril and obliged to seek a remedy,
however uncertain, with all my energy: like a sick man seized with a deadly disease,
who sees death straight before him if he does not find some remedy, is forced to
seek it, however uncertain, with all his remaining strength, for in that is all hope
placed. 977
Such an attitude could fit in William James’s chapter “On the sick soul” in his The

Varieties of Religious Experience. Yet Spinoza’s teaching that “the whole of happiness or

unhappiness is dependent on this alone: on the quality of the object to which we are bound
by love” seems right. 978 But this is not far from the hopes of the summum bonum of Jewish
mystics, of Jesus, of St. Paul, of Augustine, of Aquinas, of Dante, and so on. Again, as in the

saints of old: “People who say such things show that they are looking for a country of their
Both Richard Mason (The God of Spinoza) and Steven Smith (Spinoza’s Book of Life, 1999) deny
that Spinoza is a rationalist in these strong contemporary senses.
974 Treatise on the Correction of the Understanding, op. cited, 227, my emphasis.
975 Ibid. my emphasis.
976 Ibid. 228.
977 Ibid. 229.
978 Ibid. 229.
973
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own … they [are] looking for a better country – a heavenly one” (Heb. 11:16). Spinoza
wishes for and is committed to “the greatest good” which is

the knowledge of the union which the mind has with the whole of nature. This then
is the end to which I am striving, namely, to acquire such a nature and to endeavor
that many also should acquire it with me. It is then part of my happiness that many
others should understand as I do, and that their understanding and desire should be
entirely in harmony with my understanding and desire. 979

It is true that this was written by a younger Spinoza, not too far from the synagogue

which excommunicated him. And it is true that his successive works, especially the TTP and
Ethics, show greater sophistication and maturity. But, even so, this spirit can still be sensed
in the Ethics and some places in the TTP. Nor is this opinion unique. Some of the best
Spinoza scholars have given similar assessments of Spinoza’s religiousness. 980

Ibid. 230-231.
A great example of a scholar who takes this position is Yirmiyahu Yovel. See his Spinoza and Other
Heretics: The Marrano of Reason (especially chapter 6, “Knowledge as Alternative Salvation”).
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Chapter Sixteen
The TTP as a work of philosophy and science
“I see that you are not so much philosophizing as, if I may say so, theologizing; for you are writing down
your thoughts about angels, prophecy, and miracles. But perhaps you are doing this in a philosophical
manner.” 981

Introduction

The first months in which I studied the TTP I noticed that many of its arguments were not

the usual fare of theologians, biblical commentators or even of biblical critics – certainly not
in the 17th century. I noted over and over again that he’s not just critiquing the Bible like a
Bible commentator or theologian. In actuality, the TTP critiques the origin and nature of
religion, superstition, miracles, anthropomorphizing, inspiration, history, the state,

freedom, just government, methodology, imagination, knowledge, doubt, science, nature,
reason, and much more besides. And much of this critiquing is philosophical. These

observations clashed with the conventional image of the TTP as Spinoza’s non-philosophical
Letter from Henry Oldenburg to Spinoza in Sept. 1665 (Benedict Spinoza. The Correspondence of
Spinoza, trans. A. Wolfe, op. cited, Letter XXIX, p. 204, my emphasis). Spinoza replied to Oldenburg’s
letter saying that he is working on a new book, one on how to interpret the Scripture. He’s working
on this, he explains, because the “prejudices of the theologians … prevent men from directing their
mind to philosophy…[and also to argue for the] freedom of philosophizing” (Ibid. p. 206). We see
from this that Spinoza’s aim here is philosophical, at least in the sense of clearing away the obstacles
or prejudices that cause people to think low of philosophy. Oldenburg’s hunch was right: Spinoza
was dealing with biblical and theological issues, but he was doing it not only as an expert textual
biblical critic, but also “in a philosophical manner”, as this section will prove. I also import what this
letter can tell us because it is startling how much work on Spinoza’s philosophy of Scripture only
refers to the TTP - as if because the title mentions “Theologica” that this must be the work that will
tell scholars everything needed to know Spinoza’s view on the Scriptures and that it is only about the
Bible and theology. Wrong!
981
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treatise on scripture. I began to see that a case could be made that the TTP is a work of

philosophy and not only of biblical criticism. Needless to say, I felt some gratification when
in the succeeding months I read other contemporary scholars who argue the same thing.

In his essay “The Textual History of Spinoza’s Ethics” for The Cambridge Companion

to Spinoza’s Ethics, Piet Steenbakkers makes an aside that many contemporary philosophers
do not yet fully appreciate. Besides Spinoza’s Ethics, Steenbakkers calls the TTP “his other

masterpiece.” 982 Spinoza scholar Edwin Curley entitles two of his essays on this very

subject: “Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece (I): Spinoza and the Science of Hermeneutics”,
and “Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece (II): Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise as

Prolegomenon to the Ethics.” In both essays, he not only simply argues that the TTP is a
“masterpiece” in biblical criticism, but argues that it is also a masterpiece as a work of

philosophy and science - and, as such, needs to be known if one wishes to genuinely know

Spinoza. As Stephen Nadler puts it, “if we do not give the Theological-Political Treatise the
attention that it deserves, then we do not really know Spinoza.” 983

Being a masterpiece in biblical criticism and being important to learn in order to

understand Spinoza better is one thing, and being a masterpiece in “philosophy” and

“science” is another. You will not find the TTP in most early modern philosophy anthologies
or as mandatory reading in courses on Spinoza. 984 In fact, the TTP is usually treated as if it

were not philosophy. Because it says so much about the Bible, it looks suspiciously as if it’s
not philosophy. And a philosopher must not be caught not doing philosophy! Yet, in the

seventeenth century, doing biblical exegesis with philosophical aims in mind (and Spinoza’s
TTP certainly has philosophical purposes in mind) was considered doing philosophy.

Hobbes also did philosophy in this way. Witness his great Leviathan, most of which refers

Cambridge Companion to Spinoza’s Ethics, op. cited, 26.
Nadler’s forthcoming “A Book Forged in Hell”: Spinoza’s Scandalous Treatise, op. cited, 5.
984 See the Introduction to Nadler’s “A Book Forged in Hell” for some of his reasons why the TTP has
been neglected.
982
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to scripture. If the Leviathan is considered philosophy, why shouldn’t the TTP be

considered as philosophy just as much? One should also remember that the whole history
of philosophy from the Church Fathers up to the early modern period never left the

scriptures out of philosophy. Ultimately, it was always a fundamental concern. It had to be,
for, after all, they believed it to be literally The Book in which Creator of heaven and earth

communicated all that He wishes mankind to know. To not know and study this Book then
is tantamount to stupidity or gross sinfulness.

In our chapter on Spinoza’s Ethics we learned that the Ethics was far more about

biblical theological issues then is usually known. In this section I want to show that the TTP
is far more a work of philosophy than is usually known. I wish to argue that the TTP is not

only a work of biblical criticism, but also a work of philosophy. Even if I don’t persuade the
reader that it is just as deserving of the appellation of “philosophy” as, say, Hobbes’s

Leviathan, if I can at least heighten his or her awareness to the fact that the TTP is pervaded

with philosophy, that will have achieved my goal. 985 I will first present some arguments and
samples from the TTP that shows very clearly that philosophy is being done, and then, after
this, I enlist the help of other scholars who seem to hold this same this point of view.

The TTP as a work of philosophy: some general arguments and the samples from the TTP
Some general arguments
The first thing that we should point out in order to make some headway on the question of
the TTP as philosophy, is to try to get a little clearer, if we can, on what is meant by

As a corollary to this, I wish to add to the growing call from recent Spinoza scholarship to add at
least some study of the TTP with the Ethics in early modern and Spinoza philosophy courses –
especially because of its central role in the Radical Enlightenment.

985
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“philosophy” - particularly for Spinoza and for many of his contemporaries. The term that

Spinoza uses that is translated as “philosophy” is “philosophia.” In the “Note on the text and
translation” of the TTP commissioned by Cambridge University Texts in the History of

Philosophy, we are told that “it is invariably difficult or impossible adequately to translate

Spinoza’s term philosophia as “philosophy” as it is usually understood, because Spinoza

means by it the whole of science together with all other soundly based knowledge.” 986 This
tells us then that we’re not dealing with a narrow conception of philosophy (such as, say,

the conception of philosophy that the logical empiricists circumscribed). We get a further

hint or confirmation of this from Spinoza’s very subtitle: “Containing Various Disquisitions,

By means of which it is shown not only that Freedom of Philosophising can be allowed in

Preserving Piety and the Peace of the Republic: but also that it is not possible for such Freedom
to be upheld except when accompanied by the Peace of the Republic and Piety Themselves.”
Spinoza uses the term “disquisitions” (a formal discourse or treatise in which a subject is

examined and discussed; dissertation) here. Note too, the centrality that the subject of the

freedom to philosophize is given in the very subtitle of the book. We know from this subtitle

that philosophy is going to play a central role in this work.

Another reason why the TTP should be understood as philosophy is because from

the very beginning of the book to the end, reason and philosophy (as against revelation and
theologizing) are what is exalted. Throughout the TTP, Spinoza explicitly and repeatedly

makes statements arguing for the superiority of reason and philosophy over the claims of
revelation and theology. As opposed to Oldenburg’s oafish comment to Spinoza that it

seemed to him that Spinoza was “theologizing”, in truth, Spinoza is really de-theologizing.

In actuality, Spinoza is philosophizing against all theology. His arguments against the truth
Spinoza. Theological-Political Treatise, from the Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (ed.
by Jonathan Israel, translated by Michael Silverthorne and Jonathan Israel (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007), xliv.
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of scripture are not only historical or biblical critical, but based on his philosophy.

Theological dogmas, which are the “the prejudices of the theologians” are not only subjected
to the bar of reason and philosophy, but also ultimately indicted and executed by the bar of
reason and philosophy, too! Though a couple times in the TTP Spinoza sounds like

Descartes when he says that he wants to keep theology separate from philosophy; in truth,
he really does not. He really does the opposite. On the other hand, one can argue

(humorously) that he does keep theology separate from philosophy - that is, by destroying

theology!

The TTP then is not a commentary on the Bible, such as in the tradition of all

commentaries on the Bible up until then. It is rather a philosophical commentary arguing
against a plethora of errors, illusions, and immoralities in the Bible which he makes

primarily based on his metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of history, ethics, logic,
and epistemology. If the TTP is a commentary on the Bible, it is one in the sense of other
philosophical commentaries on various philosophical subjects. Just as works on the

philosophy of law are philosophical commentaries on the law, and just as works on political
philosophy or philosophy of government are philosophical commentaries on government

(which is what the last five chapters of the TTP are about), so also is this work on the
philosophy of religion a philosophical commentary on (or rather against) religion. If

Hobbes’ Leviathan is not considered a Bible Commentary or only biblical criticism, why

should the TTP be considered only or mostly biblical criticism?

Long before the Ethics was completed and published, Spinoza made his reasons

clear for why he was going to write his philosophical views about the scriptures. He told

Oldenburg that he had to write against the prejudices of the theologians to make straight

the way of philosophy. His Ethics has this same purpose. In the Appendix to Part I, Spinoza
says pretty much the same thing as he told Oldernburg: “whenever the opportunity arose I
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have striven to remove prejudices … there still remain a considerable number of prejudices
… I have thought it proper at this point to bring these prejudices before the bar of reason.”

This bringing of “prejudices before the bar of reason,” as we have just mentioned, is

the bringing of (theoretically and morally) questionable theological claims to be subjected
to the judgment of philosophy. Reason and philosophy are on the judgment seat.

Philosophy will separate the wheat from the chaff, the truth from the false, the illusory from
the real, the madness from the sound. Historically though, it has been the other way

around: philosophy has been subjected, subdued or indicted and imprisoned according to
the Judgment Seat of revelation and theology. Now things are different. Spinoza turns all
this completely around. No longer will putative revelation or the Bible be the judge of all

things. Now human reason and human philosophy will be the judge of all things – including
God Himself and all his alleged works.

Spinoza’s letter to Oldenburg also shows that a large part of his purpose of writing

the TTP was philosophical. He states that the “prejudices of the theologians … are the main
obstacles which prevent men from giving their minds to philosophy.” Not only that, but

because philosophy and the freedom of philosophy was being threatened by the preachers,
Spinoza felt that his TTP had to also lay down arguments to defend the “freedom to

philosophize and to say what we think.” As stated, even in this limited sense, we see that

Spinoza’s purposes in writing the TTP is explicitly philosophical. Piet Steenbakkers affirms

this philosophical purpose in that Spinoza “wants the book to play a part in current debates
on religion, philosophy, and politics.” 987

As we have already mentioned, we also know that the TTP should be considered as a

work of philosophy from the arguments Spinoza makes to separate the study of theology
from philosophy. He says this in many places in the TTP (and in his Correspondence),
987

From Piet Steenbakker’s “The text of Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus”, op. cited, p. 30.
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especially, for instance, in chapters 7 and 15. This stated methodology is seemingly in the
tradition of Descartes, but in reality Spinoza (to my mind) is either purposely using

misleading language here (e.g. he is insincere and lying) or he consistently violates his claim
to keep the two separate (for he obviously and in many places explicitly subordinates

scripture to philosophy). 988 The reader also ought to know that this is in the tradition (if I

might call it thus) of some Cartesian and Cartesian-like works on the interpretation of

scripture. Four years before the publication of the TTP, Spinoza’s good friend Ludewijk

Meyer for instance wrote Philosophia S. Scripturae Interpres, which argued that philosophy

needs to be the chief interpreter of Scripture. What Jonathan Israel says about Spinoza’s
inner circle is true: “Meyer, like Spinoza, Van den Enden, and the brothers Koerbagh,

positively gloried in the power of philosophy and science to transform the world.” 989 I take

it that Spinoza was far more influenced by Meyer and this work then people generally know.
Indeed, I speculate that if Spinoza were to tell the whole story of what got him to writing his
thinking about scripture, he would have given an account of how interested and influenced

he was by Meyer’s project and the resulting uproar Meyer’s book caused. Seeing this uproar
could only have shown Spinoza just how serious and important a subject this was.

One of the basic theses in Meyer’s book is the same as that stated in Spinoza’s TTP,

especially in the Preface and chapter 7 “Of the Interpretation of Scripture.” And this thesis

is that because Scripture is often obscure and doubtful in meaning and because theologians’
explanations of Scripture have obviously failed judging from all the varying interpretations

and bitter disputes it has received, the answer then is to clear up all these obscurities by the

988 J. Israel’s Radical Enlightenment, op. cited, p. 209, agrees. “Rather [then upholding the position
that theology and philosophy are really two separate and respectable domains] he totally subverts
theology’s autonomy, eliminating its role in teaching men truth and the path to salvation…In other
words, true theology is philosophy.”
989 J. Israel’s Radical Enlightenment, op. cited, 199.
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light of philosophy. 990 Meyer and Spinoza are also in philosophical accord to exclude the

Holy Spirit as a helper, guide, and teacher in interpreting Scripture. Indeed, Meyers chides
even the far less orthodox Collegiants and Socinians “for their unwillingness to interpret

Scripture wholly in accordance with ‘reason’” instead of “invoking the Holy Ghost to assist
and enlighten them.” As a result, “they too languish in confusion and theological strife of

their own making.” What they need to do, therefore, is to “follow him in making philosophy
the sole and ‘infallible measure’ of Scripture”, for Meyer “adamantly denies there is any

divine inspiration, or ‘inner light’, distinct from the ‘natural light of reason’, to aid man in

this quest.” 991 This position of course was one of the chief causes of the uproar against this

‘godless’ book.

However, Spinoza’s application of the light of philosophy diverges from Meyer’s on

some key points. In fact, it is thought that their differences led “Spinoza into an undeclared
debate with his ally [Meyer], in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, without anywhere

mentioning him by name.” For Spinoza, the Bible does not reveal philosophic truth, but for
Meyer the Bible “has an inner core of meaning approximating to philosophical truth.” 992

Spinoza used philosophical arguments to fight for the separation (and rejection) of theology
from philosophy.

Ibid. 200-201.
Ibid. 201. A huge amount of literature attacking the enthronement of philosophy and the
displacement of the Holy Spirit pervaded Europe in response to Meyer’s and Spinoza’s work on
philosophy (or science) as the best and only true way to rightly understand Scripture. One example
here may serve as an exact representation of all the tens of thousands of books, essays, lectures, and
sermons that were given throughout Europe on this point. Israel tells relates that the Collegiant
Petrus Serrarius railed “against the bid to enthrone philosophy in place of divine inspiration and the
Holy Ghost.” He argued that philosophy was too limited. Moreover, the Cartesian mechanistic theory
of the world as the key to knowing the truth of the world was also false. “Whatever the Philosophia
claims, the true meaning of Scripture, he insists, is grasped only through the ‘inner light’ and the
guidance of the Holy Ghost. To mistake philosophy for divine wisdom, ‘natural light for the divine
light, what is innate in man for what is received from God’, he urges, is idolatry; for whoever takes
that path prefers philosophy to Christ.” And that is to “bow before the new Golden Calf of reason”
rather than “the Lamb of God” (205).
992 Ibid. 201-202.
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991
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Now that we’ve laid out some preliminary general arguments for considering the

TTP as a work of philosophy, let us give some examples of this claim from the TTP itself.

Rather than exhaustively going through the whole work in chronological order pointing out
each and every element of philosophy in it, we will instead pick various samples from only

some of the chapters to show the reader that the TTP is not just a work of biblical criticism,
but also one of philosophy.
Some samples

The Preface lays out his general philosophy of religion
Is it really true that the TTP is a work of philosophy? Well, as Wittgenstein used to say:

“Look and see.” Let us begin then where Spinoza begins, in the Preface or introduction to
his book. A study of this Preface reveals that it lays out not only some of the principles of

biblical interpretation that he will follow (which are based on his philosophy of history and
hermeneutics), but at the same time in more than equal amount, a general philosophy of

religion. And not only does the Preface present his philosophy of religion, it also lays out

the foundation of all his philosophy, that is, that the truths of reason are the only genuine
authority to which human beings should rely – as against all other purported authorities.

Thus he argues with vehemence against the scholastic and theological demand “that reason
must be the handmaiden of theology.” 993

The Preface also lays out his philosophical position on individual and collective

freedom.

Spinoza. Theological-Political Treatise, translated by Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 2001, 8.
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Philosophizing about prophecy
The discussion in the first chapter on prophecy is primarily epistemological. It discusses
what should count as sure knowledge. It makes distinctions between natural knowledge
and theological knowledge. 994 And he examines them carefully and philosophically. He

uses expressions such as “clearly and distinctly” (which, we know, stem from Descartes)
indicating that he recognizes in it an important epistemological principle. 995 He

expostulates about causes – intermediate, mediate, and so on. 996 He refers to philosophers

(Maimonides) and philosophies (Aristotelianism). 997 If the TTP were only a book on the

Bible than why is there so much discussion and analysis on (amongst many other things)
“the imaginative faculty”? 998

When someone writes that because the Jews were “ignorant of natural causes” and

that they referred anomalous natural phenomena to supernatural miracles, we’re not doing
biblical commentary any more. We’re doing philosophical commentary on the Bible.

Spinoza is explaining biblical claims from the perspective of philosophy: “So it is folly to
have recourse to the power of God when we do not know the natural causes of some
phenomenon.” 999

So then, how do we explain revelation? Spinoza says, “I might, indeed, have

followed others in saying that it happened through the power of God, but this would be

mere quibbling [Silverthorne and Israel translate this clause thusly: “but then I would be
saying nothing meaningful” – shades of Hobbes]. 1000 This is also the message repeated
many times in the Ethics (see, for instance, Appendix I).
Ibid. 9.
Ibid. 10.
996 Ibid. 10.
997 Ibid. 13.
998 Ibid. 14.
999 Ibid. 19-20.
1000 Ibid. 19.
994
995
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The prophets felt that they were receiving revelations from God only because they

were ignorant of the natural imaginative faculty: “For many more ideas can be constructed
from words and images than merely from the principles and axioms on which our entire
natural knowledge is based.” 1001 It is the imaginative faculty that expresses itself in the

perceptual and corporeal teachings of parables and allegories of the prophets. Once this is

understood, “We shall no longer wonder why Scripture, or the prophets, speak so strangely
or obscurely … and again why God was seen by Micaiah as seated, by Daniel as an old man
clothed in white garments, by Ezekiel as fire” and so on; for “All this is in full agreement

with the common imagination of God and Spirits.” 1002 These things can’t be gained “through

assured rational principles” or “scientific knowledge.” And they cannot be explained

“through [their] first causes.” 1003

Spinoza’s Philosophy in Chapter 2 “Of the Prophets”:
We learn what Spinoza honors from the get-go in this chapter as well. He’s mostly

interested in preserving the integrity of “the province of intellect” in hope of fitting more
people “for purely intellectual activity.” 1004 You can’t make his philosophy clearer: “In

response to the demands of our age, of philosophy, and of truth itself, I have resolved to

demonstrate this point at some length, disregarding the rantings of superstition, the bitter
enemy of those who are devoted to true knowledge and true morality.” 1005

One of the purposes of this chapter, like the last one, is epistemological, that is, to

“first discuss the question of the certainty of the prophets.” 1006 And we find out Spinoza’s
Ibid. 20.
Ibid. 20.
1003 Ibid.
1004 Ibid. 21.
1005 Ibid.
1006 Ibid.
1001
1002
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answer to this soon enough: “Imagination by itself, unlike every clear and distinct idea, does
not of its own nature carry certainty with it.” 1007 In other words, in Spinoza’s philosophy of

religion, prophecy is of the imagination, and the imagination is a faculty by which we can by
no means be certain (but, really, in Spinoza’s final analysis, is just plain hocus-pocus and
false).

If you don’t identify such arguments as philosophy here, then see his second

scholium in Part II, Proposition 40 of his Ethics, for only one example of the same arguments
in Spinoza’s recognized philosophical work. Here, too, in the same way, Spinoza deals with
the epistemological shortcomings and failures of imagination in relation to God (and all

theological claims). The TTP adverts to this (or is it the Ethics that adverts to the TTP’s?)

philosophical doctrine over and over again. This is philosophy, not biblical exegesis. And
just like most philosophers, as opposed to orthodox theological works on scripture, he

exalts reasoning: In order to attain the certainty of truth and knowledge that we need, we
attain it by something superior to the faculty of imagination. We attain it, “namely,
[through] reasoning.” 1008

He continues his epistemological investigation of the problem of certainty with

respect to prophecy and signs. They are certainly not “a mathematical certainty – that is,
the certainty that necessarily derives from the apprehension of what is apprehended or
seen.” 1009 Because of epistemic facts such as this, prophets such as Hananiah “ought to

have doubted his prophecy.” 1010

As a philosopher, Spinoza finds a pattern in so called revelations and prophecies.

And this pattern bespeaks the lie behind claims of revelation and prophecy. Spinoza notes

that prophets prophesy according to their temperament. To take only one example: If one is
Ibid. 21.
Ibid. 22.
1009 Ibid. 23.
1010 Ibid.
1007
1008
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“of a cheerful disposition, then victories, peace and other joyful events were revealed to

him; for it is on things of this kind that the imagination of such people dwells.” 1011 And the
list goes on and on. “The same applies to revelation.” Curious, isn’t it, that prophets

brought up in the country have visions “of oxen and cows and the like”, while others, say
whose profession is something like a courtier, see royal thrones and other such
employment items? 1012

The scriptures in themselves don’t spell this principle out. It’s “not biblical”, as they

say. No, this pattern was discovered by a scientific or philosophical mind. Believing “hired
attorney” biblical commentators don’t find or think or even look for such things. What is

wonderful and exciting about this is that Spinoza the philosopher is able to do philosophy
on the very source of the claims of religion.

We do not need to multiply examples of this phenomenon, I hope. As Spinoza aptly

puts it, “There is no need to deal with this subject in greater detail.” 1013

Spinoza takes up other matters as well that deal directly with science and

philosophy. For instance, he takes up the question of Joshua and the biblical attestation of

an immobile earth. 1014 First, he takes on all biblical commentators who hold that all the
prophets (e.g. the scriptures) can’t err. Secondly, he takes these commentators to task
because when they are confronted with facts that contradict their beloved scriptures,

instead of humbly and honestly accepting the truth, “they prefer to declare that they do not
understand those passages, or alternatively they strive to twist the words of Scripture to

mean what they plainly do not mean. If either of these options is permissible, we can bid
Scripture farewell” 1015
Ibid. 23.
Ibid. 24.
1013 Ibid. 26.
1014 Ibid. 26-27.
1015 Ibid. 26.
1011
1012
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Spinoza is arguing that the scriptures that say that the earth is immobile and that

the sun moves are absolutely clear. The scriptures really teach this. But since Copernicus’
theory (which argues for a stationary sun and moving earth), these scriptures are now

shown to be false. Instead of admitting this, believing scholars hide behind the subterfuge
of claiming that such passages are actually obscure and therefore can be given alternative

explanations. 1016 To which Spinoza powerfully replies: “If that which is absolutely clear can

be accounted obscure and incomprehensible or else interpreted at will, it will be vain for us
to try to prove anything from Scripture.” 1017

Sprinkled throughout his biblical analyses, Spinoza can’t help but to insert a

philosophical reminder. For example, even talking about the greatest Jewish prophet,

Moses, Spinoza mentions that Moses could not have taught his people “anything more than

a moral code – not, indeed, as a philosopher might inculcate the morality that is engendered
by freedom of spirit.” 1018 Spinoza is ever on the look out to preach his philosophic message
of freedom of thought and speech.

Spinoza criticizes even Solomon for behaving “in a way unworthy of a philosopher”,

because, for Spinoza, philosophers and philosophy are greater than prophets and

revelation. Philosophy trumps the God of the Bible. Active natural reasoning trumps
imaginative and emotional imagery. The prophets fail as philosophers, for they hold

“conflicting beliefs.” “Therefore knowledge of science … should by no means be expected of
them.” They are even ignorant of matters that “concern philosophical speculation.” 1019

1016 This is a good example of how “full-proof-success-systems” work, as I mentioned elsewhere in
this study. No matter what is said to refute their belief, they will always come up with something to
save the appearances. And this, in essence, shows their non-scientific attitude (according to Karl
Popper), for, from their perspective, their claims are irrefutable and thus untestable.
1017 Ibid.
1018 Ibid. 31.
1019 Ibid. 32-33.
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Spinoza points out that the scriptures often imply that because human beings are

made in the image and likeness of God that they then have something like an absolute free
will. 1020 But the philosopher and the philosophy of the TTP deny this. And, of course, so
does the philosopher and philosophy of the Ethics.

Spinoza ends this chapter putting all his cards on the table: “the points we have

made concerning prophets and prophecy” in this chapter are “relevant to my purpose”,

which is “the differentiation of philosophy from theology” 1021 (which, as I interpret Spinoza,

means the discrediting of theology by means of philosophy).
The philosophy of Chapter 3.

Spinoza opens up Chapter 3 shooting. Jewish and Christian biblical particularism and

exclusivism are shot down as childish, spiteful, and malicious according to his universalist
philosophical argumentation.

Everyone’s true happiness and blessedness consists solely in the enjoyment of good,
not in priding himself that he alone is enjoying that good to the exclusion of others.
He who counts himself more blessed because he alone enjoys wellbeing not shared
by others, or because he is more blessed and fortunate than others, knows not what
is true happiness and blessedness, and the joy he derives therefrom, if it be not mere
childishness, has its only source in spite and malice. For example, a man’s true
happiness and blessedness consists solely in wisdom and knowledge of truth, and
not in that he is wiser than others, or that others are without knowledge … So he
who rejoices for this reason rejoices at another misfortune, and is therefore spiteful
and malicious, knowing neither true wisdom nor the peace of the true life.
Some readers may not recognize what he’s up to here, but every biblically

knowledgeable Jew and Christian will. Right from the outset, Spinoza stakes his claim that
the Jews (and the Christians) with all the many purported promises of the Creator to them
at the exclusion of all other peoples are simply not true. Spinoza is going to try to support
1020
1021

Ibid. 33.
Ibid. 24.
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his philosophical case on scriptural and not just philosophical argumentation because he
knows that arguing outside scripture and only based on philosophy won’t do the job.

I think that his argument from scripture fails and that most Jewish and Christian

teachers will not be persuaded. Is he really trying to argue from the scriptures that the Jews
(and by implication, Christians) are not specially blessed of God in the particularistic and
exclusivistic way that Scripture portrays? If he’s going to keep within his stated

hermeneutical range of only arguing the meaning of scripture from scripture, we think he

fails because the scriptures clearly teach that the Jews (and Christians) are specially chosen
and blessed of God. We think that Spinoza came to his universalist beliefs through

philosophy and not through an honest and humble study of scripture according to more
“scientific” principles, as he claims. We therefore think that either Spinoza is arbitrarily

forcing his enlightened philosophical universalism on to the text of Scripture because he

believes that this is the better interpretation of Scripture. Or, much more likely, he knows
the truth on this matter, but has decided to try to get his message a better hearing by
“becoming a Jew, to win the Jews”, as St. Paul would put it (1 Cor. 9:20).

We know that Spinoza’s universalism stems from his philosophy because his Ethics

reveals it in no uncertain terms: “The highest good of those who pursue virtue is common to
all, and all can equally enjoy it” (Pr.36.IV). For Spinoza, “to know God” is “a good that is

common to all men and can be possessed equally by all men” (Pr. 36.Proof.IV). He will have
no truck with the clear and certain biblical teaching that some are chosen unto glory and
others unto destruction. He will have no truck with God opening the eyes of some and

darkening the minds of others. Once again, it is upon the rock of reason that Spinoza builds
his church in opposition to the religious gates of hell.

Sounding like Emmanuel Kant, Spinoza enunciates the philosophy of the

Enlightenment: “In so far as men live by the guidance of reason, they are most useful to man
476

(Cor.1,Pr.35,IV) and so (Pr.19,IV) by the guidance of reason we shall necessarily endeavor to
bring it about that men should live by the guidance of reason” (Pr.37.Proof.IV). No longer
should humans live by the guidance of so-called revelation, for, as Spinoza has shown,

“revelation” is in actuality imperfect imaginary capriciousness. And this has been one of the
chief causes of all the confessionalism, divisions, religious hatred and bigotry.

Spinoza apparently excuses, justifies, or rationalizes God (Scripture) when He talks

as if the Jews are special because of God “having regard to the immaturity of their

understanding.” 1022 Spinoza goes on to show, once again, how his biblical exposition is

really being led by the nose by means of his philosophy. In clear and certain terms, right out
of the Ethics, he states:

I wish to explain briefly what I shall hereafter mean by God’s direction, by God’s
help, external and internal, by God’s calling 1023, and, finally, by fortune. By God’s
direction I mean the fixed and immutable order of Nature, or chain of natural
events; for I have said above, and have already shown elsewhere, that the universal
laws of Nature according to which all things happen and are determined are nothing
but God’s eternal decrees, which always involve eternal truth and necessity. So it is
the same thing whether we say that all things happen according to Nature’s laws or
that they are regulated by God’s decree and direction … Therefore whatever human
nature can effect solely by its own power to preserve its own being can rightly be
called God’s internal help and whatever falls to a man’s advantage from the power of
external causes can rightly be called God’s external help. 1024

Thus Spinoza twists scripture to fit his philosophical template. Many passages from his

Ethics can be cited to show that Spinoza’s TTP philosophy is part and parcel of his Ethics’

philosophy (and vice versa). We can quote Proposition 29 from Part I: “Nothing in nature is

contingent, but all things are from the necessity of the divine nature determined to exist and
to act in a definite way.” Here we see God denuded of all personal (and human) attributes.

Ibid. 36.
These expressions (“God’s direction, by God’s help, external and internal, by God’s calling”) are
biblical beliefs. At bottom, on many points, Spinoza’s philosophy as enunciated in his TTP and his
Ethics is directed against biblical beliefs and not just pure philosophical issues. To think of the Ethics,
then, as only a work of philosophy speaking on only philosophical issues is an error - as is thinking
that the TTP is only a work of biblical criticism (and not also of philosophy).
1024 Ibid.
1022
1023
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The God of the Bible has given way to the Nature of Spinoza. We also see in this passage

Spinoza’s view that in reality it is not God or the Holy Spirit that internally helps man [“for it
is God who works in you to will and to act according to his good purpose” (Phil. 2:13)];

rather it is “solely by [human nature’s] own power.” God is dead. Nature is all in all (cf. 1

Cor. 15:28).

In his Ethics Spinoza does not doubt “that many will ridicule his view as absurd and

will not give their minds to its examination, and for this reason alone, that they are in the
habit of attributing to God another kind of freedom very different from that which we
(Def.7) have assigned to him; that is, an absolute will” (Pr.33, Schol.2).

Once we understand his philosophy, says Spinoza, then we can “see why it is that the

Hebrew nations was said to have been chosen by God before all others.” 1025 And once we

understand that we need “To know things [only] through their primary [and not imaginary]
causes”, then we are on our way to being able to set up a better society. Enter Spinoza’s
political philosophizing.

Based on his philosophizing in the TTP! [and not from the Ethics], Spinoza has slowly

and carefully set the stage for the second half of his TTP philosophy, which is the laying out

of his philosophical positions on freedom, common reason, and sovereign natural right. In a
footnote to this passage in chapter 3 of the TTP, Shirley refers the reader to Ethics, 4.37,

especially Scholium 2, which describes much of Spinoza’s limited political philosophy in the
Ethics. But it might be the case that Spinoza’s political philosophy was laid out in the TTP
before he completed or published his more geometrical demonstration of it in the Ethics.
Once again, therefore, I want to press the case that Spinoza’s TTP does not get the

philosophical credit due it. Seven years before the Ethics was published, much of Spinoza’s
philosophy was presented – in the TTP.
1025

Ibid. 37, my emphasis.
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There’s so much in this chapter that is pertinent to philosophy; but because of our

limits of space in this dissertation, we must pass over these and many more in the chapters
to come in hopes of accomplishing our purpose enough through a few more samples.
Chapter 4 of the TTP:
At the end of the first paragraph of the beginning of Chapter 4 “Of the Divine Law”, Spinoza

enunciates one the key philosophical planks in his Ethics and philosophical platform: “all

things are determined by the universal laws of Nature to exist and to act in a definite and

determinate way.” 1026

We need to move on. Let us skip chapter 5 and the obviously philosophical chapter

6 (on miracles) to make quicker headway. Then after pointing out only one pertinent point
in chapter 7, we’ll skip over chapters 8 to 14. Chapters 8 to 10 are mostly of a strictly
biblical critical nature (though behind the scenes, as always, there is the Spinozist

philosophical backdrop). There is a lot of important philosophical (and biblical critical)

material in chapter 11(on the New Testament and Christ), chapter 12 (on the distinction

between Scripture and the word of God), and in chapter 13 (concerning the nature of God),
but we must summarize and come to an end. Consequently, we will also skip the

philosophically rich chapter 14 (on the analysis of faith) and then, after treating a little of
chapter 15, neglect all the last five chapters on Spinoza’s philosophy of government.

1026

Ibid. 48.
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Spinoza’s philosophy of hermeneutics in Chapter 7:
In chapter 7 “Of the Interpretation of Scriptures,” Spinoza lays down the only true way to
know the correct interpretation of Scripture. This “true method of Scriptural

interpretation” is by studying it in the same way that scientists do nature, that is, according
to Spinoza, historically.

We know Spinoza’s philosophical attitude toward Scripture and how to go about

interpreting it not only from the TTP or his chapter “Of the Interpretation of Scripture.” We

know it also from his correspondence. For instance, in an important letter to William de
Blyenberg 1027 in 1665, Spinoza tells Blyenberg their correspondence can’t go anywhere

because each of them proceed from entirely different and clashing first principles.

Blyenberg is committed to submitting all things under the authority of scripture and

Spinoza is committed to submitting all things under the authority of reason and science.
And never the twain shall meet.
The philosophy in Chapter 15
The title of Chapter 15 is “Where it is shown that theology is not subordinate to reason nor

reason to theology, and why it is we are persuaded of Holy Scripture.” 1028 Shirley interprets
the second clause as, “The reason why we are convinced of the authority of Holy Scripture.”
What? Theology “is not subordinate to reason”? And “why it is that we are

persuaded of Holy Scripture” or “convinced of the authority of Holy Scripture”? This sounds
1027 A. Wolf, Edwin Curley, and Stephen Nadler all treat Blijenbergh as if he were a complete
nincompoop. All three call him tedious, a bore, and the like. Yet he was the author of several works,
not only against the TTP, but also the Ethics, and his letters show, if not a mastery of Spinoza’s
Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, they do show a mind that has read and thought long and hard on
various theological and philosophical works. To my mind, Blijenbergh does not deserve the excess
slights on his I.Q. given to him, even if he is of the Counter-Enlightenment party.
1028 Spinoza. Benedict Spinoza: Theological-Political Treatise, translated by Michael Silverthorne and
Jonathan Israel, p. 186.
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like a title by a conservative believer and not the anti-Christ Spinoza, doesn’t it? But then, as
the reception of Spinoza’s works among the devout prove, they saw through all such

superficial shows of piety as a clear sign of the devil who masquerades as an angel of light.

Thus in all the “refutations” of Spinoza’s works, they pull out the armory of scripture verses

to protect the faithful: “Watch out for false prophets. They come to you in sheep’s clothing”
(Mt. 7:15), Jesus taught. St. Paul makes it even clearer and more specific:

I am afraid that just as Eve was deceived by the serpent’s cunning, your minds may
somehow be led astray from your sincere and pure devotion to Christ. For is
someone comes to you and preaches a Jesus other than the Jesus we preached … or a
different gospel from the one you accepted, you put up with it easy enough….For
such men are false apostles, deceitful workmen, masquerading as apostles of Christ.
And no wonder, for Satan himself masquerades as an angel of light. It is not
surprising, then, if his servants masquerade as servants of righteousness. Their
end will be what their actions deserve (2 Cor. 11:13-15).
Let us state what most devout believers argue for and cherish: All things should be

subordinate to God and Christ. And this entails puny human reason. For most theologians,
the things of God (miracles, the Trinity, the incarnation, and so on) are all tenets that must
be held by faith (ex. “By faith we understand that the universe was formed at God’s

command, so that what is seen was not made out of what was visible” (Heb.11:3); for “As
the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my

thoughts than your thoughts” (Isa. 55:9). Therefore, the conclusion of the theology versus
human reason debate for most believers is this: of course reason must be ultimately

subordinate to theology. From Jesus to St. Paul to St. Augustine to Luther, Calvin, Thomas a
Kempis, Pascal, Steno (and the list goes on and on), the attitude of created things must be

that of surrender, faith, and obedience. Though perhaps overstated, the saying “Ours is not
to reason why; ours is but to do and die” is not too far from the mark according to the
devout. Much of Spinoza’s TTP is devoted to attacking this position.

481

Conclusion
As our brief summary and samples from the TTP show, there is much in the TTP that is

philosophical (just as in our earlier chapter we saw that there is much in the Ethics that

deals with biblical theological issues). Because of this similarity in philosophical mission,

we can make a few observations in conclusion. First, each book shouldn’t be seen as entirely
different books, for both “do philosophy” and theology. Second, both show Spinoza’s heart,

his passion, and his mission to wean human beings away from the teat of ancient revelation
unto the maturity of independent and disciplined reasoning and science. We should have

also learned from this exposition that Spinoza’s philosophy and “views regarding scripture”
were largely formulated from early on. If this is so, then they shouldn’t be seen as

completely new based on chronological time – that is, as if the Ethics is a more mature work
than the TTP.

Scholars who refer to and treat the TTP as philosophy
Stephen Nadler says that the TTP is a great work of philosophy
Stephen Nadler argues that, “Without a doubt, the Theological-Political Treatise is one of the
most important and influential books in the history of philosophy, in religious and political
thought, and even in Bible studies. More than any other work, it laid the foundation for
modern critical and historical approaches to the Bible.” 1029 Moreover, Spinoza’s

Theological-Political Treatise is “Arguably the most important – and certainly the most

scandalous and vilified – work of philosophy of the seventeenth century.” In both passages,
1029

Upcoming “A Book forged in Hell”, op. cited, 326.
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Nadler categorizes the TTP as philosophy. In Jonathan Israel’s Introduction to his (and

Michael Silverthorne’s) 2007 Benedict De Spinoza: Theological-Political Treatise, Israel also
identifies the TTP as “one of the most profoundly influential philosophical texts in the
history of western thought.” 1030

Yitzhak Melamed: the TTP elaborates some of the Ethics’ metaphysics and presents original
metaphysical thoughts besides
Melamed opens his essay “The Metaphysics of the Theological-Political Treatise” from the

newly brought out volume Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise: A Critical Guide

“wondering what we could have learned about Spinoza’s metaphysics had not the Ethics
ever gotten published. This is a creative and brilliant intuition pump to explore the TTP
with. 1031

He comments on the fact that not only does “the existing literature on the TTP pays

little attention to the metaphysical doctrine of the book”, but even “studies of Spinoza’s
metaphysics commonly make little use of the TTP.” 1032 He argues that it is a mistake to

neglect the TTP on both counts. For one thing, he tells us, the TTP says a lot on Spinoza’s
metaphysical views; for another, it discusses some metaphysical issues with even more

elaboration than the Ethics. 1033 Melamed goes on to prove these claims in the bulk of his

essay delineating such philosophical issues as that between substance and attributes, God’s
essence and existence, and the nature of the conatus. But there are many other

philosophical and metaphysical issues dealt with in both the TTP and in Melamed’s

treatment of it in this essay. It is not my purpose in this section to explicate all these, but

1030 Benedict Spinoza. Benedict Spinoza: Theological Political Treatise (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007), viii.
1031 Yitzhak Melamed’s “The Metaphysics of the Theological-Political Treatise” from Spinoza’s
Theological-Political Treatise: A Critical Guide, op. cited, 1-2.
1032 Ibid. 2.
1033 Ibid.
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only to give enough examples to make the case that the TTP is not only a work in biblical
criticism but also one of philosophy. As Melamed sums up the TTP: “the book is an
invaluable resource for understanding Spinoza’s metaphysics.” 1034

Israel’s argument that the TTP is philosophy
Israel says that “a particular system of philosophy inspired and underpins the whole of the
Theological-Political Treatise” and that “his revolutionary metaphysics, epistemology and

moral philosophy subtly infuse every part and aspect of his argumentation.” 1035 At the same
time, he does a lot of historical, philological, and exegetical work. But “it is the latter

features rather than the underlying philosophy to which scholars chiefly call attention when
discussing this particular text.” 1036 Chapter 6 on miracles is a good case in point. It is

particularly philosophical. He seeks to get to the truth of the question of miracles by relying
only on reason and principles which are “wholly philosophical.” 1037 Spinoza’s overall

historical-critical exegesis is “anchored in a wider naturalistic philosophical standpoint.” 1038
Ibid. 23.
Ibid. x.
1036 Ibid.
1037 Ibid, xi.
1038 Ibid. xii. I’m afraid that my presentation of Israel’s argument that the TTP is philosophy is a bit
misleading. So let me make clear that Israel makes qualifications in his use of the term “philosophy”
here. The following two qualifications should be combined with Israel’s use of the term “philosophy”
above. First, in his “Note on the text and translation”, Israel cautions the reader that Spinoza’s use of
terms such as “philosophy” follows “the requirements of his philosophical system.” Following Klever,
Israel says that it is “invariably difficult or impossible adequately to translate Spinoza’s term
philosophia as ‘philosophy’ as it is usually understood, because Spinoza means by it the whole of
science together with all other soundly based knowledge” (xliv). Secondly, “The Theological-Political
Treatise (1670) is not a work of philosophy in the usual sense of the term. Rather it is a rare and
interesting example of what we might call applied or ‘practical’ philosophy. That is, it is a work based
throughout on a philosophical system which, however, mostly avoids employing philosophical
arguments and which has a practical social and political more than strictly philosophical purpose,
though it was also intended in part as a device for subtly defending and promoting Spinoza’s own
theories” (viii). In some respects, I think that Israel overstates his qualifications. For one thing, in
many respects the TTP explicitly does employ philosophical arguments and as such should certainly
be considered as “philosophy” in the modern sense. As such, in these respects, it goes too far to imply
1034
1035
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Historical approaches to the scriptures were utilized before Spinoza, but these treatments
were usually made to orbit about what was taken to be the higher or sacred history of
Scripture. Not so with Benedict Spinoza.

The ‘historical’ in Spinoza’s sense (which is also the characteristic ‘modern’
meaning) was in fact conceptually impossible until, philosophically, all supernatural
agency had been consciously stripped out of all forms of historical explanation, a
development that was remote from the thoughts of most early modern thinkers and
writers. 1039
Spinoza’s history is empirical, not theological. History is shaped by natural forces,

not providence. How could it be otherwise since there are no spiritual or supernatural
forces? His philosophy is a one-substance monism and upon this philosophical rock of

naturalism, he rejects all a priori biblical assumptions of revealed claims and subjects them

to a historical analysis that is in accord with nature. History and nature converge. Text and
nature converge. Even religion for Spinoza is a product of nature - human nature and its

psychological and emotional needs all completely stem from nature and not from a kingdom
outside of or transcendent to nature. As a result, religion is a natural phenomenon, and

therefore within the provenance of philosophy. It is natural for humans to feel fear and

dread in the face of the horrors of the natural world. Thus fear, hope, and ignorance drive
men to imagine a human-like God who may help, and who also may punish. 1040

In the final analysis, the text, political circumstances, motives, language, idioms,

grammar, and the histories that generated all the biblical texts are all to be understood in
the context of nature: As Israel sums it up: “All of this then in turn needs to be explained,

philosophically, as a product of nature and natural forces.” 1041 This theory of culture and

religion is part and parcel of Spinoza’s philosophy. It is not only part and parcel of his TTP,

that the TTP is only a work of applied or practical philosophy with a social and political goal. It might
well be that Israel would agree with my characterization of his characterization, as the rest of his
presentation of the TTP given above seems to bear out.
1039 Ibid. xiii.
1040 Ibid. xiii-xiv.
1041 Ibid. xii-xiii.
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but also part and parcel of his not yet completed Ethics. It is rooted in his one-substance

doctrine which reduces “All reality including the entirety of human experience, the world of
tradition, spirit and belief not less than the physical, to the level of the purely empirical.” 1042
Though Israel does not refer to Curley’s essay “Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece:

Spinoza and the Science of Hermeneutics”, he explains Spinoza’s science of textual criticism
on a par with the science of the study of nature very much as Curley does. We must study

the texts of Scripture in the same way we do the things of nature. First we must seek to find
those aspects that are universal, and then, by degrees, from there to the most specific.
Properly done then, biblical criticism is also a legitimate science. Because of this

philosophy, the social and intellectual sciences are on a par. History and the study of
religion are “methodologically no different in principle from the other sciences” – as

Spinoza puts it: “I say that the method of interpreting Scripture … does not differ from the

[correct] method of interpreting nature, but rather is wholly consonant with it.” 1043 We will

take up Curley’s argument that Spinoza’s TTP should be considered a work of science and
philosophy below.

Israel goes on to outline Spinoza’s political philosophy: his philosophical theory of

toleration, freedom, democratic republicanism, and so on; but we will not delineate these
sections, as they are outside the focus of this study’s provenance. Let us add one further
note here regarding Israel’s treatment of the reception of Spinoza and of his TTP, which

calls for either confirmation or refutation from other historians.

It is agreed by all the contemporary works on Spinoza’s TTP that it was by far one of

the most controversial and well-known books of the time. What is not so known, or agreed

about, however, is how to explain the dearth of coverage Spinoza’s TTP received

subsequently, both in its political philosophy and its philosophy of religion. Israel
1042
1043

Ibid. xv.
Ibid. xvi-xvii.
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complains of “The prevailing lack of interest in the origins of modern democratic

republicanism [and theory of toleration] today” in Spinoza. He says that they “have

continually been played down” and “indeed masked.” 1044 More, Israel is dumbfounded that
there has been, almost everywhere since the mid-nineteenth century a pervasive
misconception that Spinoza was a thinker whom practically no one read,
understood or was influenced by … This remains today an entrenched and widely
accepted view despite its being wholly unhistorical and at odds with how Spinoza
was actually received in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries … As a
historical phenomena, the almost universal tendency since the nineteenth century
to marginalize, if not Spinoza the lofty philosopher, then certainly the historical,
politically engaged Spinoza” calls for further study. 1045

Seymour Feldman’s annotations of “Ethics’ philosophy” in the TTP (or the TTP’s philosophy
in the Ethics)

One of the great values of the second edition of the Theological-Political Treatise translated

by Samuel Shirley is the annotations throughout the book made by Seymour Feldman.

What I found particularly helpful in these annotations are the many references to the Ethics
that Feldman cites throughout the text of the TTP. Since our purpose in this section is to

only provide a few samples from the TTP that show it to be a largely philosophical text, we

cannot give an exhaustive or systematic treatment of this subject. The best that can be done

here is to refer these annotations to the reader who wishes for more proof of just how much
“Ethics’ philosophy” is contained in the TTP (or vice versa, e.g. how much TTP philosophy is

in the Ethics). I say “Ethics’ philosophy” contained in the TTP or TTP philosophy in the

Ethics because the contents of both works were pretty much known and formulated around
the same time. It is a mistake to think that the Ethics is a later and therefore more mature

philosophical presentation of Spinoza’s philosophy (though some of the latter parts of the
Ethics were probably added in later years). The bulk of Spinoza’s “Ethics’ philosophy”
1044
1045

Ibid. xxxii-xxxiii.
Ibid. xxxiii-xxxiv.
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according to many Spinoza scholars was understood by Spinoza as early as 1665, seven

years before the publication of the TTP. Thus his philosophy was in most respects complete
even before he wrote and finished both the TTP and the Ethics.

Edwin Curley’s argument that the TTP should be considered as philosophy and science and
no longer neglected
Before presenting Curley’s view of the TTP as “science” let us first see what led Spinoza to

apply the method of science to scripture and then what he means by the method of science.
Spinoza tells us in the TTP that he was led to come up with his scientific method of

interpretation because of the quarrels, dissensions, and wars over theology that continued
to tear at Europe. 1046 Spinoza begins his chapter “Of the Interpretation of Scripture”

lambasting both how so many believers say that the Bible is the Word of God and yet don’t
live according to it, and how many men, including theologians, have come up with all sorts
of beliefs which they claim to come from Scripture, but are in actuality far from it. He’s
talking about the history of Christianity and especially the 16th and 17th centuries.

The 17th century is still an age of Confessionalism. After the Protestant Reformation,

all sorts of new Christian churches sprouted, each with slightly different theologies (of
eschatology, ecclesiology, pneumatology, etc.), each supposedly based on better

hermeneutical principles than the others. Each denomination believed that they had the

best and most correct interpretation of Scripture. Think of all the differences of opinion in
the 17th century on theology! The Roman Catholics (Franciscans, Dominicans, Jansenists,

1046 If Spinoza’s explanation in the TTP of what led him to write the TTP to promote his new method
of biblical interpretation is true, other factors are also nevertheless true. We know through Spinoza’s
letter to Oldenburg and from Stephen Nadler’s historical-social researches that Spinoza stopped
working on his Ethics in order to write the TTP to help fight against the orthodox onslaught against
freedom in Amsterdam and in the Netherlands. He not only wanted to teach the truth about
scripture to Europe, but also to advance its political liberties.
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Minims, etcetera), and Protestants (Lutherans, Calvinists, Quakers, Anglicans, Anabaptists,
etcetera) fought over a variety of interpretations, and each tried to found these claims on

Scripture. Europe was wracked by controversy over masses, relics, stigmata, pilgrimages,
shrines, sainthood, transubstantiation, priestly vestments, church art, church power,
purgatory, the Virgin Mary, indulgences for sale to get out of purgatory, limbo, the
confessional, rosary beads, substantial forms, and other theological claims.

After alluding to their many different interpretations of Scripture (though he does

not explicitly refer to all the concrete exemplifications of these as I did above), he says:

When I pondered over these facts … I deliberately resolved to examine Scripture
afresh, conscientiously and freely, and to admit nothing as its teachings which I did
not most clearly derive from it. With this precaution I formulated a method of
interpreting the Bible. 1047

And again:

In order to escape this scene of confusion, to free our minds from the prejudices of
theologians and to avoid the hasty acceptance of human fabrications as divine
teachings, we must discuss the true method of Scriptural interpretation and
examine it in depth; for unless we understand this we cannot know with any
certainty what the Bible or the Holy Spirit intends to teach. 1048

And how is Spinoza going to give the “true method of Scriptural interpretation” that

“unless we understand this we cannot know with certainty what the Bible or the Holy Spirit

intends to teach”? 1049

Now to put it briefly, I hold that the method of interpreting Scripture is no different
from the method of interpreting Nature, and is in fact in complete accord with it ... In
this way … steady progress can be made without any danger of error … this is not
merely a sure way, but the only way open to us. 1050
So there it is: Spinoza’s method in its barest essentials. How should we interpret

Spinoza’s meaning on this subject?
Spinoza. TTP, Shirley, op. cited, 5.
Spinoza. TTP, Shirley, op. cited, 87.
1049 Ibid.
1050 Ibid. 87.
1047
1048
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Now that we have set out Spinoza’s general statement on the matter, let us now see

what Edwin Curley says about it after first giving some background on his essays. In his
“Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece (II): The Theological-Political Treatise as a

Prolegomenon to the Ethics,” Edwin Curley argues that the neglect of the TTP has been a

big mistake for many reasons. 1051 For one thing, the TTP illuminates our understanding of
the philosophy of the Ethics. Curley comes up with a very instructive thought experiment
or “intuition pump.” He asks us to imagine that all of Spinoza’s works, except the TTP,

were never published, but instead destroyed. He asks, “How much of the teaching of the

Ethics would we be able to reconstruct from the TTP?” 1052 The simple and general answer

to this question, it turns out, is: “A lot.” There is a lot of philosophy being done in the TTP,
which, Curley argues, has been neglected by many previous commentators (such as

Jonathan Bennett). Curley cites many of these philosophical issues within the course of his
essay.

In Curley’s earlier equally excellent essay on this theme, “Notes on a Neglected

Masterpiece (I): Spinoza and the Science of Hermeneutics”, he takes a different tack to argue
for the necessity of knowing the “scientific” or philosophical nature of the TTP for scholars

who wish to do justice to Spinoza. 1053 And his conclusion on this issue is never in doubt: “I

conclude, with Spinoza, that it is proper for interpreters of texts to think of themselves as
engaged in an enterprise not fundamentally different from the one natural scientists are
engaged in.” 1054

1051 Central themes in early modern philosophy: essays presented to Jonathan Bennett, edited by Jan A.
Cover and
Mark Kulstad (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999).
1052 Ibid. 114.
1053 Edwin Curley. “Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece (I): Spinoza and the Science of Hermeneutics”
in Spinoza: The Enduring Questions, ed. By Graeme Hunter (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1984).
1054 Ibid. 27.
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The subject of Spinoza and science is too big to be dealt with here, but perhaps a

couple short notes on this are in order here. First, Spinoza is much more of an empiricist

than he is often presented as being. Curley reviews David Savan’s essay “Spinoza: Scientist
and Theorist of Scientific Method” and agrees with Savan in that Spinoza is “much less the
paradigm of aprioristic rationalism he is generally taken to be, and much more an

empiricist.” 1055 For one thing, “As far as the natural sciences and mathematics are

concerned … Spinoza was thoroughly competent and acquainted with some of the best work
of his time.” 1056 For another, as Nadler tells us, “Spinoza shared absolutely Boyle’s

commitment to the mechanical philosophy.” 1057 We see this commitment in many places in

Spinoza’s works. In the TTP, Spinoza argues that the passages in the Bible that deal with

God’s active participation in nature are better explained by adverting to naturalistic causes.
In one place, Spinoza cites three different passages of Scripture in a row to exemplify his
scientific-mechanical view of nature:

In Genesis chapter 9 v. 13 God tells Noah that he will set a rainbow in the cloud. This
act of God, again, is assuredly nothing other than the refraction and reflection of the
sun’s rays which they undergo in droplets of water.
In Psalm 147 v. 18 the natural action and warmth of the wind whereby frost
and snow are melted is called the word of God; and in v. 15, wind and cold are called
the command and word of God.
In Psalm 104 v. 4 wind and fire are called messengers and ministers of God,
and there are many other such passages in Scripture which clearly indicate that
God’s decree, command, edict and word are nothing other than the action and order
of Nature.
Therefore there can be no doubt that all the events narrated in Scripture
occurred naturally; yet they are referred to God because, as we have already shown,
it is not the part of Scripture to explain events through natural causes; it only relates
to those events that strike the imagination, employing such method and style as best
serves to excite wonder, and consequently to instill piety in the minds of the
masses. 1058

Ibid. 1.
Curley quotes from Savan’s book here. Ibid. 1.
1057 Nadler’s Spinoza: A Life, op. cited, 192-193.
1058 Spinoza. TTP, trans. Shirley, op. cited, 79. I take this passage as extremely important because it
shows that the Bible’s (as opposed to many philosophers’) claims on the relation of God to nature is
direct, constant, and personal. The Bible clearly and distinctly demonstrates over and over again
from the first page of Genesis to the last page of the Book of Revelation that God is personally
1055
1056
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Curley disagrees with Savan’s claim that Spinoza “contributed little of importance to

research or theory”, but fully agrees with (and then develops) Savan’s acknowledgment that
in the Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza

showed that the methods of the natural sciences could be fruitfully extended to the
scientific study not only of the Bible, but of historical texts generally. Spinoza is the
founder of scientific hermeneutics ... It was the extension of the scientific outlook
and scientific methods to the study of historical texts that Spinoza was innovative
and influential. He emphasized the importance of the careful collection of empirical
data. Variations and changes in the data must be noted, compared, and crosschecked … In [this] his most successful and important scientific work, then, Spinoza
is an empiricist. 1059
How Savan and Curley define “science” of course is a central issue here. I don’t

think that Curley is arguing that Spinoza’s “science” of hermeneutics is a science in the

same way as, say, physics or geology. The question as to how to define “philosophy” and
“science” is a big, and deep, and important philosophical subject, but it lies outside the
boundaries of this study. My purpose in bringing up this issue of seeing the TTP as

“philosophy” and “science” is not so much to take sides, but to simply argue that the TTP

deserves far more attention in the contemporary philosophical community (especially with
respect to its obvious relevance to today’s culture wars).

involved in all the phenomena of nature. He’s not distantly or secondarily involved as the more
modernistic versions of Galileo, Descartes, and Newton would have it. Spinoza as a master of the
Bible (in the Hebrew to boot) understood this, while his more moderate enlightener forebears and
contemporaries did not. In fact, he seems to criticize the scholastics as well: “yet I do not see that
they have taught anything more than the speculations of Aristotelians or Platonists, and they have
made Scripture conform to these” (5). If I’m reading this rightly, it seems that Spinoza (like Luther,
Calvin, Hobbes, and many others) is criticizing the scholastics for importing too much of Aristotle or
Plato into their biblical interpretation and theology.
1059 Curley, op. cited, 1-2.
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Strauss on Spinoza’s “scientific” Theological-Political Treatise

Like Curley, Strauss also argues that Spinoza’s TTP should be considered a “science.” And

he seems to agree with Spinoza in thinking that the “criticism of religion is by intent
scientific criticism.” 1060 Strauss rightly points out that

Once [Spinoza] had gained insight into the … ‘vulgarity’ of Scripture – in other
words, into its total lack of scientific thinking – awareness of the superiority of the
scientific mind to Scripture followed. This superiority, in an age in which science
was felt to be not essentially completed but constantly progressing, could not but
appear to him as belonging to a more advanced stage of human thought. 1061
But Strauss’ take on “science” is a “science of culture” rather than a “hard” science

view. We see this, for instance, in passages such as follows:

The philosophic question to which the modern study of the Bible gives rise is
primarily the methodological question, the question of the methods of historical
studies or of ‘the sciences of culture,’ as distinguished from natural science … [for
Spinoza] the method of Biblical study is fundamentally the same as that of natural
science … Once it is assumed that the Bible is a literary document like any other, it
must be studied and interpreted like any other literary document; it becomes the
object of the sciences of culture like all their objects; the foundation of Biblical
science is no longer a problem. Hence the justification of that assumption, i.e. the
critique of the opposed presupposition, that of revealed religion, is the true
foundation of Biblical science in the modern sense. 1062
Conclusion

I hope that this section has shown that the TTP should not be thought of as only a work of

biblical criticism and therefore outside the purview of philosophy proper. Yet, I am keenly
aware that my brief summary of arguments and citations from the TTP and of scholars

arguing that the TTP should be considered more seriously as a work of philosophy may
have fallen short with some skeptical readers. Besides seeing more of the details in the
Strauss. Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, op. cited, 37.
Strauss. Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, op. cited, 251.
1062 Ibid. 35.
1060
1061
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arguments of the scholars noted above (who contend for the philosophical nature of the

TTP) the best that I can say to skeptical readers is to urge them to see the more fully worked
out proofs of my claims from the works that I have cited in this section. See all of Feldman’s

Ethics’ references in Shirley’s second edition of the TTP. And see all of Curley’s references to
“Ethics’ philosophy” in the TTP (or TTP philosophy in the Ethics).

Because of the TTP’s major place in 17th century philosophy and as one of the major

precursors to the Radical Enlightenment, I wish to join the growing call of some

contemporary Spinoza and Enlightenment scholars to add at least some study of the TTP
with the Ethics in courses on early modernity and Spinoza.
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Chapter Seventeen
Conclusion: Summing it all up

The Sea of Faith
Was once, too, at the full, and round earth's shore
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furled.
But now I only hear
Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar,
Retreating, to the breath
Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear
And naked shingles of the world.
Ah, love, let us be true
To one another! for the world, which seems
To lie before us like a land of dreams,
So various, so beautiful, so new,
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain;
And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night. 1063

1063 Taken from the last two stanzas of Mathew Arnauld’s “Dover Beach.” While perhaps overly
pessimistic, it nevertheless also epitomizes the deep worry that many had regarding the
disintegration of religion (in this case, toward the end of the 19th century). Many scholars say that
the Christian faith was at its lowest ebb in the 19th century. Times have changed since then. In fact,
in the last few decades there has been a world-wide religious revival threatening many of the hardwon victories of the Radical Enlightenment. We see this struggle mostly in the Islamic world today;
but it is alive and well in the United States as well, as may be witnessed in its opposition to the
teaching of evolution, and in its continued conservative attitude toward homosexuality. Many
interpret this revival of religion as they have the revival of religion in the Hellenstic-Christian early
centuries. This “failure of nerve,” as it has been called, was diagnosed by philosophers such as Sidney
Hook as early as early as 1943 in his essay “The New Failure of Nerve.” In this essay, he quotes from
Gilbert Murray’s Four Stages of Greek Religion. He says that Murray “characterizes the period from
300 B.C. through the first century of the Christian era as marked by ‘a failure of nerve.’ This failure of
nerve exhibited itself in a ‘rise of asceticism, of mysticism, in a sense, of pessimism; a loss of selfconfidence, of hope in this life and of faith in normal human efforts; a despair of patient inquiry, a cry
for infallible revelation … a conversion of the soul to God. A survey of the cultural tendencies of our
own times shows many signs pointing to a new failure of nerve in Western civilization” (Evolution
and Religion: The Conflict Between Science and Theology in Modern America, edited by Gail Kennedy
(Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1957), 97. See also E. R. Dodds’ Pagan & Christian in an Age of
Anxiety (op. cited).
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It is now time to sum up, to tie up some of the chief strands of many chapters to

wrap up this study. We have covered a lot of ground in these 500 pages. We have gone

from the Greeks to Leibniz and Spinoza picking out some of the arguments of some of the
West’s greatest philosophers in relation to the question of revelation and theology. We

have done a lot of philosophy of religion, history of philosophy, historiography, analysis of

theology, and even biblical criticism. Our study has not been limited therefore to the

enunciation of philosophical arguments against revelation and orthodox theology. Along
the way, we have had to deal with some of the intricate scholarly issues involved in

interpreting these philosophers, theologians, and historical periods. Readers will know

now that many of these issues are really quite complicated and not as simple or cut-anddried as some may think. On the other hand, lest we fall prey to excessive relativism or

skepticism in which “The best lack all conviction, while the worst are full of passionate

intensity“ 1064, some of these central issues are cut-and-dried. Spinoza’s TTP for instance

roundly and clearly refutes the traditional belief in divine inspiration, inerrancy, and unity

of the Scriptures. This alone is the death knell of traditional Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam.

Our focus has been on the struggle and the work of rationalist-leaning philosophers

against the religion of their culture – hence the title “Philosophical Precursors to the Radical
Enlightenment.” As such, this study has not given as much coverage – or sympathetic

coverage – of philosophers and their arguments in defense of their religion and against the

arguments of the enemies of the faith - though we have presented and quoted their

positions more than is done in all the studies I’ve seen. Readers with only a cursory

knowledge of this subject and who have read this dissertation may end up with a one-sided
view of religion and Christianity – that is, against them. But a religion is greater than only

Taken from William Butler Yeats’ powerful poem “The Second Coming,” which, by the way,
bespeaks the same concern of our study.
1064
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some of its parts. There are values to religion that this study has not spoken of. 1065 We have

only focused on its theological claims that touch on ontological, epistemological, and ethical
issues. And with these, we do not support.

In his essay “Pascal’s Anti-Augustinianism”, Vincent Carraud criticizes a book by

Philippe Sellier which argues that Pascal was an Augustinian; but he does so knowing full
well how much he owes to Sellier’s previous work. Consequently, Carraud makes a

confession: “I want to take a moment here to express my debt to this book which has given
me the means, albeit a contrario, to better measure the elements of anti-Augustinianism in

Pascal’s thought.” 1066 I feel the same way regarding all those in this study whom I have

critiqued – from the Jewish scriptures to the New Testament, to St. Paul, Augustine, Aquinas,
Luther, Calvin, Descartes and Leibniz. I owe a great deal to their thinking and works.

With this said then, let us summarize the principal philosophical forces against

revelation and theology and for a Radical Enlightenment that were made in some detail in
the foregoing chapters. In sum, the major philosophical precursors, influences, causes or

arguments against orthodox faith in revelation and orthodox theology (in various shapes
and forms both as anticipatory and causal) that led to the Radical Enlightenment were

derived from the following:

1) Some of the radical arguments of the pre-Socratics.

2) Some of the enlightened arguments of Socrates and Plato.

3) The influence of various rationalist elements in Greek and Roman philosophy
and culture (as precursors in various shapes and forms both as only anticipatory
and as causal) in the Church Fathers, medieval philosophy, scholasticism, and
then in Renaissance humanism and textual criticism, the Scientific Revolution,
New Philosophy, the Enlightenment, and the Radical Enlightenment.

For some of these values, see works by Mircea Eliade, Carl Jung, and, recently, by Charles Taylor
(see for instance his A Secular Age).
1066 Vincent Carraud. “Pascal’s Anti-Augustinianism,” Perspectives on Science, 2007, vol. 15, no. 4
(Mass: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007), 452.
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4) Renaissance textual criticism of ancient texts including the beginnings of some
biblical criticism.
5) The explosion of naturalist-leaning explanations of nature via Copernicus,
Galileo, Descartes and many others in the Scientific Revolution.
6) The rejection of Aristotelian and Scholastic metaphysics by the New
Philosophers, most notably, Descartes.

7) The added and revolutionary historical and textual criticism of the Bible (by
many philosophers, but especially Spinoza’s TTP).
These then are the major general philosophical precursors to the Radical

Enlightenment, which the foregoing pages have laid out in more specific detail.

We started this study asking Will Durant’s question: “How did it come about that a

major part of the educated classes in Europe and America has lost faith in the theology that
for fifteen centuries gave supernatural sanctions and supports to the precarious and

uncongenial moral code upon which Western civilization has been based?” We now have
our answer.
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“That which was holiest and mightiest that the world has yet possessed has bled to death under
our knives”

As was mentioned in our study, Nietzsche considered Spinoza his precursor.

Jonathan Israel’s terminology refers to the “Radical Enlightenment”; Nietzsche uses the

language of “God is dead.” The complete passage is an exquisitely written aphorism that

wonderfully epitomizes some of the seriousness of what is at stake in the death of God or

the Radical Enlightenment. We provide the full text from which the quote above derives to
show its context and because we refer to some of the passages in this aphorism several

times in this study.

The madman. Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright
morning hours, ran to the market place and cried incessantly: ‘I am looking for God!
I am looking for God!’ – As many of those who did not believe in God were standing
together there he excited considerable laughter. Have you lost him then? said one.
Did he lose his way like a child? said another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us?
Has he gone on a voyage? or emigrated? – thus they shouted and laughed.
The madman sprang into their midst and pierced them with his glances.
‘Where has God gone?’ he cried. ‘I shall tell you. We have killed him – you and I. We
are all his murderers. But how have we done this? How were we able to drink up
the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do
when we unchained this earth form its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whiter are
we moving now? Away from all suns? Are we not perpetually falling? Backward,
sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Are we not
straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space?
Has it not become colder? Is more and more night not coming on all the time? Must
not lanterns be lit in the morning? Do we not hear anything yet of the noise of the
gravediggers who are burying God? Do we not smell anything yet of God’s
decomposition? – gods too decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we
have killed him.
“How shall we, the murderers of all murderers, console ourselves? That
which was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet possessed has bled
510

to death under our knives – who will wipe this blood off us? With what water
could we purify ourselves? what festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we
need to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must not we
ourselves become gods simply to seem worthy of it? There has never been a greater
deed – and whoever shall be born after us, for the sake of this deed he shall be part
of a higher history than all history hitherto.’ 1067
Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners; and they, too,
were silent and stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern on the
ground, and it broke into pieces and went out. “I have come too early,” he said then;
“my time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering; it has
not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder require time; the light of the
stars requires time; deeds, though done, still require time to be seen and heard.
This deed is still more distant from them than the most distant stars – and yet they
have done it themselves”
It has been related further that on the same day the madman forced his way
into several churches and there struck up his requiem aeternam deo. Led out and
called to account, he is said always to have replied nothing but: “What after all are
these churches now if they are not the tombs and sepulchers of God?”

1067 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, ed. Kaufmann, op. cited, Book Three, Aphorism 125, page
181, my emphases.
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Introduction

The primary purpose of this appendix is to give some elucidation to the meaning of the term

“post-enlightenment” or “postmodernity” for readers of this study who may not be

knowledgeable of the differences between the two. The reason why we have added “in

Philosophy and Literature” is because the terms “modernism”, “Enlightenment”, “post-

enlightenment”, and “postmodernism” have somewhat different meanings in philosophy as
opposed to art and literature. Any general account of the terms therefore seems to require
that this distinction is drawn out and explained.

As we will see, philosophers use these terms differently than literary critics. Not

only is this so, but the dating for modernism and postmodernism in philosophy is also very
different from that given by students of literature and the arts. 1068 Despite their many

differences, however, there is also a great deal of similarity and overlapping in meanings.

For many writers on this subject, modernism in both philosophy and literature, for instance,
either doubt or displace the role and meaning of God. This “death of God,” as the

philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche phrased it, is one of the most dramatic and revolutionary
characteristics of modernism in philosophy and literature.

As is the case with most important terms, there is a great deal of academic

controversy and debate on the meaning and dating of modernism and postmodernism, both
in philosophy and literature. 1069 It would be impossible within the short space of this broad

introduction to do justice to the many different perspectives and arguments made by

eminent philosophers, historians, and literary critics on these questions. This appendix can
1068 On these two issues, see the following two works. For philosophy see Lawrence Cahoone, ed.
From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology. Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
1996. For literature see Malcolm Bradbury and James MacFalane, ed. Modernism: A Guide to
European Literature 1890-1930. Penguin Books, New York, 1991.
1069 The two works cited above for instance not only delineate the different dates and uses of the
terms “modernism” and “postmodernism,” they also show how these varied from country to country
and even city to city.
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provide only a generalized and therefore simplified look at some of the major features of
our subject. We will begin with philosophy because of its pivotal role and influence in
literature and the arts. Then we will explore how modernism and postmodernism in

literature is to be distinguished from that in philosophy. Hopefully, this will suffice for the
general reader who may not be knowledgeable about this subject.
In philosophy

To begin then. Though there is a great deal of controversy as to when modernism

commences in the western world, most historians and philosophers are agreed that it began
with or soon after the Renaissance with its revolutionary change of focus from God to
man. 1070 This humanistic movement quickly led to a revolution in scientific and

philosophical thinking. For instance, the Copernican-Galilean theory that the earth revolves

around the sun and not the sun around the earth, as tradition and the scriptures taught
encouraged in some a radical rethinking of the role and authority that religion and the
Church should have over the mind.

Great successes in the sciences and new epistemological methodologies that

stemmed from these successes led some thinkers to replace faith in God, revelation, and the
supposed authority of the Bible, with faith in human reason, human experience, and
empirical science. The foundations of knowledge should no longer be derived from

theology, but from rationality. Though it is true that the great philosophical rationalists

Descartes and Leibniz maintained the theological view that there are absolute and universal
epistemological truths, they nevertheless sought to found these beliefs in reason and not in
theology.

See Edgar E. Knoebel, ed. The Modern World, 4th ed., Classics of Western Thought, Vol. III. New
York: Harcourt Brace &Company, 1988. See also Roy Porter. The Enlightenment. New York:
Palgrave, 2001.
1070
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They also generally speaking defended the belief that our mind can know the outer

world and that our language accurately reflects this. Though humans might sometimes err
or be fooled by illusion, still, all in all, man is able to apprehend the world directly. 1071 We

can ultimately trust our reason and senses. Empiricists maintained the same view. As John
Locke put it: our minds are like blank slates (tabula rosa) which, generally speaking,
accurately receiving the impressions of the outer world. 1072

This optimistic enlightenment epistemology was soon to be challenged by several

important philosophers whose works were precursors to postmodernist thought. The
philosopher David Hume discovered a serious problem at the very foundation of

empiricism. He discovered that there are no certain grounds for scientific or causal

induction. It is true that we can only learn from experience that billiard ball A will move
billiard ball B upon contact; but after we learn this by experience, how can we know and

universalize this particular inference to all future occurrences? For Hume, we cannot know

this. We only “know” this, he taught, by habit of association. But habit of association cannot
serve as foundational or certain knowledge. 1073

This epistemological theory led the great German philosopher Emmanuel Kant to

postulate that the human mind is more like a filter than a blank slate when it receives sense
impressions from the outer world. According to Kant, this radically different perspective

should lead to a “Copernican revolution” in epistemology. 1074 No longer must we think that

we can directly apprehend the world via our senses. Things are a lot more complicated

T. V. Smith and Marjorie Green. From Descartes to Locke. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1967.
1072 See the anthology: The Empiricists. New York: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1974.
1073 Ibid. 322-40.
1074 And so it did. Kant’s work led many philosophers after him to adopt a position in philosophy
called idealism. Very roughly put, idealism is the view that knowledge of the world is purely, or
almost purely, mental or ideational - “Esse est percipi,” being consists in being perceived. Fichte,
Schlegel, Schopenhauer, Hegel, Bradley, and many more philosophers in differing degrees followed
this thinking. See Emmanuel Kant (trans. Norman K. Smith). Critique of Pure Reason. New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1965, 22.
1071
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than that. Now we must realize that our minds are so constituted that to some degree we

mentally project onto the world certain categories such as causality, time, and space. This

thinking led to the doctrine of philosophical idealism, that is, the belief that we can never

really know the world directly through the senses, but only through the mind or the ideas

that enter the mind. Idealism was especially prominent in Germany, but it was also
influential in France and England.

By the 19th century, the major epistemological debates were between realists and

idealists. However, toward the end of the 19th century, the American philosopher William
James came up with a new theory of truth, a theory and philosophy he called pragmatism.

Like idealism, pragmatism also argued against the simple and easy realistic correspondence
theory of truth. The pragmatic theory of truth (in over-simplistic terms) states that a belief
is true not in the sense that it perfectly corresponds to the world, but in the sense that if it

works in the world, then it is to some extent true. As the slogan of pragmatism puts it: If it

works, it’s true. 1075

Then came the new fields of psychology, sociology, cultural anthropology, along

with revolutionary new theories in physics and astronomy. Psychologists such as Sigmund
Freud showed that man is not the rational animal that Aristotle and modernist philosophy
presumed. On the contrary, Freud demonstrated that human beings are actuated by all

sorts of subconscious and unconscious ulterior motives – for sex, for prestige, for power,
and so on. 1076

Sociologists and cultural anthropologists came to see that human beliefs are more a

function of what time and place one lived in than the naïve belief that our reason and

experience perfectly mirrors things. History and culture determines one’s beliefs about the

William James. Pragmatism. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975. See especially 95113.
1076 Several of Freud’s works demonstrate these theses. See for instance his Introductory Lectures on
Psychoanalysis (trans. James Strachey). New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1966.
1075
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world, not some theorized abstract and universal human reason. 1077 And then, in the early

twentieth century, Newton was refuted. Einstein’s un-commonsensical relativity theory of

curved space and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle threw the philosophy of science in

disarray. Thinkers such as Nietzsche and Thomas Kuhn questioned the notion of the history
of science as a glorious accumulation and progression to greater and greater truth. Kuhn’s
influential Structure of Scientific Revolutions seemed to prove that science proceeds by
changing paradigms and not through ever-increasing absolute truth. 1078

The philosophical end result of all these theories resoundingly put modernism or

some of the Enlightenment ideals in question. Philosophers and thinkers such as Michel

Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Karl Mannheim, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Max
Horkheimer, Theodore Adorno, Richard Rorty and Stephen Toulmin, all rejected

enlightenment optimism and its modernistic faith in reason and science. In a word, by the
1960s this anti-modernist philosophy comes to be called postmodernism. 1079

Generally speaking, postmodernism places no faith in any proposed absolute or

universal authority or ultimate foundation for knowledge or morality. It asserts that the
only truths are particular truths relative to one’s specific and local culture. All truths,

moreover, are contingent upon history and therefore are not really discovered, but instead
constructed. There are no ultimate foundations for our knowledge; nor are there any true,
solid, or irrefutable bases to prove human beliefs. 1080

See for instance Karl Mannheim (trans. Edward Shils). Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to
Sociology of Knowledge, 160ff.
1078 Thomas S. Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (second ed.). Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1962.
1079 See Joseph Natoli and Linda Htcheon (ed). A Postmodern Reader. New York: State University of
New York Press, 1993, vii-xiii.
1080 Joseph Natoli. A Primer to Postmodernity. New York: Blackwell Publishers, 1997, 13-25.
1077

517

In literature (or art)

Many of the philosophical issues we have dealt with above manifest themselves and become
paramount also in literature and the arts, though there are differences as well. As we

observed above, in order for the reader to be more knowledgeable about the meanings and
uses of “Enlightenment” or “modernism” and “post-enlightenment” or “postmodernism” as
it appears in various literatures it is important to make sure that they understand at least
some of these differences.

Modernism in philosophy was to some degree a reaction against scholasticism, but

modernism in literature and the arts was a reaction against aesthetic realism. 1081 And not

against aesthetic realism alone. 1082 Modernist poets and novelists reacted against 19th

century bourgeois morality, Victorian cultural arrogance, and in the naïve optimism of the
enlightenment’s faith and values in absolute and universal Truth and Reason. 1083 Because
of this breaking up of so many of the core values and beliefs of Western Civilization, a

pessimistic strain pervades many modernist literary works. The Irish poet W. B. Yeats

summed up this feeling well: “Turning and turning in the widening gyre/The falcon cannot
hear the falconer/Things fall apart; the center cannot hold.” 1084

Eagleton, Illusions of Postmodernity: “For the realist, the world and a literary text can be known.
There is a one to one correspondence between word and world or reality. Language is not so
contextualized that one can never transcend purely cultural and historical meaning” (135).
1082 Malcolm Bradbury and James MacFalane, ed. Modernism: A Guide to European Literature 18901930-. New York: Penguin Books, 1991.
1083 In his 1935 essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Walter Benjamin
argues that even our sense perception changes and is not constant or absolute. “During long periods
of history, the mode of human sense perception changes with humanity’s entire mode of existence.
The manner in which human sense perception is organized, the medium in which it is accomplished,
is determined not only by nature but by historical circumstances as well.”
1084 Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernity: “The dawning of modernity was the moment when we
began to realize that there were many conflicting versions of the good life; that none of these
versions could be unimpeachably grounded; and that, strangely enough, we were no longer able to
agree on the most fundamental issues in the field…. With the onset of modernity, humanity enters for
the first time upon that extraordinary condition, now thoroughly naturalized in our heads, in which
we fail to see eye to eye on all the most vital matters – a condition which would have been mindbendingly unimaginable for some of the ancients…. The political upshot of this condition is liberalism.
1081
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No longer is the old order with its moral values considered sacrosanct. Now writers

question everything. We can see some of this loss of epistemological and moral center in

works such as Flaubert’s Madame Bovary and Ibsen’s Hedda Gabler. Both explore the role of
women in modern society, their unhappiness owing to patriarchal cultural dominance, and
their need for greater freedom, power, and pleasure despite the mores of church and age-

old tradition. The questioning of the nature of sexuality and the nature of mind becomes

even more pronounced after the psychologist Sigmund Freud unleashed his psychoanalytic
findings upon a world soon to be further reeled by World War I and then World War II.

Questions about traditional human sexuality continue to arise in other modernist works

such as Thomas Mann’s Death in Venice. For the first time blatant ‘obscenities’ are used in
literature and become protected by law. In Joyce’s Ulysses, adultery, premarital sex,
masturbation, female sexual orgasms, and cursing are rampant.

Modernist writers break other traditional conventions, as well. Instead of using

only standard novelistic or poetic discourse, many authors add a variety of genres in their
works. We see this for instance in Joyce’s Ulysses. Joyce sometimes writes in the exact

language of science, sometimes in the language of poetry, and sometimes in the language of
advertising. Ulysses is also an excellent example of modernist writing in its use of

psychoanalytic techniques such as stream of consciousness and free-associating, even to the

elimination of conventional grammatical markers as the period, comma, and apostrophe.
Because the world is no longer held to be a seamless, understandable unity,

modernist writers argued that works of literature should reflect this new state of affairs.

Hence, instead of unity of discourse and point of view, modernist writers sometimes utilize

If there are many different conceptions of the good, then the state must be so constructed to
accommodate them all” (76).
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fragments of varying discourses, and this from different personas or selves. 1085 T. S. Eliot

intimated this change of perspective in his essay “Tradition and the Individual Talent:” ‘The
point of view which I am struggling to attack is perhaps related to the metaphysical theory
of the substantial unity of the soul: for my meaning is, that the poet has, not a ‘personality’

to express, but a particular medium, which is only a medium and not a personality, in which
impressions and experiences combine in peculiar and unexpected ways.’

There are several other new things under the modernist sun, but because of the

limits of this appendix only one further new thing will be mentioned here, and that is the
prominent use of myths and symbols. Writers such as Conrad, Joyce, Eliot, Faulkner, and
Wolf use myths and symbols with powerful effect in works such as Heart of Darkness,

Ulysses, The Waste Land, Go Down Moses, and Cassandra. The most jarring use of symbols is
perhaps best demonstrated in Kafka’s Metamorphosis. In this work, the protagonist Gregor
Samsa, a traveling salesman who is inwardly conflicted about his job and his father, is

metamorphosed into an insect. What makes this metamorphosis so jarring though is how

everything in the work is represented in a naturalistic, realist fashion. The juxtaposition of
the transformation of a man into an insect (which, of course, is not literally possible in the
real world) within a realist context produces a deeply unsettling effect.

Finally, we come to postmodernism in literature and particularly postmodernist or

deconstructionist literary criticism. Postmodernism in literature is primarily a post-World
War II phenomenon. Writers such as Jorge Luis Borges, Italo Calvino, Beckett, Barth, and
Pynchon, are some of postmodernism’s well-known proponents. 1086

Websites: http://www.users.voicenet.com/~grassie/Fldr.Articles/Postmodernism.html and
http://www.iath.virginia.edu/elab/hfl0256.html.
1086 Terry Eagleton. Literary Theory: An Introduction. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press,
1983.
1085
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As was mentioned in the introduction, defining modernism and postmodernism is a

tricky business, for both terms are used in varying ways, many of which are not consistent.
This is no truer than in postmodernist literary thought. Postmodernists are so antiessentialist in their philosophy of language that by ‘definition’ they cannot define

anything. 1087 This of course seems entirely self-defeating - that is, if one relies on any static

logic. The postmodernist deconstructionists, however, do not rely on any static logic. They
reject the inherent binary oppositions in structuralist thought (high/low, good/bad, etc.).

They completely reject foundationalism in epistemology, morals, and aesthetics. In essence,
then, postmodernist thought is groundless and formless. 1088

As may have been discerned, some of the themes of modernism in literature are

continued in postmodern thought. Many of these issues are postmodernist in the

philosophical sense. This development was taken even further in postmodernist literature

and literary criticism. 1089 Certain modernist elements are taken to their most extreme form

in postmodernism, some of which are barely understandable. Some postmodernist writers
go so far as to reject the notions of plot, character, and meaning itself! They not only break

down the division between popular and high art, they also reject all the “meta-narratives” of

western culture – including Democracy, Capitalism, Science, and Progress. All narratives
and truths, they claim, are constructed and relative to one’s history and culture.

Many postmodernists not only embrace the modernist death of God, they even

declare “the death of philosophy” and “the death of literature”! Postmodernists argue that

1087 Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernism: “There is no ultimate word, essence or reality to be the
foundation of all our thought. There is also no sign or transcendent signifier – ‘God’ – that can
anchor all other signs to reality, nor provide a hierarchy of meaning and values” (135).
1088 Though much of this language seems obviously self-defeating and ridiculous, there seems to be
some method in this postmodernist madness. Or, at least, that is what many prominent literary
critics tell us.
1089 See for instance John Barth’s 1967 essay “The Literature of Exhaustion” in The Atlantic.
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literature does not exist. They say that, “It is an illusion.” 1090 Because for them there is no

stable or eternal object called ‘literature,’ they judge literary theory to be an illusion, as well.
Thus, a party can be critiqued with just as much meaning and richness as Shakespeare. At
bottom, postmodernist deconstructionists view one’s commitment to a particular literary
text or theory as an issue of power, and, too often, as power to oppress. 1091

From this brief introduction, one should not make the mistake of thinking that

postmodernist ideas are purely abstract and therefore of no moment in the real world. On

the contrary, postmodernist thinking has become very political and social. It has fomented
campus wars with liberals calling for a revolution in education and society to accept the

tenets of multiculturalism. It argues against any notion of a fixed literary canon. It has even
denounced academic literature departments as oppressive “language police.” 1092 So, again,

theory, or, in this case, anti-theory, matters. What’s at stake here “is much more than a mere
conflict over methods or the lack of them… what is at issue in the contention between

different literary theories or ‘non-theories’ are competing ideological strategies related to
the very destiny of English studies in modern societies.” 1093 It is therefore well worth our

time and labor to understand the two contending ideologies of modernism and
postmodernism because the issues are ultimately of great importance.

I hope that this general and admittedly simplified account gives readers of this study

who may not be knowledgeable on this subject at least a better idea of the meanings and

uses of these terms. If so, then this appendix will have succeeded in its purpose.

1090 Op. cited. Eagleton, 194-203. Eagleton calls his book more an obituary of literature than an
introduction, for he does not unearth ‘literature’ as much as he buries it.
1091 Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernism: “According to deconstructionalists, realism is an
ideology which seeks to convert of naturalize its views and literary interpretations to seem as
innocent and unchangeable as Nature” (135).
1092 Ibid.
1093 Eagleton, Literary Theory, 199.
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